Between Grammar and Rhetoric

DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS ON LANGUAGE, LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE

CASPER C. DE JONGE

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Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Language, Linguistics and Literature

By
Casper C. de Jonge

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Casper de Jonge
Leiden, May 2008

CONVENTIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

1. References to the rhetorical works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (DH) are to the chapter, page, and line number of the edition by H. Usener & L. Radermacher, *Dionysii Halicarnasei quae exstant* 5 and 6, Stuttgart / Leipzig 1899 and 1904–1929. The English translations of passages from Dionysius' rhetorical works are based on S. Usher, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Critical Essays* 1 and 2, Cambridge, MA / London 1974 and 1985. In many cases, however, I have adapted Usher's translations.

2. References to the *Antiquitates Romanae* are to E. Cary, *The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, with an English translation, London / Cambridge, MA, 1937–1950. The English translations of passages from Dionysius' *Roman Antiquities* are adapted from Cary.

3. Unless indicated otherwise, English translations are borrowed and adapted from the Loeb Series.

4. Abbreviations for Greek and Latin authors generally follow LSJ and *OLD*, but Thuc. is Thucydides. 'Demetrius' (between inverted commas) is the unknown author of the treatise *On Style* (*De elocutione*). 'Longinus' (between inverted commas) is the unknown author of the treatise *On the Sublime* (*De sublimitate*).

5. Abbreviations for the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus are as follows:

	Latin	English
Amm. I	*Epistula ad Ammaeum* I	*First Letter to Ammaeus*
Amm. II	*Epistula ad Ammaeum* II	*Second Letter to Ammaeus*
Ant. Rom.	*Antiquitates Romanae*	*Roman Antiquities*
Comp.	*De compositione verborum*	*On Composition*
Dem.	*De Demosthene*	*On Demosthenes*
Din.	*De Dinarcho*	*On Dinarchus*

	Latin	English
Imit.	*De Imitatione*	*On Imitation*
Is.	*De Isaeo*	*On Isaeus*
Isoc.	*De Isocrate*	*On Isocrates*
Lys.	*De Lysia*	*On Lysias*
Orat. Vett.	*De oratoribus veteribus*	*On the Ancient Orators*
Pomp.	*Epistula ad Pompeium*	*Letter to Pompeius*
Thuc.	*De Thucydide*	*On Thucydides*

6. Abbreviations for collections of texts and works of reference are as follows:

DAB I	Friedrich Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit. Erste Abteilung: Von Gorgias bis zu Lysias*, Hildesheim / New York 1979[3] (first edition Leipzig 1868).
DAB II	Friedrich Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit. Zweite Abteilung: Isokrates und Isaios*, Hildesheim / New York 1979[3] (first edition Leipzig 1874).
DAB III	Friedrich Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit. Dritte Abteilung, Erster Abschnitt: Demosthenes*, Hildesheim / New York 1979[3] (first edition Leipzig 1877).
DAB IV	Friedrich Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit. Dritte Abteilung, Zweiter Abschnitt: Demosthenes' Genossen und Gegner*, Hildesheim / New York 1979[3] (first edition Leipzig 1880).
DGB	Friedrich Blass, *Die griechische Beredsamkeit in dem Zeitraum von Alexander bis auf Augustus*, Berlin 1865 (reprint Hildesheim / New York 1977).
DNP	*Der Neue Pauly. Enzyklopädie der Antike*, Stuttgart 1996–2003.
[D. Thrax]	*Dionysii Thracis Ars grammatica*, ed. G. Uhlig in *G.G.* I 1, Leipzig 1883.
FDS	Karlheinz Hülser, *Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker, Neue Sammlung der Texte mit deutscher Übersetzung und Kommentaren*, Stuttgart 1987–1988.
G.G.	*Grammatici Graeci*, ed. R. Schneider & G. Uhlig, Leipzig 1878–1910.
G.G. I	*Grammatici Graeci*, Pars prima: *Dionysii Thracis Ars grammatica et Scholia in Dionysii Thracis artem grammaticam*, ed. G. Uhlig & A. Hilgard, Leipzig 1883–1901.
G.G. I 1	Volumen primum: *Dionysii Thracis Ars grammatica*, ed. G. Uhlig, Leipzig 1883.
G.G. I 3	Volumen tertium: *Scholia in Dionysii Thracis artem grammaticam*, ed. A. Hilgard, Leipzig 1901.
G.G. II	*Grammatici Graeci*, Pars secunda: *Apollonii Dyscoli quae supersunt*, ed. R. Schneider & G. Uhlig, Leipzig 1878–1910.
G.G. II 1	Volumen primum: *Scripta minora*, ed. R. Schneider, Leipzig 1878.

G.G. II 2	Volumen alterum: *De constructione libri quattuor*, ed. G. Uhlig, Leipzig 1910.
G.G. II 3	Volumen tertium: *Librorum Apollonii deperditorum fragmenta*, ed. R. Schneider, Leipzig 1910.
G.L.	*Grammatici Latini* Vol. I–VIII, ed. Heinrich Keil, Leipzig 1857–1880.
GRF	*Grammaticae Romanae fragmenta*, Volumen prius, ed. H. Funaioli, Leipzig 1907.
GRFAC	*Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta Aetatis Caesareae*, Volumen primum, ed. A. Mazzarino, Torino 1955.
Lausberg	Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft*, München 1960². [References are to Lausberg's paragraphs.]
L&S	A.A. Long & D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Vol. I–II, Cambridge 1987.
LSJ	H.G. Liddell & R. Scott, rev. H.S. Jones (with revised supplement 1996), *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford 1996.
MSS	Manuscripts
OCD	Simon Hornblower & Antony Spawforth (eds.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Third Edition, Oxford / New York 1996.
OLD	P.G.W. Glare (ed.), *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, Oxford 1982.
Sch.	Scholia
Sch. D. Thrax	*Scholia in Dionysii Thracis artem grammaticam*, ed. A. Hilgard, Leipzig 1901 (= *G.G.* I 3).
Sch. Homer	*Scholia graeca in Homeri Iliadem* (*Scholia vetera*), ed. H. Erbse, Vol. I–VII, Berlin 1969–1988.
Spengel	*Rhetores Graeci*, ed. L. Spengel, Vol. I–III, Leipzig 1853–1856.
Suda	*Suidae Lexicon*, ed. A. Adler, Vol. I–V, Leipzig 1928–1938.
SVF	*Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, ed. H. von Arnim, Vol. I–IV, Leipzig 1905–1924.
Walz	*Rhetores Graeci*, ed. C. Walz, Vol. I–IX, Stuttgart / Tübingen / London / Paris 1832–1836.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. *Dionysius on language, linguistics, and literature: aims and methods*

Dionysius of Halicarnassus arrived in Italy 'at the very time that Augustus Caesar put an end to the civil war' (30/29 BC).[1] Dionysius settled in Rome, the political and cultural centre of the Augustan Principate, where he came into contact with a number of Greek and Roman scholars. For at least twenty-two years he lived in the flourishing capital of the Graeco-Roman world, and he devoted himself to a double career. In 8/7 BC, he published the first part of his *Roman Antiquities*, a history of early Rome in twenty books.[2] Furthermore, he wrote a large number of rhetorical and literary essays, letters and treatises, which seem to be closely related to his profession as a teacher of rhetoric.[3] He learnt Latin and studied innumerable works by both Greek and Roman authors.[4] Dionysius was a man of wide reading and interests, who thought that his own time saw the revival of the culture of classical Athens.[5] He believed that careful study, evaluation and imitation of classical Greek literature should be the basis of eloquence and rhetorical writing.

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[1] *Ant. Rom.* 1.7.2: ἐγὼ καταπλεύσας εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἅμα τῷ καταλυθῆναι τὸν ἐμφύλιον πόλεμον ὑπὸ τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ Καίσαρος ἑβδόμης καὶ ὀγδοηκοστῆς καὶ ἑκατοστῆς ὀλυμπιάδος μεσούσης … 'I arrived in Italy at the very time that Augustus Caesar put an end to the civil war, in the middle of the one hundred and eighty-seventh Olympiad (…).' The year in which Dionysius arrived was then 30 or 29 BC: see Hidber (1996) 1–4. Most scholars assume that Dionysius was born ca. 60 BC or a few years later: see e.g. Egger (1902) 1–4, Aujac (1978) 9 and Hidber (1996) 2.

[2] See *Ant. Rom.* 1.7.2. In *Ant. Rom.* 7.70.2, Dionysius tells us that the first book has already been published. See Cary (1968) vii and Hidber (1996) 1.

[3] In *Comp.* 20.94,5, Dionysius refers his addressee Metilius Rufus to their 'daily exercises' (ταῖς καθ' ἡμέραν γυμνασίαις). These exercises seem to have been part of the private education of a Roman boy by his Greek tutor. Dionysius may have taught other pupils as well, but it is not certain that he had a school: see also Grube (1965) 208.

[4] See *Ant. Rom.* 1.7.2–3.

[5] See *Orat. Vett.* 1.3,5–4,19.

In his rhetorical works and to a lesser extent in his history of Rome, Dionysius makes use of a great variety of theories that had been developed in different language disciplines. He borrows numerous ideas from earlier and contemporary scholars, including philosophers, philologists, grammarians, metricians, musical theorists, critics and rhetoricians, and he integrates these ideas into an effective programme of rhetorical theory. The present study, which examines Dionysius' views on language, linguistics, and literature, has two purposes.[6] On the one hand, it aims at increasing our knowledge of the language theories that circulated at the end of the first century BC. From this period, only a few fragments of grammatical and philological texts have survived, and the same holds for most of the other language disciplines. Many of Dionysius' works, however, are extant, which makes them a unique source of information for the linguistic views that were current in the Augustan age.[7] On the other hand, this study aims to illuminate the important connections between the various ancient disciplines that dealt in some way with language as an object of study. Ancient ideas on language were formulated in such diverse disciplines as philosophy, philology, technical grammar, rhetorical theory, literary criticism, as well as metrical and musical studies. There were intensive contacts between scholars working in different fields, so that theories that were developed within the context of one discipline easily influenced the views of scholars working in another discipline. Over the last few decades, analysis of ancient linguistic thought has become a major field of study.[8] However, it is only fairly recently that scholars have begun to recognise the importance of the many connections between the different ancient language disciplines.[9] While the connections between

[6] Throughout this study, 'linguistics' will be used as a general term that covers all disciplines that deal with language as their object of study, in particular philology, technical grammar, philosophy, metrical and musical theory, rhetorical theory and literary criticism. By 'views on language' (as opposed to 'linguistics') I mean more general views on the nature of language, which do not necessarily involve technical (grammatical, philosophical, musical) theories (see esp. chapter 2).

[7] Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 67.

[8] Important contributions to the history of ancient linguistics over the last decades are the following studies: Sluiter (1990), Schmitter (1996^2), Swiggers & Wouters (1996), Ildefonse (1997), Lallot (1997), Blank (1998), Law & Sluiter (1998^2), Matthaios (1999), Auroux, Koerner, Niederehe & Versteegh (2000), Janko (2000), Law (2003), Swiggers & Wouters (2003), and Frede & Inwood (2005).

[9] See e.g. Desbordes (1996a) 69–75. The handbook edited by Auroux, Koerner, Niederehe & Versteegh (2000) deals with various 'language sciences'. On the connec-

ancient philosophy and grammar have received close attention, the relationship between rhetorical theory and its neighbouring areas of study has not been examined systematically.[10] There is no better example of the ancient integration of disciplines than the rhetorical works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

This study does not aim to provide a complete account of Dionysius' rhetorical works, nor will it deal with all language disciplines to the same extent. Although ideas from musical and metrical theory will be discussed in several passages, the focus of this study is on the close connections between three language disciplines in particular, namely grammar (both philology and technical grammar), philosophy and rhetorical theory. Each chapter of this book will examine a specific aspect of Dionysius' set of linguistic ideas. In chapter 2, I will bring together some of Dionysius' general ideas on the nature of language, which form the basis of his more technical theories. In chapter 3 and 4, I will examine his use of the grammatical theory of the parts of speech. Chapter 3 will focus on the grammatical theory itself, whereas chapter 4 will show that Dionysius (as a historian of linguistics, as a rhetorician and as a literary critic) makes effective use of grammatical theory for his own purposes. In chapter 5, the relationships between philosophy, grammar and rhetoric will become even more manifest when we explore Dionysius' theory of natural word order, which, as I will argue, is largely based on the Stoic theory of categories. In chapter 6, I will examine his ideas on the similarities and differences between prose and poetry, a subject that will illustrate the strong ties between poetical, musical and rhetorical theory. Finally, chapter 7 deals with Dionysius' technique of metathesis (rewriting), a language experiment that he applies as a method of literary criticism. Together, the various chapters aim to paint a precise picture of Dionysius' linguistic theories and methods.

Modern interpreters have always observed that Dionysius' rhetorical works contain a wealth of interesting fragments from earlier writ-

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tions between these language sciences in antiquity, see the contribution by Siebenborn (2000).

[10] For the connections between ancient philosophy and grammar, see esp. Blank (1982), Sluiter (1990) and Swiggers & Wouters (2002). Swiggers & Wouters (1995) have made some observations on the grammatical aspects of Dionysius' rhetorical works. A number of scholars have paid attention to the borderlines between ancient syntax and rhetoric: see esp. Schenkeveld (1991) and the contributions by Viljamaa, Hyman and Vainio in Swiggers & Wouters (2003). See also Schenkeveld (2004) on the 'rhetorical grammar' of C. Julius Romanus.

ers, but not all of them evaluated the rhetorician's own role positively. In 1865, Friedrich Blass characterised the treatise *On Composition* as follows: 'Andererseits aber zeigt sich nirgend so glänzend wie hier die Vielseitigkeit des Dionysios, welcher weit davon entfernt ist das Gebiet seiner Kunst eng gegen das der andern abzugränzen: Grammatik, Metrik, Musik sind hier der Rhetorik dienstbar gemacht. Es ist in dieser Schrift in der That ein reicher Schatz von Belehrung enthalten; die Gelehrsamkeit und Belesenheit des Verfassers ebenso wie die eigne feine Beobachtungsgabe muß jeden anziehen und ihn mit hoher Achtung vor dem Schriftsteller erfüllen.'[11] I could not agree more. Unlike Blass, however, most nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars did not appreciate Dionysius' versatility and learning. There are few ancient writers who have become the object of so much pity and contempt. For a very long time, scholars believed that Dionysius' only merit was the fact that he preserved so many fragments of earlier writers: his works were the ideal *Fundgrube* for traditional *Quellenforschung*.[12] Scholars were grateful to Dionysius for his quotations of valuable literary fragments (Sappho, Simonides, Pindar, and Hegesias) and his references to philosophical, musical and philological works (e.g. Theophrastus, Chrysippus, Aristoxenus, and Aristophanes of Byzantium).[13] But since traditional scholarship primarily focused on the sources that Dionysius had collected and preserved, it often failed to give him credit for his own merits. The persistent idea was that this rhetorician was not intelligent enough to understand the important works that he cites. According to Schwartz, he was a 'kleine Seele', Wilamowitz called him an 'armen Gesellen', and Norden thought that Dionysius was one of the 'blöden Stubengelehrten'.[14]

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[11] Blass, *DGB* (1865) 199.

[12] See the *status quaestionis* in Goudriaan (1989) 466–469.

[13] See e.g. Kroll (1907) 101: 'Dionys selbst hat kaum mehr gethan als die ihm vorliegenden Erörterungen zu einer schriftstellerischen Einheit zusammenzufassen und ihre praktische Anwendung an einigen Beispielen durchzuführen; aber immer bleibt es sein Verdienst, peripatetische Gedanken wieder hervorgezogen zu haben, die sonst der Vergessenheit anheim gefallen wären.' For a list of Dionysius' quotations and references in *On Composition*, see Rhys Roberts (1910) 49–56.

[14] Schwartz (1900) 934; Wilamowitz (1900) 51; Norden (1915^{3}) 266. For an overview of similar evaluations, see Hidber (1996) vii–x, whose discussion was an important resource for this introductory section. Radermacher (1905) 970–971, who is an exception among the German scholars of his time, defends Dionysius against Norden: 'Dennoch ist das wegwerfende Urteil, mit dem man wohl heute über ihn weggeht (s. z. B. Norden, Kunstprosa 79 ff.), übertrieben und unbillig.'

Eduard Norden may be taken as a typical representative of the traditional approach to Dionysius of Halicarnassus. In his monumental work *Die antike Kunstprosa*, he argues that we should not take Dionysius as our guide when evaluating the prose style of Greek orators and historians: 'So verfehlt es im allgemeinen ist, antike Urteile—zumal auf diesem Gebiet—dem modernen Empfinden von uns Nachgeborenen unterzuordnen, so muß ich doch bekennen, daß mir der von vielen bewunderte Kritikus Dionys ein äußerst bornierter Kopf zu sein scheint.'[15] Nevertheless, Norden frequently refers to Dionysus: 'Daß wir ihn im einzelnen trotzdem öfters werden nennen müssen, verdankt er nicht sich, sondern seinen Quellen.'[16] The dangers of this approach become manifest when Norden finds a useful observation in Dionysius' works: 'bei Dionys ep. ad Pomp. 2,7 heißt es sehr fein (*daher ist es nicht von ihm*), die Hauptstärke Platons als Schriftsteller zeige sich (…).'[17] Today, not many scholars will claim that every interesting element in Dionysius' works is necessarily derived from his sources. But the approach of Norden, Schwartz and Wilamowitz has been very influential.[18] Their negative judgement on the rhetorician seems to be one of the reasons that there are still relatively few commentaries and monographs on Dionysius' rhetorical works.[19]

It is true that Dionysius' works incorporate many ideas from earlier scholars, but it is dangerous to present him as an unintelligent collector. In two respects, the method of this study will be different from the one that Norden represents. Firstly, this study will adopt an external rather than an internal approach to Dionysius' works. Secondly, this study aims to describe the general connections between the discourse of Dionysius and that of other ancient scholars rather than to point to

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[15] Norden (1915^3) 79.

[16] Norden (1915^3) 81.

[17] Norden (1915^3) 104. My italics.

[18] In particular Ammon (1889), Kroll (1907) and Nassal (1910) trace Dionysius' ideas back to earlier sources, which are now lost. Kroll assigns many theories to Aristoxenus, while Nassal thinks that the similarities between Cicero and Dionysius indicate dependence on Caecilius of Caleacte (see sections 1.5 and 4.4.1 of this study). Norden (1915^3) 79–80 argues that Dionysius' good observations are borrowed from Theophrastus and his successors. The same approach, assigning Dionysius' ideas to predecessors whose works we do not know, is characteristic of (parts of) Pohl (1968).

[19] Cf. Hidber (1996) viii. The following commentaries on separate works should be mentioned: Pavano (1958) and Pritchett (1975) on *Thuc.*, Marenghi (1971) on *Din.*, Ronnet (1952) and Van Wyk Cronjé (1986) on *Dem.*, Hidber (1996) on the preface to *Orat. Vett.*, Battisti (1997) on *Imit.*, and Fornaro (1997a) on *Pomp.* Pohl (1968) is an important contribution to the understanding of *Comp.*

specific sources that he may have read and used. I will clarify both of these methodological aspects.

(1) There are two ways in which one can study ancient views on language and literature. On the one hand, one can interpret ancient theory for its own sake. This is what Richard Rorty calls 'historical reconstruction'.[20] When adopting this approach, one will carefully reconstruct the historical contexts in which ancient views were developed, and the results thus obtained will contribute to our knowledge of the history of linguistics, or of the history of literary theory. On the other hand, we can approach ancient grammarians, rhetoricians, literary critics and philosophers as our own colleagues. This is what Richard Rorty calls 'rational reconstruction'. When adopting this method, we reconstruct the answers that earlier thinkers would have given to our questions. A scholar who adopts the latter approach looks for theories that have been developed in antiquity, in the hope that these ancient theories may solve a modern problem. As far as the historiography of linguistics is concerned, the difference between these two approaches has been discussed by Sluiter, who distinguishes between the 'external' and the 'internal' approach to the history of grammar.[21] The dangers of rational reconstruction could not be illustrated more clearly than by Norden's treatment of Dionysius cited above.[22] Norden regards Dionysius primarily as a colleague who was also interested in the style of ancient Greek prose texts. Adopting an internal approach to Dionysius' theories, Norden mainly objects to the fact that the rhetorician dares to criticise the style of passages from Thucydides and Plato, thereby apparently failing to recognise the ingenuity of these great writers: 'Dionys macht die großen Männer zu ebensolchen Pedanten, wie er, dieser σχολαστικός vom reinsten Wasser, selbst einer ist.'[23] It should be

[20] Rorty (1984) 49–56. Rorty focuses on the historiography of philosophy. Apart from historical and rational reconstruction, he distinguishes two more genres, namely 'Geistesgeschichte' and doxography. See also my section 4.2.2.

[21] Sluiter (1998) 24–25.

[22] On the dangers of the internal approach to ancient linguistics and philosophy, see Sluiter (1996) 223–225.

[23] Norden (1915[3]) 80. Norden (1915[3]) 80–81 proceeds to express his contempt as follows: 'Von keinem sind unwürdigere Worte über den θεῖος Πλάτων, den wir als den größten Künstler auch des Stils bewundern, gesprochen worden als von diesem Epigonen, der sogar von seinem oder vielmehr seiner Zeit Liebling Demosthenes nichts Höheres zu sagen weiß, als daß er sich aus allen das Beste zusammengelesen und daraus ein neues Gewebe gemacht habe.' For a similar evaluation of Dionysius' judge-

emphasised that the reason that Dionysius does not approve of the style of Thucydides (and that of Plato in his more poetic passages) is that it lacks clarity.[24] Dionysius primarily writes his works for students who wish to become successful orators. He thinks that in oratory one should adopt a lucid style, while avoiding obscure constructions. This Aristotelian idea is very relevant to the context of Dionysius' practice as a teacher of rhetoric. Norden, however, does not pay attention to Dionysius' own purposes, and ignores the rhetorical context of his theories.[25] I will argue that Dionysius' views on literature are always subservient to the production of (rhetorical) texts through imitation of classical models (see section 1.3). In this light, his evaluations of Thucydides and Plato are more understandable, even if we do not agree with his verdicts. Unlike Norden, I intend to interpret Dionysius' ideas within the context of his rhetorical and historical theories.[26]

(2) The second methodological aspect in which this study differs from the influential approach of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholars is the following. Instead of assigning particular passages from Dionysius' works to specific 'sources', I will point to the possible connections between Dionysius' *discourse* and that of earlier and contempo-

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ments, see Bruns (1905) 210: 'Am allerunbegreiflichsten aber werden diese Urteile, wo es sich um Historiker handelt. Dass Dionys über Polybius, einen Mann, dem er in Wirklichkeit nicht das Wasser reichen darf, von oben herunter urteilt, ist, da Polybius der verachteten hellenistischen Periode angehört, verständlich. Aber man traut seinen Augen nicht, wenn man liest, wie er Thucydides behandelt.' Blass *DGB* (1865) 187 also thinks that Dionysius fails to treat Thucydides with the proper respect, and Thomas Hobbes likewise criticises Dionysius' evaluation of Thucydides in his introduction to his translation of Thucydides (William Molesworth [ed.], *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, Vol. VIII, London 1839–1845, xxvi). Dionysius prefers Herodotus' subject (the wonderful deeds of Greeks and barbarians) and criticises Thucydides because he describes 'sad and terrible disasters' (*Pomp.* 3.232,18–234,15). Hobbes thinks that 'there was never written so much absurdity in so few lines'. Usher (1985) 350 agrees with Hobbes and states that Dionysius' criticism of Thucydides' subject matter has been 'the object of deserved scorn'.

[24] See e.g. Dionysius' description of Thucydides' style in *Thuc.* 24.360,25–364,2 and his grammatical notes in *Amm.* II. See also sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.

[25] A more successful example of an internal approach to Dionysius' works is Usher (1999). In his study on Greek oratory, Usher frequently cites the views of Dionysius; unlike Norden, he pays close attention to the context of Dionysius' ideas.

[26] This study as a whole focuses on Dionysius' rhetorical works, but in some cases I will also discuss views that he expresses in the *Roman Antiquities*. In particular, it will be shown that Dionysius' theory of the Latin language can only be understood within the context of his historical work: see section 2.4.

rary scholars of various backgrounds. In this way, I hope to draw a general picture of the set of ideas and technical theories that were available in the Augustan age. One of the basic assumptions on which this study rests is that it is more rewarding to describe the general world of scholarship that Dionysius' treatises reflect than to guess about his alleged use of specific sources.[27] Therefore, I will compare his theories and terminology with the work of philologists (Aristarchus in particular), technical grammarians (Apollonius Dyscolus, and the fragmentary works of earlier scholars like Tyrannion and Tryphon), philosophers (the Stoics in particular), rhetoricians and critics (Philodemus, the Hellenistic *kritikoi*, 'Demetrius', 'Longinus', and Quintilian especially). Occasionally, I will also point to similarities between the views of Dionysius and those of the musical theorist Aristoxenus. It will become clear that this approach, which interprets Dionysius' views within the context of his works and compares his discourse with that of other scholars, is more fruitful for our understanding of Dionysius' ideas on language than the approach of *Quellenforschung*, which has been so dominant in Dionysian scholarship.[28] My approach will make it possible to appreciate the ways in which Dionysius has blended theories from several language disciplines into one integrated programme of rhetorical theory.

Having clarified the methods of this study, I hasten to say that the approach of Norden and Wilamowitz, though very influential, has been abandoned in more recent scholarship. In this study, I will follow the lead of a number of scholars who have paid attention to Dionysius' ideas and methods, without presenting him as slavishly dependent on his predecessors. Bonner (1939) was the first who systematically analysed Dionysius' methods of literary criticism. More recently, a number of important publications have appeared. In particular, the annotated edition with French translation of the *opuscula* by Aujac (1978–1992) and the useful commentaries by Hidber (1996), Battisti (1997) and Fornaro (1997a) have contributed much to our understanding of Diony-

[27] In this study, I will make only a few exceptions to this principle, when there is much evidence for Dionysius' use of a specific model: see sections 4.2.3 (on Dionysius' use of a grammatical treatise in which the history of the parts of speech was discussed) and 4.4.2. (on his use of a philological commentary on Thucydides).

[28] The influence of Norden and Wilamowitz is still visible in many publications of relatively recent date. Thus, in spite of all its merits, the important article of Schenkeveld (1983) on Dionysius' linguistic theories is in my view too much inclined to assign the rhetorician's ideas to earlier sources. See esp. Schenkeveld (1983) 90: 'Dionysius only reproduces what he has read, without realizing its implications.' On this statement, see my section 2.5.

sius' rhetorical works.[29] Moreover, many articles on various aspects of Dionysius' rhetorical theory have been published in recent years.[30] With regard to the *Roman Antiquities*, recent scholarship includes the work of Gabba (1991) and Delcourt (2005), the annotated editions with translations by Fromentin (1998) and Sautel (1999), and the translation edited by Pittia (2002).[31] The only general monograph that systematically deals with both the rhetorical and the historical works is still Goudriaan (1989), but he pays little attention to Dionysius' linguistic theories.[32]

In the following sections of this introductory chapter, I will explore the aspects of Dionysius' life and works that are relevant to the theme of this study, in particular his classicism (section 1.2), the relative order and the intended audience of his rhetorical works (section 1.3), and his contacts with Greek and Roman intellectuals in Augustan Rome (section 1.4). In the final sections of this introduction, we will make the transition to the central concerns of this study: I will briefly explore the various language sciences that Dionysius incorporates in his works (section 1.5), and, finally, I will introduce his important work *On Composition*, which may be considered a multidisciplinary synthesis *par excellence* (section 1.6).

1.2. *Classicism and Atticism*

For a clear understanding of Dionysius, it is very important to recognise the classicism that his works reveal.[33] Dionysius believes that the creation of new works of art should be based on eclectic imitation of the best qualities of classical examples. In his preface to the work *On the*

[29] English translations have been published by Rhys Roberts (1901, 1910) and Usher (1974, 1985).

[30] Among the recent contributions on various aspects of Dionysius' rhetorical works the following should be mentioned: Heath (1989), Innes (1989), Gentili (1990a = 1990b), Damon (1991), Fox (1993), Classen (1994), Wooten (1994), Toye (1995), Reid (1996), Reid (1997), Vaahtera (1997), Walker (1998), Bottai (1999a and 1999b), Donadi (2000a and 2000b), Weaire (2002), Viljamaa (2003), De Jonge (2005a and 2005b) and Wiater (forthcoming). Hurst (1982) usefully summarises the earlier interpretations. I regret that I have not been able to consult Donadi (2000b).

[31] For more literature on the *Roman Antiquities*, see Delcourt (2005).

[32] For very brief introductions, see the entries of Russell (1996) in *OCD* and Fornaro (1997b) in *DNP*. For an overview of Dionysius' works, see e.g. Kennedy (1972) 342–363.

[33] On the term 'classicism', see Gelzer (1979) 3–13. The modern use of the term is based on a quotation of Fronto in Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 19.8.5. On Dionysius' classicism, see esp. Gabba (1982), Goudriaan (1989) and Hidber (1996).

Ancient Orators, a 'manifesto of classicism', Dionysius describes how his own time viewed the final victory of the ancient philosophical rhetoric over her shameless antagonist from Asia, who had taken her place after the death of Alexander the Great:[34]

> ἐν γὰρ δὴ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν χρόνοις ἡ μὲν ἀρχαία καὶ φιλόσοφος ῥητορικὴ προπηλακιζομένη καὶ δεινὰς ὕβρεις ὑπομένουσα κατελύετο, ἀρξαμένη μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνος τελευτῆς ἐκπνεῖν καὶ μαραίνεσθαι κατ' ὀλίγον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἡλικίας μικροῦ δεήσασα εἰς τέλος ἠφανίσθαι· ἑτέρα δέ τις ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνης παρελθοῦσα τάξιν, ἀφόρητος ἀναιδείᾳ θεατρικῇ καὶ ἀνάγωγος καὶ οὔτε φιλοσοφίας οὔτε ἄλλου παιδεύματος οὐδενὸς μετειληφυῖα ἐλευθερίου.
>
> 'In the period preceding our own time, the old philosophical rhetoric, being bespattered with mud and subjected to terrible insults, fell into decline. From the death of Alexander of Macedon it began to lose its spirit and gradually wither away, and in our generation had reached a state of almost total extinction. Another rhetoric stole in and took its place, intolerable in its theatrical shamelessness, ill-bred and having no share of either philosophy or any other education fit for a free man.'

The tripartite view of history that Dionysius here presents is characteristic of the classicism of the first centuries BC and AD.[35] Artists who adopt a classicistic approach towards the past divide history into three periods: first, a classical period of the glorious past; second, a period of decline and degeneration; and, finally, the present, in which the classical past revives. According to Dionysius, the period of decline started after the death of Alexander, a political date that symbolises the fall of the Macedonian empire and the gradual rise of the Roman power.[36] Dionysius is one of the clearest representatives of Roman classicism. In Hellenistic times, Alexandrian scholars had already selected the best authors of the classical period (the ἐγκριθέντες) and they had compiled lists of preferred authors (*canones*).[37] But in the Augustan period writers

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[34] *Orat. Vett.* 1.3,10–19. On the preface to *On the Ancient Orators*, see Hidber (1996). Hidber characterises this work as 'das klassizistische Manifest'. Other scholars regard it as the manifesto of Atticism: see Goudriaan (1989) 566. However, Atticism and classicism are not identical: see below, and Gelzer (1979) 13–14.

[35] On classicism in general and the division of history in three periods ('der klassizistische Dreischnitt') in particular, see Gelzer (1979), Heldmann (1982) esp. 122–131 and Hidber (1996) 14–25. Wisse (1995) 71 uses the term 'tripartite view of history'.

[36] Dionysius uses Alexander's death as a turning point also in *Ant. Rom.* 1.2.3. Cf. Hidber (1996) 18–19. Heldmann (1982) 122–131 discusses the division of history in Dionysius and other classicistic authors.

[37] On the terms ἐγκριθέντες and *classici*, see Pfeiffer (1968) 206–208 and Gelzer (1979).

started to make a more systematic use of the works of the classical past by taking them as models for their own texts, and rejecting the artistic style of the immediate past.[38] It is typical of classicism that the creation of new works of art is based on an explicit theory.[39] In Dionysius' case, we may summarise this theory by the terms μίμησις and ζήλωσις: the eclectic imitation of the best qualities of various models from the past, with the intention of surpassing them.[40] As Hidber has pointed out, Dionysius' tripartite view of history, with its demarcation dates 323 BC and 31 BC, lives on in the modern term 'Hellenism', which is adopted in many of our histories of Greek literature.[41]

In his preface to *On the Ancient Orators*, Dionysius tells us that Hellenistic rhetoric was 'altogether vulgar and disgusting' (φορτική τις πάνυ καὶ ὀχληρά).[42] He introduces a vivid image, in which he compares the Greek world to a household in which the lawful wife has been driven away by a ἑταίρα.[43] Dionysius presents the contrast between the 'philosophical' rhetoric of the classical period and the shameless rhetoric that dominated the Hellenistic age as a controversy between an Attic 'muse' and her opponent from Asia, who has taken over the power in each city, even in the civilised ones:[44]

> ἡ μὲν Ἀττικὴ μοῦσα καὶ ἀρχαία καὶ αὐτόχθων ἄτιμον εἰλήφει σχῆμα, τῶν ἑαυτῆς ἐκπεσοῦσα ἀγαθῶν, ἡ δὲ ἔκ τινων βαράθρων τῆς Ἀσίας ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην ἀφικομένη, Μυσὴ ἢ Φρυγία τις ἢ Καρικόν τι κακόν, [ἢ βάρβαρον] Ἑλληνίδας ἠξίου διοικεῖν πόλεις ἀπελάσασα τῶν κοινῶν τὴν ἑτέραν, ἡ ἀμαθὴς τὴν φιλόσοφον καὶ ἡ μαινομένη τὴν σώφρονα.
>
> 'The ancient and indigenous Attic muse, deprived of her possessions, had taken a dishonoured rank, while her antagonist, who had arrived only yesterday or the day before from some Asiatic death-holes, a Mysian or Phrygian or a Carian creature, claimed the right to rule over the Greek cities, expelling her rival from public life, the ignorant driving out the philosophical, the mad one the prudent one.'

Because of this contrast between Attic and Asianic rhetoric, Dionysius' preface is the principal text for the Greek Atticism of Augustan Rome.

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[38] See Hidber (1996) 24.

[39] See Gelzer (1979) 10–11.

[40] On the classicistic theory of μίμησις, see Flashar (1979); on Dionysius' concept of μίμησις esp. 87–88. See also Russell (1979b).

[41] Hidber (1996) 24–25.

[42] *Orat. Vett.* 1.4,4.

[43] *Orat. Vett.* 1.4,7–11.

[44] *Orat. Vett.* 1.4,13–19. On Dionysius' presentation of the contrast, see Hidber (1996) 25–30.

Dionysius' role in the Atticist movement is a complex problem: I will confine myself to the main issues.[45] Classicism and Atticism are of course closely related, but they are not the same. As Gelzer points out, classicism emerged in several cities in the first century BC, and became visible in various arts.[46] Atticism, however, began at a later moment and spread from Rome.[47] Atticism was not a coherent system, and at distinct moments, there were different ideas about what was typically 'Attic'. Common to the different versions of Atticism is the ideal of being in the tradition of Attic culture. Our sources tell us about two distinct phases, the connection between which is not entirely clear. The first phase started around 60 BC as a Roman movement. Cicero's account suggests that its leader was C. Licinius Calvus.[48] Calvus and his followers, who presented themselves as *Attici*, supported the use of pure language and a plain style, and they censured the style that they referred to as 'Asian'. These Roman Atticists, who regarded Lysias and Hyperides as their models, accused Cicero of using an excessively bombastic style; they seem to have called him an *Asianus*.[49] Cicero defended himself in the *Brutus* and *Orator* (46 BC): he presented himself as a follower of Demosthenes, and pointed out that Lysias was not the only orator who spoke Attic.[50] Thus, Cicero emphasised that there were many different types of Attic models that one could imitate.

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[45] The literature on Atticism is overwhelming. Fundamental are Rohde (1886), Schmid (1887), Radermacher (1899), Wilamowitz (1900), Norden (1915^3) 251–270 and Dihle (1977). See the useful overview in Goudriaan (1989) 595–677. My own account owes a great deal to the illuminating discussions by Wisse (1995) and Hidber (1996) 25–44.

[46] Gelzer (1979) 13.

[47] Norden (1915^3) 149 argues that Atticism had already begun shortly after 200 BC, but in *Orator* 89 (46 BC) Cicero refers to the *Attici* as a recent group. See Wisse (1995) 74–76. The date to which one assigns the origins of Atticism depends very much on the definition of Atticism that one uses. In Hellenistic times, writers were of course interested in the classical period of Athens, and Alexandrian scholars composed canons of selected authors: see Pfeiffer (1968) 206–207; on the canon of the ten Attic orators, see Worthington (1994) and O'Sullivan (1997). But the idea of reviving Attic eloquence and culture by systematic imitation of the classical orators on a theoretical basis seems to be a later phenomenon, the origins of which we may assign to ca. 60 BC (see Wisse [1995] 76).

[48] See Cicero, *Brutus* 284. On the historical context of Roman Atticism, see Bowersock (1979) 59–65 and Wisse (1995).

[49] On Cicero as *Asianus*, see Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 12.10.12. On Lysias and Hyperides as the models of the *Attici*, see Cicero, *Brutus* 67.

[50] Cicero, *Brutus* 285.

Some decades later, a second phase of Atticism became manifest in the works of Greek intellectuals in Augustan Rome. As far as we know, the representatives of Greek Atticism were Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Caecilius of Caleacte.[51] The latter rhetorician wrote a work *Against the Phrygians* and a treatise *Wherein does the Attic Style Differ from the Asian*.[52] It is well known that Caecilius admired Lysias, but the titles of his works make it clear that he allowed for many other models of imitation.[53] Likewise, Dionysius' Atticism is much broader than that of the original Roman Atticists, and closer to Cicero's views on the μίμησις of various Attic models.[54] Dionysius' concept of Atticism is very different from the ideas of the Roman *Attici*, who focused on linguistic purity and grammatical correctness.[55] Like Cicero, Dionysius does not think that imitation should be restricted to orators like Lysias and Hyperides, the typical representatives of the plain style. According to Dionysius, one should study the best elements of various classical writers: his work *On the Ancient Orators* deals with Lysias, Isocrates, Isaeus, Demosthenes, Hyperides and Aeschines (though his treatment of the latter two orators has not survived: see section 1.3). Moreover, Dionysius clearly believes that not only Attic language and literature were to be studied and imitated, but also certain moral and political ideas, especially those of the Attic orator Isocrates.[56] In his essay *On Isocrates*, Dionysius asks: 'Who could fail to become a patriotic supporter of democracy and a student of civic virtue after reading his *Panegyricus*?'[57] 'What greater exhortation

[51] On Caecilius of Caleacte and Atticism, see O'Sullivan (1997). On Caecilius, see the literature mentioned in section 1.4.

[52] Κατὰ Φρυγῶν (Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 11 Ofenloch) and Τίνι διαφέρει ὁ Ἀττικὸς ζῆλος τοῦ Ἀσιανοῦ (Ofenloch [1907] 89). Cf. Kennedy (1972) 366 and Bowersock (1979) 66. According to Wilamowitz (1900) 6, Caecilius must have written *Against the Phrygians* when the Atticists had not yet attained the victory that Dionysius (in the preface to *On the Ancient Orators*) reports. However, all evidence suggests that Caecilius was Dionysius' contemporary (Dionysius once refers to Caecilius: see section 1.3), and there is no reason to believe that Dionysius' preface marks the definite conclusion of the entire debate. For this reason, I will not follow the theory of Nassal (1910), who assumes that Caecilius influenced both Cicero and Dionysius: see section 1.5.

[53] See Hidber (1996) 41 n. 184 and Innes (2002) 276–278, who points out that Demosthenes was presumably Caecilius' main model.

[54] See Bowersock (1979) 67.

[55] On the different concepts of Atticism, see Hidber (1996) 37–44.

[56] See Hidber (1996) 50 on *On Isocrates*: 'Es geht also bei Literaturkritik nicht etwa bloss um stilistische Fragen, sondern auch darum, ob bei einem Autor (…) Beiträge zu einer allgemeinen, "philosophischen" und "politischen" Bildung zu finden sein.'

[57] *Isoc.* 5.61,10–12: τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο φιλόπολίς τε καὶ φιλόδημος ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτηδεύσειε τὴν πολιτικὴν καλοκἀγαθίαν ἀναγνοὺς αὐτοῦ τὸν Πανηγυρικόν;

to justice and piety could there be, for individuals singly and collectively for whole communities, than the discourse *On the Peace*?'[58] 'Who would not become a more responsible citizen after reading the *Areopagiticus* (…)?'[59] For Dionysius, Atticism is thus much more than an imitation of pure language and plain style; it represents a general 'Bildungsideal', a symbol of elevated culture (παιδεία).[60] It should be noted that Dionysius' idealisation of Attic culture is far removed from the narrow concept of Atticism that is characteristic of some works of the Second Sophistic: in that period we find a purely linguistic form of Atticism.[61]

The connection between the earlier Roman phase of Atticism and the Greek Atticism of the Augustan period is unclear.[62] Most scholars believe that the origins of Atticism must have been Greek. Thus, Norden and Wilamowitz think that Greek scholars initiated the Atticist debate and influenced both the Roman circle of Licinius Calvus and, in later times, Dionysius and Caecilius.[63] More recently, Wisse has argued that the origin of the debate was Roman and that Calvus himself was the originator of Atticism.[64] Bowersock suggested that Dionysius learnt about the first Atticist movement from his addressee Aelius Tubero, whose father was a friend of Cicero.[65] However, Wisse has rightly pointed out that we should not suppose that Dionysius' knowledge of Roman ideas was dependent on one individual like Tubero, important though he may have been.[66] Dionysius was part of a Graeco-Roman 'network' of intellectuals (see section 1.4), so that there were many opportunities and ways in which Dionysius could learn about Roman Atticism.[67] Although I agree with Wisse's explanation, I would

[58] *Isoc.* 7.64,1–3: τίς δὲ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν εὐσέβειαν προτρέψαιτο καθ' ἕκαστόν τε ἄνδρα ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ τὰς πόλεις ὅλας τοῦ Περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης λόγου;

[59] *Isoc.* 8.65,6–7: τίς δὲ τὸν Ἀρεοπαγιτικὸν ἀναγνοὺς λόγον οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο κοσμιώτερος …;

[60] Hidber (1996) 44–56 shows that Dionysius' φιλόσοφος ῥητορική stands in the tradition of Isocrates.

[61] See Hidber (1996) 43–44. On Atticist language and its relation to *koinê* Greek, see Frösén (1974).

[62] See Wisse (1995) 73–74.

[63] Norden (1915[3]) 149 places its origins shortly after 200 BC. Wilamowitz (1900) 31–51 thinks that Greek scholars in Rome started the Atticist movement around 60 BC.

[64] Wisse (1995) 76–77.

[65] Bowersock (1979) 68–70. See also Hidber (1996) 38.

[66] Wisse (1995) 78.

[67] See Wisse (1979) 78–80. Hidber (1996) 38–39 argues that it is 'unwahrscheinlich' that the Greek phase of Atticism depended on the Roman phase because Dionysius' concept of Atticism is so much broader than that of Calvus. In my view, it is uncon-

like to add another possibility (which does not exclude the former one): Dionysius may simply have read the works of Cicero and his opponents. We know that Dionysius knew Latin and that he read many Roman works (see section 2.3). Besides, there is one passage where Dionysius seems to allude to the views of Cicero on the imitation of Thucydides' style: Cicero expressed these views in the *Orator* and *Brutus*, which are exactly the works in which he defended himself against the *Attici* (see section 4.4.1).[68] I might add that Dionysius' presentation of Asianic rhetoric as 'a Mysian or Phrygian or a Carian creature' (Μυσὴ ἢ Φρυγία τις ἢ Καρικόν τι κακόν) seems to echo Cicero's aversion to *Caria et Phrygia et Mysia* in the *Orator*.[69] References to these three regions may have been standard in characterisations of Asianic rhetoric, but it is not impossible that Dionysius knew Cicero's ideas and alluded to them. In any case, we should not understand Caria, Phrygia and Mysia as geographical regions where certain Asian schools of rhetoric were situated, but rather as representing Asianic style in general.[70] Wilamowitz already pointed out that 'Asianism' was not the name of a movement; it was a negative term, used by Atticists to denote everything that they did not like.[71] Thus, when Dionysius tells us that apart from 'a few Asian cities' (ὀλίγων τινῶν Ἀσιανῶν πόλεων) the world has ceased to admire bombastic Hellenistic rhetoric, he is presumably not think-

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vincing that Dionysius would picture the contrast between an Attic muse and her Asian opponent without thinking of the debate in Cicero's days, although it is true that he gives his own and original interpretation of Atticism. See also Whitmarsh (1998): 'It would be better, I submit, to consider Atticism to have been an ever-negotiable concept, malleable according to the predilections and ambitions of the writer in question.'

[68] See *Thuc.* 50.409,8–410,7 and compare Cicero, *Orator* 31 and *Brutus* 287.

[69] *Orat. Vett.* 1.4.16–17; *Orator* 25: *Itaque Caria et Phrygia et Mysia, quod minime politae minimeque elegantes sunt, asciverunt aptum suis auribus opimum quoddam et tanquam adipale dictionis genus* (…). 'Accordingly, Caria, Phrygia and Mysia, where there is the least refinement and taste, have adopted a rich and unctuous diction which appeals to their ears.' (Translation Hubbell.) Bowersock (1979) 65–66 remarks that Dionysius repeats Cicero's 'refrain'. It should be noted that Μυσή (*Orat. Vett.* 1.4,16) is Kiessling's conjecture for μοῦσα. Goudriaan (1989) 570–572 defends the reading of the MSS and refers to *Orator* 57, where Mysia is not mentioned either. But I doubt that Dionysius would portray Asianic rhetoric as a 'muse'. The parallel from *Orator* 25 seems to be more convincing.

[70] Gabba (1991) 28 n. 12 thinks that Dionysius refers to 'concrete examples', but Hidber (1996) 111 rightly argues that Caria, Mysia and Phrygia stand for Asianic style in general. Goudriaan (1989) 570–572 relates the three regions of Asia Minor to the evaluation of musical modes that we find in Plato.

[71] Wilamowitz (1900) 1–8.

ing of specific schools in Asia Minor.[72] Dionysius does not refer to Asia outside his preface to *On the Ancient Orators*, but he does mention Hegesias of Magnesia (ca. 300 BC), whom he regards as the archetype of the bombastic Hellenistic style.[73]

In his 'manifesto of classicism', Dionysius tells us about the revolution (μεταβολή) that took place in his own time (ὁ καθ' ἡμᾶς χρόνος): the ancient, sober Rhetoric has been restored to her former, rightful place.[74] Dionysius gives three possible reasons for this revolution, namely a divine, a natural and a human explanation.[75] Having outlined these three general causes, Dionysius expounds what, in his view, is the real cause of the change:[76] 'I think the cause and origin of this great revolution to be almighty Rome, which forces the cities in their entirety to look at her as a model, and those who rule her virtuously and administer the world in all good faith: they are thoroughly cultured and noble in their judgements; under their ordering influence the sensible section of the city has increased its power even more and the foolish section has been forced to be sensible.'[77]

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[72] *Orat. Vett.* 2.5,11–14.

[73] *Comp.* 4.19,5–15; *Comp.* 18.79,9–82,10. Ironically, Hegesias himself presented himself as an imitator of Lysias: see Cicero, *Orator* 226. On Hegesias, see Swain (1996) 22; on Dionysius' quotation of Hegesias in *Comp.* 18, see Donadi (2000a).

[74] *Orat. Vett.* 2.4,20–5,20.

[75] *Orat. Vett.* 2.4,23–5,5. Hurst (1982) 859 thinks that the three general causes (god, nature, human beings) aim to weaken the importance of Rome, but I agree with Hidber (1996) 113 that the three general motives are so vague that they are better interpreted as a 'Priamel' that prepares the reader for the real cause.

[76] *Orat. Vett.* 3.5,21–6,1: αἰτία δ' οἶμαι καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς τοσαύτης μεταβολῆς ἐγένετο ἡ πάντων κρατοῦσα Ῥώμη πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἀναγκάζουσα τὰς ὅλας πόλεις ἀποβλέπειν καὶ ταύτης δὲ αὐτῆς οἱ δυναστεύοντες κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρατίστου τὰ κοινὰ διοικοῦντες, εὐπαίδευτοι πάνυ καὶ γενναῖοι τὰς κρίσεις γενόμενοι, ὑφ' ὧν κοσμούμενον τό τε φρόνιμον τῆς πόλεως μέρος ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπιδέδωκεν καὶ τὸ ἀνόητον ἠνάγκασται νοῦν ἔχειν.

[77] My translation is based on that of Wisse (1995) 76–77 (see also his correction in Wisse [1998]). In *Orat. Vett.* 3.5,27, Wisse (1995) 77 reads ⟨ἑκάσ⟩της πόλεως instead of τῆς πόλεως, because he thinks that Dionysius refers to the sensible section of 'each city' and not to that of Rome only (see also Wisse [1998]). This would indeed agree with the interpretations of some modern scholars, who interpret the phrase as referring to the cities reigned by Rome: see esp. Gabba (1991) 31–32 ('πόλις […] has a collective value') and Kennedy (1994) 162 ('every city'). Goudriaan (1989) 568 n. 1 correctly points out that τῆς πόλεως cannot mean 'each city', so Wisse's conjecture seems to be a welcome solution. However, I agree with Goudriaan (1989) 568 n. 1 and Hidber (1996) 121–122 that Dionysius presumably means to say that the leaders of Rome first and foremost effected the change within Rome itself. Hidber points to *Ant. Rom.* 6.24.2, where τῷ σωφρονοῦντι μέρει τῆς πόλεως ('the sensible part of the city') refers to Rome. We may add that Dionysius states that the other cities look at Rome as a model (ἀποβλέπειν)

Dionysius' reference to Rome as the cause (αἰτία) and origin (ἀρχή) of the revival of Attic culture has been interpreted in different ways. Some scholars have supposed that it is mere flattery intended for Dionysius' Roman patrons, or even for Augustus himself.[78] On the other hand, Dionysius' praise of early Rome has been explained as criticism (in veiled terms) of Augustus.[79] Hidber, however, has convincingly argued that we should take Dionysius' words seriously: his positive attitude towards Rome in the *Roman Antiquities* corresponds to his words in the preface to *On the Ancient Orators* (see below).[80] But what does Dionysius mean when he mentions Rome? Wisse suggests that the 'cause and origin' of the change refers to the Roman phase of Atticism.[81] Grube and other scholars argue that Dionysius is thinking of Roman writers like Cicero and Caesar.[82] Indeed, Dionysius tells us that in recent times, 'many fine works written by both Romans and Greeks' (πολλαὶ καὶ καλαὶ πραγματεῖαι καὶ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Ἕλλησιν) have been published, and here Dionysius may indeed be thinking of Cicero, Livy, Tubero and other writers.[83] However, when he portrays Rome as the origin of

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so that it seems acceptable that he focuses on the change within Rome itself. With this interpretation, the text of the MSS can stand.

[78] See e.g. Schwartz (1905) 934. Wisse (1995) 77 is more cautious: 'he might just be flattering his patrons'.

[79] In *Ant. Rom.* 2.12.4, Dionysius claims that 'the authority of the ancient kings was not self-willed and based on one single judgement as it is in our days' (καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς χρόνοις αὐθάδεις καὶ μονογνώμονες ἦσαν αἱ τῶν ἀρχαίων βασιλέων δυναστεῖαι), for the ancient kings had a council (βουλευτήριον) composed of the best men. Egger (1902) 12 thinks that this text implies criticism of Augustus' dominion. Marin (1956) 183 draws the same conclusion on the basis of his mistaken identification of Dionysius as the author of *On the Sublime.* For similar views on Dionysius' political attitude, see Usher (1974) 1–2 and Hurst (1982). For a discussion of these views, see Goudriaan (1989) 301.

[80] Hidber (1996) 78–79.

[81] When discussing Dionysius' reference to Rome as the 'cause and origin', Wisse (1995) 77 states that 'in itself this is not decisive', and admits that Dionysius 'does not clearly speak about the origin of the movement, only about the reason of its success'. But Wisse seems to imply that when one takes Dionysius' text together with Cicero, *Brutus* 284, one cannot but conclude that Dionysius is thinking of Calvus as the originator of Atticism.

[82] Grube (1965) 212. Egger (1902) 42 supposes that Dionysius thinks of Cicero. Heldmann (1982) 125 argues that Dionysius refers to the Roman literature of the Ciceronian and Augustan periods.

[83] *Orat. Vett.* 3.6,5–6. See Hidber (1996) 122–123. Usher (1974) 10 n. 2 thinks that Dionysius merely mentions Roman works because Atticism began as a Roman movement. According to Gabba (1991) 31–32, 'Latin literature is mentioned only as a fortuitous consequence of the classicistic revival'.

the revolution of his time, he is mainly speaking in political terms.[84] Dionysius claims that Rome has become more sensible under the rule of her leaders, who combine administrative competence with cultural education: their influence results in the development of literary production.[85] In other words, Rome's leaders (οἱ δυναστεύοντες) have created the ideal circumstances for a cultural revival.[86] Now, the new social and political context of Rome was indeed very fertile for the development of literature and other works of art.[87] Dionysius was only one of the many intellectual Greeks who came to Augustan Rome (see section 1.4). Therefore, it seems reasonable to believe that with his reference to Rome as the cause and origin of the important change, Dionysius primarily acknowledges the importance of the new political order that supported the cultural revival in Augustan Rome, and from there the flourishing of the arts in the Graeco-Roman world as a whole.[88]

Dionysius' gratitude to Rome in the preface to *On the Ancient Orators* is mirrored in his *Roman Antiquities*. In the latter work, he presents early Rome as a Greek city, which was founded by Greeks.[89] In the preface to the first book, he admits that some readers may be surprised by the fact that he decided to treat the early history of Rome, which was, according to some Greeks, obscure and inglorious, and therefore unworthy of historical record.[90] But he says that he will take away these false beliefs,

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[84] See Gabba (1982) 31–32.

[85] When interpreting Dionysius' statements about Rome, Gabba (1991) 31 emphasises the administrative aspect, whereas Hidber (1996) 120 thinks that Dionysius refers to the cultural quality of the leaders of Rome. In my view, Dionysius presents both aspects as important (οἱ δυναστεύοντες κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρατίστου τὰ κοινὰ διοικοῦντες, εὐπαίδευτοι πάνυ καὶ γενναῖοι τὰς κρίσεις γενόμενοι), but the real change, the cultural revival, is attributed to the ordering power of the leaders: 'being ruled by them' (ὑφ' ὧν κοσμούμενον) the sensible part of the city has increased its power. Therefore, the administrative quality of Rome's leaders seems to be presented as the decisive factor.

[86] Wilamowitz (1900) 45, Bonner (1939) 10 and Kennedy (1972) 352 think that the word δυναστεύοντες refers to Augustus or 'Augustus and his ministers' (Kennedy). This is possible, but, as Hidber (1996) 119–120 points out, Dionysius may also be thinking of those Roman aristocrats who acted as patrons of Greek and Roman writers.

[87] On the flowering of literature under Augustus, see Bowersock (1965) 122–139.

[88] See Bowersock (1979, 73–74): '(…) all the evidence suggests that Rome initiated and encouraged the return of Greece to the traditions of her classical past. Whatever the motives that led to this policy (some may suspect political emasculation through nostalgia), it is interesting to see the Romans as patrons of Hellenism.' It is possible that one of the leaders Dionysius praised for their cultural taste was the historian and lawyer Quintus Aelius Tubero, as Bowersock (1979) 68–69 suggests. See section 1.4.

[89] On Dionysius' presentation of Rome as a new Athens, see Hidber (1996) 75–81.

[90] *Ant. Rom.* 1.4.1.

and teach the ignorant Greeks that the early period of Rome was a noble one.[91] From now on, the Greeks should not look down on the origins of Rome, because, according to Dionysius' thesis, the founders of Rome *were* in fact Greeks.[92] Many scholars have pointed out that this identification of Romans and Greeks contributed to the justification of the new Augustan world, in which Greeks and Romans were unified into one culture.[93] It is important to recognise that Dionysius' preface to *On the Ancient Orators* shares this perspective with his historical work on early Rome. In section 2.4, I will come back to this theme when discussing Dionysius' views on Greek and Latin.

To conclude this section on Atticism and classicism, I should add that Dionysius' rhetorical and historical works have more in common: both the rhetorical treatises and the *Roman Antiquities* are based on the principle of μίμησις (imitation).[94] According to Dionysius, his history of early Rome will serve two purposes. First, he will make the real origins of Rome known to the Greeks, who were ignorant until now, because an accurate history of Rome did not exist.[95] Second, he will provide the Roman readers with models of imitation.[96] Having read Dionysius' history, the descendants of the first Romans will be able to live up to their ancestors: 'Both the present and future descendants of those god-like men will choose, not the pleasantest and easiest of lives, but rather the noblest and most ambitious, when they consider that all who are sprung from an illustrious origin ought to set a high value on themselves and indulge in no pursuit unworthy of their ancestors.'[97] Dionysius' history of Rome will thus portray the first Romans as models, whose lives

[91] *Ant. Rom.* 1.5.1.

[92] *Ant. Rom.* 1.5.1: … Ἕλληνάς τε αὐτοὺς ὄντας ἐπιδείξειν ὑπισχνοῦμαι καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἐλαχίστων ἢ φαυλοτάτων ἐθνῶν συνεληλυθότας. '(…) I engage to prove that they [i.e. the first Romans] were Greeks and came together from nations neither the smallest nor the least considerable.'

[93] See e.g. Bowersock (1965) 131–132: 'Dionysius gave expression to the fusion of cultures which characterized the Graeco-Roman world.' See also Cary (1968) xx, Gabba (1982) 49–53 Goudriaan (1989) 299–329 (esp. 300) and Hidber (1996) 75–81.

[94] On the importance of μίμησις in Dionysius' rhetorical and historical works, see also Delcourt (2005) 43–47.

[95] On Dionysius' Greek and Roman audience, see Schultze (1986) esp. 138–139, and Wiater (forthcoming).

[96] See *Ant. Rom.* 1.5.3.

[97] *Ant. Rom.* 1.6.4: τοῖς δὲ ἀπ' ἐκείνων τῶν ἰσοθέων ἀνδρῶν νῦν τε οὖσι καὶ ὕστερον ἐσομένοις μὴ τὸν ἥδιστόν τε καὶ ῥᾷστον αἱρεῖσθαι τῶν βίων, ἀλλὰ τὸν εὐγενέστατον καὶ φιλοτιμότατον, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τοὺς εἰληφότας καλὰς τὰς πρώτας ἐκ τοῦ γένους ἀφορμὰς μέγα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς προσήκει φρονεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ἀνάξιον ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν προγόνων.

should be imitated by their descendants in the present and future. This passage reminds us of the questions that Dionysius poses in the final part of the preface to *On the Ancient Orators*: 'Who are the most important of the ancient orators and historians? What manner of life and style of writing did they adopt? Which characteristic of each of them should we take over, or which should we avoid?'[98]

We may conclude that there is a close connection between Dionysius' rhetorical works and his history of early Rome. First, both genres are based on the theory of μίμησις. The rhetorical works, on the one hand, are concerned with the imitation of the best aspects of the works of various classical writers. The history of Rome, on the other hand, is concerned with the imitation of the lives of the early Romans. Second, as we have seen, Dionysius' rhetorical and historical works are similar in that they connect the classical past with the present, thus supporting the unity of the Graeco-Roman culture of Augustan Rome.

1.3. *Dionysius' rhetorical works: their relative order and intended audience*

Apart from the preface to *On the Ancient Orators* and the treatise *On Imitation*, of which we possess a number of fragments and an epitome, a total of ten rhetorical works (essays, letters, treatises) of Dionysius have survived.[99] The relative chronology of these rhetorical works is one of the most studied problems in Dionysian scholarship.[100] Because in a number of passages Dionysius refers to other works that he has already published, modern scholars have been able to establish the chronological order of some of his works. However, complete certainty about the exact order cannot be attained by this method. Therefore, some schol-

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[98] *Orat. Vett.* 4.6,21–24: τίνες εἰσὶν ἀξιολογώτατοι τῶν ἀρχαίων ῥητόρων τε καὶ συγγραφέων καὶ τίνες αὐτῶν ἐγένοντο προαιρέσεις τοῦ τε βίου καὶ τῶν λόγων καὶ τί παρ' ἑκάστου δεῖ λαμβάνειν ἢ φυλάττεσθαι …

[99] *Lys.*, *Isoc.*, *Is.*, *Dem.*, *Comp.*, *Pomp. Amm.* I, *Amm.* II, *Thuc.*, *Din.* For *On Imitation*, see Battisti (1997).

[100] On the relative chronology of the rhetorical works, see Blass (1863), Rabe (1893), Wilamowitz (1899) 625–627, Rhys Roberts (1901) 4–7, Egger (1902) 29–33, Tukey (1909a), Tukey (1909b), Kalinka (1922–1923), Kalinka (1924–1925), Bonner (1939) 25–38, Pavano (1942), Costil (1949), Pavano (1958) ix–xxiv, Lebel (1973), Usher (1974) xxiii–xxvi, Aujac (1978) 22–28, Sacks (1983) 83–87, Van Wyk Cronjé (1986) 52–92, Goudriaan (1989) 21–24 and 738–740, and Weaire (2002). I regret that I have not been able to consult the work of Costil (1949), which is known to me only through Aujac (1978–1991). The discussion of the problem in Goudriaan (1989) 738–740 is illuminating.

ars went further by taking an alleged evolution in Dionysius' rhetorical system as evidence for the chronological order of his works.[101] The latter approach is dangerous because it may well be that the character of a specific treatise requires certain methods and theories that are not relevant to other works.[102] For example, the fact that the work *On Composition* makes use of musical theories not found in other works does not imply that this is a late work, for it is the subject of the treatise that accounts for the theories that it uses. For the purpose of the present study, the order of the rhetorical works is of only minor importance. My interpretations are not dependent on an exact reconstruction of the relative chronology of Dionysius' works. However, in a few cases I make use of a rough and undisputed division of Dionysius' works into an earlier period, a middle period, and a later period.[103] This classification, which is based on Dionysius' explicit references, can be useful when examining the development of Dionysius' methods and theories. Bonner, Lebel and Damon have shown that there is a clear evolution in Dionysius' critical methods, which become more sophisticated in his later works.[104] Besides, it seems justified to assume that Dionysius became acquainted with technical theories on language in the course of his career. A certain evolution is manifest, for example, in Dionysius' analyses of 'natural' and 'unnatural' style: whereas in his early works he merely points to the 'natural' (φυσικόν) character of a certain passage, in his later works he uses an impressive apparatus of grammatical terms to describe similar passages (see section 5.2). Therefore, it seems reasonable to believe, with Schenkeveld, that Dionysius obtained or developed his knowledge of technical grammar and other disciplines during his stay in Rome.[105] It is possible that his contacts with the many Greek and Roman scholars in Augustan Rome played an important role in the development of his linguistic knowledge (see section 1.4).

Dionysius' works *On Lysias*, *On Isocrates* and *On Isaeus* comprise the first part of his *On the Ancient Orators*. In the preface to that work, Dionysius announces that he will treat six orators in two groups.[106] The sec-

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101 In particular Kalinka (1922–1923, 1924–1925) adopts this approach.

102 On the risks of this method, see Goudriaan (1989) 21–23.

103 For the division of Dionysius' rhetorical works into three periods, see also Bonner (1939) and Usher (1974) xxvi.

104 Bonner (1939); Lebel (1973); Damon (1991).

105 Schenkeveld (1983) 69: '(…) it is evident that he [Dionysius] acquired his information when he had already been in Rome for some time.'

106 *Orat. Vett.* 4.7,15–22.

ond group will consist of Demosthenes, Hyperides and Aeschines. We do not possess the treatments of Hyperides and Aeschines, and according to some scholars Dionysius never completed the second part of his *On the Ancient Orators*.[107] We do have a work *On Demosthenes*, but it is sometimes disputed that this treatise is identical with the treatment of Demosthenes that is announced in the preface to *On the Ancient Orators*.[108] The work *On Demosthenes* provides us with yet another problem. In *Dem.* 49–50, Dionysius refers to the treatise *On Composition*, but in *Comp.* 18 he seems to refer to *Dem.* 5–7.[109] Therefore, most scholars believe that Dionysius interrupted his work on *On Demosthenes* in order to write *On Composition* (which he presented as a birthday gift to his pupil Metilius Rufus):[110] the latter treatise would in that case have been written between two parts of *On Demosthenes* (scholars disagree on the dividing line between the two parts).[111] In my view, it is also possible that Diony-

[107] Wilamowitz (1899) thinks that Dionysius changed his mind after the completion of *On Demosthenes*, and that he never treated Aeschines and Hyperides. Wilamowitz (1899) 627: '(…) und so ist der Schluss berechtigt, dass er das Versprechen der Vorrede, das er am Schlusse des Buches über Demosthenes schon einschränkt, nie ausgeführt hat.' Blass (1863), Tukey (1909b) and Van Wyk Cronjé (1986) 66 think that Dionysius did write *On Aeschines* and *On Hyperides*. Cf. *Din.* 1.297,2–14.

[108] Tukey (1909b) 391 argues that 'Dionysius completed the *De oratoribus antiquis* according to his original plan and that afterward (…) he wrote another essay on Demosthenes and incorporated it into the *De oratoribus antiquis*.' Most scholars do not accept Tukey's view, because it forces him to present rather complicated scenario's (Tukey [1909b] 404): 'According to this hypothesis, we are to suppose that the *De oratoribus antiquis* at first contained two sections (συντάξεις); that later a third was added which contained a new presentation of the stylistic merits of Demosthenes and proof of his pre-eminence; that still later, probably after the death of Dionysius, the second section, containing the essays on Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Hyperides, ceased to be copied and disappeared from circulation (…).'

[109] *Dem.* 49.236,10; *Dem.* 50.239,14; *Comp.* 18.77,9–10. Pavano (1942) 303 thinks that the latter passage refers to another work on Demosthenes, but see Van Wyk Cronjé (1986) 97–99.

[110] See Tukey (1909a) 188: 'After finishing the first half of the essay, Dionysius laid it aside in order to prepare an essay on the arrangement of words (…) With his new grasp of the subject he returned to the essay on Demosthenes, and instead of proceeding according to his original plan with a discussion of Demosthenes' subject matter, he restated his doctrine of composition as developed in the *De compositione* and applied it to Demosthenes.'

[111] See Tukey (1909a) and (1909b), Kalinka (1924–1925) 49–50 and Bonner (1939). Tukey (1909a) argues that *On Composition* was written after *Dem.* 1–34, and before *Dem.* 35–58. Kalinka (1924–1925) thinks that Dionysius turned to *On Composition* when he had finished *Dem.* 32. Bonner (1939) 32 divides *On Demosthenes* into *Dem.* 1–33 and (after *Comp.*) *Dem.* 34–58. Van Wyk Cronjé (1986) 123–133 thinks that *Comp.* was written before the complete *Dem.*, but he needlessly complicates things by postulating four instead of

sius was working on the two treatises at the same time. Nevertheless, it is true that the first part of *On Demosthenes* is rather different from the second part: in *Dem.* 1–3, Dionysius expounds the theory of three styles (χαρακτῆρες λέξεως), whereas *Dem.* 37–41 adopts the theory of three composition types (χαρακτῆρες συνθέσεως) from *Comp.* 21–24, but Dionysius does not tell his audience how the two theories are related. In any case, the relative chronology of *On Demosthenes* and *On Composition* is not very important for our purposes. It suffices to assign both of these treatises to the middle period of Dionysius' works, to which the *Letter to Pompeius* (which elaborates *Dem.* 5–7) belongs as well. The group of later works includes at least the treatise *On Thucydides* and its appendix, the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*.[112] *On Dinarchus* also seems to be one of the later works.[113] The relative date of the treatises *On Imitation* and the *First Letter to Ammaeus* is uncertain, but this does not affect our examinations: these essays will be less prominent in this study because they do not contain many relevant passages on linguistic topics. The four works that will concern us most are *On Demosthenes*, *On Composition*, *On Thucydides* and the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*. In these works, Dionysius frequently uses grammatical theories, which we do not find in the works of the early period (see also section 3.3). Unfortunately, nothing is known about Dionysius' work *On Political Philosophy*, to which he refers in *On Thucydides*.[114] The *Ars rhetorica* that has come down to us under Dionysius' name is not authentic.[115] Finally, it should be mentioned that Quintilian refers to a work by Dionysius *On Figures*.[116]

To this brief survey, I would like to add some thoughts on the pedagogical nature of most of Dionysius' works. Because of the many theories that Dionysius' rhetorical works incorporate, it might seem difficult to determine the genre to which they belong. Thus, Viljamaa remarks the following: '[Dionysius'] critical essays are not easy to classify: are they literary criticism, rhetoric, stylistics or grammatical trea-

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two parts of *On Demosthenes* (1–34, 35–52, 53–54, 54–58) (see Van Wyk Cronjé [1986] 36–51).

[112] In *Amm.* II 1.421,5–15, Dionysius remarks that he has already treated Thucydides' style in *On the Ancient Orators* (i.e. *Dem.* 10) and 'a short time ago' in the work *On Thucydides*. Cf. Bonner (1939) 35.

[113] *On Dinarchus* was written after *On the Ancient Orators* and *On Demosthenes*: see *Din.* 1.297,1–2; *Din.* 11.313,21–22; *Din.* 13.320,12.

[114] *Thuc.* 2.327,20–22: ὑπὲρ τῆς πολιτικῆς φιλοσοφίας.

[115] On Pseudo-Dionysius, *Ars rhetorica*, see Russell (1979a) and Heath (2003).

[116] Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.3.89. See also section 4.4.1 n. 222. On these and other treatises that Dionysius may have written, see Aujac (1978) 19–22.

tises?'[117] It is true that some of the works seem to focus more on the criticism of earlier writers than on the production of texts. However, it is clear that both literary criticism and the other language disciplines that Dionysius applies are always subservient to his rhetorical teaching: literary criticism is subsidiary to the production of texts.[118] Therefore, I will refer to these treatises as 'rhetorical works'. The only seeming exceptions to this rule are the *First Letter to Ammaeus* and *On Dinarchus*, which deal with problems in the history of rhetoric: the former work discusses Demosthenes' alleged dependence on Aristotle, and the latter work distinguishes between Dinarchus' genuine and spurious speeches. But even these treatises on the history of literature ultimately aim to contribute to the production of texts: *On Dinarchus* shows which of Dinarchus' speeches should be taken as models for imitation (namely the genuine ones) and which speeches are spurious; the *First Letter to Ammaeus* proves that Demosthenes, Dionysius' preferred model, was not dependent on Aristotelian rhetorical rules: the conclusion might be that reading Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (or any technical manual) is not enough for students of rhetoric either.[119] In other words, even in these two works, as in all his other rhetorical treatises, letters and essays, Dionysius' primary interest is μίμησις (the eclectic imitation of the best qualities) of classical authors.[120] His discussions of Lysias, Isocrates, Isaeus, Demosthenes and other authors aim to show the future orator which qualities he should adopt and which mistakes he should avoid.[121] Likewise, in the treatise *On Thucydides*, Dionysius aims to assist 'those who will wish to imitate the historian' (τῶν βουλησομένων μιμεῖσθαι τὸν ἄνδρα) (see also section 4.4).[122]

Although all these treatises are characterised by a didactic approach in the sense that they instruct the reader on stylistic writing, we should not ignore the fact that the intended audiences of the works differ. The work *On Composition* (see section 1.6) is primarily addressed to Dionysius' pupil Metilius Rufus and more generally 'young men and those who are just beginning to take up the study' (τοῖς μειρακίοις τε καὶ

[117] Viljamaa (2003) 164.
[118] Cf. Innes (1989) 267. On the relationship between ancient literary criticism and rhetoric, see Classen (1995).
[119] See Goudriaan (1989) 19.
[120] Cf. Grube (1965) 211–212.
[121] See *Orat. Vett.* 4.6,21–24 in section 1.2.
[122] *Thuc.* 25.364,15–16.

νεωστὶ τοῦ μαθήματος ἁπτομένοις).[123] Despite Dionysius' characterisation of his treatise as a 'manual' (παραγγελματικόν) rather than a 'lecture course' (σχολικόν), it is clear that his approach is that of the tutor who instructs his pupils: this becomes manifest in the frequent questions that Dionysius asks when evaluating or analysing a literary text (see section 7.3.2).[124] The other rhetorical works are addressed to competent scholars rather than young students. *On Demosthenes* is not for 'those who do not know the orator's work'.[125] *On Thucydides* was written for the historian Tubero (see section 1.4) and 'other scholars who will read this treatise' (τῶν ἄλλων φιλολόγων τῶν ἐντευξομένων τῇ γραφῇ).[126] In the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*, Dionysius shows himself reluctant to illustrate his views on Thucydides by citing many passages, because this is the habit of 'the authors of rhetorical handbooks and introductions' (οἱ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς εἰσαγωγὰς τῶν λόγων πραγματευόμενοι); but at the special request of Ammaeus he will adopt 'the didactic instead of the epideictic method' (τὸ διδασκαλικὸν σχῆμα λαβὼν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπιδεικτικοῦ) (see section 4.4).[127] When examining Dionysius' linguistic theories and methods, it will prove useful to take the intended audience of each work into account.

1.4. *Dionysius and the network of intellectuals in Augustan Rome*

Dionysius was not the only Greek scholar who arrived in Rome at the beginning of the Augustan period.[128] Rome was a cultural centre that attracted a great number of learned men from all parts of the Graeco-Roman world. Among these men were Strabo of Amasia (who came to Rome in 29 BC) and Nicolaus of Damascus (who visited Rome several times as a diplomat of king Herod of Judaea).[129] Strabo wrote a *History* and a *Geography*, and Nicolaus composed, among other writings, a historical work and a biography of Augustus. In an earlier period, other

[123] *Comp.* 1.4,3–4.
[124] *Comp.* 22.98,15–17.
[125] *Dem.* 46.231,22–23: οὐ γὰρ δή γε τοῖς ἀπείροις τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τάδε γράφω. 'I do not write these things for those who do not know the orator's works.'
[126] See *Thuc.* 25.364,10–11.
[127] *Amm.* II 1.422,6. Cf. Goudriaan (1989) 18.
[128] On Greek literature under Augustus, see Bowersock (1965) 122–139. On Greek scholars in Rome, see Dueck (2000) 130–144.
[129] See Hidber (1996) 2–3. On Strabo see Dueck (2000), who also discusses Nicolaus of Damascus (133–135). On Nicolaus, see also Bowersock (1965) 134–138.

Greeks had already visited or settled in Rome, such as the rhetoricians Apollodorus of Pergamon and Theodorus of Gadara, and the historians Diodorus Siculus and Timagenes of Alexandria.[130] Many of these Greeks lived under the protection of Roman aristocrats, who acted as their patrons. An interesting example is Timagenes, who, having come to Rome as a captive in 55 BC, composed not only a historical work but also a biography of Augustus; after a conflict with the latter he joined the house of Asinius Pollio.[131] Apart from Greek scholars, many Roman intellectuals and literary writers were of course active in Augustan Rome. It is exciting to remember that Dionysius was roughly contemporary with Horace, Virgil, Ovid and Livy, although we do not know whether he ever met them.[132] In recent literature, the importance of Dionysius' contacts with Greek and Roman intellectuals in Augustan Rome has been firmly established.[133] It has been pointed out that Dionysius was part of a 'network' of intellectuals, who exchanged their ideas on language and literature.[134]

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[130] See Hidber (1996) 3–4.

[131] On Timagenes, see Bowersock (1965) 125–126 and Dueck (2000) 135–136.

[132] See Schultze (1986) 121 citing Spelman. Schultze correctly points out that we know nothing about the acquaintanceship of Dionysius and these Roman writers. On Horace and Dionysius, see also Rhys Roberts (1900a) 442 and Innes (1989) 267. Görler (1979) shows that in the Augustan period there are many interesting parallels between Greek literary theory (e.g. Dionysius) and Roman practice (e.g. Virgil and Horace), although he is rightly cautious about the exact relationship between Dionysius and the Roman poets. See esp. Görler (1979) 176: 'Eine direkte Benutzung der uns vorliegenden Schriften bzw. Fragmente griechischer Theoretiker ist, wie betont, fast unmöglich. Aber es ist durchaus denkbar, dass es in den Grundanschauungen und auch in manchen Details Übereinstimmungen zwischen der griechischen Theorie und der römischen "Praxis" gibt.' Görler (1979) 177 explains the parallels by assuming that earlier theories influenced both Dionysius (and Caecilius of Caleacte) and Roman poets such as Virgil and Horace.

[133] See esp. Wisse (1995) 78–80, Hidber (1996) 2–8 and Delcourt (2005) 30–35.

[134] I adopt the term 'network' from Wisse (1995) 78–80, with his explanation of the term: '(…) there must have been many contacts, of various sorts and varying intensity, between numerous Greek and Roman intellectuals.' See now also Dueck (2000) 131. Many scholars refer to a 'circle' in which Dionysius may have been active: see e.g. Rhys Roberts (1900a), Schultze (1986) 122 ('a circle of Greeks and cultured philhellene Romans'), and Hidber (1996) 7 and Delcourt (2005) 30–35 ('les cercles intellectuels'). Wisse (1998) rightly warns us for the word 'circle', which might suggest a specific group of writers under the protection of one patron. The contacts of Dionysius seem to have had a much wider range than that of a literary circle. Dionysius, for example, interchanged ideas with Pompeius Geminus, whom he did not personally know (see below): this and various other possible types of contact should also be taken into account. On Dionysius' personal contacts, see also his remark on the research for his history of early Rome in *Ant. Rom.* 1.7.3: καὶ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τῶν λογιωτάτων ἀνδρῶν, οἷς εἰς

We can uncover part of this network by examining the addressees of Dionysius' rhetorical works, and this has been successfully done by a number of modern scholars.[135] Unfortunately, most of these addressees are only known from Dionysius. Thus, Ammaeus, the Greek or Roman addressee of two literary letters and the work *On the Ancient Orators* cannot be identified.[136] The same holds for the Greek Demetrius, to whom Dionysius dedicated his treatise *On Imitation*.[137] Cn. Pompeius Geminus received copies of Dionysius' works from their mutual friend Zeno (otherwise unknown).[138] He objected to Dionysius' criticism of Plato and thus forced Dionysius to illuminate his views in his *Letter to Pompeius*. Most scholars assume that Pompeius Geminus was Greek, but Hidber argues that he may have been Roman.[139] Many hypotheses have been expressed concerning this Pompeius: some scholars suggest that he was a client of Pompeius Magnus, which is an interesting idea because we know that Pompeius acted as a patron of Greek intellectuals.[140] Richards and Goold thought that Pompeius Geminus wrote the treatise *On the Sublime*, but this is mere speculation, rightly rejected by other scholars.[141] Two more recipients of Dionysius' works should be mentioned. He presented the treatise *On Composition* as a birthday gift to his Roman student Metilius Rufus, whose father was Dionysius' 'most esteemed friend'.[142] Bowersock has shown that Metilius Rufus is the

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ὁμιλίαν ἦλθον, διδαχῇ παραλαβών … 'Some information I received orally from men of the greatest learning, with whom I associated (…).' (See also section 2.4.)

[135] See esp. Rhys Roberts (1900a), Bonner (1939) 3–6, Bowersock (1965) 130–132, Goudriaan (1989) 2–3, and Hidber (1996) 5–7.

[136] See *Orat. Vett.* 1.3,6; *Amm.* I 1.257,1; *Amm.* II 1.421,2; 17.438,1. Ammaeus may have been Greek or Roman: see Hidber (1996) 7.

[137] See *Pomp.* 3.232,8.

[138] Therefore, Pompeius Geminus did not belong to the closer friends of Dionysius, and he may not have lived in Rome: see Aujac (1978) 26 n. 1 and Usher (1985) 352 n. 1.

[139] Hidber (1996) 7 n. 50.

[140] On the alleged connection between Pompeius Geminus and Pompeius Magnus, see Rhys Roberts (1900a) 439, Schultze (1986) 122, and Fornaro (1997) 4 n. 7. On the contacts between Pompeius and Greek intellectuals, see Anderson (1963) and Crawford (1978) 203–204.

[141] Richards (1938) and Goold (1961) 173–174. Rhys Roberts (1900a) 440 already hinted at the possibility. Bowersock (1979) 70 and Schultze (1986) 122. n. 6 reject the idea because *On the Sublime* is probably of later date. Aujac (1978) 26 n. 1 identifies Pompeius Geminus with Geminus of Rhodes, who wrote a treatise on astronomy. On these conjectures, see also Goudriaan (1989) 2–3. On the date of *On the Sublime*, see the literature cited in my section 1.5.

[142] See *Comp.* 1.4,4–5: ὦ Ῥοῦφε Μετίλιε πατρὸς ἀγαθοῦ κἀμοὶ τιμιωτάτου φίλων. 'Rufus Metilius, born from a father who is excellent and the most esteemed of my friends.'

same man who was to become proconsul of Achaea under Augustus.[143] Finally, there is Q. Aelius Tubero, to whom Dionysius addressed his treatise *On Thucydides*.[144] Tubero was a historian and a lawyer; his father was a legate in Asia, and his sons became consuls in 11 and 4 BC respectively.[145] Interestingly, Cicero knew both Quintus Aelius Tubero and his father Lucius.[146] Bowersock has suggested that Tubero was Dionysius' patron in Rome, which is possible but not certain.[147]

So far, I have restricted myself to the scholars to whom Dionysius' dedicated his works. However, Dionysius must have been in contact with many other intellectuals whom he does not mention in his works. Consequently, some scholars have made partly interesting and partly more fanciful conjectures about the 'professorial circle' in which Dionysius may have taken part.[148] Thus, it has been thought that Dionysius was in contact with 'Longinus' (the author of *On the Sublime*), 'Demetrius' (the author of *On Style*), Timagenes, and the house of Asinius Pollio.[149] We are on more solid ground when we think of Caecilius of Caleacte, whom Dionysius mentions as a 'dear friend'.[150] We

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On Rufus Metilius' birthday, see *Comp.* 1.3,5–9. Some MSS give the pupil's name as Melitius, but see Bowersock (1965) 132 n. 2. Bowersock points out that Dionysius includes the Metilii in the list of Alban *principes* in *Ant. Rom.* 3.29.7, whereas this family is absent from Livy's corresponding list (1.30.2).

143 See Bowersock (1965) 132.

144 See *Thuc.* 1.325,5–6; 55.418,20. Cf. *Amm.* II 1.421,13. In *Ant. Rom.* 1.80.1, Dionysius refers to Tubero's historical work.

145 See Bowersock (1965) 130 and Bowersock (1979) 68–69.

146 See Cicero, *Pro Ligario* 5.12. Cf. Bowersock (1979) 69.

147 Bowersock (1965) 130. See also Bowersock (1979) 68 and Hidber (1996) 6. Bowersock (1965) 130 n. 1 points out that there was a lexicographer Aelius Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who was active under Hadrian and who seems to be a descendant of our Dionysius. Bowersock argues that the lexicographer received his name Aelius from the Aelii Tuberones. Cf. Goudriaan (1989) 3 n. 3.

148 See esp. Goold (1961), and the cautious discussion in Goudriaan (1989) 3–4. As I pointed out above, the term 'circle' does not cover all types of contacts that Dionysius may have had with various scholars.

149 On Dionysius' alleged contact with 'Longinus' and Manilius, see Goold (1961) 168. Richards (1938) and Goold (1961) 173–174 argue that Dionysius' addressee Pompeius Geminus is the author of *On the Sublime*. Marin (1956) believes that Dionysius himself wrote that treatise. Goold (1961) 186–189 argues that 'Demetrius' (the author of *On Style*) is identical with the Demetrius to whom Dionysius refers in *Pomp.* 3.232,8. Rhys Roberts (1900b) 440 already hinted at the possibility. On Dionysius' alleged contact with Asinius Pollio and Timagenes, see Hurst (1982) 848, who draws on Costil (1949). On further possible contacts, see Goudriaan (1989) 3.

150 In *Pomp.* 3.240,14, Dionysius refers to Caecilius as τῷ φιλτάτῳ Καικιλίῳ. On this formulation, see Tolkiehn (1908), who points out that, given the rarity of the word φίλτατος in Dionysius' works, we may assume that there was a close connection

have already observed that Caecilius and Dionysius represent the Greek Atticism of Augustan Rome (see section 1.2). Caecilius also adopted the method of σύγκρισις (the detailed comparison of two authors), which Dionysius considers 'the best method of assessment' (κράτιστος ἐλέγχου τρόπος).[151] Unlike Dionysius, Caecilius applied this method in order to evaluate Latin literature also, for he made a famous comparison between Demosthenes and Cicero.[152] The only contemporary author who refers to Dionysius is Strabo.[153]

The conjectures about Dionysius' acquaintances are fascinating, but they do not help us much further. Therefore, I will adopt a slightly different approach to the problem, which will be more relevant to the subject of this study on Dionysius' linguistic ideas. Since this study focuses on Dionysius' integration of ideas from various language disciplines, it is useful to examine the presence of representatives of these disciplines in Augustan Rome. In the remaining part of this section, I intend to demonstrate that the presence of many grammarians in Rome may have influenced Dionysius' ideas on language. I will not claim that Dionysius was in contact with specific scholars or that he read specific treatises, although we may assume that some of these scholars were indeed known to him. My overview of contemporary linguists in Rome rather serves as a sketch of the scholarly context in which Dionysius was working, a context that shaped the ideas on which he built his rhetorical programme. A whole range of grammarians came to Rome in the first century BC. Some of them, such as the elder Tyrannion, Philoxenus and presumably Asclepiades of Myrlea, had either visited Rome or even settled there some decades before Dionysius arrived. Others, such as Tryphon and Diocles, also known as the younger Tyrannion, arrived in Rome in the same year as Dionysius (30 BC). Further, we should not forget that the Roman Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BC) was still alive when Dionysius settled in Rome. I will briefly discuss the most important facts concerning these scholars.

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between the two rhetoricians. On Caecilius of Caleacte, see further Rhys Roberts (1897), Brzoska (1899), Kennedy (1972) 364–369, Weißenberger (1997) and Innes (2002).

[151] *Pomp.* 1.224,9–10. See also section 7.4.

[152] Caecilius, fr. 153–154 Ofenloch. See Plutarch, *Demosth.* 3. 'Longinus', *Subl.* 12.4 also compares Demosthenes and Cicero. Russell (contribution to the discussion of Bowersock [1979] 76) supposes that Caecilius' comparison was not positive for Cicero. See also Innes (2002) 277–278 and Kennedy (1972) 368.

[153] Strabo 14.2.16. On Dionysius and Strabo, see Bowersock (1965) 129–130, Schultze (1986) 122, Goudriaan (1989) 2 and Dueck (2000) 130–133.

Tyrannion from Amisus in Pontus (the elder Tyrannion) came to Italy in 71 BC as a captive of the second Mithridatic war.[154] Before that time, he had been a student of Dionysius Thrax in Rhodes, if we may believe the ancient testimony.[155] Tyrannion worked in Rome from 67, and may have lived until 25 BC. In Rome, Tyrannion was not only the teacher of Strabo and of Cicero's son Marcus and nephew Quintus, but he also had connections with Caesar.[156] Furthermore, he took care of the Peripatetic library of Apellicon, which Sulla had brought to Rome in 84 BC. This library included many valuable manuscripts of works by Aristotle and Theophrastus.[157] Only a few fragments of Tyrannion's works survive, but we know that he wrote a treatise Περὶ μερισμοῦ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν (*On the classification of the parts of speech*) (see section 3.2).[158] Tyrannion is the first *grammarian* in whose fragments the originally philosophical expression τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου is used. Some of the other book titles that have been preserved under the name of Tyrannion do not belong to him, but to his pupil Diocles, who was presumably named Tyrannion after his teacher.[159] Just like Tryphon (see below) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Diocles, or the younger Tyrannion, came to Rome around 30 BC.[160] He was given as a slave to Cicero's widow Terentia, who freed him. It is certain that he wrote, besides other works, an Ἐξήγησις τοῦ Τυραννίωνος μερισμοῦ, which was a commentary on his teacher's treatise mentioned above.[161]

We are told that the grammarian Asclepiades of Myrlea came to Rome in the first half of the first century BC, but this is not entirely

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[154] For the testimonia on the elder Tyrannion's life, see Haas (1977). For Tyrannion's life and works, see also Wendel (1943), Pfeiffer (1968) 272–273, Rawson (1985) 69 and Baumbach (2002b).

[155] See Suda s.v. Tyrannion. Cf. Pfeiffer (1968) 266 and Rawson (1985) 69.

[156] On Tyrannion as one of Strabo's teachers, see Dueck (2000) 9.

[157] Strabo 13.1.54. See Pfeiffer (1968) 273, Rawson (1985) 40 and Dueck (2000) 9. See also my sections 1.5 and 3.3.1.

[158] Tyrannion fr. 55–56 Haas. The titles Περὶ μερισμοῦ and Περὶ τῶν μερῶν τοῦ λόγου, both mentioned in Suda, have been identified as one treatise that carried the title Περὶ μερισμοῦ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν, which was also the title of one of the works of Apollonius Dyscolus. Cf. Wendel (1943) 1815.

[159] See the discussion in Haas (1977) 97–98.

[160] According to Tyrannion T[estimonium] 17 Haas, Diocles came to Rome after Actium. If this information is correct, the elder Tyrannion must have taught Diocles at a very high age. Therefore, some scholars have suggested that Diocles came to Rome already in 48 BC (after Pharsalos): see Haas (1977) 96–97.

[161] Tyrannion T 17 Haas; cf. Haas (1977) 97.

certain.[162] Asclepiades wrote books on various subjects, including the biographical work Περὶ γραμματικῶν (*On Grammarians*) and a treatise on Nestor's cup (*Iliad* 11.352 ff.).[163] Our limited knowledge of Asclepiades' book Περὶ γραμματικῆς (*On Grammar*) can presumably be enhanced by the study of Sextus Empiricus' *Against the Grammarians*, for Blank has argued that Sextus Empiricus' attacks on grammar (including the theory of the parts of speech) respond to Asclepiades.[164] Blank also believes that Dionysius of Halicarnassus follows Asclepiades' argument in his work *On Composition*: I will examine this claim in section 3.3.2.[165]

A grammarian who definitely went to Rome in the first half of the first century BC was Philoxenus, who came from Alexandria.[166] He wrote a treatise Περὶ τῆς Ῥωμαίων διαλέκτου, in which he stated that Latin was a Greek dialect that was very close to Aeolic.[167] In section 2.4, I will discuss this theory, and we will see that Dionysius of Halicarnassus expresses the same view in his *Roman Antiquities*.[168] Philoxenus' work on the Latin language is not only interesting because of the theory it contains, but also because it implies that the author knew Latin to a certain extent. Philoxenus was also active in the field of technical grammar: we know the title of a work *On Monosyllabic Verbs* (Περὶ μονοσυλλάβων ῥημάτων).[169]

The influential grammarian Tryphon arrived in Rome in the same year as Dionysius (30 BC).[170] Tryphon wrote a number of grammatical works on the parts of speech, namely Περὶ ἄρθρων (*On Articles*), Περὶ προθέσεων (*On Prepositions*), Περὶ συνδέσμων (*On Conjunctions*), and Περὶ

[162] See Suda s.v. Asclepiades, where it is said that Asclepiades came to Rome under Pompeius Magnus. Pfeiffer (1968) 273 thinks that Asclepiades 'certainly went to Rome', but Rawson (1985) 69 n. 11 thinks that the Suda article is mistaken here. On Asclepiades, see further Wentzel (1896), Blank (1998) xlv–xlvi and Blank (2000) 407–411.

[163] See Pfeiffer (1968) 273.

[164] Blank (1998) xlvi and Blank (2000).

[165] On the relationship between Asclepiades and Sextus Empiricus, see Blank (1998) xliv–l and Blank (2000) 405. For the alleged connection between Asclepiades and Dionysius, see Blank (2000) 410.

[166] On Philoxenus, see Wendel (1941), Pfeiffer (1968) 273–274 and Rawson (1985) 68–69. On his works, see Theodoridis (1976) 8–14.

[167] For the fragments, see *GRF* 443–447 and *GREAC* 396–397. The same topic was treated by the younger Tyrannion mentioned above. See Pfeiffer (1968) 274.

[168] *Ant. Rom.* 1.90.1.

[169] See Wendel (1941) 197–198 and Pfeiffer (1968) 274.

[170] The fragments have been collected by Von Velsen (1853). For Tryphon's life and works, see also Wendel (1939) and Baumbach (2002a).

ἐπιρρημάτων (*On Adverbs*).[171] Although we do not have any evidence, we should not exclude the possibility that Tryphon was part of the network of intellectuals in which Dionysius participated.[172] Dionysius may also have known one or more of Tryphon's grammatical treatises.

Apart from the Greek grammarians mentioned, Didymus (who was active in the second half of the first century BC) may have come from Alexandria to Rome, but this is not certain.[173] Didymus wrote a large number of works, including commentaries on Homer, Aristophanes, Pindar and Sophocles, but also on Demosthenes and perhaps on Thucydides.[174] It is possible that Dionysius of Halicarnassus knew a commentary of the type that Didymus wrote: in section 4.4.2, I will discuss some remarkable parallels between Dionysius' grammatical notes on Thucydides and the observations in the Thucydides scholia.

What about Roman grammarians? It is possible that Dionysius was acquainted with the works of Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BC), who wrote his *De lingua latina* in the middle of the first century BC.[175] Dionysius knew at least one work by this erudite Roman scholar, for he refers to his *Antiquities* when discussing the origins of Rome.[176] Varro died shortly after Dionysius' arrival in Rome, but we are informed about a number of Roman *grammatici* who were active in the same period. In his *De grammaticis et rhetoribus*, Suetonius lists twenty grammarians who taught in Rome between the end of the second century BC and the end of the first century AD.[177] Some of them belong to the intellectual world of the Augustan period. Marcus Verrius Flaccus

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[171] See Von Velsen (1853) and Wendel (1939). Tryphon also wrote a work on the verbal moods, the title of which Suda cites as Περὶ ῥημάτων ἐγκλιτικῶν καὶ ἀπαρεμφάτων καὶ προστακτικῶν καὶ εὐκτικῶν καὶ ἁπλῶς πάντων: see Wendel (1939) 734–735. See also my section 3.8. It is uncertain whether Tryphon wrote separate treatises Περὶ ἀντωνυμίας and Περὶ μετοχῆς, as is sometimes assumed. Further, the titles of a number of unauthentic works have survived under Tryphon's name, among which a Τέχνη γραμματική and a work Περὶ τοῦ ὥς. On Tryphon's views on syntax, see Matthaios (2003).

[172] Here I may borrow the words that Bowersock (1965) 124 uses when discussing the connections between Dionysius, Strabo, Timagenes and Nicolaus: 'It would be surprising if these men failed to encounter one another at Rome (…).'

[173] See Pfeiffer (1968) 274–275. On Didymus, see Pfeiffer (1968) 274–279.

[174] See Pfeiffer (1968) 275–278. On the alleged commentary on Thucydides, which may even go back to Aristarchus, see Pfeiffer (1968) 225 and 277.

[175] On Varro and his connections to the intellectuals of his time, see Rawson (1985) *passim*.

[176] See *Ant. Rom.* 1.14.1: Οὐάρρων Τερέντιος. Varro was an important source for Dionysius' *Roman Antiquities*: see Gabba (1991) 98–101 and Fantham (1996) 95–96.

[177] See Kaster (1995).

(ca. 55 BC – 20 AD), for example, taught Augustus' grandsons and had a grammar school at the Palatium.[178] Suetonius does not mention his writings, but we know that Verrius wrote a lexicographical treatise *De verborum significatu* (*On the Meaning of Verbs*). Quintus Caecilius Epirota (ca. 75–15 BC), Lucius Crassicius (ca. 70–20 BC), Scribonius Aphrodisius (born ca. 50 BC), Gaius Iulius Hyginus (born ca. 60 BC), and Gaius Melissus (ca. 50 BC – 20 AD) also taught grammar while Dionysius was at Rome.[179] Because Suetonius is more interested in the lives of these grammarians than in their writings, it is difficult to determine the connections between their views and the ideas of Dionysius of Halicarnassus.[180]

The foregoing survey clearly shows that, in the first century BC, Rome was a place where linguistic knowledge was omnipresent. There were many opportunities for someone like Dionysius to come into contact with the theories of grammarians. Although we do not have any hard evidence, we should take into account the possibility that Dionysius knew one or more treatises by Asclepiades, the elder Tyrannion or other grammarians, and that, during his stay in Rome, he was in contact with scholars like Tyrannion, Tryphon and Diocles (the younger Tyrannion) or their Roman colleagues. It is clear that Dionysius' grammatical treatment of the parts of speech in particular (a subject that is to be explored in chapters 3–5 of this study) cannot entirely depend on his reading of earlier Peripatetic and Stoic sources, though the works of Theophrastus and Chrysippus seem to have been important for him (see section 3.3.1). Schenkeveld has rightly suggested that Dionysius' remarks on grammar 'correspond with the level of common knowledge of linguistic views which then at Rome, at least in Greek circles, were circulating.'[181] The network of Greek and Roman intellectuals in Augustan Rome, the contours of which I have tried to sketch above, may have played an important role in the formation of Dionysius' ideas. I have focused on grammarians, but we should not ignore the representatives of other disciplines. Apart from the Greek and Roman linguists mentioned above, the Roman Vitruvius will also concern us, in particular in connection with Dionysius' views on the architectural character of dis-

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[178] Suetonius, *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* 17. See Kaster (1995) 190–196.

[179] Suetonius, *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* 16–21. See Kaster (1995) 182–222.

[180] Cf. Kaster (1995) 231. In his chapter on Quintus Remmius Palaemon, Suetonius does not even mention his *ars grammatica* (but we are informed about that treatise by Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 1.4.19–20 and Juvenal 6.451–453).

[181] Schenkeveld (1983) 93.

course (section 4.3.1). We will see that the classicistic ideas that pervade Vitruvius' *De architectura* (written in the early Augustan period) are very similar to the views that we find in Dionysius' rhetorical works.

1.5. *Rhetoric, philosophy, philology, grammar, musical and poetical theory*

Ancient Greek and Roman ideas on language were developed in the context of various disciplines. Dionysius of Halicarnassus makes use of these ideas and blends them into a programme of rhetoric that is to guide the future orators of his time. In this section, I will briefly introduce the most relevant facts concerning the disciplines that influenced Dionysius. I will start with the various philosophical schools to which Dionysius refers. Then I will present some of the other disciplines that play a role in his works.

Dionysius frequently refers to representatives of various philosophical schools.[182] The Peripatos is particularly prominent in his works.[183] As a rhetorician, Dionysius knew not only Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (at least the third book), but also Theophrastus' *On Style*.[184] From the latter work, he quotes more than once.[185] Dionysius may have known more works by these philosophers, for in 84 BC Sulla had brought the Peripatetic library of Apellicon, containing a number of Theophrastus' and Aristotle's manuscripts, from Athens to Rome (see section 1.4). One of the scholars who took care of this library was the elder Tyrannion mentioned above.[186] In Dionysius' rhetorical works, we find a number of Aristotelian ideas. Thus, the Aristotelian quality of 'clarity' (σαφήνεια) is central to Dionysius' stylistic theory, from his earliest to his later works

[182] See the overview in Goudriaan (1989) 439–469.

[183] Kroll (1907) 100–101 already pointed to the importance of 'altperipatetische Quellen (…), für welche Musik, Poesie und Prosa innerlich zusammengehören.' On the Peripatetic influence on Dionysius, see also Bonner (1938), Aujac & Lebel (1981) 35–36, Goudriaan (1989) 439–440 and 456–458 and Wooten (1994). Fortenbaugh (2005) 14–17 discusses Dionysius' use of Theophrastus and other Peripatetic sources.

[184] In *Comp.* 25.126,2–11, Dionysius refers to the third book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (see section 6.1). On Dionysius' references to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, see also Sauppe (1896).

[185] Dionysius is one of the most important sources for our knowledge of Theophrastus' *On Style*. For Dionysius' use of Theophrastus, see Fortenbaugh (2005) 14–17. Dionysius mentions Theophrastus sixteen times: once in the *Antiquitates Romanae* (5.73.3), and fifteen times in the rhetorical works. Passages from Theophrastus' *On Style* are discussed in *Lys.* 14.23,16–24,20 (Theophrastus fr. 692 Fortenbaugh) and *Comp.* 16.66,8–18 (Theophrastus fr. 688 Fortenbaugh).

[186] See Pfeiffer (1968) 273 and Rawson (1985) 40.

(see also sections 5.2 and 7.3.1).[187] Besides, he applies a number of stylistic ideas that were developed by Aristotle's successors. Dionysius' theory of essential and additional virtues of style (ἀρεταὶ λέξεως) elaborates Theophrastus' list of four virtues (purity of language, lucidity, appropriateness and ornament) (see section 6.5).[188] He also refers to Theophrastus' theory of the 'naturally beautiful words' (ὀνόματα φύσει καλά) (see section 4.3.1).[189] Furthermore, Bonner has shown that the theory of the three styles (*Dem.* 1–3: see section 5.2) as well as the theory of the three composition types (*Comp.* 22–24: see section 4.3.2) is based on the Peripatetic concept of the right mean of style (μεσότης, τὸ μέσον): the mixed style is preferred above the plain and elevated style, and the same holds for the mixed composition type.[190] It should be noted that Dionysius knows at least one representative of the Peripatos of his own time: in the *First Letter to Ammaeus*, Dionysius refutes a contemporary Peripatetic philosopher who had argued that Demosthenes learnt his rhetorical skill from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.[191]

Dionysius' relationship with Plato is complex.[192] Because of the focus of his rhetorical works, Dionysius is more interested in Plato's style than in his ideas. In his work *On Demosthenes* he points out that Plato's style, which is a mixture of the grand and the plain style, is attractive as long as the author uses common words and inartificial language.[193] But as soon as Plato's expressions become more ornate, poetic and 'dithyrambic', Dionysius sharply objects to them (see sections 5.2 and 6.4). He hastens to say that he knows that 'Plato produced many works on a variety of subjects that are great and admirable and show the highest ability'.[194] But the damage has already been done: the *Letter to Pompeius* proves that not all readers approved of Dionysius' attacks on Plato's 'poetic' style.[195] Occasionally, we find references to more philosophical ideas. Thus, Dionysius knew Plato's 'views concerning

[187] See e.g. *Lys.* 4.12,11–13; *Thuc.* 24.363,4–9.

[188] See *Pomp.* 3.239,5–240,16 and *Thuc.* 22.358,19–23. For an analysis of Dionysius' theory, see Bonner (1939) 16–19. Innes (1985) 255–263 discusses the history of the theory of the virtues of style.

[189] *Comp.* 16.66,8–18 (Theophrastus fr. 688 Fortenbaugh).

[190] Bonner (1938). For the 'Peripatetic mean of style', see also Hendrickson (1904).

[191] See Goudriaan (1989) 456–457.

[192] On Dionysius and Plato, see Goudriaan (1989) 555–565.

[193] *Dem.* 5–7.

[194] *Dem.* 6.138,12–14: πολλὰ περὶ πολλῶν οἶδα μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄκρας δυνάμεως ἐξενηνεγμένα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

[195] See esp. *Pomp.* 1.221,7–18.

the Form, his views concerning the good and his views concerning the state'.[196] In section 2.5, I will examine Dionysius' reference to Plato's *Cratylus*, which plays an interesting role in his discussion of mimetic words.[197] On the whole, however, Plato's influence is not as significant as that of Aristotle and Theophrastus.

Many scholars have recognised the Isocratean influence on Dionysius.[198] In section 1.2, we have already seen that Dionysius presents Isocrates' life (rather than his style) as a model for imitation. He even holds that anyone who is interested in 'true philosophy' (τὴν ἀληθινὴν φιλοσοφίαν) should imitate (μιμεῖσθαι) the principles of this orator.[199] Here, Dionysius adopts Isocrates' concept of 'philosophy' (very different from that of Plato or Aristotle), which is also related to Dionysius' 'philosophical rhetoric' (see section 1.2).[200] Dionysius thinks that a practical type of philosophy (which might also be called παιδεία) should characterise the leaders of cities, having attained high cultural standards through the study of rhetoric.[201] We may assume that Dionysius' lost treatise *On Political Philosophy* contained Isocratean ideas on the participation in public life (see section 1.3).[202] Like Isocrates, Dionysius is mainly interested in the genre of the πολιτικὸς λόγος (see section 1.6).[203] Isocrates' influence on Dionysius' political ideas is significant, but it will be of limited importance in this study on Dionysius' linguistic views. An exception is section 6.2, where I will compare Dionysius' and Isocrates' views on the styles of prose and poetry.

For the purpose of this study, the Stoic influence on Dionysius is much more important. Dionysius knew the work Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν (*On the Syntax of the Parts of Speech*) by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus (see sections 3.3.1 and 5.3.1).[204] Dionysius may

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[196] *Thuc.* 3.329,1–2: τὰ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ περὶ τἀγαθοῦ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας.

[197] See *Comp.* 16.62,18–63,3.

[198] I regret that I have not been able to consult Hubbell (1913), who discusses Isocrates' influence on Dionysius. On this topic, see also Hidber (1996) 44–56.

[199] *Isoc.* 4.61,4–9.

[200] See Goudriaan (1989) 439 and 442–445 (on Dionysius' use of the term 'philosophy').

[201] In *Dem.* 15.161,10–11 he characterises the well educated few as οἱ δὲ πολιτικοί τε καὶ ἀπ' ἀγορᾶς καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας ἐληλυθότες, 'men experienced in public life and with a broad education'. On Dionysius' 'Bildungsideal', see Goudriaan (1989) 442–443 and Hidber (1996) 44–56.

[202] Cf. Grube (1965) 208.

[203] On the πολιτικὸς λόγος, see Goudriaan (1989) 71–76.

[204] *Comp.* 4.22,12–17.

also have known other Stoic works.[205] In chapter 3, I will argue that Dionysius' theory of the parts of speech combines elements from Stoic philosophy and Alexandrian grammar. In chapter 5, I will argue that Dionysius' passage on natural word order (*Comp.* 5) is based on the Stoic theory of categories. Despite the importance of Stoic ideas for Dionysius' linguistic theories, I will not follow the suggestion of Aujac, who thinks that Dionysius may have been a Stoic himself.[206] Dionysius' profound abhorrence of Chrysippus' style renders it highly improbable that he was a member of the Stoic school.[207]

The Epicurean school is the object of Dionysius' contempt. At the end of his discussion of the three composition types in the treatise *On Composition*, Dionysius explicitly expresses his aversion to 'the chorus of Epicureans, who have no regard for these things' (Ἐπικουρείων δὲ χορὸν οἷς οὐδὲν μέλει τούτων).[208] It has been suggested that this remark is particularly directed at the philosopher Philodemus, who was active in Rome and Naples and who died about one decade before Dionysius arrived in Rome.[209] Philodemus wrote many treatises, including *On Rhetoric*, *On Music* and *On Poems*. Thus, unlike other Epicureans, Philodemus was interested in the artistic composition of prose and poetry.[210] For this reason, it seems in the first instance improbable that Dionysius refers to Philodemus when criticising 'the chorus of Epicureans'. Nevertheless, we should not rule out the possibility that Dionysius is indeed thinking of Philodemus: this becomes clear when we look at another group of scholars that seems to have influenced Dionysius' views, namely the so-called *kritikoi*, whom we know from Philodemus' *On Poems*.

The *kritikoi* were Hellenistic scholars who were interested in the criteria for good poetry.[211] In his work *On Poems*, Philodemus discusses and refutes the theories of these critics.[212] Philodemus' intermediate source was the Stoic philosopher Crates of Mallos, an older contemporary of

[205] Atkins (1934 II) 133 thinks that Dionysius may have been influenced by the Stoic Crates of Mallos (see below).
[206] Aujac & Lebel (1981) 77 n. 1.
[207] See *Comp.* 4.20,19–21,15.
[208] See *Comp.* 24.122,3–12.
[209] See Aujac & Lebel (1981) 174 n. 2 and Usher (1985) 209 n. 2. On Philodemus' life, see Janko (2000) 4–7.
[210] Cf. Janko (2000) 8.
[211] On the *kritikoi*, see Schenkeveld (1968), Porter (1995a) and Janko (2000) 120–189.
[212] See Janko (2000) 120–189.

Aristarchus.[213] Crates was one of the leading scholars of Pergamon and he visited Rome in 168 BC, where he taught grammar while recovering from a broken leg.[214] In the treatise *On Poems*, Philodemus refutes the views of Crates and the various earlier writers (*kritikoi*) whom Crates discussed in his work. The work *On Poems* has come down to us in 'what are probably the most damaged, disordered, and difficult fragments to survive from classical antiquity'.[215] But recent scholarship, including Janko's edition of *On Poems* 1, has increased our knowledge and understanding of the badly damaged papyri fragments from the book-rolls of the 'Villa dei Papiri' at Herculaneum, which was covered with ash in the eruption of the Vesuvius in 79 AD.[216] The views on poetry expressed in the fragments of *On Poems* 1 also shed new light on the literary theories of other critics, such as Horace and Dionysius.[217] The exact theories of the various *kritikoi* differ widely, but they all concentrate on the euphonic aspects of poems. These critics thought that poetry should 'please the ear' and that, consequently, the ear was the only criterion for the *evaluation* of poetry (see section 4.3.1). One of them is Heracleodorus, who seems to have argued that the only relevant aspect of poetry is composition (σύνθεσις) and 'the sound that supervenes upon it'.[218] Thus, for Heracleodorus and other critics, the understanding of the words of a poem is irrelevant to its quality. Here, Philodemus disagrees, for he thinks that words and sense together determine the quality of a poem, and that one cannot separate the words (or the composition) from the meaning.[219] As some modern scholars have observed, there are interesting parallels between the critics whose views Philodemus refutes on the one hand and Dionysius on the other.[220] In this study,

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[213] See Janko (2000) 120–134.

[214] On Crates of Mallos, see also Ax (1996) 288–289.

[215] Janko (2000) v.

[216] On Philodemus and poetry, see also Obbink (1995) and the literature mentioned there.

[217] See Janko vi: 'Although under half of it survives, *On Poems* 1 is an addition to the corpus of ancient literary criticism on the scale of the *Poetics* or *On the Sublime*. The theories which it contains are at least as significant as those in Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *De compositione verborum*, and will require us totally to reassess Horace's *Ars Poetica*.'

[218] Cf. Janko (2000) 156.

[219] Cf. Janko (2000) 8. Like Philodemus, Crates of Mallos denied that the content of a poem is irrelevant: see Janko (2000) 121.

[220] See Schenkeveld (1968) and Janko (2000) 178. Goudriaan (1989) 153–154 thinks that Dionysius' theories are not dependent on the *kritikoi*, but see my section 4.3.1 for a refutation of his arguments. Atkins (1934 II) 133 already pointed to the similarity

it will turn out that the connection between the *kritikoi* and Dionysius is even closer than scholars have thought so far. In several passages of this study, I will compare Dionysius' views with those of the *kritikoi*. In particular, I will point to similarities in their use of the theory of the parts of speech for stylistic theory (sections 3.2 and 3.3), their views on σύνθεσις (composition), on the architectural character of composition and on the role of the 'ear' in evaluating literature (section 4.3.1), their ideas on the similarity between prose and poetry (sections 6.2 and 6.6), and their use of the method of metathesis (section 7.2).

Coming back to Dionysius' criticism of Epicurean philosophers (see above), we may now reconsider the possibility that Dionysius is thinking of Philodemus. Given the fact that Philodemus objected to the critics who claim that the quality of a poem depends only on the composition (σύνθεσις) and its sound, we should not exclude the possibility that Dionysius' disgust at the Epicureans is indeed directed at Philodemus: it may be significant that Dionysius' reference to the Epicureans directly follows his discussion of the three composition types, in which euphony is the central concern. But it is perhaps better to leave the question open.

The views of the *kritikoi* are closely related to musical theory.[221] The influence of musical theory on Dionysius' rhetorical works (especially his composition theory) has long been recognised.[222] According to Dionysius, oratory and music differ from each other 'only in degree, not in kind' (see section 6.5).[223] Dionysius twice refers to the teachings of Aristoxenus 'the musical theorist': he is cited as an authority on rhythms and on vowels as well as other letters.[224] It is possible

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between the doctrines of Dionysius and the *kritikoi*: 'The closest analogy to his [i.e. Dionysius'] theorising is presented by those Hellenistic scholars whom we learn from Philodemus, notably Heracleodorus, and the Stoics, Ariston of Chios and Crates of Mallos, who insisted for the first time on the importance of "composition" in poetry, on the need for beautiful words harmoniously arranged, and for those euphonious and rhythmical effects inherent in syllables and letters (…) so that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, directly or indirectly, the animating ideas of Dionysius were drawn from these sources.'

[221] See Janko (2000) 134–138, esp. 134: '(…) musical theory came to influence Hellenistic poetics.'

[222] Kroll (1907) 91–101 argued that large parts of Dionysius' *On Composition* depend on musical theory. This seems to be true (see also Pohl [1968] 90–97), but *pace* Kroll (1907) 97–98, I do not think that the discussion of rhythm in *Comp.* 17 is based on Aristoxenus: see section 6.3.

[223] *Comp.* 11.39,17–40,16. See Goudriaan (1989) 536–554.

[224] *Comp.* 14.49,2 and *Dem.* 48.233,8–9.

that Dionysius' four means of σύνθεσις (composition), namely μέλος (melody), ῥυθμός (rhythm), μεταβολή (variety) and πρέπον (propriety), are originally musical categories..[225] Although this study focuses on the relationship between rhetoric, grammar, and philosophy, I will occasionally touch upon the connections between Dionysius and Aristoxenus and other musical theorists (see sections 4.3.2, 6.3 and 6.5).

When we turn to grammar, we should distinguish between Alexandrian philology on the one hand, and technical grammar on the other. It is not certain when exactly technical grammar emerged (see section 3.2), but I have already pointed out above (section 1.4) that Dionysius may have known the works of the elder Tyrannion, Asclepiades or Tryphon. Concerning the Alexandrian philologists, the scholars who wrote commentaries and compiled lists of selected authors, the following should be added. Dionysius twice refers to Aristophanes of Byzantium and his division of poems into metrical *cola* (see also section 3.3.1).[226] He also mentions Callimachus and 'the grammarians from Pergamon' (τοὺς ἐκ Περγάμου γραμματικούς).[227] Aristarchus and Dionysius Thrax are not mentioned in Dionysius' works. There is, however, reason to believe that Dionysius made use of the work of philologists: one of Dionysius' more famous remarks is that nobody could understand Thucydides without 'linguistic explanation' (ἐξηγήσεως γραμματικῆς) (see section 4.4).[228] In section 4.4.2, we will encounter some interesting similarities between the scholia on Thucydides and Dionysius' grammatical notes on Thucydides in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*. I will argue that Dionysius used a commentary on Thucydides, which might ultimately go back to Aristarchus.

The influence of the rhetorical tradition on Dionysius can of course not be overestimated. I have already mentioned the importance of Isocrates. In this study, I will frequently compare Dionysius' views with those of 'Demetrius', the author of the treatise *On Style*, and 'Longinus', the author of the treatise *On the Sublime*. The date of both works is uncertain. With Russell and Innes, I will assume that 'Demetrius' belongs to the second century BC (preceding Dionysius) and that 'Longinus' belongs to the first century AD.[229] In some cases, I will com-

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[225] See Kroll (1907) 94–95. The four means of composition are treated in *Comp.* 11–20.
[226] *Comp.* 22.102,2 and *Comp.* 26.140,19.
[227] *Din.* 1.297,15–16.
[228] *Thuc.* 51.410,15–17.
[229] On the date and authorship of *On Style* and *On the Sublime*, see Innes (1995) 312–321 and Russell (1995) 145–148 in the Loeb edition. On 'Longinus', see also Russell (1964)

pare Dionysius with the Roman rhetorician Quintilian (ca. 40–100 AD), who uses Dionysius' rhetorical works in his *Institutio oratoria*.[230] Not surprisingly, we will also find that there are parallels between Dionysius and his contemporary colleague Caecilius of Caleacte (see section 1.4). We possess only fragments of his works, but these clearly show that, just like Dionysius, Caecilius made use of grammar for his stylistic theory (see section 4.4.2). However, I will not follow the view of Nassal, who argued that the aesthetic theories of both Dionysius and Cicero depend on Caecilius of Caleacte.[231] This thesis is very unlikely, because all evidence suggests that Caecilius was contemporary with Dionysius and perhaps even slightly younger (see section 4.4.2).[232] Although he was wrong about Caecilius' date, Nassal correctly pointed out that there are remarkable parallels between the composition theories of Cicero and Dionysius. Instead of assigning these parallels to a Greek source, I will argue that Dionysius may have known some of Cicero's works:[233] despite the modern reluctance to make a Greek scholar dependent on a Roman author, parallels between Cicero and Dionysius may be based not only on their use of earlier theories, but also on Dionysius' knowledge of Cicero's treatises.

1.6. *Dionysius'* On Composition *as a synthesis of ancient language disciplines*

Dionysius' integration of various language disciplines is most successful in his work Περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνόματων (*De compositione verborum*), which deserves a separate introduction. Literally, the title of this treatise could be rendered as 'the putting together of words', but it also deals with the arrangement of letters and syllables, and with the juxtaposition of clauses and periods. The traditional English title is *On Literary Composition*, and it is indeed true that the treatise develops a method of σύνθεσις

xxii–xxx. For a different view, see Heath (1999), who revives the old attribution of *On the Sublime* to Cassius Longinus (third century AD).

[230] Quintilian refers to Dionysius in *Inst. orat.* 3.1.16; 9.3.89; 9.4.88.

[231] Nassal (1910).

[232] Blass, *DGB* (1865) 174, Bowersock (1965) 124 and Kennedy (1994) 160 assign Caecilius to Augustan Rome. Hidber (1996) 41 n. 184 rightly rejects the earlier dates of Caecilius advocated by Wilamowitz (1900) 6 and Nassal (1910). See also section 4.4.1.

[233] Egger (1902) 77 already considered the possibility that Dionysius read Cicero's rhetorical works and used them for his composition theory.

that covers all genres of prose and poetry.[234] Nevertheless, the adjective 'literary' carries connotations that do not entirely fit Dionysius' introduction to his work: he regards the treatise as 'the most necessary of all aids (…) to all alike who practice civil oratory, whatever their age and disposition may happen to be'.[235] In this study, it will become clear that we can only understand Dionysius' works when we pay due attention to his practical (rhetorical) aims (see also section 1.3). Although Dionysius' treatise blurs the borders between prose and poetry, and even those between music and oratory, we should not ignore the fact that Dionysius is primarily focusing on those readers who wish to become successful orators. Throughout this book, therefore, I will use the neutral title *On Composition*, which seems to be the least unsatisfactory translation of the Greek title.[236]

On Composition is generally considered to be Dionysius' most original contribution to rhetorical theory and literary criticism.[237] In fact, this treatise on σύνθεσις is a very successful *synthesis* itself. Nowhere is Dionysius' versatility so manifest as in this treatise on composition, which incorporates views from all ancient language disciplines that are relevant to the subject.[238] A brief overview of the structure of the

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[234] See Rhys Roberts (1910) 10–11 and Usher (1985) 5. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 9–12 translate the title as *La composition stylistique*. Cf. Rhys Roberts (1910) xii: 'Though he has the art of speaking specially in view, Dionysius draws his literary illustrations from so wide a field that the art of literature may be regarded as his theme.'

[235] *Comp.* 1.3,15–4,3: ἀναγκαιότατον ἁπάντων χρημάτων … ἅπασι μὲν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἀσκοῦσι τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους, ἐν ᾗ ποτ' ἂν ἡλικίᾳ τε καὶ ἕξει τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες. On the genre of the πολιτικὸς λόγος, see Aujac (1978) 175–176 n. 2 and Goudriaan (1989) 71–76 (see also my section 1.5). Although the aesthetical aspect of the 'political speech' is in some cases more relevant than its role in the political domain, Dionysius normally associates this genre with the orator who is politically active: see e.g. *Dem.* 15.160,20–22. In *Comp.* 22.98,7, Dionysius distinguishes three genres of writing, namely ποίησις (poetry), ἱστορία (history) and λόγοι πολιτικοί (political speeches).

[236] *On Word-Arrangement*, the title that Grube (1965) 217 uses, aptly brings out the importance of words as Dionysius' starting point, but it lacks the crucial idea of συντιθέναι (putting together). Egger (1902) 67 also adopts the title *Sur l'arrangement des mots*.

[237] See e.g. Grube (1965) 217 and Goudriaan (1989) 698.

[238] In section 1.1, I have already drawn attention to the apt characterisation of the work by Blass, *DGB* (1865) 199. It has been pointed out that Dionysius' older contemporary Varro, too, integrated many linguistic theories in his works. See Taylor (1996a) 335: 'Varro blends Aristotelian, Stoic, Alexandrian, Epicurean, and even Pythagorean linguistic thought into a typically eclectic Roman amalgam of language science.' But the wide range of Dionysius' theories also includes views from musical, metrical and rhetorical theory.

work can illustrate the broad range of theories that the work brings together:[239]

Comp. 1–5:	introduction; definition of σύνθεσις (composition); the powerful effects of composition (illustrated with passages from Homer and Herodotus); natural word order;
Comp. 6–9:	the three ἔργα (activities) of composition, namely ἁρμογή (the basic arrangement), σχηματισμός (the shaping of the form of the units) and μετασκευή (the modification of the material by subtraction, addition or alteration); the three ἔργα are applied to the level of words (ὀνόματα) (*Comp.* 6), to the level of clauses (κῶλα) (*Comp.* 7–9), and to the level of periods (περίοδοι) (*Comp.* 9);
Comp. 10–20:	the two aims of composition: ἡδονή (attractiveness) and καλόν (beauty); the four means of attaining these aims: μέλος (melody), ῥυθμός (rhythm), μεταβολή (variety) and τὸ πρέπον (appropriateness);
Comp. 21–24:	the three composition types (χαρακτῆρες συνθέσεως or ἁρμονίαι): σύνθεσις αὐστηρά (austere composition), σύνθεσις γλαφυρά (smooth composition) and σύνθεσις εὔκρατος or κοινή (well-blended or intermediate composition);
Comp. 25–26:	the relations between prose and poetry: in what way can prose be made to resemble a beautiful poem, and in what way can a poem be made to resemble beautiful prose?

The success of Dionysius' integration of various disciplines into one coherent whole is a result of two factors. On the one hand, Dionysius makes use of linguistic views where they are relevant to a certain aspect of composition. On the other hand, he always keeps the practical aims of his treatise in mind. Thus, we find Dionysius selecting the workable ideas from different language sciences, while at the same time avoiding elaborate discussions of technical details that are not useful for his intended audience. I will illustrate both aspects of the work *On Composition*, thus previewing some of the linguistic theories that we will encounter in this study (the following list of theories is not exhaustive).

At the beginning of his treatise, Dionysius demarcates his subject: all kinds of discourse (λόγοι) consist of ideas (νοήματα) on the one hand

[239] For more detailed summaries of *On Composition*, see Rhys Roberts (1910) 1–10 and Goudriaan (1989) 160–166. Note that Dionysius himself announces the structure of the work in *Comp.* 1.6,3–16.

and words (ὀνόματα) on the other; the former aspect corresponds to 'subject matter' (ὁ πραγματικὸς τόπος) and the latter aspect to 'expression' (ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος).[240] Expression in its turn is divided into two parts, namely the selection of words (ἐκλογὴ ὀνομάτων) and the putting together of words (σύνθεσις ὀνομάτων), which is the subject of this treatise.[241] The definition of σύνθεσις (*Comp.* 2) introduces τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια (the parts of speech) as the building blocks of composition (see section 4.3.1).[242] Dionysius then discusses the history of the theory of the parts of speech, listing the various philosophers and grammarians who used different numbers of parts of speech (see section 4.2.1).[243] Here we enter the realm of grammatical theory. It has been claimed that Dionysius rejects the grammatical approach after the first part of his work on composition, but this analysis is not correct.[244] The parts of speech play a fundamental role in Dionysius' theory of composition as a whole: they are the elements (στοιχεῖα) from which clauses (κῶλα) are built, thus constituting the starting point in the process of composition.[245] Dionysius' use of the term στοιχεῖα reminds us of the Stoic views on the μέρη λόγου (see section 3.5). Having cited some attractively composed passages from Homer and Herodotus, Dionysius intends to prove the power of composition by applying the method of metathesis: he rewrites a number of Homeric lines in order to illustrate his view that their quality depends on their σύνθεσις: this is a linguistic experiment that we also find in the works of other rhetoricians and in the fragments of the *kritikoi* in Philodemus' *On Poems* (see section 7.2). At the end of *Comp.* 4, Dionysius reports that when examining the views of his predecessors on the subject of his treatise, he came across some treatises by Chrysippus (see sections 3.3.1 and 5.3.1). Although Dionysius tells us that these Stoic works contained logical rather than rhetorical investigations, it seems that they have nevertheless influenced his thinking. In *Comp.* 5, Dionysius examines whether a natural word order results in beauty and attractiveness. The rules of nature are here the rules of logic: Dionysius arranges the parts of speech according to the logical order of their categories (see section 5.3). This is a unique example

[240] *Comp.* 1.4,6–11.
[241] *Comp.* 1.5,5–8. On Dionysius' rhetorical system, see Kremer (1907).
[242] *Comp.* 2.6,17–19.
[243] *Comp.* 2.6,20–7,13.
[244] Pohl (1968) 3 thinks that Dionysius leaves the grammatical perspective after *Comp.* 5, but see my section 4.3.
[245] *Comp.* 2.6,19; *Comp.* 2.7,14–18.

of the integration of grammatical, philosophical and rhetorical theory, even if Dionysius decides to reject the approach. In *Comp.* 6, Dionysius starts the discussion of the three ἔργα of composition. These are first applied to the level of the μόρια λόγου, which are both parts of the phrase and word classes (see sections 3.4 and 4.3.1), and subsequently to the level of the κῶλα (clauses).[246] On the level of words, the second ἔργον of composition deals with the selection of the correct *grammatical* form of nouns, verbs, and other parts of speech: here we find the earliest extant discussion of the *accidentia* of the parts of speech, but it should be noted that the grammatical theory is completely subservient to Dionysius' rhetorical theory (section 4.3.1).[247] Dionysius' treatment of the modification (μετασκευή) of the parts of speech for the sake of euphony (as perceived by the ear) corresponds to what we know of the views of the Hellenistic *kritikoi*.[248] On the level of clauses (κῶλα), Dionysius adopts the Stoic speech act theory and applies it to his theory of composition.[249] The discussion of the two aims and the four means of composition (*Comp.* 10–20) contains a number of ideas that originate in poetical, metrical and musical theory. The four means of composition, melody, rhythm, variety and appropriateness, seem to be borrowed from musical theory.[250] The passage on the values of the different letters and syllables (*Comp.* 14–15) builds on the doctrines of Aristoxenus (see section 1.5), and Dionysius' observations largely correspond to the views that we find in the fragments of the *kritikoi* in Philodemus' *On Poems*.[251] The passage on the various sounds of letters and syllables culminates in a discussion of mimetic words (*Comp.* 16), in which Dionysius refers to Plato's etymologies in the *Cratylus*. Dionysius' account of prose rhythm (*Comp.* 17–18) seems to build on the theories of 'metricians' rather than on the views of Aristoxenus (section 6.3).[252] The discussion of appropriateness (*Comp.* 20) includes a close analysis of the tortures of Sisyphus as portrayed by Homer.[253] In this 'splendid appraisal' of the Homeric passage, more than anywhere else, Dionysius shows

246 *Comp.* 6–9.
247 *Comp.* 6.28,20–29,14.
248 *Comp.* 6.29,14–19.
249 *Comp.* 8. See Schenkeveld (1983) 90–91 and Schenkeveld (1984).
250 See Kroll (1907) 91–101 and Pohl (1968) 90–97. See also section 1.5.
251 See Janko (2000) 178.
252 See *Comp.* 17.73,2. On the ancient metricians, see Leonhardt (1989).
253 *Comp.* 20.89,18–93,19 on *Odyssey* 11.593–598.

that he is a sophisticated literary critic.[254] His theory of the three composition types (*Comp.* 21–24) incorporates views from musical, poetical and grammatical theory (see section 4.3.2).[255] The building blocks of the three ἁρμονίαι are again the grammatical parts of speech. Thus, the composition types (austere, smooth, and well-blended) are not only characterised by their rough or smooth sounds, but also by their use of 'conjunctions' and 'articles'. Besides, Dionysius uses the concept of συνέχεια (continuity), which we know from musical and poetical theory, and the concept of the παραπληρώματα (filler words), which we find in rhetorical and grammatical theory (notably in the fragments of Dionysius' contemporary Tryphon). In his discussion of prose and poetry (*Comp.* 25–26), Dionysius refers to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (see sections 1.5 and 6.1), but his views are more similar to those of 'Longinus' and the *kritikoi* (see section 6.5). In a polemical passage, Dionysius provides an interesting description of the grammatical curriculum, which seems to inform us about the contemporary practice of grammar schools (see section 3.3.3).

This summary of *On Composition* shows that the treatise is indeed a *synthesis* of language disciplines. But in spite of all the different theories that he uses, Dionysius always keeps an eye on the unity of his work and on its practical purposes.[256] Thus, he never loses himself in technical discussions of details that are not relevant to the subject of his treatise. In many passages, Dionysius states that he will leave the technical details to grammarians, philosophers or metricians, thus explicitly demarcating his own profession as a teacher of rhetoric. I will give a few examples of this attitude. Having started his discussion of letters, the sounds of which contribute to the presence or absence of euphony, Dionysius touches upon the problem of the exact number of letters: some have thought that there are only thirteen 'elements of sound' (φωνῆς στοιχεῖα) and others have thought that there are more than twenty-four.[257] Dionysius decides that he is not going to deal with these irrelevant examinations: 'Now the discussion of these matters belongs more properly to grammar and prosody, or even, if you like, to philosophy. It is enough for us to assume that there are neither more nor

[254] Grube (1965) 219. See also Innes (1989) 271.
[255] Cf. Pohl (1968) 121–122.
[256] Goudriaan (1989) 161–165 shows that *On Composition* complies with the rules of the systematic handbook (τέχνη) as analysed by Fuhrmann (1960).
[257] *Comp.* 14.50,1–6.

less than twenty-four elements of sound, and to describe the properties of each, beginning with the vowels.'[258] In his discussion of the syllables formed from letters, Dionysius comes to speak about the different lengths of short and long syllables. The first syllable of the word ὁδός remains short even if one adds one letter (Ῥόδος), two letters (τρόπος) or three letters (στρόφος) before the vowel. On the other hand, the syllable of the word σπλήν remains long even if one subtracts one or more letters. These facts are still supposed to be relevant to the discussion of μέλος, but Dionysius does not wish to run into further difficulties: 'As to the reason why long syllables do not exceed their natural quantity when lengthened to five letters, nor short syllables lose their shortness when reduced from many letters to one (…) this does not need to be considered at present. It is enough to have said what is relevant to the present subject (…).'[259] Dionysius adopts the same attitude when he has listed the twelve basic rhythms of two or three syllables in *Comp.* 17: 'Otherwise it was certainly not my intention to touch upon metrical and rhythmical questions, but only in so far as it was necessary to do so.'[260] Again and again, Dionysius delineates the borders of his field, thus showing that the various linguistic theories that he uses are all subservient to the theory of composition.[261]

Dionysius thus combines a wide knowledge of many different disciplines on the one hand with a focus on the practical purposes of his own work on the other hand. This attitude has important consequences for our interpretation of Dionysius' theories on language, linguistics, and literature. Although Dionysius deals with theories from grammar, philosophy and metrical studies, we should not interpret these passages as if they were parts of a grammatical, philosophical or metrical trea-

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[258] *Comp.* 14.50,6–11: ἡ μὲν οὖν ὑπὲρ τούτων θεωρία γραμματικῆς τε καὶ μετρικῆς, εἰ δὲ βούλεταί τις, καὶ φιλοσοφίας οἰκειοτέρα· ἡμῖν δὲ ἀπόχρη μήτ' ἐλάττους τῶν κδ μήτε πλείους ὑποθεμένοις εἶναι τὰς τῆς φωνῆς ἀρχὰς τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐτοῖς λέγειν, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ τῶν φωνηέντων ποιησαμένοις.

[259] *Comp.* 15.59,2–14: αἰτία δὲ τίς ἐστι τοῦ μήτε τὰς μακρὰς ἐκβαίνειν τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν μέχρι γραμμάτων ε μηκυνομένας μήτε τὰς βραχείας εἰς ἓν ἀπὸ πολλῶν γραμμάτων συστελλομένας ἐκπίπτειν τῆς βραχύτητος, … οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ παρόντι σκοπεῖν. ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ὅσον εἰς τὴν παροῦσαν ὑπόθεσιν ἥρμοττεν εἰρῆσθαι, …

[260] *Comp.* 18.73,10–13: οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἄλλως γέ μοι προὔκειτο μετρικῶν καὶ ῥυθμικῶν ἅπτεσθαι θεωρημάτων, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου ἕνεκα.

[261] Dionysius frequently tells his readers that he could say more about a certain subject, if time would not force him to return to his actual theme: on this aspect of his discourse, see also Bottai (1999b) 146–147.

tise.[262] This principle will prove to be fruitful throughout this study.[263] The diverse theories that *On Composition* and other works contain will be interpreted within the framework of Dionysius' rhetorical (and historical) theories and analyses.[264]

[262] It is dangerous to ignore the unity and structure of *On Composition*. Those scholars who adopt the method of *Quellenforschung* focus so much on Dionysius' alleged sources that they find inconsistencies everywhere. See e.g. Kroll (1907) 94: 'Es scheint also, als habe Dionys Gedanken, die in seiner Vorlage nur skizziert waren, um jeden Preis in ein System bringen und auf Flaschen ziehen wollen und sei damit nicht recht fertig geworden—was bekanntlich Schulmeistern zu allen Zeiten passirt.'

[263] See esp. sections 2.5 (on Dionysius' alleged philosophy of language) and 3.6.6 (on Dionysius' alleged system of nine word classes).

[264] Cf. Van Ophuijsen (1993) 768, who warns us that, when interpreting isolated statements of the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus with a philosophical terminology, we should 'remember that A. still is not himself a philosopher'.

CHAPTER TWO

DIONYSIUS ON THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE

2.1. *Introduction*

As a rhetorician, Dionysius of Halicarnassus is primarily interested in the artistic use of language for the sake of persuasion and aesthetic effects. However, his theories of composition and style presuppose certain more general views on the nature of language. These ideas will be the subject of this chapter. Here, I will not yet be concerned with grammatical, syntactical or poetical theory. I will rather try to find out what language itself means to Dionysius. I will discuss three aspects of Dionysius' concept of language in particular, namely the hierarchical structure of language (section 2.2), the connections between language, thought and reality (section 2.3), and Dionysius' views on the relationship between Greek and Latin, the two languages of the Graeco-Roman world in which he lived (section 2.4). Finally, I will focus on three passages in the work *On Composition* where Dionysius has been thought to allude to a certain philosophy of language. Some scholars have claimed that there is an inconsistency between Dionysius' views in these different passages; they think that, concerning the relation between names and things, in one case Dionysius follows Peripatetic and in other cases Stoic theories. I will argue (section 2.5), however, that the relevant passages are not in fact incompatible and that the local functions of these passages within Dionysius' treatise scarcely allow us to draw any conclusions about his alleged philosophy of language.

Before I start my discussion of Dionysius' ideas on language, a note of caution is necessary. To a certain extent, it is possible to recover Dionysius' views, by combining various passages of his works where he (sometimes implicitly) expresses himself on the nature of language. But we should not ignore the fact that his statements are always embedded in his rhetorical theory. Dionysius is not a philosopher but a rhetorician, and his works should not be interpreted as philosophical treatises. When discussing his ideas, I will take their rhetorical context into account. In two respects, then, this chapter may be considered

as introductory to the following chapters. First, it brings together some of Dionysius' more general views on language that form the basis of his technical theories on linguistics and style. Second, this chapter is programmatic in the sense that it shows the importance of interpreting Dionysius' views within the context of his (rhetorical and historical) theories. As we saw in section 1.6, many modern scholars have primarily used Dionysius in order to reconstruct the ideas of his 'sources' (e.g. Aristoxenus, Theophrastus, the Stoics). This traditional approach has led to a lot of misunderstanding. We will see that Dionysius' views on the hierarchical structure of language and the relation between names and things are closely related to his rhetorical theory (sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.5), and his ideas on Greek and Latin can only be understood as part of his historical work (section 2.4). The contextual approach to Dionysius' views on language will turn out to be fruitful in all the chapters that follow.

2.2. *The hierarchical structure of language*

The concept of language as a hierarchical structure is one of the central ideas in Dionysius' rhetorical works. According to this concept, language is a system that consists of various levels: the units of one level are the building blocks (or elements, στοιχεῖα) of the units at the next level. The '*stoicheion* theory of language' is found in the texts of many ancient writers of various language disciplines.[1] It can be traced back to Plato, but the various levels of language that are distinguished differ from one discipline to the other.[2] For the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus, the levels are letters, syllables, words and sentences.[3] For the rhetorician Dionysius, they are letters, syllables, words (parts of speech), clauses, periods and discourse. The musical theorist Aristides Quintilianus distinguishes between letters, syllables, metrical feet, metres and a complete poem.[4] All the scholars mentioned regard letters or sounds as the elements (στοιχεῖα) of language, but the levels that they distinguish in addition to that of the smallest elements depend on the units that

[1] See Pinborg (1975) 70 and Armstrong (1995) 211.
[2] Plato, *Cratylus* 424c5–425a5.
[3] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.2: see section 4.2.1 n. 11.
[4] Aristides Quintilianus, *On Music* 1.20–29.

are relevant to their specific discipline.[5] While the levels that consist of the smallest units (letters, syllables, words) seem to be regarded as representing the structure of language itself, the levels consisting of larger units (e.g. clauses, metres) are part of the artistic (technical) use of language for certain purposes. Thus, where the scholars of different disciplines seem to agree that language as such has a (naturally) hierarchical structure, they have their own views on how this hierarchical structure can be further developed in artistic (rhetorical or musical) composition. The atomistic approach to language does not only describe the hierarchical structure of language as such, but it also has a pedagogical function: many scholars organise their technical treatises (on grammar, metre, or music) according to the different levels of language that they distinguish.[6]

Plato expresses the atomic character of letters (γράμματα) by referring to them as στοιχεῖα ('elements'), and this becomes a standard term for letters in later times.[7] The Stoic philosophers emphasise the symmetry between the different levels of language when they use the term στοιχεῖα not only for letters, but also for the parts of speech (τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου): they distinguish between the στοιχεῖα λέξεως (or φωνῆς), the 'elements of articulated sound' (letters) on the one hand, and the στοιχεῖα λόγου, the 'elements of speech' (words) on the other (see section 3.2).[8] Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses the term στοιχεῖα for letters, but he also tells us that 'some call the parts of speech στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως.'[9] The latter statement seems to combine the Stoic point of view (words as elements) with a rhetorical approach to language as expression (λέξις): according to Dionysius, composition (σύνθεσις) starts from the parts of speech, which are the 'elements of style' (see section 4.3.1). But we should not read too much in Dionysius' reference to words as στοιχεῖα λέξεως (rather than στοιχεῖα λόγου), because he does not consistently distinguish between parts of λέξις and parts of λόγος (see sections 3.5 and 4.2.1). In any case, Dionysius' use of the term στοιχεῖα for both letters and words (parts of speech) is explicitly connected with his

[5] Because writing is central to all these disciplines, it is the letter (γράμμα) rather than the sound that is considered to be the element: see Desbordes (1986).

[6] See Sluiter (1990) 43 n. 16 and the literature mentioned there.

[7] See Sluiter (1990) 44 n. 19.

[8] See *FDS* 539–541.

[9] *Comp.* 2.6,19. See also De Jonge (2005a).

concept of language as a hierarchical structure. Concerning the letters, Dionysius states the following:[10]

> Ἀρχαὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φωνῆς καὶ ἐνάρθρου μηκέτι δεχόμεναι διαίρεσιν, ἃ καλοῦμεν στοιχεῖα καὶ γράμματα· γράμματα μὲν ὅτι γραμμαῖς τισι σημαίνεται, στοιχεῖα δὲ ὅτι πᾶσα φωνὴ τὴν γένεσιν ἐκ τούτων λαμβάνει πρώτων καὶ τὴν διάλυσιν εἰς ταῦτα ποιεῖται τελευταῖα.
>
> 'Now in the human and articulate speech there are prime units admitting no further division, which we call "elements" and "letters": "letters" (γράμματα) because they are signified by certain lines (γραμμαί), and "elements" (στοιχεῖα) because every vocal sound originates in these first units and is ultimately resolved into them.'

According to this explanation, the letters are the indivisible 'atoms' of the articulate speech of human beings. Dionysius also calls them τὰς πρώτας τε καὶ στοιχειώδεις τῆς φωνῆς δυνάμεις ('the first and elementary powers of the voice').[11] The adjective πρῶτος ('first') emphasises the status of letters as the smallest units: they constitute the first level of the hierarchical structure of language. The symmetry between the level of letters and that of words is indicated by the fact that the parts of speech are described as τὰ πρῶτα μόρια καὶ στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως ('the first parts and elements of the phrase': see section 3.5).[12] Dionysius' atomic theory of language is closely related to the concept of architectural discourse (see section 4.3.1): the structure of language is reflected in the composition of a text, which is 'erected' from its building blocks. In *Comp.* 2, Dionysius discusses the various levels of composition: here, the levels of language (in general) coincide with the levels of rhetorical composition.[13] The difference is that artistic composition starts from words (Dionysius' στοιχεῖα λέξεως) and not from letters (Dionysius' στοιχεῖα φωνῆς), although the building of certain mimetic words is also treated in the work *On Composition*.[14] The process of σύνθεσις begins with τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια ('the parts of speech'): they are put together in order to form κῶλα ('clauses'); the clauses constitute περίοδοι ('periods'), and these complete the λόγος ('discourse').[15] In chapter 4 of this study, I will

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[10] *Comp.* 14.48,3–8.

[11] *Comp.* 14.49,11–12. The terminology may be borrowed from Aristoxenus, to whom Dionysius refers in *Comp.* 14.49,2.

[12] *Comp.* 7.30,14.

[13] *Comp.* 2.6,17–7,18. See my discussion in section 4.2.1.

[14] *Comp.* 16.61,20–63,3.

[15] Dionysius describes the final stage as follows: αὗται δὲ τὸν σύμπαντα τελειοῦσι λόγον, 'and the periods make up the complete discourse' (*Comp.* 2.7,17–18). The use

argue that Dionysius' theory of composition is deeply influenced by the concept of architectural discourse.

2.3. *Language, thought, and reality*

Dionysius of Halicarnassus does not teach his students a semantic theory. But for a rhetorician it is crucial that one can use language both in order to formulate one's ideas and in order to present or describe the world about which one speaks or writes. Therefore, we find many implicit remarks in Dionysius' rhetorical works on the relationship between language and thought on the one hand, and the relationship between language and extra-linguistic reality on the other hand.[16] In this section, I will discuss Dionysius' ideas on these two aspects of language.

Central to Dionysius' views as a rhetorician is the distinction between 'ideas' (τὰ νοήματα) and 'words' (τὰ ὀνόματα), which correspond to the two aspects of discourse (τὰς θεωρίας τοῦ λόγου), namely 'subject matter' (ὁ πραγματικὸς τόπος) and 'expression' (ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος) (see also section 1.6).[17] This division is a guiding principle in Dionysius' essay on Thucydides, where he first discusses the historian's treatment of subject matter and then his style.[18] Likewise, in the *Letter to Pompeius*, he compares Herodotus and Thucydides first with regard to subject matter and subsequently with regard to style.[19] However, expression and subject matter cannot always be separated. Although in many parts of his work Dionysius focuses on stylistic matters, he knows very well that words and ideas are closely related.[20] I disagree with Scaglione, who argues that Dionysius 'is not interested in words as symbols but only as sounds, not in logic and semantics but only in phonetics broadly understood'.[21] It is true that, because of the scope of

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of the words τελειοῦσι λόγον reminds us of Apollonius Dyscolus' view (*Synt.* I.2) that the regularity of the intelligibles (νοητά) constitutes the complete discourse (ὁ αὐτοτελὴς λόγος), but Apollonius' λόγος is the sentence. See section 4.2.1.

[16] On ancient theories of semantics and signification, see Calboli (1992), Manetti (1993) and Sluiter (1997).

[17] See *Comp.* 1.4,6–15.

[18] Dionysius deals with Thucydides' subject matter in *Thuc.* 6–20, his style in *Thuc.* 21–51.

[19] Subject matter in *Pomp.* 3.232,18–238,22; style in *Pomp.* 3.239,1–240,22.

[20] See also Goudriaan (1989) 248–249.

[21] Scaglione (1972) 58. Blass, *DGB* (1865) 199 expresses a similar view. It is true that

his treatises, Dionysius pays more attention to euphony than to the correct formulation of thoughts; but he is always aware of the relationship between the form of words and their meaning, and he is concerned with the propriety (τὸ πρέπον) that should exist between the two: both the selection of words and the composition should be appropriate to the subject matter (τὸ ὑποκείμενον), 'the matter that underlies' the words.[22] In spite of the focus on matters of euphony and rhythm, the subject matter is in the end more important than the expression: Dionysius explicitly states that 'nature wants the expression to follow the thoughts, not the thoughts to follow the expression' (see also section 5.2).[23] Similarly, Lysias is praised because he does not make the subject (πράγματα) slave of his words (ὀνόματα), but makes the words conform to the subject.[24]

The semantic relationship between language and thought is especially expressed by the terms σημαίνειν ('to signify') and δηλοῦν ('to make clear').[25] In utterances (λέξις), 'we signify our thoughts' (σημαίνο-

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euphony is Dionysius' central concern in *On Composition* and that the meaning of words receives less attention here, but we must not forget that the subject of the treatise (σύνθεσις) is the cause of this imbalance. We should not interpret a treatise on stylistic composition as a treatise on rhetoric in general.

[22] See esp. *Comp.* 20.88,11–15: ὁμολογουμένου δὴ παρὰ πᾶσιν ὅτι πρέπον ἐστὶ τὸ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἁρμόττον προσώποις τε καὶ πράγμασιν, ὥσπερ ἐκλογὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων εἴη τις ἂν ἡ μὲν πρέπουσα τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἡ δὲ ἀπρεπής, οὕτω δή που καὶ σύνθεσις. 'It is generally agreed that appropriateness is the treatment that is fitting for the underlying persons and things. Just as the choice of words may be either appropriate or inappropriate to the subject matter, so surely may the composition be.' See further e.g. *Dem.* 13.156,6–7: τὸ πρέπον τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις προσώποις τε καὶ πράγμασι, 'the appropriateness concerning the underlying persons and things.' *Comp.* 11.40,7: τὸ μὴ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἁρμόττον, 'that which does not fit the subject.' In the selection of the correct grammatical form of a word (one of the ἔργα of composition), one should also pay attention to the propriety between the form and the underlying matter: see *Comp.* 6.28,20–29,14 (section 4.3.1): ἔπειτα διακρίνειν, πῶς σχηματισθὲν τοὔνομα ἢ τὸ ῥῆμα ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅ τι δή ποτε χαριέστερον ἱδρυθήσεται καὶ πρὸς τὰ ὑποκείμενα πρεπωδέστερον. 'Then they should decide the form in which the noun or verb or whichever of the other parts of speech it may be will be situated more elegantly and in a way that more appropriately fits the underlying matter.' On the term ὑποκείμενον in ancient literary theory, see also Meijering (1987) 110.

[23] *Isoc.* 12.72,6–8: βούλεται δὲ ἡ φύσις τοῖς νοήμασιν ἕπεσθαι τὴν λέξιν, οὐ τῇ λέξει τὰ νοήματα. Scaglione (1972) 58 has taken over Rhys Roberts' ([1910] 11) wrong reference to *Isoc.* 2.

[24] *Lys.* 4.13,6–8: τούτου δὲ αἴτιον, ὅτι οὐ τοῖς ὀνόμασι δουλεύει τὰ πράγματα παρ' αὐτῷ, τοῖς δὲ πράγμασιν ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ ὀνόματα.

[25] Van Ophuijsen (2003) 84–85 argues that both Aristotle and the Stoics use σημαίνειν in the sense of 'signposting': where δηλοῦν is 'to designate' (something desig-

μεν τὰς νοήσεις).[26] For Dionysius' stylistic theory, it is of course fundamental that thoughts can be expressed in different ways.[27] This idea is not only central to his distinction of three types of composition (see section 4.3.2), but it also clears the way for his important method of 'metathesis', the rewriting of a text in order to show the qualities, faults and particularities of the original (see section 7.3). Besides, it enables Dionysius to explain obscure passages in Thucydides by reformulating 'what he means to say', a technique that we also know from the ancient scholia (see section 4.4.2). Thus, he frequently introduces his interpretations with the words βούλεται γὰρ δηλοῦν …, 'for he wants to make clear (…)', or βούλεται γὰρ λέγειν…, 'for he wants to say (…)'.[28] An expression that he uses in a similar way is ὁ μὲν νοῦς ἐστὶ τοιόσδε ('the meaning is as follows') (see below).[29] The expression ἐκφέρειν τὴν νόησιν ('to express the thought') also relates to the formulation of thought in language.[30] In some cases, Dionysius simply states that a writer 'formulates as follows' (ἐκφέρει οὕτως). The concept of 'meaning' is more implicit in expressions like ποιεῖν τὴν λέξιν or ποιεῖν τὴν φράσιν ('to make the expression', 'to phrase'), σχηματίζειν τὸν λόγον ('to construct the sentence'), σχηματίζειν τὴν φράσιν ('to construct the phrase'), or simply σχηματίζειν ('to construct'): these terms refer to the shaping of a thought on the level of expression.[31]

The word νόησις ('thought', 'intelligence') is used less often in Dionysius' works than νόημα ('that which is thought', 'thought').[32] Dionysius also employs the term διάνοια ('thought', 'intention', 'meaning'), and,

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nates something), σημαίνειν is an act of communication between speaker and addressee (someone points something out to someone).

[26] *Comp.* 3.8,20–21: Ἔστι τοίνυν πᾶσα λέξις ᾗ σημαίνομεν τὰς νοήσεις ἢ μὲν ἔμμετρος, ἢ δὲ ἄμετρος. 'Every utterance, then, by which we signify our thoughts is either in metre or not in metre.' On the Greek terms for 'meaning', see Sluiter (1997) 151–155.

[27] See e.g. *Comp.* 4.20,8–10: on this passage, see section 7.1.

[28] For βούλεται δηλοῦν, see *Amm.* II 4.426,12; *Amm.* II 6.427,12–13; *Amm.* II 8.428,12–13; *Amm.* II 14.433,17; *Thuc.* 29.374,22; *Thuc.* 30.375,25–376,1; *Thuc.* 30.376,6; *Thuc.* 31.378,5. For βούλεται λέγειν, see *Amm.* II 9.429,2–3; *Thuc.* 29.374,13; *Thuc.* 32.378,22; *Thuc.* 46.402,24.

[29] *Thuc.* 31.377,16. Cf. *Thuc.* 40.394,8.

[30] *Amm.* II 4.426,1–2.

[31] For ποιεῖν τὴν λέξιν, see *Amm.* II 4.426,2. For ποιεῖν τὴν φράσιν, see *Amm.* II 5.426,16. For σχηματίζειν τὸν λόγον, see *Amm.* II 7.427,17–18; *Amm.* II 13.432,16–17. For σχηματίζειν, see e.g. *Amm.* II 5.426,16 (see also section 3.7).

[32] For νόησις, see above (*Comp.* 3.8,20–21) and e.g. *Dem.* 25.183,19 ('ideas' opposed to aspects of style like εὐέπεια and καλλιλογία); *Amm.* II 4.426,2. For νόημα, see e.g. *Lys.* 4.13,1; *Isoc.* 3.58,15.

as I already mentioned, νοῦς ('meaning', 'sense', 'idea').[33] The word ἔννοια ('thought', 'intent'), which is a common term for 'meaning' in the works of the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus, appears in one or two passages of Dionysius only.[34] As Sluiter points out, all these words are somehow connected to the idea of 'mental' processes, and their use points to the idea of words as 'vehicles of a thought'.[35] This can be either the thought of the speaker or a thought that is simply attached to a certain word. Dionysius presents the thought as the 'substrate' of the words, by referring to 'the underlying meaning' (τὴν ὑποκειμένην διάνοιαν, τὸν ὑποκείμενον νοῦν).[36]

With regard to utterances, Dionysius distinguishes between the form, τὸ σημαῖνον ('that which signifies') and the meaning, τὸ σημαινόμενον ('that which is signified').[37] These terms are prominent in Stoic philosophy, which distinguishes between the corporeal form (σημαῖνον) of a word, its incorporeal meaning (σημαινόμενον) and the thing in reality to which it refers (τυγχάνον).[38] The Stoic division between form and meaning, which has deeply influenced the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus, also seems to play a role in Dionysius' work.[39] According to Apollonius Dyscolus, only the forms of words can be modified, but their (incorporeal) meanings remain unaffected by the changes that occur on the level of the form.[40] Thus, whereas many sentences contain certain mistakes or irregularities on the level of expression, the asomatic λεκτόν ('sayable'—a more specific term than σημαινόμενον) is always

[33] For διάνοια as 'thought', see e.g. *Lys.* 8.15,12 (as one of the three aspects, besides λέξις and σύνθεσις, in which Lysias' ἠθοποιία [characterisation] becomes manifest); *Dem.* 20.171,3 ('thought' opposed to λέξις 'style'). For νοῦς, see e.g. *Comp.* 9.33,9; *Comp.* 22.97,10; *Comp.* 22.97,14.

[34] For ἔννοια, see *Ant. Rom.* 20.9.3; τῶν ἐννοιῶν in *Dem.* 39.212,11 was deleted by Krüger, probably because the text of the MSS would say that 'figures of thought' (τῶν ἐννοιῶν) include both 'figures of thought' (κατὰ τὰς νοήσεις) and 'figures of style properly' (κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν λέξιν); but Aujac keeps τῶν ἐννοιῶν in her text, translating 'des idées'. For the use of ἔννοια in Apollonius Dyscolus, see Van Ophuijsen (1993) 755–759.

[35] Sluiter (1997) 153.

[36] *Dem.* 39.212,21–22; *Dem.* 40.215,21.

[37] These neuter participles τὸ σημαῖνον and τὸ σημαινόμενον occur only in *Thuc.* and *Amm.* II.

[38] See Sluiter (1990) 22–26. Dionysius does not use the term τυγχάνον.

[39] On the distinction between σημαῖνον and σημαινόμενον in Apollonius Dyscolus, see Sluiter (1990) 26–36.

[40] See Apollonius Dyscolus, *G.G.* II 1, *Adv.* 158,14–15: τῶν … φωνῶν τὰ πάθη, καὶ οὐ τῶν σημαινομένων. 'Modifications affect the sounds, not the meanings.' (Translation by Sluiter.) See Sluiter (1990) 24–25.

regular (κατάλληλος).[41] Apollonius frequently rewrites sentences from daily usage or literary texts in order to bring out their meaning. The rewritten sentences are in fact 'verbal representations of the incorporeal λεκτά'.[42] In other words, Apollonius' paraphrases offer a representation of that which is signified by the expression.[43] As a rhetorician, Dionysius of Halicarnassus employs a similar method when he analyses obscure passages from Thucydides and other writers. In these cases, his rewritings (metatheses) offer a clear and straightforward alternative to the original passage, which he regards as difficult to understand (see sections 5.2 and 7.3.1). Interestingly, he twice introduces his metathesis with the following words: ἦν δὲ τὸ σημαινόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς λέξεως τοιοῦτο ('that which is signified by the expression was the following').[44] Here, Dionysius of course employs the same technique as the one that he elsewhere describes by the words βούλεται δηλοῦν, βούλεται λέγειν, etc. (see above); but his formulation suggests that he intends to recover *the* (unchangeable) meaning that underlies a certain expression rather than simply giving an alternative phrasing.[45] Dionysius' idea seems to be that there is a fixed meaning underlying all utterances, which one can present in different ways (more and less accurately, more and less clearly, or with different sounds or rhythms). In some passages, Dionysius states that a certain classical author has 'adapted' the formulation of a thought that he himself presents in his metathesis: in these cases, he regards his own metathesis as the more natural formulation, which corresponds more closely to the underlying meaning of the expression (see section 7.3.2). Unlike Apollonius' 'word-pictures', Dionysius' rewritings do not only intend to recover the true 'meaning' of a passage, but also to show the student how he should or should not construct his sentences. I will discuss Dionysius' rewriting method in more detail in chapter 7 of this study.[46]

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[41] See Sluiter (1990) 61–62. See also section 5.2 of this study. On the Stoic λεκτόν ('sayable'), see Frede (1987a) 303–309 and Sluiter (2000a) 377–378.

[42] Sluiter (1990) 63.

[43] Householder (1981) characterises Apollonius' verbal representations of the λεκτόν as a form of 'deep structure', but this is an anachronistic interpretation. Sluiter (1990) 67–68 points out that Apollonius' paraphrases do not represent the 'underlying structure' of expressions, but their true meaning: Apollonius' interest is semantic, not structural.

[44] *Amm.* II 7.428,3–4; *Amm.* II 10.430,8–9.

[45] The expression ὁ μὲν νοῦς ἐστὶ τοιόσδε (see above) similarly refers to the representation of an underlying meaning (νοῦς).

[46] In section 5.2, I will relate Dionysius' concept of a basic, underlying word order to his views on ἀκολουθία and ὁ κατάλληλος λόγος.

Another context in which Dionysius employs the terms σημαῖνον (form) and σημαινόμενον (meaning) is the grammatical analysis of a *constructio ad sensum*. More than once Dionysius points out that Thucydides 'sometimes changes the cases of nouns or participles from the signified to the signifying, and sometimes from the signifying to the signified' (ποτὲ μὲν πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ σημαίνοντος ἀποστρέφων, ποτὲ δὲ πρὸς τὸ σημαῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ σημαινομένου).[47] This construction occurs when Thucydides combines a collective noun in the singular (e.g. δῆμος, 'populace') with a plural verb, so that the grammatical from of the verb does not correspond to the grammatical form of the noun, but to its meaning (σημαινόμενον) (see section 4.4.2). Aristarchus calls this kind of construction a σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ νοητόν.[48] The fact that Dionysius adopts the term σημαινόμενον (and not νοητόν) can be explained by the influence of Stoic philosophy on grammatical theory in the period between Aristarchus and Apollonius Dyscolus (see section 3.2). Another word from the same verbal root as σημαίνειν is σημασία ('signification', 'meaning'). Dionysius uses this word twice when referring to Thucydides' 'rapidity of signification' (τὸ τάχος τῆς σημασίας):[49] the historian uses few words to express a lot of thoughts. Dionysius characterises the same aspect of Thucydides' style as 'the effort to signify as many things as possible in the fewest possible words, and to combine many ideas into one' (τό τε πειρᾶσθαι δι' ἐλαχίστων ὀνομάτων πλεῖστα σημαίνειν πράγματα καὶ πολλὰ συντιθέναι νοήματα εἰς ἕν).[50] The result is obscure brevity.

Concerning the relationship between language and extra-linguistic reality, I have already observed above that Dionysius pays much attention to the appropriate harmony that should exist between words and their subject matter (ὑποκείμενον). The 'substrate' (ὑποκείμενον) can be either the thought (e.g. τὴν ὑποκειμένην διάνοιαν, see above) or the referent (person or object) in reality.[51] Dionysius frequently specifies τὸ

[47] *Thuc.* 24.362,7–10; *Amm.* II 2.423,13–16; *Amm.* II 13.432,14–17. The translation of Usher (1974) 529 'from subject to object' and 'from object to subject' is misleading.

[48] See Matthaios (1999) 384.

[49] *Thuc.* 24.363,12; *Amm.* II 2.425,3.

[50] *Thuc.* 24.363,5–9.

[51] For ὑποκείμενον as the extra-linguistic referent, see e.g. *Comp.* 16.61,21–62,1: οἰκεῖα καὶ δηλωτικὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τὰ ὀνόματα, 'the words that suit and illustrate their referents' (see section 2.5). On ὑποκείμενον in Apollonius Dyscolus, see Lallot (1997 II) 213 n. 228.

ὑποκείμενον by the words πράγματα (things) and πρόσωπα (persons).[52] In general, words are said to refer to a person (σῶμα) or a thing (πρᾶγμα), and Dionysius criticises Thucydides when he refers to a person as a thing or to a thing as a person (see section 4.4.2).[53] More generally, the reality to which language refers is described as the πρᾶγμα or πράγματα: this term forms one angle in the triangle between words (ὀνόματα), thoughts (νοήματα) and things (πράγματα). Thus, in Dionysius' discussion of Herodotus' story about Gyges and Candaules, he states that neither the incident described (πρᾶγμα), nor the words (ὀνόματα) are dignified, and the words have not made the thoughts (νοήματα) nobler than they are. In this passage, the appealing quality of the style is not derived from the beauty of the words, but from their combination (συζυγία).[54] It should be said that it is not in all cases clear whether πρᾶγμα designates the 'thought' or the 'referent': Dionysius uses the word in both ways; the πραγματικὸς τόπος, for example, is the treatment of νοήματα (ideas).[55] The use of πρᾶγμα as extra-linguistic referent is common in Plato, whereas the use of πρᾶγμα in the sense of 'meaning' or 'content' can be traced back to Stoic philosophy.[56] The grammarians use πρᾶγμα in particular for the meaning of verbs.[57] In section 2.5, I will further discuss Dionysius' views on the (natural or conventional) relationship between ὀνόματα and πράγματα.

In a few cases, Dionysius describes the connection between language and reality in a more technical way: nouns indicate substance (οὐσία), verbs accident (τὸ συμβεβηκός), and adverbs 'circumstances of manner, place, time and the like' (τῶν συνεδρευόντων αὐτοῖς, τρόπου … καὶ τόπου καὶ χρόνου καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων).[58] According to this approach, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the logical structure of language on the one hand and that of reality on the other. As Schenkeveld has pointed out, these terms betray Stoic influence.[59] I will discuss this philosophical terminology in section 5.3.

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[52] See *Lys.* 13.23,1–2: τὸ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις προσώποις καὶ πράγμασι τοὺς πρέποντας ἐφαρμόττειν λόγους, 'accommodating the arguments to suit the underlying persons and things'; *Dem.* 13.156,6–7 (see section 2.3 n. 22); *Comp.* 20.88,11–15 (see above).

[53] *Dem.* 40.215,14–15; *Amm.* II 14.433,6–434,12.

[54] *Comp.* 3.12,8–15,2.

[55] For πράγματα as extra-linguistic referents, see e.g. *Comp.* 16.62,3 (see section 2.5.3).

[56] See Sluiter (1997) 154–155.

[57] See Sluiter (1997) 155.

[58] *Comp.* 5.23,13–24,20.

[59] Schenkeveld (1983) 85–89.

2.4. *Greek and Latin*

After his arrival in Rome, Dionysius of Halicarnassus 'learnt the language of the Romans and acquired knowledge of their writings' (διάλεκτόν τε τὴν Ῥωμαϊκὴν ἐκμαθὼν καὶ γραμμάτων ⟨τῶν⟩ ἐπιχωρίων λαβὼν ἐπιστήμην).[60] Dionysius was thus one of the many bilinguals who lived in Rome in the first century BC.[61] Bilingualism was extremely common at the time: although it was particularly Romans who acquired Greek as a second language, there were also many Greeks who learnt Latin.[62] In his rhetorical works, Dionysius does not mention any Roman author by name, although there is one passage in which he seems to refer to Cicero (see section 4.4.1).[63] In the preface to *On the Ancient Orators*, he mentions the publication of contemporary works on history, politics, philosophy and other subjects 'by both Roman and Greek writers'.[64] In the *Roman Antiquities*, he is more explicit. He tells us that he studied the works not only of Quintus Fabius Pictor and Lucius Cincius Alimentus, who wrote in Greek, but also of Porcius Cato, Quintus Fabius Maximus Servilianus, Valerius Antias, Licinius Macer, 'the Aelii, Gellii and Calpurnii', and that he acquired information from the men with whom he associated (οἷς εἰς ὁμιλίαν ἦλθον).[65] This list suggests that Dionysius read and spoke Latin reasonably well.[66] How did he view the relation-

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[60] *Ant. Rom.* 1.7.2. Dionysius' attitude towards Rome and the Roman Empire has been the subject of many publications. See the useful discussion in Hurst (1982) 845–856; add Goudriaan (1989) 299–329, Gabba (1991) 3–4 and 18–19, and Hidber (1996) 75–81.

[61] On the bilingualism of Romans and Greeks, see Adams (2003).

[62] See Rochette (1997) 211–256 and Adams (2003) 15–16. Whereas a Greek accent in Latin was normally positively evaluated, a Latin accent in Greek sounded 'rustic'. In *Ant. Rom.* 19.5.1, Dionysius tells about a Roman ambassador who was humiliated because of his bad Greek. See Adams (2003) 108–110.

[63] *Thuc.* 50.409,13. Most scholars think that Caecilius of Caleacte is one of the οὐκ ἄδοξοι σοφισταί to whom Dionysius refers, but we know that Cicero expressed the view that Dionysius attributes to these 'reputable critics'. Many scholars are surprised that Dionysius does not mention Cicero, whereas his colleague Caecilius of Caleacte compared Cicero with Demosthenes: see Delcourt (2005) 29–30.

[64] *Orat. Vett.* 3.6,1–7.

[65] *Ant. Rom.* 1.6.2; 1.7.3 (see section 1.4 n. 134). Many other Roman writers are mentioned in other passages. In *Ant. Rom.* 1.14.1., Varro is mentioned.

[66] On Dionysius' knowledge of Latin, see Rhys Roberts (1900) 442, Rhys Roberts (1910) 48, Gabba (1991) 4, Rochette (1997) 231–233 and Delcourt (2005) 28–30. On the influence of Latin on Dionysius' Greek, see Marin (1969), who distinguishes five types of Latinisms in Dionysius' Greek: (a) specific terminology pertaining to typical Roman institutions (e.g. *curia*, κουρία), (b) dates of the Roman calendar (e.g. ἐν μηνὶ Φεβρουαρίῳ, 'in February'), (c) names of Roman persons and places (e.g. *Aventinus*, Αὐεντῖνος), (d)

ship between his mother tongue and his second language? At the end of the first book of his *Roman Antiquities*, Dionysius gives the following explanation of the Latin language:[67]

> Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ φωνὴν μὲν οὔτ' ἄκρως βάρβαρον οὔτ' ἀπηρτισμένως Ἑλλάδα φθέγγονται, μικτὴν δέ τινα ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἧς ἐστιν ἡ πλείων Αἰολίς, τοῦτο μόνον ἀπολαύσαντες ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιμιξιῶν, τὸ μὴ πᾶσι τοῖς φθόγγοις ὀρθοεπεῖν …
>
> 'The language spoken by the Romans is neither utterly barbarous nor absolutely Greek, but a mixture, as it were, of both, the greater part of which is Aeolic; and the only disadvantage they have experienced from their intermingling with these various nations is that they do not pronounce their sounds properly (…).'

Dionysius' view on the nature of the Latin language plays a crucial role in his history of early Rome: it is the linguistic argument that supports the main thesis of the work (especially of its first book), namely that the Romans are direct descendants of the Greeks. According to Dionysius, the Greeks arrived in several groups in Italy, in the period before and directly after the Trojan War.[68] He argues that the Greeks of his time should not look down on the origins of Rome, because the founders of that city *were* in fact Greeks (see also section 1.2).[69] Various scholars

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common Roman words (e.g. *lustrum*, Λοῦστρον), and (e) grammatical constructions that are typical of Latin (e.g. the use of ὥσπερ … οὕτως as the Latin *ita* … *ut*). On Dionysius' Latinisms, see also Lebel (1976) 80.

[67] *Ant. Rom.* 1.90.1. The translation is by Cary. Whereas the rest of this study focuses on Dionysius' views on language in his rhetorical works, section 2.4 is based on his *Antiquitates Romanae*. It is in general useful to study Dionysius' historical and rhetorical works together (cf. Gabba [1991] 4). Dionysius' ideas on the relationship between Greek and Latin (only expressed in the *Antiquitates Romanae*) are of course highly relevant to a study on his views on language.

[68] The first of these groups consisted of the Aborigines, who were Arcadians (*Ant. Rom.* 1.11.1–4). In a later period, the Pelasgians, inhabitants of Thessaly, joined the Aborigines (*Ant. Rom.* 1.17.1). Next, Evander brought a group of Arcadians to Rome, 'the sixtieth year before the Trojan war' (*Ant. Rom.* 1.31.1). Then, another Greek expedition, guided by Heracles, came to Italy from the Peloponnese (*Ant. Rom.* 1.34.1–2). Finally, Aeneas and his fellow Trojans fled from Troy to Italy (*Ant. Rom.* 1.45.1). Dionysius argues that the Trojans were originally also a Greek people (*Ant. Rom.* 1.61–62). In *Ant. Rom.* 1.89.1–2, Dionysius summarises the various Greek groups who were the original inhabitants of Rome, 'a Greek city' (Ἑλλάδα πόλιν). In later times, many barbarian tribes came to Rome (*Ant. Rom.* 1.89.3), such as the Opicans, Marsians, Samnites, etc., which explains (according to Dionysius) the fact that Latin is a mixture of Greek and barbarian languages. On the importance of Arcadia in Dionysius' concept of the Roman origins, see Delcourt (2005) 130–156.

[69] *Ant. Rom.* 1.5.1. In *Ant. Rom.* 1.4.2, Dionysius rejects the views of certain ignorant Greeks who believe that Rome, being founded by barbarians, attained the dominion

have pointed out that by his identification of Romans and Greeks and his presentation of Rome as the revival of classical Athens Dionysius accepts and supports the new order of the Augustan empire, in which Greeks and Romans are integrated into a genuinely Graeco-Roman world.[70] Dionysius' theory on the Greek origin of the Romans can be interpreted as a political contribution to the integration of Greeks and Romans in the Roman Empire: for the Greeks it would of course be easier to accept being ruled by a Greek than by a barbarian people. Dionysius' linguistic argument on the Latin language is thus part of his wider theory on the origin of the Roman people, which is closely related to his interpretation of the bicultural world in which he lived.[71]

Dionysius is not the only author who argues that Latin is partly derived from Aeolic Greek. In the first century BC, there were several grammarians who shared Dionysius' views.[72] One of them was Philoxenus of Alexandria (active in Rome), who may have been the first to advance the theory on the Aeolic origin of the Latin language (see section 1.4).[73] He wrote a treatise Περὶ τῆς τῶν Ῥωμαίων διαλέκτου (*On the Dialect of the Romans*), in which he used the absence of the dual from both Aeolic and Latin as an argument for the dependence of these two languages. More specifically, he argued that the forms of the dual are used neither by the Aeolians, nor by the Romans, 'who are colonists of the Aeolians' (οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ἄποικοι ὄντες τῶν Αἰολέων).[74] The younger Tyrannion, who was active in the Augustan age, presumably defended the same theory in a treatise Περὶ τῆς Ῥωμαϊκῆς διαλέκτου (*On the*

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of the world through unjust fortune (τύχην ἄδικον). On Dionysius' opponents (possibly the historian Timagenes) and their anti-Roman sentiments, see Baumann (1930) 22–25, who compares similar polemical passages in Polybius and Livy. See also Crawford (1978) 193, Gabba (1991) 191–192 and Hidber (1996) 76.

[70] For the literature, see section 1.2.

[71] Dionysius' presentation of the past (in particular his view on the Greek origins of Rome) shows his positive attitude towards the Roman rulers of his time. According to Bowie (1974), this attitude may be contrasted to the way in which the Greeks of the Second Sophistic presented their past. However, Gabba (1982) 64 and Schmitz (1999) 85 point out that we hardly find any traces of anti-Roman sentiments in the Second Sophistic. Gabba argues that even in that period, the focus on the classical period may be explained 'as an exaltation of Greek glory within the framework of an acceptance of Rome's empire'.

[72] On the grammarians who mention the theory of Aeolic Latin, see Gabba (1963), Dubuisson (1984) and Sluiter (1993) 133–135.

[73] On Philoxenus and his works, see Wendel (1941) and Theodoridis (1976) 2–14.

[74] Philoxenus fr. 323 Theodoridis. On this fragment, see also Dubuisson (1984) 60 and Rochette (1997) 225.

Roman Language).[75] There is uncertainty about the authorship. The Suda attributes the work to Tyrannion, but we do not know whether this was the elder or the younger one, though most scholars think that it was the younger Tyrannion (also named Diocles).[76] In any case, this grammarian argued that the Roman dialect is not αὐθιγενής (native) but derived from Greek. We may assume that Tyrannion agreed with Philoxenus' views on the Aeolic origin of Latin. Dubuisson lists some later Greek grammarians who seem to have defended the same theory.[77] Their contemporary Roman colleagues also believed that Latin and Greek were related. Lucius Aelius Stilo Praeconinus explained Latin words by deriving them from Greek words.[78] His student Varro not only discussed the etymological relationship between Latin and Aeolic words in his work *De lingua latina*, but he also composed a separate work *De origine linguae latinae* (*On the Origin of the Latin Language*), which he dedicated to Pompeius.[79]

There are two recurring arguments in discussions of the Aeolic origin of the Latin language. First, the absence of the dual in both Aeolic and Latin; second, the similarity between the Latin letter *u* and the Aeolic digamma (ϝ). Quintilian says that Latin uses the Aeolic digamma (*Aeolicum digammon*).[80] Dionysius of Halicarnassus points out that the lands where the Greek Pelasgians once settled are in his time still called Οὐέλια (*Velia*), 'in accordance with the ancient form of their language' (κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον τῆς διαλέκτου τρόπον).[81] He adds that many ancient Greek words begin with the syllable ου, written as one

[75] Tyrannion fr. 63 Haas.

[76] For Haas (1977) 98 and Rawson (1985) 69, both possibilities remain open. Wendel (1943) 1820, Dubuisson (1984) 60–61 and Rochette (1997) 224 assign the work to the younger Tyrannion. On both grammarians named Tyrannion, see Wendel (1943).

[77] Apart from Philoxenus and the younger Tyrannion. Dubuisson (1984) 60–61 mentions Hypsicrates of Amisus, Seleucus, Apion and Claudius Didymus. See also Rochette (1997) 258–263.

[78] Lucius Aelius Stilo fr. 21 *GRF*. On this grammarian, see Suetonius, *De grammaticis* 3.2 with the commentary by Kaster (1995).

[79] For Varro's Aeolic etymologies of Latin words, see *De lingua latina* 5.25–26; 5.96; 5.101–102. For *De origine linguae latinae*, see Varro fr. 295 *GRF*. Cf. Gabba (1963) 189–190. Dahlmann (1932) 30–31 points out that Varro does not go as far as the Greek grammarians: he derives only a few Latin words directly from Greek. 'Er folgt also, wenn mann so will, eher der latinistischen als der anderen damals in Rom florierenden gräzistischen Richtung, die möglichst alles Lateinische griechisch erklärte in dem Glauben, daß Lateinische sei ein äolischer Dialekt.'

[80] Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 1.4.8; cf. *Inst. orat.* 1.7.26. On Quintilian's views on the differences between Greek and Latin, see Fögen (2000) 170–177.

[81] *Ant. Rom.* 1.20.2–3.

letter ϝ, which corresponds to the Latin *u*.[82] Dionysius may have been influenced by the theories of Philoxenus or the younger Tyrannion, who was his contemporary fellow citizen.[83]

Just like Dionysius, Varro seems to have connected his linguistic observations on the relationship between Latin and Aeolic with a theory about the (partly) Greek origin of the Roman people: 'when Evander and the other Arcadians came to Italy, they sowed the Aeolic language into the barbarians.'[84] It has been suggested that Pompeius (the addressee of Varro's *De origine linguae latinae*), who had connections with several Greek intellectuals, played a special role in the dissemination of this kind of theory.[85] It is possible that Augustus also supported the propagation of similar ideas in order to unite the Greeks and Romans in his empire. If so, Greek intellectuals may have contributed to a Roman act of propaganda: grammarians provided linguistic arguments that supported the theory of the Greek origin of Latin, which in its turn confirmed the politically important idea that the Romans and Greeks were really one people. In this way, linguistic theory may have given a political answer to two aspects of the urgent problem of integration. On the one hand, the Greeks would more easily accept their Roman rulers if they were Greek descendants. On the other hand, the Romans would be happy that they were not longer considered to be 'barbarians'. The traditional Greek division of the world into two types of people, Greeks and barbarians, became a problem when the Romans developed their powerful empire.[86] In the first instance, Romans were considered to be

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[82] *Ant. Rom.* 1.20.3: σύνηθες γὰρ ἦν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἕλλησιν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ προτιθέναι τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὁπόσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀπὸ φωνηέντων ἐγίνοντο, τὴν ⟨ου⟩ συλλαβὴν ἑνὶ στοιχείῳ γραφομένην. τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὥσπερ γάμμα διτταῖς ἐπὶ μίαν ὀρθὴν ἐπιζευγνύμενον ταῖς πλαγίοις, ὡς ϝελένη καὶ ϝάναξ καὶ ϝοῖκος καὶ ϝέαρ καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα. 'For it was the custom of the ancient Greeks generally to place before those words that began with a vowel the syllable ου, written with one letter (this was like a gamma, formed by two oblique lines joined to the one upright line), as ϝελένη, ϝάναξ, ϝοῖκος, ϝέαρ and many such words.' Translation by Cary.

[83] Baumann (1930) 21 and Hurst (1982) 852 consider the possibility that the younger Tyrannion influenced Dionysius' views on Latin.

[84] Varro fr. 295 *GRF*: Εὐάνδρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρκάδων εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἐλθόντων ποτὲ καὶ τὴν Αἰολίδα τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐνσπειράντων φωνήν.

[85] See Sluiter (1993) 135. On Pompeius' contacts with Greek intellectuals, see Anderson (1963) and Crawford (1978) 203–204. Pompeius died in 48 BC, long before Dionysius of Halicarnassus arrived at Rome. But it may be relevant to recall that Dionysius' correspondent Cn. Pompeius Geminus may have been connected to Cn. Pompeius Magnus: see section 1.4.

[86] See Dubuisson (1984) 55–57 and Sluiter (1993) 133–134.

barbarians, and they even called themselves *barbari*.[87] In later times, two alternative classifications were invented in order to save the Romans from their pejorative qualification: either the Romans were a third group, besides Greeks and barbarians (the *tertium genus* theory), or they were Greeks themselves. According to the latter option, the traditional bipartition of the world into Greeks and barbarians could be maintained. The linguistic theory on the similarity between Aeolic and Latin supplied an important argument for the latter world view.

2.5. *Philosophy of language in Dionysius'* On Composition*?*

In section 2.3, I discussed some aspects of the relationship between words, thoughts and extra-linguistic referents as treated in Dionysius' rhetorical works. The present section will focus on a related problem in Dionysius' *On Composition*, which concerns his ideas on the connection between names (ὀνόματα) and things (πράγματα). Scholars have suggested that in three different chapters of his treatise Dionysius expresses views on this topic. His formulations in those passages seem to betray philosophical influence. The three passages have puzzled modern scholars, because Dionysius appears to defend two incompatible views within one treatise, namely an arbitrary relation between names and words on the one hand (*Comp.* 18), and a natural correctness of words on the other hand (*Comp.* 16).[88] A third passage (*Comp.* 3) has been considered even internally inconsistent.[89] I will argue that these passages, when interpreted within their rhetorical context, are not incompatible with each other, but fully consistent. Further, I will show that it is in fact doubtful whether Dionysius expresses any belief at all concerning the philosophical subject of the correctness of words. These passages should first and foremost be understood as part of Dionysius' rhetorical instruction on several aspects of composition.

First, I will briefly cite the three relevant statements that Dionysius seems to make on the relation between names and things, and I will mention the inconsistencies that modern interpreters have observed in these remarks (section 2.5.1). Next, I will raise some objections to the modern interpretations (section 2.5.2). Finally, I will attempt to

[87] Plautus refers to Romans as *barbari*: see Dubuisson (1984) 56.
[88] *Comp.* 18.74,2; *Comp.* 16.62,9–12. See Schenkeveld (1983) 89.
[89] *Comp.* 3.14,11–12. See Schenkeveld (1983) 90.

interpret the three passages within their rhetorical context (sections 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.5), in order to demonstrate that the three statements are in fact not incompatible.

2.5.1. *The alleged inconsistency in Dionysius' views on names and things*

One of Dionysius' statements that have been interpreted as expressing ideas on the relation between ὀνόματα and πράγματα is found in a passage in *Comp.* 16, which deals with the use of mimetic words:[90]

> μεγάλη δὲ τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ διδάσκαλος ἡ φύσις ἡ ποιοῦσα μιμητικοὺς καὶ θετικοὺς[91] ἡμᾶς τῶν ὀνομάτων οἷς δηλοῦται τὰ πράγματα κατά τινας εὐλόγους καὶ κινητικὰς τῆς διανοίας ὁμοιότητας·
>
> 'The great source and teacher in these matters is nature, who prompts us to imitate and to coin words, by which things are designated according to certain resemblances that are plausible and capable of stimulating our thoughts.'

Schenkeveld interprets these words in the following way: 'These words accord with the Stoic view that originally language is an exact replica of things signified, and that when composing names the namegiver acted in a precise way, be it that here we, not an imaginary name-giver, are said to do so.'[92] I will later come back to this text and Schenkeveld's interpretation. For the moment, I only observe that Schenkeveld's final words seem to be important: Dionysius is not referring to an original name-giver, but to us (ἡμᾶς): *we* can express the things that we are talking about by the use of certain mimetic words.[93] The second statement that is relevant to our topic is found in Dionysius' discussion of rhythm (*Comp.* 18):[94]

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[90] *Comp.* 16.62,9–12.

[91] With F, I read καὶ θετικούς. These words are omitted in P, and Usener deletes them. However, I do not think that without these words (ἡ φύσις ἡ ποιοῦσα μιμητικοὺς ἡμᾶς τῶν ὀνομάτων) the text gives the desired sense. The meaning must be 'nature, making us imitators [of things] and [thereby] coiners of words': see my explanation in section 2.5.3.

[92] Schenkeveld (1983) 89. See also Allen (2005) 29 n. 25. Schenkeveld's presentation of the Stoic view ('that originally language is an exact replica of things signified') is a simplification. The very first words were indeed onomatopoeic; this principle produced only a very few words; other words were formed by various other principles: see Allen (2005) 16–17 (the only extant source is Augustine, *De dialectica* 6).

[93] Just as we imitate things on a higher level in the combination of words: *mimesis* plays a role not only in the ἐκλογή (selection), but also in the σύνθεσις (composition) of words: see *Comp.* 20.

[94] *Comp.* 18.74,2.

> τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα κεῖται τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς ἔτυχεν.
>
> 'For names have been assigned to things in a haphazard way.'[95]

Here one might think that Dionysius contradicts his earlier statement (*Comp.* 16 above), where he discussed words imitating the things that they refer to. Schenkeveld says: 'This idea is the very opposite of the first one: ὡς ἔτυχεν versus κατά τινας εὐλόγους ὁμοιότητας.[96] This second opinion may have been taken from a Peripatetic source (…). We must not imagine that between ch. 16 and ch. 18 Dionysius has changed his mind; on the contrary, he only reproduces what he has read, without realizing its implications.'[97] Other scholars share Schenkeveld's assumption that Dionysius makes a mistake in *Comp.* 18. Goudriaan calls it an 'uitglijder' ('slip'), and Aujac also thinks that Dionysius' statement in *Comp.* 18 is incompatible with that in *Comp.* 16: 'Denys, après avoir dit ailleurs que les mots étaient imitation des choses, et imposés par la Nature (par ex. 16, 1–2), semble ici faire du langage un produit du hasard et de la convention.'[98]

Dionysius' earlier statement about mimetic words (*Comp.* 16) has been thought to express the same idea as a remark in *Comp.* 3. In that passage, he explains that, in his famous story of 'Gyges and Candaules', Herodotus has used very simple and common words:[99]

> ἀνεπιτήδευτα γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἀνέκλεκτα, οἷα ἡ φύσις τέθηκεν σύμβολα τοῖς πράγμασιν.[100]
>
> 'These [i.e. the words] have not been carefully contrived and selected, but are such labels as nature has fixed to things.'

The word σύμβολα may remind us of Peripatetic philosophy, according to which names are conventional 'tokens', whose meaning is fixed by

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[95] This is Usher's translation, which is similar to the translations of Rhys Roberts ('for names have been attached to things in a haphazard way') and Aujac ('car les noms sont donnés n'importe comment aux choses'). I will argue, however, that Dionysius' words should be translated differently (see section 2.5.4). I would suggest something like the following: 'For [it cannot be helped that] things have the names that they have'. In other words, one cannot avoid using certain words (although they contain ugly sounds or rhythms), because if one refers to a certain object, one will have to use the name that is normally used for that object.

[96] Schenkeveld here ignores the words καὶ κινητικὰς τῆς διανοίας.

[97] Schenkeveld (1983) 89.

[98] Goudriaan (1989) 246 (cf. also 157), and Aujac (1981) 126 n. 1.

[99] *Comp.* 3.14,11–12. See Schenkeveld (1983) 90.

[100] The subject of the sentence is τὰ ὀνόματα (the words), to be supplied from the preceding sentence (see section 2.5.3 for the full passage).

convention. Aristotle states that 'spoken utterances are symbols (σύμβολα) of affections in the soul, and written things are symbols of spoken utterances.'[101] In another text, Aristotle states that words are tokens (σύμβολα) for things.[102] Dionysius' remark would then partly correspond to the Aristotelian view on words, but Schenkeveld thinks that the use of ἡ φύσις in the same phrase agrees more with the statement about mimetic words in *Comp.* 16: in both cases, Dionysius would be referring to nature as 'the originator of language'.[103] Because he assumes that the reference to nature is based on Stoic ideas, Schenkeveld draws the following conclusion concerning Dionysius' words οἷα ἡ φύσις τέθηκεν σύμβολα τοῖς πράγμασιν (*Comp.* 3): 'One may wonder whether this expression betrays a Peripatetic source,—the use of σύμβολα certainly leads us to think so—and in that case, confusion between Peripatetic and Stoic views seems complete.'[104]

Is it possible to solve this problem? In other words, can we interpret Dionysius' statements in such a way that they are not incompatible? I intend to show that this is indeed possible. At the very least, we should interpret Dionysius' alleged philosophical remarks within their rhetorical context, by paying attention to the purposes of the relevant passages within the treatise *On Composition*. Before doing so, I will first raise some objections to the modern interpretations just mentioned (section 2.5.2). Subsequently, I will discuss in more detail Dionysius' statements in *Comp.* 16 (section 2.5.3), *Comp.* 18 (section 2.5.4) and *Comp.* 3 (section 2.5.5).

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[101] Aristotle, *Int.* 16a3–9: Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. A σύμβολον is a 'token', whose meaning is fixed by agreement between certain parties. Cf. Manetti (1993) 71–72, Whitaker (1996) 9–13, Sluiter (1997) 190–192 and Weidemann (1996^2) 180: 'Symbole sind die stimmlichen Aüßerungen—genauer gesagt: die *sprachlichen* Aüßerungen der Stimme—insofern, als sie Zeichen sind, die ihre Bedeutung nicht von der Natur aus besitzen, sondern eine Uebereinkunft verdanken.'

[102] Aristotle, *Sophistici Elenchi* 165a6–8. The word πρώτων in Aristotle, *Int.* 16a6 also seems to imply that words are signs of thoughts 'in the first place' and of things in the second place; when we adopt this interpretation of the word πρώτων (Minio-Paluello's emendation for πρώτως or πρῶτον), the passage *Int.* 16a6–8 confirms the view (known from the *Sophistici Elenchi*) that words are labels for things (apart from labels for thoughts). Note that this interpretation is also possible with the adverbs πρώτως and πρῶτον, which have been transmitted in the MSS. On this problem, see Whitaker (1996) 17–23.

[103] Schenkeveld (1983) 90: 'The first opinion, that of φύσις as the originator of language, we find again in Comp. Verb. 3.14,11ff.' It remains to be seen, however, whether Dionysius considers nature 'the originator of language'.

[104] Schenkeveld (1983) 90.

2.5.2. *Objections to modern interpretations*

My objections to the modern interpretations of the three passages mentioned in the previous section are the following. First, it seems that interpreters of Dionysius do not always pay due attention to the different ways in which the word φύσις can be used.[105] The modern scholars who discuss Dionysius' views on ὀνόματα and πράγματα fail to distinguish between ideas on the natural *correctness* of words on the one hand and views on the natural *origin* of words on the other hand. As Fehling and other scholars have pointed out, these are two distinct problems, which are often (both in antiquity and in modern times) confused with each other.[106] In fact, a conventional correctness of names does not exclude the possibility of a natural origin (see e.g. the view of Epicurus); and the idea of imposition (θέσις) by name-givers can be combined with either a conventional or a natural correctness of names.[107] For this reason it is confusing when Usher, commenting on Dionysius' discussion of *onomatopoeia* in *Comp.* 16, seems to state that the Stoic philosophers thought that words had 'natural origins'.[108] In fact we do not know much about the Stoic views on the origin of words, but it is more probable that the Stoics assumed that one or more original name-givers created language than that they thought of a natural origin.[109] In other words, it was θέσις (imposition), not φύσις, that originated language.[110]

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[105] On the complex problem of φύσις, see e.g. Holwerda (1955).

[106] Fehling (1965). See also Sluiter (1997) 178–179, Schenkeveld (1999) 179, Gera (2003) 168–170, and Allen (2005) 18–20. In later antiquity, the two problems were confused to the extent that θέσις came to mean 'convention': Hermogenes' position in the *Cratylus*, which is characterised by συνθήκη ('convention') is wrongly described by the term θέσις. See Fehling (1965) 226–229.

[107] On Epicurus' ideas on the natural origin of language, see Sluiter (1997) 203–204 and Verlinsky (2005) and the literature mentioned there. On the views of Hermogenes and Cratylus in the *Cratylus*, a dialogue that does not deal with the origin of names but with the relationship between words and reality, see e.g. Sluiter (1997) 177–188; Schmitter (2000) lists the most important titles of the enormous amount of literature on the *Cratylus*. As Fehling (1965) 225 rightly emphasises, Hermogenes' defence of a conventional relationship between names and things does not imply any view on the origin of language.

[108] Usher (1985) 113 n. 3: '*Onomatopoeia*, the formation of words by natural association, (…) was also of especial interest to the Stoics, who related it to their doctrine of the natural origins of words.'

[109] On the Stoic views on the origin of language, see Sluiter (1990) 20–21 and Allen (2005).

[110] See Sluiter (1990) 20–21 and Schenkeveld (1999) 180: 'Definite texts on Stoic views on the origin of language are lacking because they probably paid little attention to

Apart from the two uses of the word φύσις mentioned so far, namely φύσις as opposed to θέσις (natural origin versus imposition) and φύσις as opposed to νόμος (natural correctness versus convention), there is a third usage, which seems to be particularly relevant to the passages under discussion. I mean the use of φύσις as opposed to τέχνη. I will argue that, in the passages from both *Comp.* 3 and 16, the word φύσις is used as opposed to τέχνη rather than to θέσις or νόμος.

My second objection to the modern interpretations of Dionysius' alleged 'philosophy of language' is a more general and methodological one. It seems that modern scholars who interpret Dionysius' observations on ὀνόματα do not pay sufficient attention to the context of his remarks. Aujac, Schenkeveld and Goudriaan detach the three statements in *Comp.* 3, 16 and 18 from their context, and they are more interested in the alleged 'source' that Dionysius has used in these passages (Platonic, Aristotelian or Stoic) than in the point that he is making himself.[111] My objection to this approach is mainly that it interprets Dionysius as someone who writes a book by using a 'copy-and-paste technique'. Schenkeveld's suggestion that Dionysius 'only reproduces what he has read, without realizing its implications' ignores the fact that Dionysius' statements are directly relevant to the context of his theory of composition.[112] The idea that Dionysius merely copies earlier ideas and brings them together without adding anything useful is characteristic of nineteenth-century scholarship, but it has influenced a lot of more recent interpretations as well (see section 1.1). I will not follow this approach. Instead, I will now look more closely at the three passages cited above in order to understand how they fit into Dionysius' compositional theory.

2.5.3. *Dionysius on mimetic words (*Comp. *16)*

The passage where Dionysius has been thought to express a Stoic theory on the relationship between names and things is part of *Comp.* 16: this passage concludes the discussion of μέλος (*Comp.* 14–16), one of the four means of composition (σύνθεσις). Dionysius has examined the pho-

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this question. From their view that a fully rational correspondence between word and meaning existed it may follow that they favoured a conscious invention of language.' See also Allen (2005) 16–18.

[111] See Aujac (1981) 68 n. 2, Schenkeveld (1983) 89 and Goudriaan (1989) 157.

[112] Schenkeveld (1983) 89.

netic values of the various letters (*Comp.* 14) and syllables (*Comp.* 15). Then, he states that great poets and prose writers are aware of the different sound effects of letters and syllables: 'they arrange their words by weaving them together with deliberate care, and with elaborate artistic skill they adapt the syllables and the letters to the emotions which they wish to portray.'[113] Thus Homer expresses the ceaseless roar of the seashore exposed to the wind (*Il.* 17.265: ἠιόνες βοόωσιν etc.), the greatness of the Cyclops' anguish and the slowness of his searching hands (*Od.* 9.415–416: Κύκλωψ δὲ στενάχων etc.), and he portrays Apollo's supplication 'when he keeps rolling before his father Zeus' (*Il.* 22.220–221, containing the word προπροκυλινδόμενος).[114] It is clear that Dionysius thinks that, in the Homeric lines that he quotes, the poet mimetically expresses the things that he describes, through the juxtaposition of certain sounds. According to Dionysius, 'there are countless such lines in Homer, representing (δηλοῦντα) length of time, bodily size, extremity of emotion, immobility of position, or some similar effect, by nothing more than the artistic arrangement of the syllables; and other lines are wrought in the opposite way to portray brevity, speed, urgency, and the like.'[115] He adds two more examples: in the first one, Homer describes Andromache holding her breath and losing control of her voice (*Il.* 22.476, containing the word γοόωσα); in the second one, he expresses the mental distraction and the unexpectedness of the terror of some charioteers beholding a fire (*Il.* 18.225: ἡνίοχοι δ' ἔκπληγεν etc.).[116] In both cases, it is the reduction of the number of syllables and letters' (ἡ τῶν συλλαβῶν τε καὶ γραμμάτων ἐλάττωσις) that causes the effect.[117] The latter explanation seems to be related to the modification of syllables through subtraction (ἀφαίρεσις), one of the categories of change that

[113] *Comp.* 15.60,6–10: Ταῦτα δὴ καταμαθόντες οἱ χαριέστατοι ποιητῶν τε καὶ συγγραφέων τὰ μὲν αὐτοὶ κατασκευάζουσιν ὀνόματα συμπλέκοντες ἐπιτηδείως ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ γράμματα καὶ τὰς συλλαβὰς οἰκείας οἷς ἂν βούλωνται παραστῆσαι πάθεσιν ποικίλως φιλοτεχνοῦσιν.

[114] *Comp.* 15.60,10–61,4. For ancient views on Homer as the creator of neologisms, see Gera (2003) 180.

[115] *Comp.* 15.61,5–10: μυρία ἔστιν εὑρεῖν παρ' αὐτῷ τοιαῦτα χρόνου μῆκος ἢ σώματος μέγεθος ἢ πάθους ὑπερβολὴν ἢ στάσεως ἠρεμίαν ἢ τῶν παραπλησίων τι δηλοῦντα παρ' οὐδὲν οὕτως ἕτερον ἢ τὰς τῶν συλλαβῶν κατασκευάς· καὶ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐναντίως εἰργασμένα εἰς βραχύτητα καὶ τάχος καὶ σπουδὴν καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὁμοιογενῆ.

[116] *Comp.* 15.61,10–17.

[117] *Comp.* 15.61,17–19.

Dionysius has discussed in *Comp.* 6 (see section 4.3.1).[118] It seems then that Homer does not only coin new mimetic words (e.g. προπροκυλινδόμενος), but also adapts existing words in order to portray the things that he describes (e.g. by elision of δέ).[119]

Next, at the beginning of *Comp.* 16, Dionysius explains that there are two possibilities for poets and prose writers who wish to use mimetic words: either they coin (κατασκευάζουσιν) these words themselves, or they borrow (λαμβάνουσιν) from earlier writers (for example Homer) 'as many words as imitate things' (ὅσα μιμητικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστίν):[120]

> Καὶ αὐτοὶ μὲν δὴ κατασκευάζουσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογογράφοι πρὸς χρῆμα ὁρῶντες οἰκεῖα καὶ δηλωτικὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τὰ ὀνόματα, ὥσπερ ἔφην· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ἐκεῖνοι κατεσκεύασαν, ὅσα μιμητικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστίν· ὡς ἔχει ταυτί
>
> ῥόχθει γὰρ μέγα κῦμα ποτὶ ξερὸν ἠπείροιο.
> αὐτὸς δὲ κλάγξας πέτετο πνοιῇς ἀνέμοιο.
> αἰγιαλῷ μεγάλῳ βρέμεται, σμαραγεῖ δέ τε πόντος.
> σκέπτετ' ὀιστῶν τε ῥοῖζον καὶ δοῦπον ἀκόντων.
>
> 'Thus the poets and prose authors, on their own account, look at the matter they are treating and furnish it with the words which suit and illustrate the subject, as I said. But they also borrow many words from earlier writers, in the very form in which they fashioned them—as many words as imitate things, as is the case in these examples:[121]
>
> *With thunderous roar the mighty billow crashed upon the shore.*
> *And he with yelping cry flew headlong down the wind's strong blast.*
> *(The wave) resounds upon the mighty strand, the ocean crashes round.*
> *Alert, he watched for hissing arrows and for clattering spears.*'

Dionysius is still discussing the use of words that mimetically designate their underlying subject (ὑποκειμένων: for the term, see section 2.3). The Homeric lines that he quotes contain several mimetic words (ῥόχθει, κλάγξας, βρέμεται, σμαραγεῖ), whose onomatopoeic character is also mentioned in the Homeric scholia.[122] Whereas Dionysius pre-

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[118] *Comp.* 6.29,14–30,12.

[119] It is difficult to determine which words Dionysius regards as shortened in *Iliad* 22.476 and *Iliad* 18.225: see Usher (1985) 112 n. 1.

[120] *Comp.* 16.61,20–62,8. Here and elsewhere, I translate μίμησις as 'imitation'. In general, μίμησις is 'representation' rather than 'imitation' (see Kardaun [1993]), but in the case of Dionysius' discussion of mimetic words, 'imitation' seems to be the better translation: words represent things according to certain 'resemblances' (ὁμοιότητας), i.e. the words sound just like the things to which they refer.

[121] Homer, *Od.* 5.402; *Il.* 12.207; 2.210; 16.361.

[122] See Sch. Hom. *Iliad* 2.210a, 2.463c (βρέμεται, σμαραγεῖ); 16.361c (ῥοῖζος).

viously quoted Homeric lines containing mimetic words that are produced by artistic treatment (κατασκευή), he now quotes some lines that contain words that later writers 'borrow from their predecessors' (παρὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λαμβάνουσιν). Indeed, all the onomatopoeic words mentioned here are also found in later poets, such as Aeschylus, Pindar and Apollonius Rhodius. These later poets did not coin these mimetic words themselves, but they borrowed them from Homer.[123] The important thing to notice is that Dionysius is thinking of a very limited group of specific words, which writers borrow from each other: the word ὅσα (in ὅσα μιμητικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστίν) has a restrictive sense. Dionysius does not say that all words imitate the things that they signify: it is clear that he supposes that there is a distinct group of mimetic words that can be used for specific purposes. Therefore, this passage does not imply anything about the relationship between ὀνόματα and πράγματα in general. In the subsequent passage, nature (φύσις) comes in:[124]

> μεγάλη δὲ τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ διδάσκαλος ἡ φύσις ἡ ποιοῦσα μιμητικοὺς καὶ θετικοὺς[125] ἡμᾶς τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷς δηλοῦται τὰ πράγματα κατά τινας εὐλόγους καὶ κινητικὰς τῆς διανοίας ὁμοιότητας· ὑφ' ἧς ἐδιδάχθημεν ταύρων τε μυκήματα λέγειν καὶ χρεμετισμοὺς ἵππων καὶ φριμαγμοὺς τράγων πυρός τε βρόμον καὶ πάταγον ἀνέμων καὶ συριγμὸν κάλων καὶ ἄλλα τούτοις ὅμοια παμπληθῆ τὰ μὲν φωνῆς μηνύματα, τὰ δὲ μορφῆς, τὰ δὲ ἔργου, τὰ δὲ πάθους, τὰ δὲ κινήσεως, τὰ δ' ἠρεμίας, τὰ δ' ἄλλου χρήματος ὅτου δή· περὶ ὧν εἴρηται πολλὰ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν, τὰ κράτιστα δ' ὡς πρώτῳ τὸν ὑπὲρ ἐτυμολογίας εἰσαγαγόντι λόγον, Πλάτωνι τῷ Σωκρατικῷ, πολλαχῇ μὲν καὶ ἄλλῃ μάλιστα δ' ἐν τῷ Κρατύλῳ.
>
> 'The great source and teacher in these matters is nature, who prompts us to imitate and to coin words, by which things are designated according to certain resemblances, which are plausible and capable of stimulating

[123] For κλάγξας, see e.g. Aeschylus, *A.* 201; Pindar, *P.* 4.23. For ῥοχθεῖν, see e.g. Apollonius Rhodius 4.925. For βρέμεται, see e.g. Pindar, *N.* 11.7. For σμαραγεῖ, see e.g. Hesiod, *Th.* 679; Apollonius Rhodius 4.148; 4.1543. See further Aujac (1981) 210.

[124] *Comp.* 16.62,9–63,3.

[125] Usener (1904) deletes καὶ θετικούς, which is not found in P. However, this solution makes the Greek phrase incomprehensible; ἡ φύσις ἡ ποιοῦσα μιμητικοὺς ἡμᾶς τῶν ὀνομάτων would mean 'nature, making us imitators of words', but the context makes clear that Dionysius is dealing with words that imitate things: things are represented, not words. Therefore, I believe that we have to follow F, reading ἡ φύσις ἡ ποιοῦσα μιμητικοὺς καὶ θετικοὺς ἡμᾶς τῶν ὀνομάτων: 'nature, making us imitators [of things] and [thereby] coiners of words'. Strangely enough, Aujac & Lebel (1981) 114 follow Usener (and P) in printing ἡ φύσις ἡ ποιοῦσα μιμητικοὺς ἡμᾶς τῶν ὀνομάτων, whereas they translate 'la Nature, qui fait de nous des imitateurs, créant des mots'. There does not seem to be a parallel for the use of the word μιμητικός with a genitive case in that sense ('imitating through'), and therefore I think that the reading of F is to be preferred.

> our thoughts. It is she who has taught us to speak of the bellowing of bulls, the whinnying of horses, the bleating of goats, the roar of fire, the beating of winds, the creaking of ropes, and a host of other similar imitations of sound, shape, action, feeling, movement, stillness, and anything else whatsoever. These matters have been discussed at length by our predecessors, the most important work being that of the first writer to introduce the subject of etymology, Plato the Socratic, especially in his *Cratylus*, but in many places elsewhere.'

At the beginning of this passage, Dionysius makes the transition from μίμησις as it is practiced by prose writers and poets, Homer and his successors in particular, to the μίμησις that we (ἡμᾶς), human beings in general, apply in our natural (that is daily) language. In other words, he makes the transition from τέχνη to φύσις. In my opinion, the use of the word φύσις in this text should not be related to an alleged opinion on the natural origin of words, or on the natural correspondence between the form and meaning of words.[126] The thing that Dionysius wants to make clear is that the τέχνη of poets and prose writers, who imitate the objects that they describe in the sounds of their words, finds a model in (human) φύσις, which makes that we 'naturally', that is usually (not technically) use imitative, onomatopoeic words, such as 'bellowing' or 'whinnying'. In the immediately preceding text, Dionysius does not use the term τέχνη itself, but he does use the word φιλοτεχνοῦσιν ('they arrange artistically') when referring to the artistic skill by which Homer and other poets compose their syllables and words.[127] In my view, the words μεγάλη δὲ τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ διδάσκαλος ἡ φύσις provide a strong indication that φύσις is here used as opposed to τέχνη (rather than to νόμος or θέσις): τούτων refers (indirectly) to the τέχνη of Homer and his imitators, and μεγάλη δὲ τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ διδάσκαλος ἡ φύσις (*Comp.* 16) appears to be nothing else but a Greek variant of the well known aphorism *natura artis magistra*, 'nature is the teacher of art.'[128] Like other ancient critics, Dionysius regularly refers to nature as the model for

[126] Therefore, it does not seem correct to interpret φύσις here as 'the originator of language' (Schenkeveld [1983] 90). Cf. also Aujac (1981) 126 n. 1: 'Denys, après avoir dit ailleurs que les mots étaient imitation des choses, et imposés par la Nature (par ex. 16, 1–2) (…).' In my opinion, Dionysius says nothing more than that one can create certain words that imitate things: we ourselves create those words, not nature. Nature is, however, our teacher in these matters, in that our natural use of onomatopoeic words is the model for the artistic composition of mimetic words.

[127] *Comp.* 15.60,10.

[128] For a discussion of Dionysius' search for a natural word order in *Comp.* 5, see De Jonge (2001) and section 5.3 of this study.

art (and stylistic writing): 'the greatest achievement of art (τέχνη) is to imitate nature' (τὸ μιμήσασθαι τὴν φύσιν) (see section 5.2).[129]

Dionysius tells us, then, that nature (we might say human nature) causes us to produce mimetic words, which express things according to certain resemblances (ὁμοιότητας), 'which are plausible and stimulate our thoughts'. The idea seems to be that a mimetic word triggers a certain image in the mind, thus stimulating our thinking. The word ῥόχθει, for example, helps the listener to imagine the 'sparkling' of a wave, because it triggers a specific image in the mind (διάνοια). Dionysius mentions two categories of mimetic words that nature prompts us to coin. First, there are the purely onomatopoeic words that designate sounds, such as the bellowing of bulls, the whinnying of horses, the bleating of goats, the roar of fire, the beating of winds, the creaking of ropes, and so on. This type of words also appears in Augustine's discussion of the first words according to Stoic theory (see below): he mentions *tinnitus* (the clash of bronze), *hinnitus* (the whinnying of horses) and *balatus* (the bleating of sheep) as words that sound like the noise to which they refer.[130] But it seems that these are standard examples of onomatopoeic words, which are not necessarily related to Stoic theory. Having mentioned these onomatopoeic words, Dionysius lists a more general category of mimetic words, namely 'a host of other similar indications (μηνύματα) of sound, shape, action, feeling, movement, stillness, and anything else whatsoever.' Apparently, mimetic words comprise not only onomatopoeic words, but also 'a whole multitude' of other words. It is important, however, to observe the use of the word παμπληθῆ ('in their whole multitude', LSJ), which implies that Dionysius is not speaking about *all* words: there are 'very many' mimetic words, but nothing is said about the relationship between ὀνόματα and πράγματα in general. Although Dionysius mentions Plato's *Cratylus* as the first work in which the subject of etymology was discussed, he does not express any opinion about Cratylus' views on the natural correctness of names.

Etymology (ἐτυμολογία) was a subject in which the Stoics were particularly interested.[131] In my view, however, it is doubtful that Dionysius is referring here to the Stoic view on the *original*, mimetic relation between the form and meaning of the first words, as Schenkeveld

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[129] *Is.* 16.114,12–13: τῆς τέχνης, ὅτι τὸ μιμήσασθαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς μέγιστον ἔργον ἦν. See also *Comp.* 4.23,3–4; *Comp.* 5.23,13: see section 5.3.2. Cf. 'Longinus', *Subl.* 22.1.

[130] Augustine, *De dialectica* 6. See Sluiter (1990) 18 and Allen (2005) 16–17.

[131] See Herbermann (1996[2]) 356, Allen (2005) 14–15 and Long (2005) 36.

argues.[132] Our knowledge of Stoic ideas on the correlation between the form and meaning of words is based on the relatively late accounts of Origen and Augustine.[133] The former tells us that, according to the Stoics, the first verbal sounds (πρῶται φωναί) imitate the things that they express (μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα). The latter describes various principles according to which words 'imitate' their meaning: apart from the onomatopoeic principle that applies to the first words (e.g. *tinnitus*, *hinnitus* and *balatus*), there are several other ways in which words imitate their meaning: for example, words can affect the sense of hearing just as the quality that they designate affects another sense (e.g. *mel*, 'honey'); Augustine mentions several other principles of imitation.[134] Because many words gradually became corrupt, it is the task of etymology to retrace the original meaning of those words. Dionysius, however, does not discuss 'first words'. He refers neither to original name-givers, nor to the gradual corruption of words. He is only interested in the ways in which *we* (ἡμᾶς) create words and mimetically portray certain things by the combination of sounds: this happens both in our daily language (φύσις) and in our stylistic writing (τέχνη). In my view, the references to Plato's *Cratylus* and to etymology do not imply any opinion about the natural relation between names and things in general.[135] Dionysius mentions the *Cratylus*

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[132] Schenkeveld (1983) 89.

[133] Origen, *Cels.* 1.24 (= *FDS* 643); Augustine, *De dialectica* 6.

[134] See Allen (2005) 16–17. Allen (2005) argues that the Stoic views on the natural relationship between the form and meaning of words differ in important respects from the views that are discussed in Plato's *Cratylus*. According to his interpretation of the Stoic texts, 'mimetic accuracy' is not the reason why words are correct, because there are many other principles of imitation involved (see Augustine, *De dialectica* 6). If Allen is right, then we will have even more reason to doubt that Dionysius' passage (which mentions the *Cratylus* but no Stoics) is taken from a Stoic source.

[135] The term 'etymology' remained to be used by grammarians, although they did not necessarily suppose that the discovery of the original form of a word conveyed its 'natural' meaning: use of etymology did not imply any opinion in the debate on the natural or conventional correctness of words. See Herbermann (1996^2) 359: 'Diesen anspruchsvollen Namen [sc. ἐτυμολογία, "Lehre vom Wahren"] aber behielt die Beschäftigung mit den Bennenungsgründen schließlich auch dann noch bei, als der namensprechende Anspruch, nämlich der, daß die Entdeckung der Benennungsgründe zu wahren Aussagen über das Wesen des Benannten führe, nicht mehr als ihre eigentliche Triebfeder fungierte, als aus der philosophischen Disziplin eine Disziplin der Grammatik bzw. Sprachlehre geworden war. Unabhängig von seinem Standpunkt in dem alten Disput um den φύσει- oder νόμῳ- resp. θέσει Status der Wörter und unabhängig auch davon, ob er überhaupt einen diesbezüglichen Standpunkt einnimmt, versucht der antike Grammatiker (…) die Benennungsgründe bzw. die Ursprüng der Bildung der einzelnen Wörter darzulegen.'

only as a text in which Plato discussed the mimetic qualities of certain words.[136]

2.5.4. *Dionysius on mixing mean and beautiful rhythms (*Comp. *18)*

The second passage in which modern scholars have recognised a statement on the relationship between ὀνόματα and πράγματα is part of the discussion of rhythm, the second of the four means of composition (*Comp.* 17–18). In *Comp.* 17, Dionysius has started his careful analysis of all types of rhythms that one can use in a text: some of these rhythms are beautiful, whereas others are ugly (see also section 6.3). Examples of dignified and impressive rhythms are the spondee (– –) and the molossus (– – –). Mean and unimpressive rhythms are for example the choree (⏑ ⏑ ⏑) and the effeminate amphibrach (⏑ – ⏑).[137] Because each word has its rhythmical value, we have to arrange the words that we use in the best way, mixing the inferior with the more dignified:[138]

> εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔσται δύναμις ἐξ ἁπάντων κρατίστων ῥυθμῶν συνθεῖναι τὴν λέξιν, ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν κατ' εὐχήν· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη μίσγειν τοῖς κρείττοσι τοὺς χείρονας, ὡς ἐπὶ πολλῶν γίνεται (τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα κεῖται τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς ἔτυχεν), οἰκονομεῖν αὐτὰ χρὴ φιλοτέχνως καὶ διακλέπτειν τῇ χάριτι τῆς συνθέσεως τὴν ἀνάγκην ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν τὴν ἄδειαν ἔχοντας· οὐ γὰρ ἀπελαύνεται ῥυθμὸς οὐδεὶς ἐκ τῆς ἀμέτρου λέξεως, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς ἐμμέτρου.
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> 'Now if it proves possible for us to compose in a style which consists entirely of the finest rhythms, our ideal may be realised; but if it should be necessary to mix the worse with the better, as happens in many cases (for it cannot be helped that things have the names that they have),[139] we must manage our subject-matter artistically and disguise the constraint under which we are working by the elegance of our composition; and we can cultivate this elegance the more effectively because here we have great freedom, since no rhythm is excluded from non-metrical language, as some are from metrical language.'

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[136] Note Dionysius' words περὶ ὧν εἴρηται πολλὰ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν: the words περὶ ὧν refer to the types of mimetic words discussed in the preceding passage. In *Comp.* 16.63,3–66,8, Dionysius goes on citing Homeric lines that portray things by the use and combination of certain letters and syllables.

[137] See Rhys Roberts (1910) 6, who lists all rhythms discussed by Dionysius with the qualities attributed to them.

[138] *Comp.* 18.73,19–74,6.

[139] I have altered Usher's translation ('for names have been assigned to things in a haphazard way').

Dionysius' argument is the following: some words have a beautiful rhythmical structure, whereas other words are characterised by a mean rhythm. It would be ideal if we were able to compose a text entirely consisting of dignified rhythms. In reality, however, this is impossible in most cases, because τὰ ὀνόματα κεῖται τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς ἔτυχεν: 'for names have been attached to things as they happen to have been attached.'[140] In other words: 'it cannot be changed that things have the names that they have.' Therefore, in some cases we are forced to use a certain word with an ignoble rhythm, for example when we cannot find a synonym with a more dignified rhythmical structure. In that case we cannot avoid using the ugly rhythm, but we can compensate it by mixing it with (and hiding it between) more beautiful rhythms. Earlier in his treatise, Dionysius has given similar advice with regard to the use of words that do not have a beautiful sound: just like words with an undignified rhythm, words that are built from unattractive sounds should be 'mixed' with more euphonious words. According to Dionysius, Homer has applied this technique in his catalogue of ships, where he has hidden the inelegant names of Boeotian cities such as Hyria, Mycalessus and Graia:[141]

> εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγχωροίη πάντ' εἶναι τὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως ὑφ' ὧν μέλλει δηλοῦσθαι τὸ πρᾶγμα εὔφωνά τε καὶ καλλιρήμονα, μανίας ἔργον ζητεῖν τὰ χείρω· εἰ δὲ ἀδύνατον εἴη τοῦτο, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἔχει, τῇ πλοκῇ καὶ μίξει καὶ παραθέσει πειρατέον ἀφανίζειν τὴν τῶν χειρόνων φύσιν, ὅπερ Ὅμηρος εἴωθεν ἐπὶ πολλῶν ποιεῖν. εἰ γάρ τις ἔροιτο ὄντιν' οὖν ἢ ποιητῶν ἢ ῥητόρων, τίνα σεμνότητα ἢ καλλιλογίαν ταῦτ' ἔχει τὰ ὀνόματα ἃ ταῖς Βοιωτίαις κεῖται πόλεσιν Ὑρία καὶ Μυκαλησσὸς καὶ Γραῖα καὶ Ἐτεωνὸς καὶ Σκῶλος καὶ Θίσβη καὶ Ὀγχηστὸς καὶ Εὔτρησις καὶ τἆλλ' ἐφεξῆς ὧν ὁ ποιητὴς μέμνηται, οὐδεὶς ἂν εἰπεῖν οὐδ' ἥντιν' οὖν ἔχοι· ἀλλ' οὕτως αὐτὰ καλῶς ἐκεῖνος συνύφαγκεν καὶ παραπληρώμασιν εὐφώνοις διείληφεν ὥστε μεγαλοπρεπέστατα φαίνεσθαι πάντων ὀνομάτων·
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> 'If, then, it were possible that all parts of speech by which a certain subject was to be expressed should sound beautiful and be elegantly phrased, it would be an act of madness to look for the inferior ones. But supposing this to be impossible, as in many cases it is, we must try to cover up the natural defects of the inferior letters by interweaving,

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[140] The word κεῖσθαι ('to lie') is of course also used as the passive perfect of τιθέναι ('to be placed'). If we adopt the latter interpretation for the text under discussion, this would mean that Dionysius refers to a process of imposition (θέσις), but it would not imply anything about the relationship between names and things (natural or conventional).

[141] *Comp.* 16.66,18–67,14.

> mixing and juxtaposing, and this is precisely Homer's practice in many passages. For instance, if someone were to ask any poet or rhetorician what grandeur or elegance there is in those names which have been given to the Boeotian towns Hyria, Mycalessus, Graea, Eteonus, Scolus, Thisbe, Onchestus, Eutresis, and the rest of the list which the poet records, no one would be able to say that they possessed any such quality at all. But Homer has so beautifully interwoven them and dispersed them among supplementary words that sound pleasant that they appear as the most impressive of all names.'

Dionysius proceeds to quote *Iliad* 2.494–501, in order to show that Homer, when he is forced (ἀναγκασθείς) to use words that are not naturally beautiful (οὐ καλὰ τὴν φύσιν), abolishes their unpleasant effect (δυσχέρειαν) by mixing them with beautiful words.[142] The similarity between the passage quoted above (*Comp.* 16.66,18–67,14) and the passage in which Dionysius discusses the blending of beautiful and ugly rhythms (*Comp.* 18.73,19–74,6) is striking. The same argument is applied to the theory of μέλος ('melody', the first element of composition) on the one hand, and ῥυθμός (rhythm, the second element) on the other. In both cases, Dionysius seems to elaborate a theory of Theophrastus, who (as Dionysius tells us) defined which words are naturally beautiful and which words are mean and paltry.[143] Where Theophrastus thought that 'from paltry and mean words neither fine poetry nor prose will be produced', Dionysius recommends that these words be mixed with the beautiful words.[144] Furthermore, Dionysius uses the division between beautiful and mean words not only for words with attractive or unattractive sounds, but also for words with attractive or unattractive rhythms. Ideally, we would only use the beautiful words when composing a text, but that is often impossible. If we are forced to use the paltry words, we should intermingle them with the more dignified. Thus, Homer is forced to mention the names of the Boeotian towns in his catalogue of ships. The names that have been given to these cities (τὰ ὀνόματα ἃ ταῖς Βοιωτίαις κεῖται πόλεσιν) could not be avoided. There-

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[142] *Comp.* 16.67,15–68,6.

[143] *Comp.* 16.66,8–18 (= Theophrastus fr. 688 Fortenbaugh). This text is closely related to 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 173–175 (= Theophrastus fr. 687 Fortenbaugh). See Fortenbaugh (2005) 281–286. It seems plausible that Theophrastus divided words merely according to the euphonic quality of their letters, whereas Dionysius applies this theory also to rhythmic quality of words.

[144] *Comp.* 16.66,16–17. Fortenbaugh (2005) 285 rightly argues that Dionysius' recommendation to mix beautiful and ugly words cannot be Theophrastus' advice.

fore, Homer has intermingled these names with more beautiful words and παραπληρώματα (filler words) (see section 4.3.2).[145]

This analysis of the context of Dionysius' remark (τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα κεῖται τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς ἔτυχεν) shows that he does not intend to say more than that things have the names that they happen to have. Philosophy of language is not the issue in this passage, at least not in the sense of a theory of the natural or conventional relation between names and things: a statement on the 'haphazard' distribution of names to things would not have any function in the context of *Comp.* 18. Consequently, there is no inconsistency between this passage and other statements by Dionysius, and we should not speak of a 'slip' or a 'contradiction'.[146] Dionysius' statements in *Comp.* 16.62,9–12 and *Comp.* 18.74,2 are perfectly compatible: in the former passage Dionysius discusses the creation and use of a distinct group of mimetic words in order to express the things we discuss by the sounds of our words; in the latter passage he advises mixing ugly rhythms with beautiful ones in order to hide the inferior rhythms of unavoidable words. Both recommendations perfectly fit into Dionysius' theory of composition, without contradicting each other.

It may be helpful to add some comment on the expression ὡς ἔτυχε. Part of the modern confusion concerning Dionysius' statement on ὀνόματα and πράγματα in *Comp.* 18 seems to result from the standard translation of the words ὡς ἔτυχε(ν) as 'haphazardly' or 'at random'. Although these translations are possible interpretations of the words in some contexts, they are not in all cases correct. The basic sense of the words ὡς ἔτυχε(ν) is 'as it happened (to be)': something occurs or is done without planning.[147] The verb τυγχάνω does not point to 'randomness' or 'arbitrariness' (although this can be the interpretation of the words in some particular cases) but to the fact that there is no control or consciousness involved.[148] The phrase ὡς ἔτυχεν applies to a situation in which things are just as they happen to be: nobody can consciously change anything about that situation. Apart from the passage discussed above, there are seven passages in Dionysius' works where the phrase ὡς ἔτυχε(ν) occurs.[149] An analysis of these passages makes it clear that it

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[145] On the theory of 'parapleromatic' words, see also Sluiter (1997b).

[146] Goudriaan (1989) 246 ('uitglijder') and Schenkeveld (1983) 89.

[147] See LSJ s.v. τυγχάνω I.A.3.

[148] See also Sicking (1971) 111 and 115 n. 104.

[149] *Ant. Rom.* 1.56.5; *Lys.* 8.16,3–16 (= *Imit.* fr. X Usener, 216,7–14; fr. 7 Battisti); *Is.* 16.114,7–17; *Dem.* 40.214,20–215,8; *Comp.* 3.8,20–9,2.

is very unlikely that in *Comp.* 18, Dionysius uses the expression ὡς ἔτυχεν as opposed to something that is 'natural', as Aujac and Schenkeveld think. As a matter of fact, Dionysius in two cases uses the expression ὡς ἔτυχεν in combination with φύσις, whereas there seems to be a clear contrast between something that is (or is done) ὡς ἔτυχεν on the one hand, and something that is artful, conscious, and technical on the other hand.[150] I cannot discuss all these passages here, but two of them will sufficiently illustrate my point.

When discussing the qualities of Lysias' style, Dionysius points out that his type of composition is ἀποίητος (not artificial) and ἀτεχνίτευτος (artless): it makes the impression 'that it has not been composed deliberately and artistically, but spontaneously and as it happens to be': ὅτι ἀνεπιτηδεύτως καὶ οὐ κατὰ τέχνην, αὐτομάτως δέ πως καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε σύγκειται.[151] It is clear that Dionysius does not mean that the words in Lysias' texts are combined 'at random' (the point is not that the words can take *any* position in the sentence), but that the composition is just as it would be in common language. A text that is composed ὡς ἔτυχε is not composed 'at random' or 'fortuitously', but it is written in the style that corresponds to everyday language, that is 'naturally' or (seemingly) 'spontaneously'. The special thing of Lysias' style is that it appears to change nothing about the normal way of expression: that is the reason why Dionysius thinks that a student who wishes to become an imitator of nature (φύσεως μιμητὴς γίνεσθαι βουλόμενος) should study Lysias. The idea that the phrase ὡς ἔτυχεν brings out is elsewhere clearly formulated as follows: '[Lysias] achieves elegance not by changing (διαλλάττειν) the language of everyday life, but by reproducing (μιμήσασθαι) it.'[152] Unlike Lysias, the orator Isaeus makes the impression that 'not a single statement was spontaneous or unconsidered, not even when

[150] In *Lys.* 8.16,3–16 (= *Imit.* fr. X Usener, 216,7–14; fr. 7 Battisti) and in *Is.* 16.114,7–17, ὡς ἔτυχεν is associated with φύσις (see below). In *Is.* 16.114,7–17, ὡς ἔτυχεν is also contrasted with τέχνη. In *Dem.* 40.214,20–215,8, ὡς ἔτυχεν is likewise contrasted with a conscious and artistic process: the words are not placed ὡς ἔτυχεν or fit together ἀπερισκέπτως, in an 'inconsiderate' or 'thoughtless' way; no, the process of composition is characterised by 'deciding' (διακρίνουσα), 'paying attention' (σκοποῦσα) and 'taking very great care' (πολλὴν σφόδρα ποιουμένη φροντίδα). In *Comp.* 3.8,20–9,2, beautiful conscious arrangement of words is contrasted with expression that is ἀνεπιστάτως δὲ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ῥιπτουμένη ('thrown off without control and inattentively').

[151] *Lys.* 8.16,3–16 (= *Imit.* fr. X Usener, 216,7–14; fr. 7 Battisti).

[152] *Lys.* 4.13,8–10: τὸν δὲ κόσμον οὐκ ἐν τῷ διαλλάττειν τὸν ἰδιώτην, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ μιμήσασθαι λαμβάνει.

it describes the events as they actually happened (ὡς ἔτυχε γενόμενα), but that everything was artfully designed and contrived to mislead'.[153] Isaeus makes the impression that he is always artfully shaping his composition, even when he is describing certain things as they actually happened. The γενόμενα to which Dionysius here refers are not 'random' events, but the relevant events that have to be reported in the narrative of a speech.

Before I conclude my discussion of the expression ὡς ἔτυχεν, there are two passages from other authors that deserve our attention, because they are part of a context in which the relation between names and things is discussed. In the first book of his *Bibliotheca*, Dionysius' contemporary Diodorus Siculus describes the pre-history of men, in a famous passage that may be based on the ideas of Democritus.[154] According to Diodorus, men developed speech together, 'agreeing with one another upon symbols (σύμβολα) for each of the underlying things (τῶν ὑποκειμένων)'.[155] In various parts of the inhabited world, different groups of men created language in this way, each group developing its own words, which resulted into the existence of a variety of languages and nations:[156]

> τοιούτων δὲ συστημάτων γινομένων καθ' ἅπασαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, οὐχ ὁμόφωνον πάντας ἔχειν τὴν διάλεκτον, ἑκάστων ὡς ἔτυχε συνταξάντων τὰς λέξεις· διὸ καὶ παντοίους τε ὑπάρξαι χαρακτῆρας διαλέκτων καὶ τὰ πρῶτα γενόμενα συστήματα τῶν ἁπάντων ἐθνῶν ἀρχέγονα γενέσθαι.
>
> 'But since groups of this kind arose over every part of the inhabited world, not all men had the same language, inasmuch as every group composed their words as they happened to do. This is the explanation of the present existence of every conceivable kind of language, and, furthermore, out of these first groups to be formed came all the original nations of the world.'

According to Diodorus' account, the relation between names and things is conventional: words are tokens (σύμβολα), the product of an agreement between human beings.[157] Words could have any form, for

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[153] *Is.* 16.114,14–17: μηδὲν ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτοφυῶς καὶ ἀπραγματεύτως λέγεσθαι μηδ' εἴ τινα ὡς ἔτυχε γενόμενα εἴρηται, ἐκ κατασκευῆς δὲ πάντα καὶ μεμηχανημένα πρὸς ἀπάτην ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ κακουργίαν.

[154] On this passage, see Vlastos (1946), Gera (2003) 159–166 and the literature mentioned there.

[155] Diodorus Siculus 1.8.3: καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τιθέντας σύμβολα περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

[156] Diodorus Siculus 1.8.4. Translation adapted from Oldfather.

[157] Cf. Gera (2003) 163–164.

there is no natural relation between words and objects. And, as a matter of fact, words are not everywhere the same, for every society composes its own words ὡς ἔτυχε: in this context, we can indeed translate (that is, interpret) the expression as 'arbitrarily'.[158] The main point is, however, that in the formation of words there was no general principle involved that caused the words to be the same in every part of the world. The basic meaning of ὡς ἔτυχε is still the same: various groups of human beings coined words as they happened to do without planning. The notion of arbitrariness is not part of the meaning of the phrase ὡς ἔτυχε itself, but it is a connotation attached to it as a result of the use of the expression in this context. In a similar way, the expression ὡς ἔτυχε is used in a scholion on Dionysius Thrax, which deals with etymology:[159]

> Ἐτυμολογία οὖν, ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι ἀληθολογία· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἱ Ἑλληνικαὶ λέξεις ἐπετέθησαν ἑκάστῳ πράγματι, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὸν νοῦν ἀναπτύσσοντας ἐξευρίσκειν, …
>
> 'Etymology is, as one could say, "the stating of the truth". For from the beginning the Greek words were not assigned to each thing without planning, but through the invention by men who disclosed their meaning (…).'

In this text, it is stated that the imposition of words was a conscious process by name-givers who disclosed the meaning of words in their forms.[160] Again, the words ὡς ἔτυχεν describe a situation that is contrasted with a situation in which control and consciousness are involved: the words were not formed in an uncontrolled way (as they happened to occur), but by a conscious process. In this case, the result is that the forms of words correspond to their meaning, so that etymology can do its work.[161]

Although the passage from Diodorus Siculus and the scholion on Dionysius Thrax use the words ὡς ἔτυχεν in a context in which the relationship between words and things is explicitly discussed, I do not think that these texts should influence our reading of Dionysius' remark in *Comp.* 18. I have argued that the basic meaning of ὡς ἔτυχεν ('as it happened to be') applies to all passages discussed above. There is no reason to believe that the expression ὡς ἔτυχεν as such refers to

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158 Cf. Gera (2003) 164: 'arbitrarily, by chance'.
159 Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 14,26–29.
160 On similar ancient definitions of etymology, see Herbermann (1996^2) 357–358.
161 A similar text is Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 470,36–471,5.

language as 'un produit du hasard et de la convention'.[162] Besides, chance ('hasard') and convention are two entirely different things. Both Diodorus and the scholion on Dionysius Thrax describe the process of name giving as a conscious act of imposition; the former thinks that the relation between names and things is arbitrary, whereas the latter argues that there is an original connection between word and meaning. But neither of these texts speaks of 'chance' ('hasard'). In Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the context is entirely different, as we have seen. His point is nothing more than that it cannot be helped that things have the names that they happen to have, so that one is forced to use certain words despite their unattractive rhythmical structure. When composing a text, one should mix the unavoidable ugly words with the more attractive ones.

2.5.5. *Dionysius on the pleasing combination of common words* (Comp. 3)

In the previous sections, I have argued that in *Comp.* 16 and 18 Dionysius does not present any philosophical view on the relationship between names and things. There remains one passage to be discussed, namely *Comp.* 3.14,11–12. At the beginning of his treatise *On Composition*, Dionysius tells us that there are two subdivisions of the treatment of style, namely selection of words (ἐκλογή) and composition (σύνθεσις).[163] Selection of words is prior in 'order' (τάξει), but composition is prior in 'potency' (δυνάμει).[164] In *Comp.* 3, Dionysius claims that the combination of words is more important and effective than the choice of words (see also section 7.2).[165] He intends to prove his claim by analysing two passages, one in prose and one in poetry. The two examples are *Odyssey* 16.1–16 (Odysseus in Eumaeus' hut) and Herodotus 1.8–10 (the famous

[162] Aujac & Lebel (1981) 126 n. 1. Fehling (1965) 224 argues that the terms ὡς ἔτυχε and *fortuito* are characteristic of ancient accounts of the evolutionary development of language.

[163] *Comp.* 1.5,14–17.

[164] *Comp.* 2.8,14–15.

[165] *Comp.* 3.9,17–21. Cf. *Comp.* 3.9,6–9: ἕτεροι δ' εὐκαταφρόνητα καὶ ταπεινὰ λαβόντες ὀνόματα, συνθέντες δ' αὐτὰ ἡδέως καὶ περιττῶς πολλὴν τὴν ἀφροδίτην τῷ λόγῳ περιέθηκαν. 'Other writers have taken words that are easily despised and humble, and by arranging them in a pleasing and striking way they have succeeded in investing their discourse with great beauty.' Görler (1979) demonstrates that this theme (*ex verbis communis cacozelia*) is very influential in the Augustan period, both in Greek classicistic theory (Dionysius) and in Roman poetic practice (Virgil). See also Freudenburg (1993) 139.

conversation between Candaules and Gyges).[166] In his analysis of these texts, Dionysius distinguishes between three aspects, namely the subject matter or thoughts, the words, and the composition. His argument is in both cases that neither the subject matter (πράγματα) nor the words (ὀνόματα) are the cause of beauty; it is the composition (σύνθεσις) that has produced the pleasing form of these passages. Dionysius focuses on the contrast between the commonplace words on the one hand and the beautiful composition on the other, but in both cases he implies that the character of the words corresponds to that of the subject matter: the passage from the Odyssey portrays 'minor happenings from everyday life' (πραγμάτι' ἄττα βιωτικά).[167] The passage from Herodotus (in which Candaules asks Gyges to see his wife naked) describes 'an incident that is not only undignified and unsuitable for artistic embellishment, but also insignificant and hazardous and closer to ugliness than to beauty.'[168] Nevertheless, the story has been told 'with great dexterity' (δεξιῶς): in fact, 'it is better to hear the incident described than to see it done': the latter words clearly allude to Candaules' words that 'men trust their ears less readily than their eyes'.[169] The attractiveness of the passage is due neither to the subject matter (which is unsuitable and insignificant), nor to the selection of words (which are common and artless), nor to the Ionic dialect (which Dionysius changes into Attic—see section 7.3.3):[170] consequently, the cause of the attractiveness can be nothing else but the composition. After he has quoted Herodotus 1.8–10, Dionysius wants the reader to agree that it is not the words, but the composition that has made the story so elegant:[171]

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166 *Comp.* 3.10,1–12,3; *Comp.* 3.12,4–15,2.

167 *Comp.* 3.10,5–6.

168 *Comp.* 3.12,14–16: πρᾶγμα οὐχ ὅτι σεμνὸν ἢ καλλιλογεῖσθαι ἐπιτήδειον, ἀλλὰ καὶ παιδικὸν καὶ ἐπικίνδυνον καὶ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐγγυτέρω.

169 *Comp.* 3.12,17–18: κρεῖττον γέγονεν ἀκουσθῆναι λεγόμενον ἢ ὀφθῆναι γινόμενον. Compare Herodotus 1.8.2 (cited in *Comp.* 3.13,4–5): ὦτα γὰρ τυγχάνει ἀνθρώποις ὄντα ἀπιστότερα ὀφθαλμῶν. Dionysius borrows Candaules' opposition between eyes and ears (seeing and hearing), but he turns things around: Herodotus' composition makes the incident better to hear described (ἀκουσθῆναι) than to see done (ὀφθῆναι), whereas Candaules thought that it would be better for Gyges to see his wife than to hear somebody describing her. If we extrapolate the comparison, Dionysius' allusion will make Herodotus' story as attractive as Candaules' wife. Goudriaan (1989) 198 thinks that Dionysius' remark on ὀφθῆναι echoes Aristotelian ideas on ὄψις, but he does not notice the allusion to Herodotus.

170 On the change (metathesis) of the Ionic dialect into Attic, see also De Jonge (2005b) 476.

171 *Comp.* 3.14,9–15,2.

> οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ ἡ σεμνότης τῶν ὀνομάτων εὔμορφον πεποίηκε τὴν φράσιν· ἀνεπιτήδευτα γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἀνέκλεκτα, οἷα ἡ φύσις τέθηκεν σύμβολα τοῖς πράγμασιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἥρμοττεν ἴσως κρείττοσι χρήσασθαι ἑτέροις. ἀνάγκη δὲ δή που, ὅταν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις τε καὶ προσεχεστάτοις ὀνόμασιν ἐκφέρηται, τὰ νοήματα μηδὲν σεμνότερα εἶναι, ἢ οἷά ἐστιν.[172] ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστι σεμνὸν οὐδὲ περιττόν, ὁ βουλόμενος εἴσεται μεταθεὶς οὐδὲν ὅ τι μὴ τὴν ἁρμονίαν. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ τῷ ἀνδρὶ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν, ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις τεκμήραιτο, ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ κάλλει τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ πειθὼ τῆς ἑρμηνείας ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ συζυγίᾳ. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἱκανὰ ταῦτα.
>
> 'Here again, no one can say that it is the dignity and grandeur of the words that has given the style its pleasing form. These have not been carefully contrived and selected, but they are such labels as nature has fixed to things: indeed, perhaps it would not have been fitting to use other more striking words. It must necessarily be the case, in fact, that whenever they are expressed in the most common and appropriate words the thoughts are not more dignified but remain such as they are. That there is no grand or striking word in the present passage, anyone who wishes may discover by changing nothing but the arrangement. There are many passages like this in this author, as in Homer, from which one may conclude that the appealing quality of his style is derived, after all, not from the beauty of the words, but from their combination. That is sufficient on this subject.'

Herodotus could have used more beautiful words in order to present the banal story in a more elevated way; but he has not done that, for the character of the words corresponds to that of the ideas. Neither the subject matter, nor the words, nor the dialect are responsible for the beauty of the passage: the persuasiveness of the style (ἡ πειθὼ τῆς ἑρμηνείας) lies solely in the combination (τῇ συζυγίᾳ) of the words.[173] As we have seen above (section 2.5.1), Schenkeveld supposes that in this text (οἷα ἡ φύσις τέθηκεν σύμβολα τοῖς πράγμασιν), there is an inconsistency between the idea of φύσις 'as the originator of language' and the use of the word σύμβολα, which seems to imply that words are conventional tokens.[174] He relates the word φύσις to the Stoic views on the natural correctness of words, but he thinks that the term σύμβολα

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[172] The text seems to be corrupt here. The MSS (P,F) have σεμνότερον. I follow the reading of Aujac & Lebel (1981) 68–69: τὰ νοήματα μηδὲν σεμνότερα εἶναι, ἢ οἷά ἐστιν. Usener prints τὰ νοήματα μηδὲν σεμνότερ' εἶναι, ἢ οἷά ἐστιν ⟨ἐκεῖνα⟩ ('the thoughts are not more dignified than such as the words are').

[173] For a discussion of this passage, see also Goudriaan (1989) 197–198. On Dionysius' use of συζυγία, see Pohl (1968) 7.

[174] Schenkeveld (1983) 90.

must have been taken from a 'Peripatetic source'. However, in the analysis of *Comp.* 16 (section 2.5.3) we have found that it may be more helpful to interpret φύσις as the opposite of τέχνη rather than as the opposite of νόμος or θέσις. The contrast between nature and art is a recurring theme in Dionysius' rhetorical works, and it seems to be relevant in this passage as well.[175] The artistic merits of the story of 'Gyges and Candaules' cannot be found in the choice of words, but in the composition, for the words themselves are artless (ἀνεπιτήδευτα) and have not been selected with studious care (ἀνέκλεκτα): they are just the most common words, by which one normally calls the things by their proper names. They are κυριωτάτοις τε καὶ προσεχεστάτοις, 'the most proper and appropriate words'.[176] Given the emphasis on the inartistic character of Herodotus' words, Dionysius' use of the word φύσις in this passage presumably does not indicate more than that the words used by Herodotus are those of everyday language. In the preceding discussion of the passage from the *Odyssey*, where Dionysius uses exactly the same argument, he points out that 'the whole passage is woven together from the most commonplace, humble words, such as might have come readily to the tongue of a farmer, seaman or artisan, or anyone else who takes no trouble to speak well'.[177] In my view, the term φύσις summarises exactly the latter idea: it is not 'the originator of language', but rather 'human nature' that has assigned the proper (not metaphorical or poetic) words to things. Another passage in which Dionysius uses the word φύσις in a similar way is the following text from the treatise *On Demosthenes*, where Dionysius describes the style of Thucydides (see also section 5.2):[178]

> τουτὶ δ' ἔστι τὸ μὴ κατ' εὐθεῖαν ἑρμηνείαν ἐξενηνέχθαι τὰ νοήματα μηδ', ὡς ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις σύνηθες λέγειν, ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀφελῶς, ἀλλὰ ἐξηλλάχθαι καὶ ἀπεστράφθαι τὴν διάλεκτον ἐκ τῶν ἐν ἔθει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὰ μὴ συνήθη τοῖς πολλοῖς μηδ' ὡς ἡ φύσις ἀπαιτεῖ.

[175] On Dionysius' use of the contrast between φύσις amd τέχνη, see Untersteiner (1959) and section 5.2 of this study. On φύσις in general, see Holwerda (1955).

[176] Aristotle, *Po.* 21.1457b1–6 defines κύριον ὄνομα as a word used by all members of a community (ἕκαστοι), whereas a 'loan word' (γλῶττα) is used by outsiders (ἕτεροι). For Dionysius' use of κύριον ὄνομα (a word used in its proper sense), see section 3.6.1.

[177] *Comp.* 3.11,10–14: διὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων καὶ ταπεινοτάτων ὀνομάτων πέπλεκται πᾶσα ἡ λέξις, οἷς ἂν καὶ γεωργὸς καὶ θαλαττουργὸς καὶ χειροτέχνης καὶ πᾶς ὁ μηδεμίαν ὠραν τοῦ λέγειν εὖ ποιούμενος ἐξ ἑτοίμου λαβὼν ἐχρήσατο.

[178] *Dem.* 9.145,6–11.

> 'This [i.e. the most characteristic aspect of Thucydides' style] is that the thoughts are not expressed by direct means and not in a simple and plain way, as is the normal practice of other writers, but that the language is removed and turned away from what is customary and natural (κατὰ φύσιν) towards expressions that are unfamiliar to most people and different from what nature (ἡ φύσις) demands.'

In my view, the φύσις in this passage is the same φύσις that appears in *Comp.* 3. In both cases, 'nature' corresponds to the normal and familiar usage of human beings, which is contrasted to a technical and artificial use of language (words and constructions). When Dionysius states that 'nature demands' (ἡ φύσις ἀπαιτεῖ) a certain use of language, he presumably does not have a philosophical construct in mind. In my view, the same interpretation holds for his remark that 'nature has fixed labels to things' (ἡ φύσις τέθηκεν σύμβολα τοῖς πράγμασιν).

As far as the term σύμβολα is concerned, I am less certain. I do not believe that the use of this word implies the use of a 'Peripatetic source', but it is possible that it echoes Aristotelian ideas: we recall that Aristotle said that 'spoken utterances are symbols (σύμβολα) of affections in the soul'.[179] This could mean that Dionysius believes that the relation between ὀνόματα and πράγματα depends on convention, a view that we have encountered in our discussion of his contemporary Diodorus Siculus (section 2.5.4).[180] But perhaps we should not read too much into the use of the word σύμβολα: in the first century BC. many originally philosophic terms had become part of the general intellectual discourse of the time, and it seems that a certain philosophical terminology could also be used as a mere dressing of scholarship. Besides, the word σύμβολον was used in a wider sense than that of the Aristotelian 'token'. The terms σύμβολον and συμβολαῖον both occur rather frequently in Dionysius' works. My impression is that Dionysius normally uses σύμβολον with a general sense of 'sign', 'mark' or 'guarantee', and that it does not necessarily imply a preceding human agreement or convention.[181] I think that Dionysius may have selected the term σύμβολον in *Comp.* 3 because of its philosophical flavour. In any case, on the basis of the passage discussed above, we should not draw too many

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[179] Aristotle, *Int.* 16a3–9: see section 2.5.1 above, where I also referred to Aristotle, *Sophistici Elenchi* 165a6–8 (words as tokens for things).

[180] Cf. Whitaker (1996) 9–10.

[181] See e.g. *Dem.* 50.237,8 (μορφῆς σύμβολον); *Ant. Rom.* 2.8.4 (τεκμήριον and σύμβολον as 'proofs' or 'indications').

conclusions regarding Dionysius' views on the origin of language or his ideas on the natural or conventional relation between words and things. As I have pointed out above, the passage in which the allegedly philosophical remark occurs deals primarily with a stylistic evaluation of Herodotus' 'Gyges and Candaules': Dionysius' argument is that the charming character of this story results from the pleasing combination of common words.

2.5.6. *No inconsistency in Dionysius' views on language*

Having analysed three passages of his work *On Composition*, I have shown that a good understanding of Dionysius' works in general, and of his alleged philosophical statements on language in particular, must be underpinned by a careful interpretation of the context of his theories. Dionysius is not a philosopher, and it is not his purpose to teach his audience about the nature of language. In *On Composition*, he wishes to teach his addressee and other readers about the means and aims of composition. It is true that he makes use of a lot of views on language that were developed in other language disciplines, such as philosophy, grammar and rhetoric. However, the suggestion that Dionysius 'only reproduces what he has read, without realizing its implications' is incorrect and ignores the internal cohesion of Dionysius' theory of composition.[182] The three statements on ὀνόματα that have been discussed in this chapter all contribute to Dionysius' rhetorical theory, and should not be interpreted out of context. The alleged inconsistency between two views on the relation between ὀνόματα and πράγματα (a Stoic view on the one hand and an Aristotelian view on the other) appears to rest on a misinterpretation of Dionysius' statements and their context. We have to conclude that 'philosophy of language' was not a matter of great concern to Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his work *On Composition*. At the same time, however, we may conclude that as a teacher of rhetorical theory he was not so careless and ignorant as some modern scholars have thought he was.

[182] Schenkeveld (1983) 89.

2.6. *Conclusion*

In this chapter, I have collected and analysed a number of Dionysius' more general ideas on the nature of language. We have seen that, according to this rhetorician, language is characterised by a hierarchical structure. Language is an atomic system, which is reflected in the architectural character of written discourse. Dionysius was of course aware of the different languages spoken in the world. He himself was bilingual, and he adopted a common theory on the Greek (Aeolic) origin of the Latin language. We have observed that this theory is closely related to Dionysius' views on the Greek origin of the Roman people and the unity of the Graeco-Roman world under Augustus. I have also explored Dionysius' views on the relation between language, thought and reality. Despite some modern claims, Dionysius does not ignore the importance of the meanings underlying words. His stylistic analyses build on the important idea that the meaning that underlies a certain utterance can be expressed in several ways, with different degrees of accuracy, clarity and embellishment. Finally, I have discussed three passages from the treatise *On Composition* in which Dionysius has been thought to offer contradicting explanations of the relation between names and things. These passages deal primarily with different aspects of composition theory, and they scarcely allow any conclusions about Dionysius' philosophical views to be drawn. I have argued that a contextual approach to Dionysius' ideas is more fruitful than the approach that portrays Dionysius as a stupid copyist. Now that we have detected the importance of this principle, we are ready to turn to Dionysius' more technical ideas on language.

CHAPTER THREE

DIONYSIUS ON THE GRAMMATICAL THEORY OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH

3.1. *Introduction*

Our study of Dionysius' integration of different language disciplines will continue with an examination of the connections between grammar and rhetoric. Ancient grammar focused on the word as the central unit of language. Modern scholars have characterised the ancient *artes grammaticae* (τέχναι γραμματικαί) as 'word-based grammars'. Adopting the 'word and paradigm model' as their framework, these treatises mainly consist of a discussion of μέρη λόγου (normally translated as 'parts of speech' or 'word classes') and their *accidentia*.[1] The *Technê Grammatikê* that has come down to us under the name of Dionysius Thrax distinguishes eight word classes: ὄνομα (noun), ῥῆμα (verb), μετοχή (participle), ἄρθρον (article), ἀντωνυμία (pronoun), πρόθεσις (preposition), ἐπίρρημα (adverb) and σύνδεσμος (conjunction).[2] For a long time, Dionysius Thrax (170–90 BC) was considered to have been the first grammarian who used this system of eight parts of speech. In 1958, however, Di Benedetto put forward the view that most part of the *Technê Grammatikê*, including the exposition of the word class system, was to be regarded as a compilation that was put together in the 3rd or 4th century AD.[3] Although doubts about the authenticity of the *Technê* had already been expressed in antiquity, Di Benedetto was the first to claim that Dionysius Thrax himself only wrote the first five paragraphs of the *Technê*.[4]

[1] Cf. Robins (1997) 31.

[2] The English terms do not entirely coincide with the Greek concepts: the ἄρθρον does not only cover the article, but also our relative pronoun, the ἐπίρρημα also includes interjections, and the σύνδεσμος comprises what we call 'particles'. The ὄνομα covers both substantives and adjectives. The Romans substituted the interjection for the ἄρθρον, thus listing the following eight word classes: *nomen*, *verbum*, *participium*, *pronomen*, *praepositio*, *adverbium*, *coniunctio*, *interiectio*.

[3] Di Benedetto (1958–1959).

[4] For the ancient doubts on the authenticity of the *Technê Grammatikê*, see Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 124,7–14 and Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 160,24–161,8.

The publication of Di Benedetto's views was the starting point of a long and passionate debate on the authenticity and authority of the *Technê*.[5] Although several scholars (notably Pfeiffer and Erbse) have tried to rebut Di Benedetto's arguments, most specialists have now accepted the view that Dionysius Thrax himself wrote only the very first part of the *Technê Grammatikê*, while the rest of the work, including the classification of the parts of speech, belongs to the 3rd or 4th century AD.[6]

Having acknowledged that the major part of the *Technê* was not written by Dionysius Thrax, historians of grammar had to reconsider questions about the origin and development of the traditional system of eight word classes. According to ancient testimonies, Dionysius Thrax 'separated' ὄνομα (proper noun) and προσηγορία (appellative), and 'combined' ἄρθρον (article) and ἀντωνυμία (pronoun).[7] This would mean that he did not use the word class system that we find in the *Technê Grammatikê*. Those scholars who have accepted Di Benedetto's thesis that the *Technê* is not authentic have pointed to the works of other grammarians as the possible origin of the traditional word class system. In particular, Di Benedetto himself and others have argued that it was the grammarian Tryphon (1st century BC) who first adopted the traditional system of eight word classes.[8] More recently, however, Matthaios has shown that Aristarchus (216–144 BC), the teacher of

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[5] Di Benedetto (1973, 1990, 2000) has repeated and illuminated his arguments in response to his opponents Pfeiffer (1968) and Erbse (1980). For the problems of authenticity and authority of the *Technê*, and the arguments *pro* and *contra*, see also Pinborg (1975) 103–106, Kemp (1996^2) 307–315, Law & Sluiter (1998^2) and Lallot (1998) 20–25, and the literature cited there.

[6] Exceptions are prof. A. Wouters and prof. P. Swiggers, who regard the *Technê Grammatikê* as authentic, although they acknowledge that the preserved text may have undergone some changes. See e.g. Wouters (1998) and Swiggers & Wouters (2002) 16–17.

[7] Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 124,7–14; Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 160,24–161,8. The information that Dionysius Thrax combined ἀντωνυμία and ἄρθρον may depend on Apollonius Dyscolus' report (*Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1.1, 5,18–19) that Dionysius Thrax called the pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά. Scholars interpret Apollonius' testimony in different ways. Some believe that Dionysius Thrax treated the pronouns and articles as one single word class, whereas others think that he called pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά ('deictic articles') without rejecting their status as a separate word class (so Matthaios [2002] 193). See sections 3.2 and 3.6.3 of this study.

[8] For the view that Tryphon was the one who introduced the system of eight word classes, see Di Benedetto (1958) 125–126, Pinborg (1975) 116–117, Schenkeveld (1994) 268 and 277, and Lallot (1998) 124–125. Ax (1982) 98–100 usefully summarises the views that various scholars have expressed on the two relevant questions: (a) from which time was a grammatical theory of word classes used? And (b) at which point was it fixed in a grammatical treatise?

Dionysius Thrax, already distinguished the word classes that were to become the canonical eight.[9] He did not discuss these word classes in a grammatical treatise, but he employed them for his philological activities (Ax characterises Aristarchus' grammar as a 'Grammatik im Kopf').[10] Apart from the adverb, for which he used the term μεσότης (instead of the later ἐπίρρημα), all word classes that were identified by Aristarchus carried the names that would become standard in later grammars. With the acknowledgement of the important role of Aristarchus, a new picture of the early history of the system of eight word classes has been drawn.[11]

Many things are still unclear, however, concerning the distribution, development and systematisation of the traditional word class theory in the period after Aristarchus.[12] It is certain that many other word class systems, consisting of nine or more μέρη λόγου, circulated in the period between Aristarchus (second century BC) and Apollonius Dyscolus (second century AD), before the latter grammarian adopted the system of eight word classes in his *Syntax* and other grammatical works.[13] And although Apollonius was very influential, the octopartite system probably did not become canonical until the Roman grammarian Donatus (active around 350 AD) had adopted it.[14] What happened in the period

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[9] See Matthaios (1999), who has elaborated the views of Ax (1982, 1996^2).

[10] Ax (1996^2) 288.

[11] Matthaios has used the results that he obtained from his research on Aristarchus to write a new reconstruction of the history of the theory of the parts of speech: see Matthaios (2001) and Matthaios (2002).

[12] Cf. Robins (1998^2) 19: 'We know the names of several important grammarians in the Greek world who were active in the first centuries BC and AD, and we desperately need to find out what was going on in the Greek world between the times of Dionysius [i.e. Dionysius Thrax] and Apollonius over a span of about three hundred years.' See also Lallot (1998) 29–30.

[13] Ancient histories of the theory of the parts of speech inform us about the existence of various systems: see Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Comp.* 2.6,20–7,13 and Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 1.4.17–21 (see sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3 of this study). See also Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 356,16–21 and Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 520,23–27 (systems of nine, ten and eleven word classes). In practice, we find systems with nine word classes in the grammatical papyri P. Yale I 25 (nr. 1 Wouters) and P. Heid. I 198 (nr. 12 Wouters). See Wouters [1979], 179 n. 22. If one follows Schenkeveld (1983), Dionysius of Halicarnassus also uses a system of nine parts of speech, but see my section 3.6.6. For Apollonius' use of the eight word classes, see *Synt.* I.14–29. Schoemann (1862) 12 already pointed out that many grammarians after Aristarchus adopted different word class systems.

[14] The Romans substituted the interjection for the article. This may have been the work of Palaemon (see Taylor [1996a] 344), but the definitive *canonisation* of the system of eight word classes, to the exclusion of systems with nine or more *partes orationis*,

between Aristarchus and Apollonius is difficult to tell, because so many important texts have been lost: only fragments survive of the works written by important grammarians such as Dionysius Thrax, Tyrannion, Asclepiades of Myrlea and Tryphon (see section 3.2).

Dionysius of Halicarnassus did not write any grammatical treatises, but we have seen (section 1.5) that in the context of his rhetorical theory he makes use of views that were developed in philology, grammar and philosophy. Unlike the grammatical treatises of Alexandrian scholars (Tyrannion, Asclepiades of Myrlea and Tryphon), most of the works of Dionysius have survived. Schenkeveld was the first to draw attention to Dionysius' treatises as 'a possible source of information for the level of linguistic knowledge in the second half of the first century BC.'[15] In this chapter, I intend to build on Schenkeveld's work by using Dionysius' works as a source that can increase our knowledge of the theory of the parts of speech as it was circulating at the end of the first century BC. I will shed more light on the transmission of that theory in the period between Aristarchus and later grammarians by re-examining the relevant data that Dionysius offers on the word class theory and by interpreting them in the light of recent scholarly work.[16] In this way, I will also attempt to establish Dionysius' place in the history of the theory of the 'parts of speech'.

I will argue that Dionysius' treatment of the parts of speech incorporates views from different language disciplines, in particular the Alexandrian philological tradition (known to us especially through the fragments of Aristarchus) and the Stoic philosophical tradition.[17] In other words, as far as Dionysius of Halicarnassus shows knowledge of the grammatical theory of word classes, he belongs to a particular tradition of scholars such as Dionysius Thrax, Tyrannion, and writers of some grammatical papyri: in the surviving fragments of these grammarians we find the influence of the original Alexandrian tradition of philologists (Aristophanes, Aristarchus) on the one hand and the Stoic

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belongs to later times. For the influential role of Apollonius Dyscolus, see Lallot (1997 I) 23 n. 35.

[15] Schenkeveld (1983) 67.

[16] In particular, the contributions of Sluiter (1990) and Lallot (1997) on Apollonius Dyscolus, Lallot (1998) on the *Technê Grammatikê*, Blank (1998) on Sextus Empiricus, Matthaios (1999) on Aristarchus, and Janko (2000) on Philodemus shed new light on the history of the theory of the 'parts of speech', which has consequences for our interpretation of the information found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

[17] See also Matthaios (2001) 89.

tradition on the other.[18] From Dionysius Thrax onwards, Alexandrian and Stoic ideas on language were integrated into one system that consituted the basis of technical grammar. Apollonius Dyscolus completes the integration process by making a complete synthesis of the two traditions.[19] I will discuss various aspects of Dionysius' use of grammar that support the view that he was influenced by both philological and Stoic ideas. Further, we will see that Dionysius' use of the parts of speech theory is not only influenced by philology, grammar and philosophy, but also by the tradition of poetic criticism (see sections 3.2 and 4.3).

The study of Dionysius' works can increase our knowledge of the development of grammatical theory between Aristarchus and Apollonius Dyscolus. This should, however, not obscure the fact that Dionysius' profession is rhetoric, and not grammar: when using his works in order to reconstruct the history of linguistics, we should not ignore the fact that his concept of 'parts of speech' is somewhat different from that of the grammarians (see section 3.4), and that he uses grammatical theory for different purposes, namely rhetorical theory and literary criticism.[20] In the current chapter I bring together the relevant data from Dionysius' works, in order to reconstruct his grammatical knowledge. In chapter 4, I will discuss the contexts in which Dionysius mentions the grammatical theories, in order to show how he makes use of the theory of the parts of speech in different parts of his rhetorical and critical works. Before I investigate Dionysius' views on the parts of speech, I will recall the earlier views on the parts of λόγος and λέξις (section 3.2) in various language disciplines, and consider to what extent Dionysius was acquainted with these views (section 3.3).

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[18] On Stoic influence on Dionysius Thrax, see Matthaios (2002) 192–193 and see section 3.2. On the Stoic influence on Tyrannion, see Matthaios (2002) 193–195.

[19] Cf. Matthaios (2001) 88: 'Er [Apollonius Dyscolus] ist derjenige, durch dessen Leistung die alexandrinische und die stoische Lehrtradition zu einer sinnvollen Synthese und Fügung gelangt sind.' For Apollonius and the influence of philology and philosophy on his work, see Blank (1982) and Sluiter (1990) 40–41.

[20] Dionysius' remarks on the parts of speech are often cited as evidence for the grammatical knowledge of his time, but his own aims are sometimes ignored. Thus, Pinborg (1975) 117 n. 45 pays no attention to the function of Dionysius' discussion of the *accidentia* in *Comp.* 6 (see section 4.3.1), and Matthaios (2001) 89 refers to Dionysius as if he were a grammarian. Schenkeveld (1983) 69 does mention the fact that Dionysius' grammatical observations serve 'his argument on literary matters', although in his interpretation of single passages he does not always take the rhetorical context into account, which can sometimes lead to misunderstanding (e.g. when dealing with Dionysius' 'system' of word classes, see section 3.6.6).

3.2. Logos, lexis, *and their parts in the various language disciplines*

The most obvious approach to reconstructing the history of the parts of speech in the period before Dionysius of Halicarnassus might seem to start from his own history of the theory of the parts of speech in *De compositione verborum* 2.[21] As I have argued elsewhere, this passage may be characterised as the first extant history of linguistics in the western world.[22] Dionysius describes the gradual increase of the number of the parts of speech from Aristotle onwards: Theodectes and Aristotle distinguished three parts (ὀνόματα, ῥήματα and σύνδεσμοι), the Stoic philosophers added the ἄρθρον and distinguished four, 'later generations' (οἱ μεταγενέστεροι) separated ὀνοματικά and προσηγορικά, thus arriving at five parts. 'Others' (ἕτεροι) distinguished the ἀντονομασία as the sixth part of speech, and 'yet others' (οἳ δέ) added the ἐπιρρήματα, προθέσεις and μετοχαί, thus listing nine parts of speech; others (οἳ δέ) introduced still further divisions. I will discuss this overview of the development of the parts of speech in section 4.2, where I will argue that Dionysius' overview is the archetype of the traditional historiography of linguistics. His presentation of the history of the parts of speech as a gradual progress (from three parts in Aristotle to a system of nine or more parts) has remained standard in overviews of ancient grammar until the end of the twentieth century. When determining Dionysius' own position in the history of linguistics, however, I will not adopt his approach as a historian of linguistics. Taylor (1986), Schenkeveld (1994) and other scholars have rightly argued that historians of linguistics should no longer ignore the different contexts in which ancient ideas on language were developed.[23] This means in particular that we should take into account that the units that were called μέρη were in fact very different items that were used differently in distinct language disciplines. The English term 'parts of speech' is the traditional translation of the Greek τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, and the Latin *partes orationis*.[24] Originally a philosophical term,

[21] *Comp.* 2.6,17–7,21.

[22] De Jonge (2005a).

[23] See also Sluiter (1993, 1998) and De Jonge (2005a) 15–16.

[24] On the terms μέρη λόγου and *partes orationis*, and their meaning and possible translations, see also Pinborg (1975) 116, Lambert (1985) 115–116, Robins (1986) 20, Lallot (1992) 127–129 ('Comment dit-on "mot" en Grec?'), Blank (1998) 174, Matthaios (1999) 198–200 and Law (2003) 59. Pinborg (1975) 116 is particularly instructive: 'The concept of "part of speech" is somewhat heterogeneous as a consequence of its historical origin. It is used of a segment of a string (identified with a word) and of classes of such segments. Aristotle seems to have used the term exclusively in this way. It is then used of

it was used in different ways and contexts by Aristotle and the Stoic philosophers respectively. Philologists and grammarians, on the other hand, distinguished different 'word classes', for which at some point they borrowed the expression τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου from the philosophers. In theories of composition and syntax, the term could be used to designate the 'parts of a phrase': the words in their context. In short, the phrase τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου did not mean the same thing to the various thinkers who used the term. Therefore, when sketching the history of the theory of the parts of speech as a background to Dionysius' position, I will not follow Dionysius' own historical overview, which does not pay attention to the contexts of the views of Aristotle, the Stoics, and other thinkers. Instead, I will summarise the most important distinctions that his predecessors, including philosophers, critics, philological and technical grammarians, made concerning λόγος, λέξις and their μέρη.[25]

For Aristotle, the μέρη λόγου were the parts of the λόγος ἀποφαντικός ('assertion'), and in *De interpretatione* he distinguished two of them, namely ὄνομα and ῥῆμα.[26] The term σύνδεσμος does occur in this work, but it is not considered a part of the λόγος: it only refers to the 'joining' of primitive assertions.[27] Likewise, in his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle considers ὄνομα and ῥῆμα the sole components of a λόγος, although the σύνδεσμοι do appear elsewhere in the same work.[28] Aristotle's distinction of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα in *De interpretatione* is the result of a logical analysis of a sentence as the bearer of truth or falsity, which Aristotle needs for his investigation into contradictions.[29] In the *Poetics*, however, Aristotle

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classes established as semantic classes (especially by the Stoics) and of classes of words undergoing similar inflections. The traditional exposition of the eight parts of speech reflects a conglomeration of these different approaches.'

[25] The treatment of the μέρη λόγου and μέρη λέξεως by various philosophers, philologists and grammarians is, of course, a complex problem: I can only deal with the aspects that are most relevant as a background to Dionysius' use of the 'parts of speech'.

[26] Aristotle, *Int.* 16a19–17a7: see the interpretation in Whitaker (1996) 35–73. For Aristotle's analysis of the λόγος in *De interpretatione* and its role in the history of the theory of the 'parts of speech', see also Arens (1984), Lallot (1988) 15, Ax (1992) 247–248, Schenkeveld (1994) 271 and Arens (2000).

[27] The expression συνδέσμῳ εἷς occurs at *Int.* 17a9 and 17a16: non-primitive assertions are 'single by conjunction', i.e. formed by joining primitive assertions together. Thus, the *Iliad* is also 'single by conjunction'. Cope (1867) 392–397 discusses Aristotle's use of the term σύνδεσμος.

[28] For ὄνομα and ῥῆμα as the components of the λόγος, see *Rh.* 1404b26–27; the σύνδεσμοι are mentioned in *Rh.* 1407a21, 1407b12, 1407b39 and 1413b33.

[29] Cf. Whitaker (1996) 7.

discusses the μέρη λέξεως or 'parts of the expression':[30] στοιχεῖον ('element', i.e. 'letter'), συλλαβή ('syllable'), σύνδεσμος ('conjunction'), ὄνομα ('noun'), ῥῆμα ('verb'), ἄρθρον ('joint'), πτῶσις ('case') and λόγος ('utterance'). This list contains all items that can be considered 'components of diction', whether they are smaller than words (e.g. 'element' and 'syllable'), words, or combinations of words:[31] thus, λόγος is here a μέρος λέξεως and it is defined as 'a compound, significant utterance, some of whose parts do have independent significance'.[32] Aristotle's μέρη λέξεως and his μέρη λόγου represent two entirely different approaches to language, and neither of these concepts corresponds to the 'word classes' that grammarians identified in later times.[33]

The Stoics had a different ontology and logic than Aristotle, which is mirrored in their list of μέρη λόγου.[34] They identified first four, later five 'parts of speech': Chrysippus added the προσηγορία to the list of four parts that were distinguished by earlier Stoics, namely ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, ἄρθρον and σύνδεσμος. The μεσότης (adverb) was added at a still later stage, presumably under influence of Alexandrian philology.[35] Chrysippus' distinction between 'proper noun' (ὄνομα) and 'appellative' (προσηγορία) was based on the ontological difference between an individual quality and a common quality.[36] For the Stoics, λέξις is articulated sound, which is either meaningless or meaningful.[37] Λόγος, how-

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[30] *Po.* 20. Cf. Schenkeveld (1994) 271 and Grintser (2002) 104–105.

[31] Lallot (1992) 128 remarks that Aristotle does in fact not have a word meaning 'word'.

[32] *Po.* 20.1457a 23–24: λόγος δέ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ ἧς ἔνια μέρη καθ' αὑτὰ σημαίνει τι. The translation is by Halliwell (1995).

[33] The Aristotelian distinction between λόγος and λέξις is also preserved in Theophrastus fr. 683 Fortenbaugh. On the 'grammatical' chapters in Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* (1–4), *Poetica* (19–22) and *Rhetorica*, see Arens (1984), Rosén (1990), Ax (1992), Weidemann (1996[2]), Ildefonse (1997) 72–117, Grintser (2002) and Swiggers & Wouters (2002).

[34] For the fragments on the theory of the Stoic μέρη λόγου, see *FDS* 536–549. See especially Diogenes Laertius VII.56–58 (= *FDS* 536). Cf. Schenkeveld (1994) 271–272 and Luhtala (2000) 78–85.

[35] In Stoic grammar the μεσότης was introduced by Antipater (Diogenes Laertius VII.57), but Aristarchus used the term already before that time. See Matthaios (1999) 553: 'Diese Entwicklung impliziert die Annahme, Antipater habe unter dem Einfluß der Ansichten der Alexandriner die Selbständigkeit des Adverbs auch für das stoische Redeteilsystem angenommen und zu dessen Bezeichnung den von den Alexandrinern geprägten Terminus μεσότης übernommen.'

[36] Diogenes Laertius VII.58. See also section 5.3.6.

[37] Unlike the grammarians, who equated λέξις with 'word', the Stoics used the term λέξις ('articulated sound') only in the singular.

ever, is a *semantic* unity, which is always meaningful, whether it refers (in non-Stoic terms) to a word, a series of words or an entire text.[38] The στοιχεῖα λέξεως (or φωνῆς) are the 'elements of articulated sound', that is the letters, while the στοιχεῖα λόγου are the 'elements of speech', that is the (meaningful) 'parts of speech'.[39]

Alexandrian philologists and (in a later period) technical grammarians partly used the same terms as the Stoics, but they did so in a different way and for a different purpose. Matthaios has shown that Aristarchus (216–144 BC) distinguished the names of eight word classes, namely ὄνομα ('noun'), ῥῆμα ('verb'), μετοχή ('participle'), ἄρθρον ('article'), ἀντωνυμία ('pronoun'), μεσότης ('adverb'), σύνδεσμος ('conjunction') and πρόθεσις ('preposition').[40] Aristarchus and his Alexandrian colleagues used these word classes and their *accidentia* for the explanation and textual criticism of Homer. For example, Aristarchus observed that in a certain verse Homer used a passive instead of an active verb form (παθητικὸν ἀντὶ ἐνεργητικοῦ), or that he used the word τούς not as an ἄρθρον (article), but instead of an ἀντωνυμία (pronoun).[41] Aristarchus seems to have refined the terminological system of his Alexandrian predecessors, who already made some important distinctions: Apollonius Dyscolus reports that Aristophanes of Byzantium used the term πρόθεσις ('preposition'), and that Aristarchus' older contemporary Comanus knew the pronoun, which he called ἀντωνομασία (see section 3.6.3).[42] Aristarchus' most important contributions may have been the distinction of the adverb and the participle as separate word classes, for the

[38] Diogenes Laertius VII.56–57. Cf. Sluiter (1990) 23 and Luhtala (2000) 72–73.

[39] See *FDS* 539–541. The term στοιχεῖα λόγου also appears in the title of a work by the Peripatetic philosopher Theophrastus: Περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων (fr. 683 Fortenbaugh). It has been suggested that this title refers to the first part of Theophrastus' Περὶ λέξεως, but Schenkeveld (1998a) 69–79 has argued that it is the title of a logical work. See section 3.3.1.

[40] See Matthaios (1999). Matthaios concludes that careful analysis of the fragments of Aristarchus confirms the testimony of Quintilian (*Inst. orat.* 1.4.20; see section 4.2.3), who states that Aristarchus knew eight *partes orationis*. On Aristarchus and his philological work, see Pfeiffer (1968) 210–233.

[41] Aristarchus, fr. 57 Matthaios (Sch. Hom., *Iliad* 3.306–310): see Matthaios (1999) 312–318; Aristarchus, fr. 100a Matthaios (Sch. Hom., *Iliad* 10.322): see Matthaios (1999) 437–438. On Aristarchus' use of the word classes in his philological work, see Ax (1982), Schenkeveld (1994) 273–278, Ax (1996^2) 282–288, and especially Matthaios (1999).

[42] For Aristophanes' use of the πρόθεσις, see Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* IV.11. Cf. Callanan (1987) 28ff., Schenkeveld (1994) 275, Lallot (1997 II) 286–287 and Matthaios (1999) 588, 608 and 613. For Comanus on the ἀντωνομασία see Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 4,18.

terms μεσότης and μετοχή are not used in this sense in earlier extant texts.[43] For our reconstruction of the history of the word class system after Aristarchus, it is important that we pay attention to two important facts. First, Aristarchus did not use the term ἐπίρρημα, which was the normal term for 'adverb' in later times.[44] Second, he presumably did not use the expression τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου to designate ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, etc.[45] Unlike the philosophers, Aristarchus was not interested in 'parts of λόγος', but in 'word classes' (types of words).[46]

In the generation of Aristarchus' pupil Dionysius Thrax (ca. 170–90 BC), Stoic influence on the Alexandrian grammarians became stronger.[47] It has been noticed that where the teachings of Dionysius Thrax (as reported by ancient testimonies) differ from the theories in the *Technê Grammatikê*, Dionysius Thrax seems to have adopted Stoic ideas.[48] In particular, Dionysius Thrax is said (1) to have separated ὄνομα (proper noun) and προσηγορία (appellative), (2) to have called the pronoun ἄρθρον δεικτικόν ('deictic article'), and (3) to have defined the verb as 'a word that signifies a predicate' (ῥῆμα ἐστι λέξις κατηγόρημα σημαίνουσα).[49] All these doctrines can be explained as resulting from Stoic influence. As Frede and Janko point out, it may have been Apollodorus of Athens who influenced Dionysius Thrax by introducing to him the teachings of the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon (2nd century BC).[50] Both

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[43] For μετοχή, see Aristarchus fr. 92a Matthaios. For μεσότης, see Matthaios (1999) 520 ff.

[44] See Matthaios (1999) 548–563.

[45] The term μέρη λόγου is not found in the fragments of Aristarchus and Dionysius Thrax: see Matthaios (1999) 198–200. Aristarchus seems to have used the term λέξις when discussing the category to which a word belongs, and later grammarians still used λέξις when they defined particular word classes. But grammarians did not say that 'there are eight (or nine) λέξεις'. Schenkeveld (1994) 279–280 thinks that the 'parts' of the Alexandrians (Aristophanes and Aristarchus) were actually μέρη λέξεως in the Aristotelian sense; however, it should be emphasised that Aristotle included also other units than words among the μέρη λέξεως.

[46] Cf. Law (2003) 59. Leonard Bloomfield introduced the term 'word classes' in 1914.

[47] A very instructive history of the word class theory in the period after Aristarchus is found in Matthaios (2002) 191–213. For the fragments of Dionysius Thrax, see Linke (1977) and for a reconstruction of his 'Precepts' (Παραγγέλματα), see Schenkeveld (1998^{2}b) and Di Benedetto (2000).

[48] See Frede (1987b) 358–359 and Janko (1995) 215.

[49] The ancient testimonies are the following: Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 124,7–14; Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 160,24–161,8; Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1.1, 5,13–19. See my discussion in section 3.6.3.

[50] Frede (1987b) 358–359; Janko (1995) 215. Diogenes of Babylon, who wrote a τέχνη περὶ φωνῆς, is mentioned several times in the account of Diogenes Laertius (VII.55–58 etc.). On Apollodorus, see Pfeiffer (1968) 252–266.

Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax studied with Aristarchus in Alexandria. Apollodorus shared at least one of the views of Dionysius Thrax: he too called pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά (see section 3.6.3).[51] A second factor that may have contributed to the integration of philological and Stoic ideas was the so-called *secessio doctorum*: in 145 BC many scholars were forced to leave Alexandria and moved to Rhodes, Pergamon, Athens and (in later times) Rome. As a result, many ideas seem to have been exchanged between philosophers and philologists who now came into contact with each other at various Hellenistic centres of learning.[52]

In the period after Dionysius Thrax, a new discipline must have developed from the philological work of the Alexandrian scholars, namely that of technical grammar: scholars now started to write systematic grammatical treatises, including lists of word classes and their *accidentia*. One might say that these technical treatises systematically laid down the 'Grammatik im Kopf' that Aristarchus and Dionysius Thrax used for their philological explanations. We do not know who wrote the first treatise of technical grammar, but I have already mentioned (in section 1.4) that Asclepiades of Myrlea (who came from Alexandria to Rome in the first century BC) wrote a treatise Περὶ γραμματικῆς (*On Grammar*), which Sextus Empiricus used as a source for his refutations of grammatical theories in his *Against the Grammarians*.[53] We have also seen that Tyrannion, who lived in Rome from 67 BC onwards, wrote a treatise Περὶ μερισμοῦ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν (*On the classification of the parts of speech*).[54] In this work, Tyrannion may have discussed the number and order of the word classes, and presumably he also dealt with the assignment of words to their proper word class, the procedure for which Apollonius Dyscolus uses the word μερισμός.[55] The title of this work on

[51] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1.1, 5,18–19.

[52] See Matthaios (2002) 191–192.

[53] On Asclepiades, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there.

[54] Haas (1977) has collected the fragments of the two grammarians named Tyrannion (Diocles, the younger Tyrannion, probably took over the name of his teacher Tyrannion). Pfeiffer (1968) 272–274 offers a general discussion of the scholarly work of Asclepiades and Tyrannion. For Tyrannion's life and works, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there.

[55] On the content of Tyrannion's treatise, see Wendel (1943) 1815. The titles Περὶ μερισμοῦ and Περὶ τῶν μερῶν τοῦ λόγου (Tyrannion fr. 55–56 Haas), both mentioned in Suda, have been identified as one treatise that would have carried the title Περὶ μερισμοῦ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν, which was also the title of one of the works of Apollonius Dyscolus. Cf. Wendel (1943) 1815: 'Gewiß betont Lehrs (…) mit Recht, daß μερισμός die Aufteilung der Sprache auf die Wortklassen bedeutet, so daß deren Zahl und wechselseitiges Verhältnis sowie die Unterbringung von Wörtern zweifelhafter Zugehörigkeit in

the parts of speech makes Tyrannion the first grammarian of whom we know that he used the expression τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, which is until this time only attested in philosophical writings.[56] The introduction of the originally philosophical expression τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου in philology and technical grammar is another example of Stoic influence on Alexandrian scholars. For Aristotle and the Stoics, this term referred, as we have seen, to the components of λόγος, but for the grammarians it now came to designate the types of words (word classes) that they distinguished.[57] From now on, μέρος λόγου seems to be the standard term for word class, but the term μόριον was used as well: in the grammatical papyri, the works of Apollonius Dyscolus and the *Technê grammatikê*, both μέρος λόγου and μόριον are used in the sense of word class.[58] Finally, the distinction between λέξις and λόγος developed into one between 'word' and 'sentence': this is a relatively late application of these terms, which we find in Apollonius Dyscolus and in the *Technê Grammatikê*, where λέξις is defined as 'the smallest part of the constructed sentence (λόγος)'.[59]

Not only Tyrannion's adoption of the expression τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, but also his treatment of the different word classes betrays Stoic influence.[60] For example, he does not seem to have distinguished the participle as a separate word class, but as a subtype of the noun.[61]

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derartigen Schriften vorwiegend erörtert werden mußte (…), aber das Ergebnis solcher Untersuchungen war doch eben die Feststellung und Abgrenzung der μέρη τοῦ λόγου, so daß die Titel Περὶ μερισμοῦ und Περὶ τῶν μερῶν τοῦ λόγου durchaus verschiedene Kürzungen des gleichen Volltitels darstellen können.' On Apollonius' use of μερισμός, see Sluiter (1990) 106–139.

[56] If Blank (1998) is right that Asclepiades of Myrlea was, via an intermediate Epicurean text, the main source of Sextus Empiricus' *Against the Grammarians*, we may assume that Asclepiades also used the term τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, since the discussion in *Adv. Math.* I.131–158 (esp. 132–141) presupposes a grammarian who used that term.

[57] Matthaios (1999) translates μέρος λόγου with 'Redeteil' when dealing with Aristotle or Stoics, but with 'Wortart' when dealing with the grammarians: see Matthaios (1999) 200.

[58] The term μέρος λόγου is found in Apollonius Dyscolus, e.g. *Synt.* I.14–29 etc., [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 22,4–23,3, and in the following papyri: P. Yale I 25 (nr. 1 Wouters), P. Lond. Lit. 182 (nr. 2 Wouters), P. Heid. I 197 (nr. 6 Wouters), and P. Heid. I 198 (nr. 12 Wouters). For μόριον, see e.g. Apollonius Dyscolus *Synt.* I.19 (where τὸ μόριον refers to the word class pronoun) and *Synt.* I.22 (where τὸ μόριον refers to the word class participle).

[59] [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 22,4: λέξις ἐστὶ μέρος ἐλάχιστον τοῦ κατὰ σύνταξιν λόγου. Cf. Lallot (1992) 128–129.

[60] On Stoic influence on Tyrannion's treatment of the parts of speech, see Matthaios (2002) 193–195.

[61] Tyrannion fr. 56 Haas. See Matthaios (2002) 194.

The integration of Alexandrian and Stoic ideas that characterises the grammatical views of Dionysius Thrax and Tyrannion is mirrored in some grammatical papyri from later times. In these texts, the originally Stoic distinction of ὄνομα and προσηγορία (proper noun and appellative) is incorporated in a list of word classes: this results in a system of nine word classes (with proper noun and appellative noun as two separate classes), which we find in two papyri in the collection of Wouters.[62]

We recall that for most word classes, Aristarchus already used the names that were to become the traditional ones, but that he called the adverb μεσότης, not ἐπίρρημα. The term ἐπίρρημα (in the sense of adverb) seems to have been introduced in the first century BC: it first appears in the fragments of Tryphon (active in the Augustan period), namely in the title of his work Περὶ ἐπιρρημάτων ('On Adverbs'), and, in roughly the same period, in the rhetorical works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (see section 3.6.5).[63]

While philologists in Alexandria were explaining and commenting on the Homeric texts, another group of Hellenistic scholars, known as κριτικοί, was engaged in a heated debate on the criteria of good poetry (see section 1.5). We know these critics from Philodemus' *On Poems*. One of the surviving fragments of this work, which Janko has assigned to the critic Pausimachus of Miletus (cited by Philodemus via Crates), mentions ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, and a word that must be restored as πρόθεσις.[64] For our purposes this fragment is important because the interests of the *kritikoi* are similar to those of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The way in which the 'parts of speech' (we do not know what they

[62] P. Yale I 25 (nr. 1 Wouters) and P. Heid. I 198 (nr. 12 Wouters) (see also section 3.6.6).

[63] Tryphon, fr. 65 Von Velsen (= Apollonius Dyscolus, *Adv.*, *G.G.* II 1.1, 146,15–23). See also Tryphon, fr. 66–77 Von Velsen. Cf. Matthaios (1999) 559–560. For Dionysius' use of the adverbs, see also section 5.3.4.

[64] Janko (2000) 282–283 (P. Herc. 994 fr. 19,4–5). Note that Janko reads πρ[ο|θέσεις] because πρ[ο|σηγορίας] would exceed the space of the lacuna. If Janko's reconstruction is correct, the fragment would confirm the belief, based on Apollonius Dyscolus' reference to Aristophanes of Byzantium, that the πρόθεσις (preposition) was already distinguished in the period before Aristarchus. Apollonius (*Synt.* IV.11) suggests that Aristophanes of Byzantium already knew the πρόθεσις (see above). In an earlier publication, Janko (1995) 228 assigned the fragment from Philodemus to Aristarchus' older contemporary Crates of Mallos, but more recently (Janko [2000] 186–187) he has identified this critic as Pausimachus of Miletus, who, according to Janko's reconstruction, is quoted by Crates of Mallos.

called them) are used in this context seems to correspond to the way in which Dionysius of Halicarnassus employs them in some passages of *De compositione verborum* (see below, section 4.3.1). Like Dionysius, the *kritikoi* seem to have used the doctrine of the parts of speech in their discussion of σύνθεσις (composition), in particular by arguing that the modification of the parts of speech (by adding and removing letters) can lead to a more euphonious composition.[65] The fragmentary state of Philodemus' *On Poems* and the lack of other evidence make it impossible to judge the exact connections between the *kritikoi* and Dionysius, but it is not unlikely that Dionysius' use of the parts of speech was influenced by these Hellenistic critics (see section 4.3.1).

Dionysius' contemporary colleague Caecilius of Caleacte, critic and rhetorician, also seems to have used the grammatical theory of the parts of speech in his rhetorical teaching (see also section 1.5). Only a few fragments of his works have come down to us, but they show us that, in his work *On Figures*, Caecilius dealt with at least ὀνόματα and ῥήματα and discussed figures that made particular use of the *accidentia*, in particular πτώσεις (cases), ἀριθμός (number), πρόσωπα (persons) and χρόνοι (tenses).[66] In as far as the fragments allow us to draw conclusions, Caecilius' use of the parts of speech in rhetorical theory resembles that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (section 4.4.2).

This overview of the various traditions of philosophers, philological and technical grammarians, poetical critics and rhetoricians, all of which played their own role in the history of the analysis of λόγος and λέξις into μέρη, be it as 'parts of the expression', 'parts of speech', 'parts of the phrase', or 'word classes', serves as a background to Dionysius of Halicarnassus' use of the μόρια λόγου and μόρια λέξεως. Before we turn to a discussion of Dionysius' use of these 'parts of speech', we should consider his possible connections to the different traditions listed above, so that our analysis will enable us to establish Dionysius' place in the history of the theory of the parts of speech.

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[65] It may well be that the concept of the 'parts' of the *kritikoi* was similar to that of Dionysius, namely 'word classes' as well as 'parts of the phrase' (words as building blocks of composition): see section 3.4.

[66] Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 73 and 75 Ofenloch.

3.3. *Dionysius' knowledge of earlier and contemporary theories*

Dionysius uses the theory of the parts of speech only in four of his treatises, namely *Dem.*, *Comp.*, *Thuc.* and *Amm.* II, all of which are works belonging to the middle or late periods in the division of Dionysius' writings (see section 1.3). Although we should not exclude the possibility that it was because of the character of his earlier works (*Lys.*, *Isoc.*, *Is.*) that Dionysius did not use grammatical theories there, I think that Schenkeveld has rightly argued that Dionysius obtained his knowledge about grammatical theories when he had been in Rome for some time.[67] In this section, I will discuss the connections between Dionysius and the scholars of various disciplines that dealt in some way with a theory of the parts of speech. This discussion will consist of three parts. First, I will discuss those philosophers, philologists and critics of earlier periods with whose ideas we know Dionysius must have been acquainted, since he refers to their works (section 3.3.1). Second, I will list a number of contemporary grammarians with whose views on the parts of speech Dionysius may have become familiar in Rome, where many intellectuals came together in the first century BC (section 3.3.2).[68] Finally, I will briefly discuss the passages where Dionysius describes how one learns to read and write: Dionysius' discussion shows that the word classes were part of the grammatical curriculum of his time (section 3.3.3).

Because Dionysius does not mention the names of contemporary scholars, we can never be certain about his connections with them, but we should definitely allow for the possibility that he knew their ideas on language. This is not to say that this study will engage in *Quellenforschung* here: it will not be my purpose to assign each of Dionysius' ideas to one particular philosopher or grammarian. Instead, I will explore the intellectual context in which Dionysius was working, so that we may better understand how Dionysius' use of the μόρια λόγου is related to the various theories that existed in his time. As I have argued above (section 1.3), Dionysius' participation in the network of intellectuals at Rome is fundamental to our understanding of his works. In this light, it is not useful to point to specific sources of his ideas, but more so to

[67] Schenkeveld (1983) 69.

[68] For the intellectual life in Augustan Rome, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there.

reconstruct the collective set of ideas that circulated in this network, and the discourse in which these ideas were expressed and exchanged.

Only in a few cases will I point to a specific text as the possible source of Dionysius' views: I will only do so when there are strong reasons to believe that a certain passage should be traced back to an earlier treatment, for instance because Dionysius' terminology in that passage differs from that used in the rest of his work, or because the views that are expressed in that passage seem to be typical of particular school or discipline: the history of the theory of the parts of speech (*Comp.* 2) may be a case in point (see section 4.2.3). Here, Dionysius tells us that 'some' (τινες) call the parts of speech στοιχεῖα. Quintilian offers a history of the parts of speech that closely resembles Dionysius' account (see section 4.2.3), and Blank has argued that much of Quintilian's grammatical theory is based on Asclepiades of Myrlea.[69] We can imagine that a technical grammatical treatise started with a historical overview of the development of the parts of speech from Aristotle onwards, so in this case we might indeed think of Asclepiades' *On Grammar* (or another grammatical work) as the source of Dionysius' account.[70] Another case is Dionysius' *Second Letter to Ammaeus* (see section 4.4), which partly seems to be based on a philological commentary on Thucydides. In general, however, I will refrain from tracing his ideas back to specific sources: it is more useful to illustrate the ways in which Dionysius reflects the discourse of his time.

3.3.1. *Dionysius' knowledge of earlier views on the parts of speech*

Dionysius knew the views of several thinkers of the four traditions that we have discussed in section 3.2: those of the Peripatetic philosophers, the Stoic philosophers, the Alexandrian philologists and the Hellenistic *kritikoi*. He mentions representatives of the first three groups, while his connection to the *kritikoi* seems to be clear from the similarity between their views on euphony and his. Did Dionysius also know how the parts of speech were treated in these different traditions?

In section 1.5, we have observed that Dionysius knew both Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Theophrastus' *On Style*. Above, I have pointed out that, in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle distinguished only two μέρη λόγου, namely

[69] Blank (1998) xlv–xlvi.
[70] See also De Jonge (2005a) 14 n. 19.

ὄνομα and ῥῆμα.[71] He did mention σύνδεσμοι in the same treatise, however, and this could explain why Dionysius, in his history of the theory of the parts of speech (see section 4.2.1), tells us that Aristotle (and Theodectes) considered ὀνόματα, ῥήματα and σύνδεσμοι the primary parts of speech.[72] Janko's suggestion that Dionysius is here quoting an Aristotelian dialogue in which Theodectes appeared seems unnecessary, for we can imagine that Dionysius is referring to the third book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and to a similar work on style by Aristotle's pupil Theodectes.[73] In any case, there is a reasonable chance that Dionysius' history of the theory of the parts of speech in *Comp.* 2 depends on a grammatical source (Asclepiades' *On Grammar* has been suggested), and, consequently, that the observations on the number of parts of speech distinguished by Aristotle and later thinkers are not necessarily based on Dionysius' own investigations.[74] Dionysius presumably did not know Aristotle's *Poetics*, but there is a chance that the Aristotelian difference between μέρη λόγου (parts of the assertion, namely ὄνομα and ῥῆμα) and μέρη λέξεως (parts of expression, namely στοιχεῖον, συλλαβή, σύνδεσμος, ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, ἄρθρον, πτῶσις and λόγος) was known to him from the works of Aristotle's succesor Theophrastus.[75] Simplicius tells us that Theophrastus, in his work *On the Elements of Speech* (Περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων) inquired 'whether just the noun and verb are elements of speech (τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα), or also ἄρθρα and σύνδεσμοι and certain others—these too are parts of expression (λέξεως μέρη), but noun and verb are parts of speech (λόγου)—(…)'.[76] The latter words indicate that Theophrastus preserved the Aristotelian distinction between λόγος and λέξις and their respective μέρη. It has been suggested that *On the Elements of Speech* is another title of Theophrastus' book *On Style* (Περὶ λέξεως), or

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[71] Aristotle, *Rh.* 1404b26–27.

[72] *Comp.* 2.6,20–7,2. The σύνδεσμοι are mentioned in Aristotle, *Rh.* 1407a21; 1407b12; 1407b39; 1413b33.

[73] Janko (2000) 186–187. Frede (1987a) 317 thinks that the information on Theodectes can only derive from 'Theodectes' remarks on diction in one of his rhetorical writings'.

[74] See Kroll (1907) 91–92, Blank (1998) xlv–xlvi, and my section 4.2.3.

[75] Dionysius seems to be ignorant of the *Poetics*: in *Comp.* 2, he states that Aristotle only distinguished ὄνομα, ῥῆμα and σύνδεσμος as parts of speech, but in *Poetics* 20.1456b38–1457a10 the ἄρθρον is mentioned. Cf. Fortenbaugh (2005) 249.

[76] Simplicius, *In Cat.* 8.10,20–11,2 (= Theophrastus fr. 683 Fortenbaugh): ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων ὅ τε Θεόφραστος ἀνακινεῖ (…) οἷον πότερον ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα ἢ καὶ ἄρθρα καὶ σύνδεσμοι καὶ ἄλλα τινά (λέξεως δὲ καὶ ταῦτα μέρη, λόγου δὲ ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα) …

perhaps a name of the first part of that work.[77] If this were true, it would mean that Dionysius could have taken notice of of the Peripatetic distinction between λόγος and λέξις from Theophrastus' *On Style*, a work that he used extensively. However, Schenkeveld has argued that Simplicius' passage mentioned above does not refer to Theophrastus' *On Style*, but rather to a logical treatise by the same author.[78] Therefore, we do not know whether Theophrastus mentioned the parts of expression (either in connection with the parts of the assertion or not) in his work *On Style*, nor do we know whether Dionysius was acquainted with the difference between Aristotle's μέρη λόγου and μέρη λέξεως.[79] Dionysius himself does not distinguish between parts of the assertion and parts of the expression: as we will see, he uses both μόρια (or μέρη) λόγου and μόρια (or μέρη) λέξεως, but without adopting the Peripatetic (or the Stoic) distinction between the two (see section 3.5).

In *Comp.* 4, Dionysius tells us that he has read two treatises of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus with the title Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν, *On the Syntax of the Parts of Speech*, which did not adopt a rhetorical but a dialectical approach (see also sections 1.5 and 5.3.1).[80] They dealt with 'the composition (σύνταξις) of true and false propositions, possible and impossible ones, propositions that are contingent, changing their truth value, ambiguous ones and others of such a kind'.[81]

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[77] See Theophrastus fr. 666 (titles of books) 17a (*On Style*) and b (*On the Elements of Speech*) and Fortenbaugh's comments there. On the possible identification of *On the Elements of Speech* with (a part of) *On Style*, see also Frede (1987a) 317.

[78] Schenkeveld (1998a) 69–79. In his commentary, Fortenbaugh (2005) 244–245 agrees with Schenkeveld: he now recommends placing fr. 683 before fr. 78 (Ammonius, *On Aristotle's* De Interpretatione 4.17a1), which seems to be based on the same logical treatise by Theophrastus.

[79] P. Hib. 183 (Theophrastus fr. 683 appendix 8 Fortenbaugh) seems to mention 'eight parts of the expression', but Fortenbaugh (2005) 250–254 is not convinced that this text should be attributed to Theophrastus. P. Hamb. 128 (Theophrastus fr. 683 appendix 9 Fortenbaugh) contains a discussion of types of words, where 'nouns and verbs combined' (ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων συνθέτων) are mentioned. But Schenkeveld (1993) disagrees with Snell's attribution of the text to Theophrastus' *On Style*. Fortenbaugh (2005) 254–266 (see esp. 265–266) hesitates.

[80] *Comp.* 4.22,12–17. The title does not entirely correspond to the titles of Chrysippus' works that we know from Diogenes Laertius VII.192: Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως καὶ στοιχείων τῶν λεγομένων and Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν λεγομένων. On Chrysippus' treatises mentioned by Dionysius and Diogenes Laertius, see Barwick (1957) 21, Frede (1987a) 324–325, Atherton (1993) 142 n. 7 and Van Ophuijsen (2003) 81 and 93.

[81] *Comp.* 4.22,14–17: ὑπὲρ ἀξιωμάτων συντάξεως ἀληθῶν τε καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ δυνατῶν καὶ ἀδυνάτων ἐνδεχομένων τε καὶ μεταπιπτόντων καὶ ἀμφιβόλων καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν τοιουτοτρόπων.

Dionysius emphasises that Chrysippus' books were not useful to civil oratory, 'at least as far as the attractiveness and beauty of style (ἡδονὴν καὶ κάλλος ἑρμηνείας), which should be the aims of composition, are concerned'.[82] Just before mentioning the title of Chrysippus' treatise, Dionysius also refers more generally to Stoic τέχναι ὑπὲρ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων, 'handbooks on the syntax of the parts of speech', which were very disappointing to him, because the writers who claimed to write on the syntax of the parts of speech, and Chrysippus in particular, turned out to be the worst examples of stylistic writing themselves:[83] 'they never even dreamt what it is that makes composition attractive and beautiful.'[84] Although Dionysius objects so strongly both to Chrysippus' own stylistic composition and to his logical approach to the grouping of the parts of speech, we should not exclude the possibility that Dionysius' use of the μόρια λόγου to a certain extent reflects his reading of these Stoic texts.[85] This seems to be true at least for the experiment concerning natural word order (*Comp.* 5), which immediately follows the remarks on Chrysippus' works (see section 5.3). Dionysius abandons that experiment with the logical ordering of the parts of

[82] *Comp.* 4.22,18–23,1: οὐδεμίαν οὔτ' ὠφέλειαν οὔτε χρείαν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς λόγοις συμβαλλομένας εἰς γοῦν ἡδονὴν καὶ κάλλος ἑρμηνείας, ὧν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι τὴν σύνθεσιν.

[83] *Comp.* 4.21,10–18: ἀπόχρη δὲ τεκμηρίῳ χρήσασθαι τοῦ λόγου Χρυσίππῳ τῷ Στωϊκῷ (περαιτέρω γὰρ οὐκ ἂν προβαίην)· τούτου γὰρ οὔτ' ἄμεινον οὐδεὶς τὰς διαλεκτικὰς τέχνας ἠκρίβωσεν οὔτε ἁρμονίᾳ χείρονι συνταχθέντας ἐξήνεγκε λόγους τῶν γοῦν ὀνόματος καὶ δόξης ἀξιωθέντων. καίτοι σπουδάζεσθαί γέ τινες προσεποιήθησαν αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ὂν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τέχνας γέ τινας ἔγραψαν ὑπὲρ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων. 'It is sufficient to point to Chrysippus the Stoic as proof of my statement [that those who claim to be philosophers and publish handbooks on logic are inept in the arrangement of their words], for beyond that I refuse to go. Of writers who have been judged worthy of renown or distinction, none has written treatises on logic with more precision, and none has published discourses that are worse specimens of composition. And yet some of those writers claimed to make a serious study of this department also, as being indispensable to good writing, and even wrote handbooks on the syntax of the parts of speech.' In this passage, I follow the text of Aujac & Lebel (1981). Usener reads προβαῖεν instead of προβαίην (MSS).

[84] *Comp.* 4.22,2–3: οὐδ' ὄναρ εἶδον, τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ποιοῦν ἡδεῖαν καὶ καλὴν τὴν σύνθεσιν.

[85] While the Stoic treatises dealt with σύνταξις, Dionysius himself is interested in the σύνθεσις of the parts of speech. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* IX.8 tells us that according to technical authors (τεχνογράφοι), who may be identified as Stoics, 'a definition differs from a universal statement only in σύνταξις, but it is the same in "semantic potential" (δύναμις).' The translation is by Van Ophuijsen (2003). Sextus Empiricus gives an example that suggests that, for the Stoics, σύνταξις has nothing to do with the order of words, but with the logical combining (by the use of conjunctions) of propositions. See Van Ophuijsen (2003) 82–84.

speech (nouns precede verbs, verbs precede adverbs, etc.) for the reason that in many cases the logical rules do not lead to a composition that is pleasing (ἡδεῖα) and beautiful (καλή):[86] this was, as we have seen, exactly the objection that he had uttered to Chrysippus' work and to the logical handbooks in general. I will argue that Dionysius' discussion of natural word order is indeed based on the Stoic theory of the parts of speech, although I do not think that Chrysippus himself was as interested in pleasing and beautiful word order as Dionysius was: we should rather believe that Dionysius borrowed Stoic theories on the hierachy of the parts of speech, which he himself applied to the art of composition.[87] Stoic ideas also play a role in other parts of his work, and Schenkeveld has rightly drawn attention to the Stoic terminology that Dionysius uses in his grammatical observations.[88] It will turn out that many aspects of Dionysius' use of the parts of speech can indeed be considered Stoic. This does not imply, however, that Dionysius borrowed all such theories from Chrysippus or another Stoic source. Since Stoic thought influenced many grammarians of the second and first centuries BC, Dionysius' Stoic terminology may also have resulted from his use of grammatical, rather than philosophical treatises.[89] Stoic terminology was part of the intellectual discourse of the time.

We can be quite certain, then, that Dionysius was acquainted with Stoic views on the μέρη λόγου. Although he is less explicit about his knowledge of the achievements of Alexandrian philologists in this field, we may assume that he was acquinted with their views. When Dionysius refers to Aristophanes of Byzantium, he only mentions the fact that the Alexandrian scholar 'or any other metrician' divided poems into metrical *cola*.[90] Dionysius nowhere mentions Aristarchus or Diony-

[86] *Comp.* 5.26,17–20.

[87] Kroll (1907) 91 has suggested that Dionysius' experiment concerning natural word order, including its examples, is borrowed from Chrysippus. See also Jensen (1923) 149. Barwick (1957) 21 also thinks that the Stoic τέχναι themselves treated the order of the parts of speech in a sentence, and so does Frede (1987a) 324–325. It is, however, also possible that the Stoics discussed the natural hierarchy of the parts of speech without implying that the μέρη λόγου should be placed in a sentence according to that order: in that case, Dionysius (*Comp.* 5) would have gone one step further than the Stoics themselves. See section 5.3.7.

[88] Schenkeveld (1983).

[89] Matthaios (2002) 191–213 discusses Stoic influence on technical grammarians in the period between Aristarchus and Apollonius. The Stoic Crates of Mallos, who came to Rome in 168 BC, played an important role in the development of Roman grammatical ideas: see Taylor (2000) 455 and Matthaios (2002) 201.

[90] *Comp.* 22.102,2: Ἀριστοφάνης ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις μετρικῶν. *Comp.* 26.140,19: Ἀριστο-

sius Thrax. However, in his discussion of the style of Thucydides, he remarks that nobody could understand the historian without the use of a 'linguistic interpretation' (ἐξηγήσεως γραμματικῆς) (see section 4.4).[91] The term ἐξήγησις does not necessarily imply a commentary (ὑπόμνημα), but the similarity between Dionysius' notes on Thucydides in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* and the comments in the scholia on Thucydides indeed suggests that Dionysius made use of a philological commentary. Such a commentary may have originated in Alexandrian scholarship. If Pfeiffer correctly assumes that Aristarchus wrote the first commentary on Thucydides, then we may believe that Dionysius used that work.[92] In any case, Dionysius' analysis of Thucydides' use of the parts of speech resembles the kind of remarks that we know from Aristarchus' work on Homer. For example, Dionysius points out that a noun is used instead of a verb (or *vice versa*), or that a single pronoun is combined with a plural verb. I will discuss the relation between Dionysius and Alexandrian scholarship in more detail in section 4.4.2. Dionysius does not refer to the *kritikoi* whom we know from Philodemus' *On Poems*. Nevertheless, in the discussion of Dionysius' theory of μετασκευή (*Comp.* 6), we will see that the way in which the theory of the parts of speech is used in that passage is related to the views of the *kritikoi* (section 4.3.1).

3.3.2. *Dionysius' knowledge of contemporary views on the parts of speech*

Having considered Dionysius' connections to the earlier thinkers who wrote about the parts of speech in different contexts, we should now focus on the grammarians of the first century BC, whose views Dionysius may have learnt during his stay in Rome. Dionysius may have known Tyrannion's Περὶ μερισμοῦ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν (*On the Classification of the Parts of Speech*) (see section 1.4). He also may have known the commentary on this work, the Ἐξήγησις τοῦ Τυραννίωνος μερισμοῦ, written by the younger Tyrannion or Diocles. Particularly relevant for our purposes is the work of Asclepiades of Myrlea, Περὶ γραμματικῆς

φάνης ἢ ἄλλός τις. Dionysius himself is not interested in Aristophanes' division into metrical clauses, but only in the division of a poem into rhetorical clauses, i.e. grammatical unities that contain a complete thought. On Dionysius' concept of *colon*, see Viljamaa (2003), who compares the *colon* to the intonation unit of modern text analysis.

[91] *Thuc.* 51.410,15–17.

[92] See Pfeiffer (1968) 225. See further section 4.4.2.

(*On Grammar*). It has been argued that the structure of Asclepiades' book is reflected in Sextus Empiricus' *Against the Grammarians*. According to David Blank, Sextus Empiricus made use of an Epicurean source that attacked Asclepiades' treatise. In *On Grammar*, Asclepiades also included a discussion of the parts of speech, which was probably the basis for Sextus' attacks on that theory in *Adv. Math.* I.131–158. Blank has suggested that Asclepiades' grammatical theories have influenced both Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quintilian (*Inst. orat.* 1.4–8).[93] He even goes so far as to state that not only Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian, but also Dionysius of Halicarnassus closely follow Asclepiades' exposition of grammatical doctrines:[94] Dionysius' discussion of 'voice ([*Comp.*] 14), letters or elements ([*Comp.*] 14); syllables ([*Comp.*] 15); words ([*Comp.*] 15); and *lógos* ([*Comp.*] 16)' (thus Blank) in *De compositione verborum* would reflect what Asclepiades had written on these topics. Although I do think that Asclepiades may have influenced Dionysius' ideas, I do not agree with Blank's suggestion that *Comp.* 14–16 follows the sections of a grammatical treatise. These chapters are all part of Dionysius' discussion of μέλος, one of the means of composition, and they contain many observations that originate in musical and stylistic theory rather than grammar. A grammatical treatise may have been *one* of the models (besides a treatise of Aristoxenus) for the discussion of the individual properties of letters and syllables in *Comp.* 14–15. But from the end of *Comp.* 15, the focus is on such combinations of letters and syllables that aim to portray emotions or to express the content of a passage in general.[95] There is no grammatical discussion of 'words' in *Comp.* 15, nor is there any linguistic treatment of 'logos' in *Comp.* 16, which deals, in fact, with the selection and formation of imitative words.[96]

Especially relevant to this analysis is the grammarian Tryphon, Dionysius' contemporary in Augustan Rome (see section 1.4). As I have pointed out, it is possible that Tryphon and Dionysius participated

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93 Blank (1998) xlvi and Blank (2000).

94 Blank (2000) 410.

95 *Comp.* 15.60,6ff.

96 I do think that Dionysius' surveys of grammatical teaching in *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25 (letters, syllables, parts of speech) correspond to the expositions that we find in Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian. Blank (1998) does not mention this agreement, but I consider these more convincing parallels than Blank's reference to *Comp.* 14–16: see below.

in the same network of intellectuals, although we do not have any evidence that they knew each other. We have seen that Tryphon was the author of separate treatises on the parts of speech, namely Περὶ ἄρθρων, Περὶ προθέσεων, Περὶ συνδέσμων, and Περὶ ἐπιρρημάτων.[97] I recall the fact (see section 3.2) that the latter title of Tryphon's treatise on adverbs and Dionysius' rhetorical works are the earliest extant texts in which the term ἐπίρρημα is used for the adverb.

Finally, we should briefly consider the possible connections between Dionysius and the Roman grammarians who were active under the reign of Augustus (see section 1.4). Varro enumerated only four parts of speech on a strictly morphological basis, and in this respect he was an outsider in Hellenistic grammar.[98] As far as the theory of the parts of speech is concerned, his influence on someone like Dionysius was probably limited. Varro's views on the parts of speech were not influential: in the beginning of the first century AD, Remmius Palaemon wrote an *ars grammatica* in which he distinguished eight parts of speech, thus following the Alexandrian grammarians rather than his famous Roman predecessor.[99] Quintilian's remarks on Palaemon (see section 4.2.3) suggest that he was only one of the grammarians who distinguished eight *partes orationis*. It is possible that earlier Roman grammarians also listed eight parts of speech, but Suetonius, who is our major source on the *grammatici* of the first century BC, does not mention any treatise on the parts of speech.[100] We do not know whether Dionysius' contemporary Roman colleagues mentioned by Suetonius (Marcus Verrius Flaccus, Lucius Crassicius, Scribonius Aphrodisius, Gaius Iulius Hyginus, Gaius Melissus: see section 1.4) wrote on the parts of speech.

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[97] See Von Velsen (1853) and Wendel (1939).

[98] On Varro's unconventional treatment of the parts of speech, see Dahlmann (1932), Taylor (1996[2]a) 338, Taylor (1996b) 18–30, Taylor (2000) and Matthaios (2002) 203–208. Varro distinguished the following word classes: words with case, words with tense, words with both case and tense and words with neither.

[99] Suetonius, *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* 23 is silent on Palaemon's *ars*, but Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 1.4.19–20 and Juvenal 6.451–453 inform us about the work and its reputation. On Palaemon, see Kaster (1995) 228–242. Barwick's reconstruction (1922) of Palaemon's *Ars grammatica* has been criticised on various points, particularly on his view that the Stoic (Pergamenic) τέχνη περὶ φωνῆς was the starting point of Roman grammar: see Pinborg (1975) 113–114, Schenkeveld (1990), Baratin (2000) and Schenkeveld (2004) 22.

[100] Kaster (1995) 230 warns against overestimation of Palaemon's *ars*. Other works may have been equally influential despite of Suetonius' silence. Suetonius focuses on the lives of the grammarians, and does not intend to mention all their writings.

3.3.3. *Dionysius on the grammatical school curriculum*

Although Dionysius does not mention any of the grammarians listed above (section 3.3.2), there is one strong indication that he was familiar with contemporary theories on the parts of speech: in two similar passages, Dionysius refers to the curriculum of grammar schools, in which he tells us that pupils first learn the letters (γράμματα), then the syllables (συλλαβαί), then the words (λέξεις) or parts of speech (τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια) and their *accidentia* (συμβεβηκότα); finally they start to read and write.[101] Barwick has argued that Dionysius' discussions of the curriculum of grammar (*Comp.* 25 and *Dem.* 52) depend on Stoic sources.[102] He based his conclusion on the assumption that in these passages, Dionysius uses Stoic terminology when he distinguishes between the ὄνομα, τύπος and δύναμις of letters.[103] However, even if it is true that these terms are Stoic, we should realise that Stoic ideas had influenced both philologists and technical grammarians (e.g. Dionysius Thrax and Tyrannion) of the second and first century BC (see section 3.2). Therefore, Stoic terminology cannot be used as evidence for the use of a Stoic source. Given the importance of grammatical teaching in Augustan Rome and Dionysius' own career as a teacher of rhetoric, it seems obvious that in a description of grammatical school practice he would present his own knowledge and experience rather than relying on Stoic sources. Moreover, he refers to the grammatical curriculum as 'something that we all know' (ὃ γὰρ ἅπαντες ἴσμεν), thus implying that his audience recognises his description (see section 3.7).[104] The nature of the relationship between the scholarly treatises mentioned earlier and the type of grammar that was actually taught at grammar schools in Rome is a complex problem.[105] The few sources, apart from Dionysius, that inform us about the teaching of grammar in the first century BC seem to indicate that technical grammar was only a small

[101] *Dem.* 52.242,12–243,9 and *Comp.* 25.134,23–135,12. For the Greek text, see section 3.7. Note that the three technical stages are termed differently in the two passages: in *Dem.* 52 they are referred to as (1) στοιχεῖα τῆς φωνῆς or γράμματα, (2) συλλαβαί and (3) τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια, while in *Comp.* 25 they are (1) γράμματα, (2) συλλαβαί and (3) λέξεις.

[102] Barwick (1922) 107–108; Barwick (1957) 47–48.

[103] *Comp.* 25.135,1–2; *Dem.* 52.242,16–18.

[104] *Comp.* 25.134,21–22.

[105] According to Suetonius, *De grammaticis* 3, there were more than twenty grammar schools (*super viginti celebres scholae*) in Rome. On the teaching of grammar in antiquity, particularly in Rome, see Bonner (1977), Kaster (1988), Hovdhaugen (1996^2), Morgan (1998) and Schenkeveld (2000).

part of it:[106] 'grammar' (γραμματική) was the art of reading and writing, and the γραμματικός or *grammaticus* taught literature, especially poetry.[107] Most scholars assume that some parts of *technical* grammar, dealing with letters, word classes, orthography and ἑλληνισμός, made their entrance in the school curriculum at the end of the first century BC:[108] that is exactly the period in which Dionysius of Halicarnassus was working in Rome. Therefore, it is plausible that his remarks on the teaching of letters, syllables and parts of speech (as preparation for reading and writing) refer to the actual situation that he observed in Rome between 30 and 8 BC (see also section 3.7).

Schenkeveld thinks that Dionysius' description 'looks implausible', because it implies that pupils first learn 'a complete grammar' before starting to read and write.[109] However, exercises containing (1) alphabets, (2) syllabaries (αν βαν γαν δαν ζαν etc.) and (3) isolated words are numerous among the grammatical papyri, as well as exercises with classifications and declensions of nouns and conjugations of verbs.[110] Schenkeveld's suggestion that the doctrine of the parts of speech was explained at a later stage, when pupils could already read and write, may sound more convincing; but I emphasise that Dionysius' words do not suggest that one learns a 'complete grammar' before starting to read and write, but rather that one digests a (brief) survey of the parts of speech and their properties. Besides, Dionysius states that his readers are familiar with his description of the grammatical curriculum. I will come back to this problem in section 3.7. For now, the most important thing is that Dionysius' information shows that the theory of the parts of speech had a place in the school curriculum.

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[106] Cf. Hovdhaugen (1996^2) 384.

[107] It should be noted that Cicero, *De Oratore* 1.187 does not include any theory of word classes under the parts of 'grammar': he only mentions 'the examination of the poets, the investigation of the stories, the explanation of words, and the sounds that should be used in pronouncing them.' (Translation May & Wisse.) As Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* I.252 tells us, Asclepiades of Myrlea divided γραμματική (i.e. 'science of literature') into three parts: 'the expert, the historical and the grammatical' (τεχνικὸν ἱστορικὸν γραμματικόν). The 'expert' part (τεχνικόν) dealt with letters, word classes, orthography, etc., the 'historical' part (ἱστορικόν) with historical and mythical data, and the 'grammatical part' (γραμματικόν) with the interpretation of poets and prose writers. See also *Adv. Math.* I.91–95 and cf. Blank (1998) 264–266 and Blank (2000) 409.

[108] See Schenkeveld (1994) 264 and Hovdhaugen (1996^2) 389. This assumption is based on several sources, including Suetonius, Quintilian, the grammatical papyri and Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

[109] Schenkeveld (2000) 433.

[110] See Morgan (1998) 163–164 and 156–158.

It is possible that in this period grammarians had started to make use of τέχναι (grammatical manuals), although the earliest extant remains of such works in the papyri date from the first century AD.[111] It should be noticed that the curriculum of grammar as Dionysius describes it (letters, syllables, parts of speech and finally reading and writing) largely corresponds to the exposition of grammatical doctrines that we find in Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian, which Blank has traced back to Asclepiades' *On Grammar* (see section 1.4).[112] In my view, the agreement between Dionysius' references to school grammar and the evidence from Sextus and Quintilian suggests that some technical grammatical school treatise was used at the end of the first century BC, which may have been a τέχνη not known to us, or, perhaps, (a summary of) Ascepiades' *On Grammar*.[113] My hypothesis is that Dionysius knew (theories from) such a treatise and combined it with ideas found in a number of other sources, including the Peripatetic and Stoic works by Theophrastus and Chrysippus mentioned above.

3.4. *The double character of Dionysius' μόρια λόγου*

Having considered the intellectual contexts of his grammatical ideas, we can now focus on the actual theories on the parts of speech that we find in Dionysius' rhetorical works. As we have seen, the terminological differences between Aristotle, the Stoics and the grammarians are closely related to their different interests and approaches. The terminology that we find in the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus differs from that of all these groups, which can again partly be explained by the fact that his analyses have a different purpose, namely that of instruction in rhetorical theory. Dionysius uses various expressions when referring to the parts of speech, namely τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, τὰ μέρη τῆς λέξεως, τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου and τὰ μόρια τῆς λεξεως (see section 3.4.2). When refer-

[111] Cf. Wouters (1979) and Morgan (1998) 156. See especially P. Yale I 25 (nr. 1 Wouters), from the first century AD, in which nine parts of speech are listed.

[112] Blank (1998) xlvi and Blank (2000) 410. As I mentioned above, Blank detects the structure of Asclepiades' *On Grammar* (letters, words, *logos*) in Dionysius, *Comp.* 14–16. He does not refer to the passages on grammatical teaching in *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25, which are in my view much more convincing parallels to the expositions known from Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian.

[113] Blank (1998) 110 only briefly refers to *Dem.* 52, but he does not discuss the correspondence between Dionysius' discussions of school grammar and the exposition of grammatical theories in Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian.

ring to Dionysius' 'parts of speech' I will for the sake of convenience use the term μόρια λόγου (or τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου): this choice is based on two considerations, namely that μόρια λόγου and μόρια λεξεως occur in his works more frequently than the other two expressions, and that μόρια λόγου is used in Dionysius' definition of composition in *Comp.* 2.[114] In this section, I will examine Dionysius' concept of the μόρια λόγου. The next section (3.5) will deal with the terminology with which he refers to words, word classes and parts of speech.

Dionysius' use of the term μόρια λόγου combines the point of view of the grammarians, who listed several 'categories of words', with an approach that is closer to that of Aristotle's analysis of the 'components of the λέξις'. On the one hand, Dionysius classifies words as 'word classes', a procedure that grammarians called μερισμός.[115] On the other hand, Dionysius considers the μόρια λόγου the primary building blocks of composition (σύνθεσις) (see section 4.3.1). Thus, Dionysius' μόρια λόγου are both word classes and parts of the phrase, even if one of the two aspects can be dominant in a specific context. The double character of the μόρια λόγου is particularly clear in Dionysius' definition of 'composition' (σύνθεσις) in *Comp.* 2, a passage that is extremely important for our understanding of both Dionysius' use of the parts of speech and his theory of composition:[116]

> Ἡ σύνθεσις ἔστι μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ δηλοῖ τοὔνομα, ποιά τις θέσις παρ' ἄλληλα τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων, ἃ δὴ καὶ στοιχεῖά τινες τῆς λέξεως καλοῦσιν.
>
> 'Composition is, as the name itself indicates, a certain arrangement of the parts of speech, or the elements of diction, as some call them.'

Τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια are here presented as the building blocks (στοιχεῖα) of σύνθεσις: they are literally the 'parts' of the structure that they consitute. Therefore, it would be natural to interpret τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια as 'parts of the phrase'. However, Dionysius immediately tells us that various generations of philosophers and grammarians distinguished different numbers of μόρια λόγου, and he lists the items that they distinguished in different periods: ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον, προσηγορικόν, ἀντονομασία, ἐπίρρημα, πρόθεσις, μετοχή (for a discussion of this passage, see section 4.2). In the second instance, then, it becomes clear that τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια are also the 'word classes' that were dis-

[114] *Comp.* 2.6,17–19.

[115] Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 73–77.

[116] *Comp.* 2.6,17–19. For Dionysius' definition of composition in its context, see section 4.2.1.

tinguished by grammarians. Dionysius does not distinguish between the concept of the μέρη λόγου in Aristotle and Stoic philosophy on the one hand, and the concept of the word classes of the philologists and technical grammarians on the other. His own concept of the μόρια λόγου has two aspects: they are parts of the phrase *and* word classes. Unlike the writers of *artes grammaticae*, Dionysius is not so much interested in word classes as such, but rather in words as they are combined in larger structures of language. By consequence, his concept of μόρια λόγου seems to be broader than that of the μέρη λόγου in the *Technê Grammatikê*, which focuses on separate words, without paying much attention to matters of composition or syntax. Dionysius' concept of the parts of speech is more similar to that of the syntactician Apollonius Dyscolus, who is, like Dionysius, concerned with words in their contexts.[117]

3.5. *Words, word classes, and parts of the phrase: Dionysius' terminology*

Dionysius does not only use the term μόρια λόγου, but he also makes use of other terms, which can, from various points of view, all refer to 'words':[118] μόρια λέξεως, μέρη λέξεως, μέρη λόγου, πρῶτα μέρη, πρῶτα μόρια, στοιχεῖα λέξεως and στοιχειώδη μόρια.[119] Dionysius also refers to 'words' as ὀνόματα and, less often, as λέξεις. How does he use all these different expressions?[120] Although ὄνομα, λέξις, μέρος, μόριον

[117] See Lallot (1997 II) 9 n. 9 on Apollonius Dyscolus' concept of μέρος λόγου: 'La synonymie qui vient d'être signalée met en évidence que le syntagme *méros (toû) lógou* ne doit pas être traduit mécaniquement, chez A[pollonius], par "partie du discours", expression figée qui évoque pour nous la catégorie grammaticale dont relève un mot. Pour A., *méros (toû) lógou*, en plus de ce sens, peut aussi bien avoir celui de segment d'une phrase particulière; c'est en raison de cette flexibilité du sens de l'expression grecque que j'ai pris le parti (…) de la traduire par "partie de (la) phrase".'

[118] Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 70 and Schenkeveld (1998[2]) 50: 'This fact [i.e. Dionysius' use of a 'mixture of expressions for "word classes"'] I can only explain by the assumption that an original distinction between μέρη λέξεως as "parts of the expression" and μέρη λόγου "parts of the proposition" was not taken over by the first Alexandrian scholars.' In grammar, however, the term μέρη λόγου is only attested from Tyrannion onwards: concerning the *first* Alexandrian scholars we do not know whether they used this term; neither μέρη λόγου nor μέρη λέξεως is found in the fragments of Aristarchus: see Matthaios (1999) 198–200.

[119] Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 70 and Schenkeveld (1994) 280.

[120] Schenkeveld (1983) has listed the various expressions, but he has refrained from analysing the ways in which they are used. He considers ὄνομα, λέξις and μόριον λόγου equivalents, without paying attention to their different connotations. See also Schenkeveld (1998[2]) 50: '(…) in the treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus we come

and στοιχεῖον can all refer to a 'word', each of these terms seems to represent a different point of view.

(1) Although in Dionysius' works, as in the grammatical tradition, the term ὄνομα can refer to the word class 'noun', it normally has the general meaning of 'word'. In particular, it is used to distinguish 'words' from letters and syllables on the one hand, and clauses, periods and discourse on the other hand.[121] Thus, ὄνομα is Dionysius' most general term for 'word', and as such it plays the role that λέξις plays in the works of the Alexandrian grammarians.[122] The use of ὄνομα as 'word' in general, which we do find in Plato and Aristotle, is rare in technical grammatical works:[123] for Aristarchus, ὄνομα is the word class 'noun' (including κύριον ὄνομα, προσηγορία and ἐπίθετον), and although there are a few instances where Apollonius Dyscolus uses ὄνομα in the sense of 'word', he, too, normally uses it in the specific sense of 'noun'.[124] 'Demetrius' and 'Longinus', however, frequently use the word ὄνομα as 'word', for instance when speaking of ὀνομάτων ἐκλογή (selection of words) or ὀνομάτων σύνθεσις (composition or 'putting together' of words).[125] In this respect there seems to be a noteworthy difference between the rhetorical and grammatical traditions. The difference between the terminology of rhetoricians and grammarians can probably be explained by pointing to the genres in which they were writing. In rhetoric and literary criticism, the term λέξις was primarily reserved for 'style', 'diction', 'expression' or 'passage'. For that reason, the rhetoricians seem to have selected the term ὄνομα as their standard term for 'word', in order to avoid the confusion that would arise from using λέξις for too many different items. In grammatical works, on the other hand, ὄνομα carried the technical meaning of 'noun', which

across a mixture of expressions for "word classes", (…) without any difference between the terms.'

[121] See *Comp.* 16.63,4–18, where the symmetry between the levels of γράμματα, συλλαβαί, ὀνόματα and λόγος is discussed.

[122] On the use of λέξις in technical grammar, see Lallot (1992) 129.

[123] See Schoemann (1862) 3, Lallot (1992) 128 and Matthaios (1999) 201. The term ὄνομα ('name') is related to the concept of language as a nomenclature. On Plato's use of ὄνομα ('name') and ῥῆμα ('attribute'), see De Rijk (1986) 218–225.

[124] For Aristarchus' use of ὄνομα, see Matthaios (1999) 201–296. For Apollonius' use of ὄνομα, see Lallot (1997 II) 22 n. 64.

[125] See e.g. 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 49, 50, 92; 'Longinus', *Subl.* 8.1, 30.1, 30.2.

explains why the grammarians, on their part, preferred λέξις as their normal term for 'word'.[126]

(2) Besides ὄνομα, Dionysius also uses λέξις in the sense of word, but this use is less frequent.[127] In the cases where Dionysius uses λέξις (and not ὄνομα) as 'word', he often points to a particular word in the text that he is analysing: in most cases, λέξις is a word *qua* concrete and specific form.[128] In purely grammatical contexts, the term λέξις may be preferred to ὄνομα for practical reasons. Thus, Dionysius refers to μίαν λέξιν εἴτε ὀνοματικὴν εἴτε ῥηματικὴν ('a single noun or verb') when he opposes the use of one single word to the use of 'more nouns or verbs' (πλείοσιν ὀνόμασιν ἢ ῥήμασιν).[129] In this case, use of the term ὄνομα for 'word' (e.g. ὄνομα ὀνοματικόν) would of course be rather confusing, because in the same passage it already has the meaning of 'noun'.

(3) When Dionysius refers to a 'word' with the term μόριον or μέρος (λέξεως or λόγου), he normally regards it as a word that is a part or constituent of a larger structure.[130] This perspective is, of course, particularly relevant in *De compositione verborum*, where words are considered the units of which texts are composed.[131]

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[126] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.18 considers two explanations for the fact that ὄνομα means both 'word' and 'noun': either ὄνομα was originally only used for 'noun' and, because of the primacy of this part of speech, it was later used in the sense of 'word' in general; or ὄνομα originally meant 'word' and was later introduced as the special term for the 'first' in the hierarchy of the parts of speech, i.e. 'noun'. According to Apollonius, both explanations would confirm the primacy of the 'noun' over the other parts of speech.

[127] For λέξεις as 'words' in Dionysius, see e.g. *Comp.* 6.30,11; 9.34,13; 11.41,18; 11.41,19; 11.42,5; 20,91,10; 20.92,16; 20.93,7; 25.135,4.

[128] E.g. λέξεις (*Comp.* 6.30,11) in the context of the modification of specific words; τῆς αὐτῆς λέξεως (*Comp.* 9.34,13) refers to the repeated word καλεῖς in Aesch. 3.202, τῶν τριῶν λέξεων (*Comp.* 11.42,5) refers to Euripides' σῖγα σῖγα λευκόν. In *Comp.* 11.41,18–19 (τάς τε λέξεις τοῖς μέλεσιν ὑποτάττειν ἀξιοῖ καὶ οὐ τὰ μέλη ταῖς λέξεσιν) Dionysius does not discuss specific words, but here, too, it is the form of words that is relevant.

[129] *Amm.* II 4.425,19–426,1.

[130] See Rhys Roberts (1910) 311 on μόρια: ' "Words" simply might serve as a rendering in many cases, except that it is usually well to preserve Dionysius' idea of "words in their syntactical relations", "words in a sentence".'

[131] A similar distinction between λέξις and μέρος λόγου is found in Apollonius Dyscolus. Lallot (1997 II) 9 n. 9 states that in Apollonius Dyscolus, λέξις, μέρος τοῦ λόγου and μόριον are 'largement interchangeables'. There is, however, a difference in connotation, which Lallot himself confirms elsewhere: see Lallot (1992) 129, where he explains that λέξις is Apollonius' term for a word qua 'forme individuelle et concrète', whereas μέρος λόγου points to a word as belonging to a word class.

(4) In Dionysius' works, μέρη λέξεως, μέρη λόγου, μόρια λέξεως and μόρια λόγου can all refer to words.[132] Μόρια, however, is much more frequent in this sense than μέρη: Dionysius refers to words only once as μέρη λόγου, and only twice as μέρη λέξεως, while μόρια λόγου and μόρια λέξεως (or simply μόρια) are the standard expressions:[133] μόρια λόγου is found ten times, μόρια λέξεως twelve times.[134] Dionysius' preference for μόρια instead of μέρη can again be explained by the fact that he is a rhetorician. Philosophers used τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου when referring to the parts of speech, and in later times grammarians adopted the term for their word classes (as we have seen, Tyrannion may have been the first grammarian who used the term). For rhetoricians, however, τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου is the technical expression that refers to 'the parts of a speech', i.e. the parts of a text. Indeed, Dionysius uses the word μέρη normally when referring to larger structures. Τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, on the one hand, are primarily the parts of a *text*, such as introduction (προοίμιον) and narrative (διήγησις).[135] The arrangement of these 'parts of a text' is called οἰκονομία, while the arrangement of the smaller 'parts of the phrase' is called σύνθεσις.[136] Τὰ μέρη τῆς λέξεως, on the other hand,

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[132] The distinction between 'particles' and 'word classes' is one of later times, as has been shown by Schenkeveld (1988).

[133] Dionysius himself uses the term τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου for words only in *Comp.* 6.29,13 (τῶν ἄλλων τοῦ λόγου μερῶν). In *Comp.* 4.22,12–13, the expression is part of the title of Chrysippus' treatises Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν. The *epitome* of *Comp.* (17.171,12) substitutes πᾶν μέρος λόγου for πᾶν ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα καὶ ἄλλο μόριον λέξεως (*Comp.* 17.68,13). Τὰ μέρη τῆς λέξεως refers to words only in *Comp.* 2.7,2 (with the adjective πρῶτα) and *Comp.* 12.43,18.

[134] Τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου (or μόρια λόγου): *Dem.* 26.185,1; *Dem.* 52.242,20; *Comp.* 2.6,18–19; *Comp.* 4.21,17; *Comp.* 5.23,14; *Comp.* 6.28,15–16; *Comp.* 6.30,5; *Comp.* 11.41,2; *Comp.* 12.46,21; *Comp.* 25.132,7. Τὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως (or μόρια λέξεως): *Dem.* 39.211,24–25 (τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις τε καὶ στοιχειώδεσι μορίοις τῆς λέξεως); *Dem.* 48.232,20–21 (τοῖς πρώτοις μορίοις τῆς λέξεως); *Dem.* 48.233,10–11 (τῶν πρώτων μορίων τῆς λέξεως); *Dem.* 51.240,6–7 (τὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως); *Comp.* 2.7,1–2 (τὰ πρῶτα μόρια τῆς λέξεως); *Comp.* 7.30,14–15 (τὰ πρῶτα μόρια καὶ στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως); *Comp.* 12.44,6 (τῶν τῆς λέξεως μορίων); *Comp.* 16.66,19 (τὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως); *Comp.* 17.68,13 (μόριον λέξεως); *Comp.* 17.69,17 (δισυλλάβων μορίων λέξεως); *Comp.* 20.90,20 (τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς λέξεως μόρια); *Comp.* 22.101,7–8 (λέξεως μορίων); *Comp.* 22.109,9–10 (τῶν μορίων τῆς λέξεως); *Comp.* 26.136,5 (τὰ τῆς λέξεως μόρια); *Amm.* II 5.426,15 (τὰ ῥηματικὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως). In *Pomp.* 2.230,14–15, Dionysius does not refer to a word but to an *aspect* of Plato's style, whether one retains the MSS' τῆς δὲ λέξεώς τι μόριον, which is printed by Aujac (1992) 85, or reads Usener's τοῦ δὲ λεκτικοῦ μορίου.

[135] See *Ant. Rom.* 1.40.6; 3.65.6; *Lys.* 16.27,10–11; *Is.* 14.111,11–12.

[136] See *Dem.* 51.240,20–241,7. Cf. Kremer (1907) 2–3.

are the aspects of stylistic writing, namely selection of words (ἐκλογή) and composition (σύνθεσις).[137]

The fact that Dionysius speaks of both 'parts of the λόγος' and 'parts of the λέξις' when referring to words reminds us of Aristotle's 'parts of the assertion' (μέρη λόγου) and 'parts of the expression' (μέρη λέξεως) (see section 3.2). We have already seen that Dionysius may have been familiar with the Peripatetic distinction between μέρη λόγου and μέρη λέξεως from his reading of Theophrastus' *On Style* (see section 3.3.1). However, Dionysius uses the expressions 'parts of the λόγος' and 'parts of the λέξις' without adopting the Aristotelian distinction between the two: in his case, the different terms do not imply two different concepts.[138]

(5) Dionysius also refers to words as στοιχεῖα, 'elements'.[139] This term points to the role of words as building blocks in the process of composition.[140] The same idea is expressed by the term στοιχειώδη μόρια.[141] In *Comp.* 2, Dionysius states that the μόρια λόγου are also called στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως ('elements of the phrase').[142] We know that the Stoic philosophers regarded the parts of speech as στοιχεῖα (elements), but they did

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[137] See *Thuc.* 22.358,8–27 (ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἅπασα λέξις εἰς δύο μέρη διαιρεῖται τὰ πρῶτα etc.); cf. Pohl (1968) 11–12.

[138] Rosén (1990) 116–117 discusses the definition of σύνθεσις in *Comp.* 2.6,17–19 and concludes that Dionysius of Halicarnassus preserves the Aristotelian distinction between λόγος ('Satz') and λέξις ('Rede' or 'Ausdruck'). But he does not take into account the fact that Dionysius uses μόρια λέξεως and μόρια λόγου in quite the same way. Rosén thinks that a direct line runs from Aristotle's *Poetics* to Dionysius Thrax and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, but he ignores the Stoic influence on the theory of the 'parts of speech'. Besides, Aristotle's μέρη λέξεως also include 'elements' and syllables, whereas Dionysius' parts of the phrase are words only.

[139] The term στοιχεῖα refers to words in *Dem.* 48.232,20–21; *Comp.* 2.6,19; *Comp.* 2.7,8; *Comp.* 7.30,14. It refers to letters in *Dem.* 52.242,16–17; *Comp.* 14.48,5; *Comp.* 14.48,6; *Comp.* 14.48,8; *Comp.* 14.50,4; *Comp.* 22.101,14; *Comp.* 22.101,16; *Comp.* 22.102,9. Other applications of the word στοιχεῖον in Dionysius' rhetorical works: in *Lysias* (15.25,14; 15.26,16; 16.26,18), the στοιχεῖα are elements of the subject matter (not of language); τὰ πρῶτη στοιχεῖα in *Dem.* 37.209.18–19 are the physical elements of the world; στοιχεῖον in *Dem.* 53.244,6 refers to 'delivery' (ὑπόκρισις) as an essential 'element' of oratory.

[140] For Dionysius' explanation of the use of στοιχεῖα in the sense of 'letters' (*Comp.* 14.48,3–8), see section 2.2.

[141] *Dem.* 39.211,24–25 (στοιχειώδη μόρια τῆς λέξεως) and *Thuc.* 22.358,13 (στοιχειώδη μόρια). In *Comp.* 14.49,11–12, however, τὰς πρώτας τε καὶ στοιχειώδεις τῆς φωνῆς δυνάμεις are the letters (or sounds).

[142] *Comp.* 2.6,17–19. Cf. *Dem.* 48.232,20–21: τοῖς πρώτοις μορίοις τῆς λέξεως, ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα ὑπό τινων καλεῖται …

not refer to them as στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως, but as στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου:[143] for them, the στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου were the parts of speech, while the στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως were the letters.[144] The same distinction can be found in the works of the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus. As far as we know, Dionysius of Halicarnassus is the only author who refers to the 'parts of speech' as στοιχεῖα λέξεως (instead of λόγου). In Dionysius, words are τὰ στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως, whereas the letters (and the corresponding sounds) are τὰ στοιχεῖα τῆς φωνῆς. If it is true that the parts of speech were called στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως by some people, as Dionysius claims, then we might suppose that these people (or perhaps Dionysius himself?) have combined an originally philosophical idea (the parts of speech as elements) with a rhetorical approach to language as expression (λέξις) (see also section 4.2.1).[145] However, we have seen that Dionysius does not use μόρια λόγου and μόρια λέξεως with different meanings. We should therefore not attach too much importance to his use of στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως instead of στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου.

(6) The parts of the phrase are also called τὰ πρῶτα μέρη (τῆς λέξεως) and τὰ πρῶτα μόρια τῆς λέξεως.[146] The adjective πρῶτος emphasises the idea that words are the units from which the process of composition starts: the connotation of πρῶτα μέρη seems to be similar to that of στοιχεῖα (see also section 2.2).[147] The expression τὰ πρῶτα μέρη (or μόρια) only occurs in passages where the word στοιχεῖα is also mentioned, in some cases clearly as an alternative: τὰ πρῶτα μόρια καὶ στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως ('the first parts and elements of the phrase'); τοῖς πρώτοις μορίοις τῆς λέξεως ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα ὑπό τινων καλεῖται ('the first parts of the phrase, which are called elements by some people') (see section 4.2.1).[148] Just as

[143] For the Stoic use of the term στοιχεῖον λόγου for a part of speech, see *FDS* 536A, 539–541. Cf. Sluiter (1990) 43–44.

[144] Dionysius, however, refers to letters (γράμματα) as στοιχεῖα, as στοιχεῖα φωνῆς or as ἀρχαὶ φωνῆς: see *Comp.* 14.48,3–8; *Dem.* 52.242,16–17 (τῶν στοιχείων τῆς φωνῆς); *Ant. Rom.* 1.20.3.

[145] Cf. Ildefonse (1997) 105.

[146] Τὰ πρῶτα μέρη: *Comp.* 2.7,7; *Comp.* 2.7,14–15; τὰ πρῶτα μέρη τῆς λέξεως: *Comp.* 2.7,1–2; τὰ πρῶτα μόρια τῆς λέξεως: *Dem.* 48.232,20; *Dem.* 48.233,10–11; *Comp.* 2.7,12–13; *Comp.* 7.30,14.

[147] Cf. *Comp.* 7.30,13: Μία μὲν δὴ θεωρία τῆς συνθετικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἡ περὶ αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα μόρια καὶ στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως ἥδε. 'This, then, is one aspect of the science of composition, the one which is concerned with the primary parts and elements of speech.' See section 4.2.1.

[148] *Comp.* 7.30,14; *Dem.* 48.232,20–21.

the term πρῶτος characterises the parts of speech as the 'primary' units of composition, it also refers to the letters as the 'first and elementary powers of voice'.[149]

(7) Schenkeveld also mentions τὰ τῆς φράσεως μόρια as one of Dionysius' expressions for *partes orationis*.[150] It is doubtful whether this is right. The term is found only once in Dionysius' works, and there the context seems to make clear that it refers to 'parts of the expression' in a more general sense:[151] in *Thuc.* 24, Dionysius first tells us that the typical style of Thucydides is characterised by (a) his choice of words (ἐκλογὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων), (b) his σύνθεσις τ' ἐλαττόνων καὶ τῶν μειζόνων μορίων ('composition of both shorter and longer parts'), and (c) his figures (σχηματισμοί). Then he remarks that, during the entire war, 'Thucydides never stopped revising his eight books (…) and polishing and rounding off every single one τῶν τῆς φράσεως μορίων.'[152] This statement is illustrated by a range of examples, some of which belong to the level of words, while others are related to matters of composition and figures of speech. Therefore, I would prefer to interpret τὰ τῆς φράσεως μόρια in the same way as the 'shorter and longer parts' mentioned earlier: they include both word classes and longer units (e.g. clauses).[153] I have found no other ancient text in which the expression τὰ τῆς φράσεως μόρια (or μέρη) occurs. However, Dionysius himself provides us with a useful parallel. When discussing Plato's style in *Pomp.* 2, he tells us that Plato, 'in aiming to achieve lofty, impressive and daring effects of expression (φράσεως), did not succeed in all aspects (μέρη).'[154] Here, τὰ μέρη are clearly general 'aspects' of expression, which seems to support my interpretation of τὰ τῆς φράσεως μόρια in *Thuc.* 24.[155]

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[149] *Comp.* 14.49,11–12: see section 2.2.

[150] Schenkeveld (1983) 70.

[151] *Thuc.* 24.361,18.

[152] *Thuc.* 24.361,15–19: διετέλεσέ γέ τοι τὸν ἑπτακαιεικοσαετῆ χρόνον τοῦ πολέμου ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἕως τῆς τελευτῆς τὰς ὀκτὼ βύβλους, ἃς μόνας κατέλιπεν, στρέφων ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν τῆς φράσεως μορίων ῥινῶν καὶ τορεύων.

[153] Usher (1974) 527 translates 'the individual phrases', Aujac (1991) 75 'chacun des éléments de son énoncé'.

[154] *Pomp.* 2.231,21–24: (…) τῆς ὑψηλῆς καὶ μεγαλοπρεποῦς καὶ παρακεκινδυνευμένης φράσεως ἐφιέμενον Πλάτωνα μὴ περὶ πάντα τὰ μέρη κατορθοῦν.

[155] The parallel is in itself not decisive, however, because the difference between μέρη (generally larger structures and only in a few cases designating 'words') and μόρια noted above might play a role here.

3.6. *The word classes according to Dionysius*

I have argued that Dionysius' μόρια λόγου are both word classes and parts of a phrase. In this section, I will concentrate on the former aspect. In his passage on the history of the theory of the parts of speech, Dionysius lists nine word classes: ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον, προσηγορικόν, ἀντονομασία, ἐπίρρημα, πρόθεσις, μετοχή.[156] All these word classes are also used in other passages in Dionysius' works.[157] They appear in different forms: either as nouns (e.g. ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ῥῆμα) or as neuter adjectives (e.g. ὀνοματικόν, προσηγορικόν, ῥηματικόν). In the latter case, the adjectives either qualify a substantive like ὄνομα (e.g. τὸ μετοχικὸν ὄνομα) or μόριον (e.g. τὰ προθετικὰ μόρια), or they are used as substantives (e.g. τὸ προσηγορικόν, τὸ ῥηματικόν).[158] I will briefly discuss each of the word classes that occur in Dionysius: ὄνομα and προσηγορικόν (and ἐπίθετον) (section 3.6.1), ῥῆμα and μετοχή (section 3.6.2), ἄρθρον and ἀντονομασία (section 3.6.3), πρόθεσις and σύνδεσμος (section 3.6.4) and ἐπίρρημα (section 3.6.5). This discussion has two purposes. On the one hand, it will enable us to compare Dionysius' word class theory with the views of philologists and grammarians, so that we may establish Dionysius' place in the history of the theory of the parts of speech. On the other hand, the overview will serve to answer an important question: does Dionysius use a system of nine word classes (section 3.6.6)? Schenkeveld has concluded that 'we may safely ascribe to Dionysius the use of the system of nine word classes'.[159] I will reconsider the evidence and argue that, although Dionysius makes use of a total of nine word classes, we cannot attribute to him the use of a 'system' of nine word classes.

3.6.1. *ὄνομα and προσηγορικόν (and ἐπίθετον)*

Dionysius uses the term ὄνομα in many different ways. We have already seen (section 3.5) that ὄνομα is the most general term for 'word'. In grammatical contexts, Dionysius uses ὄνομα on two different levels. First, ὄνομα is 'noun' in general; that is, any proper noun or appellative noun, and (in modern terms) any substantive or adjective. Second,

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156 See section 4.2.1. Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 70.
157 See Schenkeveld (1983) 70–71.
158 Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 70.
159 Schenkeveld (1983) 72.

when it is directly opposed to appellative noun (προσηγορικόν or προσηγορία), ὄνομα means 'proper noun', i.e. a personal name.[160] When classifying appellative nouns, Dionysius does not consistently use the term προσηγορικόν (or προσηγορία). This term is used when Dionysius points to the difference between a proper noun (ὄνομα) and an appellative noun (προσηγορικόν); but when this opposition is not relevant, appellatives are often classified as ὀνόματα (see below).[161] The form προσηγορικόν occurs fifteen times, the form προσηγορία only twice (in *Amm.* II 11).[162] The fact that προσηγορία appears only in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* supports the idea that Dionysius used a philological commentary in this work (see section 4.4.2). Dionysius' preference for the term προσηγορικόν might seem to suggest that he regards the appellative noun as a subtype of the noun (i.e. as προσηγορικὸν ὄνομα) rather than as a separate word class (i.e. προσηγορία). Schenkeveld, however, observes that in the history of the word class system, Dionysius also uses the term προσηγορικά when a separate word class is meant.[163] Therefore, the neuter form προσηγορικόν does not indicate that the appellative noun is a subtype of the ὄνομα (noun) rather than a separate word class. It is possible that the neuter form προσηγορικόν stands for προσηγορικὸν μόριον ('appellative part') rather than for προσηγορικὸν ὄνομα ('appellative noun').

Dionysius classifies the words χορόν, Ὀλύμπιοι, κλυτάν, πανδαίδαλον and Ἀθηναῖος as προσηγορικά, and the word πόλεις as προσηγορία.[164]

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[160] See e.g. *Thuc.* 24.361,22–362,1: καὶ αὐτῶν γε τούτων ἀναστρέφων τὰς χρήσεις, ἵνα τὸ μὲν ὀνοματικὸν προσηγορικὸν γένηται, τὸ δὲ προσηγορικὸν ὀνοματικῶς λέγηται. 'He [i.e. Thucydides] inverts the normal use of the nouns, so that the proper noun becomes an appellative noun, and so that he expresses the appellative noun by a proper noun.'

[161] In the history of the theory of the parts of speech (*Comp.* 2.7,5–6), Dionysius states that the προσηγορικά were separated from the ὀνοματικά. See section 4.2.1.

[162] The term προσηγορικόν occurs in the following passages: *Thuc.* 24.361,23–362,1 (twice); *Amm.* II 2.423,6–7 (= *Thuc.* 24.361,23–362,1; twice); *Comp.* 2.7,5–6; *Comp.* 2.7,11; *Comp.* 5.26,12–13; *Comp.* 5.26,13–14; *Comp.* 22.101,8–9; *Comp.* 22.101,11; *Comp.* 22.101,14–15; *Comp.* 22.102,17–18; *Comp.* 22.103,9; *Comp.* 22.105,6; *Comp.* 22.108.18. The term προσηγορία occurs at *Amm.* II 11.430,13 and *Amm.* II 11.430,20.

[163] Schenkeveld (1983) 70. The argument does not work for *Comp.* 2.7,5–6 (τὰ προσηγορικὰ διελόντες ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνοματικῶν) because here Dionysius could mean that 'they separated the προσηγορικὰ ὀνόματα [not yet a separate word class] from the other nouns', thus forming a new word class προσηγορίαι. But Schenkeveld's argument does work for *Comp.* 2.7,11 (καὶ τὰς μετοχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν προσηγορικῶν), where the 'appellatives' (προσηγορικά) must be a separate word class.

[164] See *Comp.* 22.101,8–11 (χορόν and Ὀλύμπιοι), *Comp.* 22.102,17–18 (κλυτάν), *Comp.* 22.105,6 (πανδαίδαλον), *Comp.* 22.108,18 (Ἀθηναῖος) and *Amm.* II 11.430,20 (πόλεις).

In some cases, however, appellatives are called ὀνοματικά or ὀνόματα (nouns). For instance, Dionysius (*Amm.* II 5–6) analyses how Thucydides 'changes verbs into nouns and nouns into verbs': where normal usage would have demanded a verb, Thucydides uses a noun, and *vice versa* (see section 4.4.2).[165] In this passage, the words παραίνεσις, ἀξίωσις, ἀποτείχισις, ὀλόφυρσις, ἀνάγκη and πόλεμος are classified as ὀνοματικά (not προσηγορικά).[166] The reason for this categorisation is that Dionysius opposes these nouns to the verbs παραινεῖν, ἀξιοῦν, ἀποτειχίσαι, ὀλοφύρασθαι, ἀναγκάσαι and πολεμεῖν respectively.[167] In this context, there is no need for Dionysius to classify the relevant nouns as 'appellatives', because the opposition here is between verbs and nouns, not between common and appellative nouns. It may be significant that Dionysius uses the term ὀνοματικά in this passage, and not ὀνόματα, for it is the distinction of 'nominal' and 'verbal' parts that is relevant here. Elsewhere, Dionysius classifies the words ἄνδρα, μῆνιν and ἠέλιος as ὀνόματα.[168] This can be explained in in the same way. Dionysius points out that in three Homeric verses that he quotes, the nouns are placed before the verbs (section 5.3.3): ἄνδρα precedes ἔννεπε (*Odyssee* 1.1), μῆνιν precedes ἄειδε (*Iliad* 1.1), and ἠέλιος precedes ἀνόρουσε (*Odyssee* 3.1). In these examples, the opposition is again between nouns and verbs. The fact that these nouns are *apellative* nouns is not important here, so Dionysius calls them ὀνόματα, 'nouns'.[169] The other words to which Dionysius refers as ὀνόματα are τὸν Συρακόσιον ('the Syracusian') and

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Schenkeveld (1983) 77 also mentions χάριν, but Dionysius does in fact not classify that word in his discussion of ἐπί τε κλυτὰν πέμπετε χάριν θεοί in *Comp.* 22.102,5–104,13.

[165] See *Amm.* II 2.423,4–5: καὶ νῦν μὲν τὸ ῥηματικὸν ὀνοματικῶς ἐκφέρων, αὖθις δὲ τοὔνομα ῥῆμα ποιῶν. 'And sometimes expressing the verbal part in a nominal form, and sometimes changing the noun into a verb.' *Amm.* II 5.426,15–16: Ἐν οἷς δὲ τὰ ῥηματικὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως ὀνοματικῶς σχηματίζει, τοιαύτην ποιεῖ τὴν φράσιν. 'When he casts the verbal parts of speech in the form of nouns, he expresses himself in the following way.' *Amm.* II 6.427,8–10: Ὅταν δὲ ἀντιστρέψας ἑκατέρου τούτων τὴν φύσιν τὰ ὀνόματα ποιῇ ῥήματα, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐκφέρει τὴν λέξιν. 'But when he reverses the natural use of both of these parts and turns nouns into verbs, he produces the following kind of expression.' See section 4.4.2.

[166] *Amm.* II 5.426,15–427,16. For the context, see section 4.4.2.

[167] *Amm.* II 5.426,20–427,1; *Amm.* II 5.427,4–6; *Amm.* II 6.427,14–16. See section 4.4.2.

[168] *Comp.* 5.23,15–24,4.

[169] Dionysius does not make explicit which are the ὀνόματα that are 'placed after the verbs' in the Homeric verses quoted in *Comp.* 5.24,9–14. However, the ὀνόματα seem to include Ἀτρυτώνη, Μοῦσαι and Ἀχιλλεῦ, and in that case Schenkeveld (1983) 72 is wrong in saying that 'nowhere does DH classify a proper name'.

τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ ('the Athenian'), but here one might also think that ὀνόματα has the general sense of 'words'.[170]

Apart from its use as 'noun' and 'proper noun', ὄνομα is also used in opposition to ἐπίθετον. The latter use is only found once in Dionysius' works, in the passage where he discusses the natural word order of ὀνοματικά and ἐπίθετα (see section 5.3.6):[171] ἠξίουν τὰ μὲν ὀνοματικὰ προτάττειν τῶν ἐπιθέτων. 'I thought I should place ὀνοματικά before ἐπίθετα'. The word ἐπίθετον is first mentioned in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, where it refers to any ornament that characterises something or somebody.[172] The first definition of the ἐπίθετον is found in the Hellenistic papyrus P. Hamb. 128 (ca. 200 BC): τὸ μετὰ κυρίων ὀνομάτων λεγόμενον 'that which is said together with substantives.'[173] The papyrus mentions examples like σίδηρος αἴθων and χρυσὸς αἰγλήεις, which seem to support Snell's interpretation of κύριον ὄνομα in this text as 'substantive'.[174] Aristarchus does not regard ἐπίθετον as a separate word class, but as one of the functions of the noun (ὄνομα).[175] He classifies adjectives as ὀνόματα (nouns): a word may perform the *role* of ἐπίθετον, but that does not mean that it belongs to a separate word class.[176] In antiquity, the ἐπίθετον was never treated as a separate word class. Apollonius Dyscolus states that 'the ἐπίθετα signify size, quantity, condition of the soul or something similar'.[177] In the *Technê Grammatikê*, the ἐπίθετον is a subtype of the ὄνομα: 'it is placed next to proper or appellative nouns alike, and conveys praise or blame.'[178] Dionysius of Halicarnassus does not offer any examples of ἐπίθετα, so that it is difficult to determine the status of

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[170] *Amm.* II 9.429,2–4. Schenkeveld (1983) 77 also includes the words τάραχος, ταραχή, ὄχλησις and ὄχλος among the words that Dionysius classifies as ὀνόματα, but Dionysius merely mentions these words in his discussion of the interchange of masculine and feminine (*Amm.* II 10.429,17–430,11), without assigning them to word classes. On this passage, see section 4.4.2.

[171] *Comp.* 5.26,11–12: see section 5.3.6.

[172] See e.g. Aristotle, *Rh.* 1405a10; 1405b20. Cf. Schoemann (1862) 86 and Matthaios (1999) 236–237.

[173] See Schenkeveld (1993) 69 and Matthaios (1996) 67–68.

[174] Snell (1954) 42 and Matthaios (1999) 237.

[175] See Aristarchus fr. 12b Matthaios, where Aristarchus points out that, in *Iliad* 2.111, μέγας is not used 'as an epitheton' (κατ' ἐπίθετον) but in order to differentiate the great Ajax from the small Ajax. See Matthaios (1999) 233–244.

[176] See Matthaios (1999) 241.

[177] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 26,12: ἀλλὰ μὴν τἀπιθετικὰ ἢ πηλικότητα ἢ ποσότητα ἢ διάθεσιν ψυχῆς δηλοῖ ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.

[178] [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 34,3: Επίθετον δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐπὶ κυρίων ἢ προσηγορικῶν † ὁμωνύμως τιθέμενον καὶ δηλοῦν ἔπαινον ἢ ψόγον. The translation is by Kemp.

this item in his theory. Rhys Roberts thinks that Dionysius regards the adjective as a separate part of speech, but Schenkeveld has rejected that view.[179] Schoemann argues that Dionysius uses ἐπίθετον in the same way as Aristotle and he states that Dionysius 'nennt (…) ein und dasselbe Wort bald ἐπίθετον bald προσηγορικόν, je nachdem es entweder sich dem Eigennamen oder ein anderweitigen Benennung des Gegenstandes anschließt, oder allein als dessen Bezeichnung auftritt (…).'[180] It is true that, in the rest of Dionysius' work, the term ἐπίθετον is a rhetorical rather than a grammatical concept. It appears for example in phrases like τὴν ἐπίθετον καὶ κατεσκευασμένην φράσιν ('the ornamental and elaborate expression'), or τοὺς ἐπιθέτους κόσμους ('the additional ornaments').[181] Likewise, ἐπίθετα are 'additions' or 'appositions' in general.[182] The only grammatical context in which the term appears is the phrase ἠξίουν τὰ μὲν ὀνοματικὰ προτάττειν τῶν ἐπιθέτων. According to Schoemann, the ὀνοματικά are not 'substantives' here but 'nomina propria'.[183] This is possible, but not necessary. The corresponding passage in Quintilian (see section 5.4.3) seems to translate ὀνοματικά and ἐπιθέτων literally: *nomina adpositis* (…) *essent priora*.[184] In Aristarchus, ἐπίθετα are combined with both persons and things.[185] Therefore, I conclude that the opposition ὀνοματικά / ἐπίθετα is one of nouns (appellatives or proper nouns) and epithets (ὀνόματα used with the function of describing other nouns). Dionysius presumably thinks of words that we would call adjectives. But if we translate ἐπίθετον as 'adjective', we should be aware that the ἐπίθετον is not a separate word class for Dionysius, but a noun (ὄνομα) that is used to qualify another noun (ὄνομα).

In his use of the term κύριον ὄνομα, Dionysius adopts the rhetorical, not the grammatical meaning of the term (see also section 2.5.5).[186]

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179 Rhys Roberts (1910) 299; Schenkeveld (1983) 72.

180 Schoemann (1862) 86.

181 E.g. *Dem.* 4.135,16–17; *Dem.* 13.158,7; *Dem.* 18.166,3.

182 See e.g. *Dem.* 5.137,18.

183 Schoemann (1862) 86 n. 2 adds his own examples: Φωκίων ὁ στρατηγός ('Phokion, the commander') and ὁ στρατηγὸς Φωκίων ('the commander, Phokion'). In the former order, στρατηγός would be an epithet, in the latter order it would not be an epithet, according to Schoemann.

184 Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.4.23.

185 Matthaios (1999) 235: ἐπίθετον is 'dasjenige "Nomen", das der (eigentlichen) Benennung ([κύριον] ὄνομα) einer Person sowie eines Gegenstandes oder Sachverhalts hinzugefügt wird, um diese bzw. diesen durch Angabe einer ihnen eigenen Art oder Beschaffenheit näher zu charakterisieren.'

186 On the ancient use of the term κύριον ὄνομα, see Matthaios (1996).

Just like Aristotle, Dionysius uses this term for a noun that is used in its proper sense, as opposed to a word that is used in a metaphorical sense.[187] This use of κύριον ὄνομα is different from the one that we find in Alexandrian scholarship. Aristarchus employs the term κύριον ὄνομα for a word that expresses the actual designation of a person or thing: the κύριον ὄνομα is normally opposed to the ἐπίθετον, which describes or characterises the person or thing designated by the κύριον ὄνομα.[188] Neither κύριον ὄνομα nor ἐπίθετον are separate word classes for Aristarchus, but 'Anwendungsarten' of the ὄνομα.[189] In later times, κύριον ὄνομα ('proper noun'), ἐπίθετον ('adjective') and προσηγορικόν ('appellative') are treated as subtypes of the ὄνομα.[190] Dionysius of Halicarnassus does not employ any of the grammatical concepts of κύριον ὄνομα. In his works, κύρια ὀνόματα are words that are used in their proper sense: we often find the collocation τὰ κύρια τε καὶ κοινὰ ὀνόματα, 'standard and ordinary words'.[191]

3.6.2. *ῥῆμα and μετοχή*

Just like ὄνομα, the term ῥῆμα is used in different ways. First, it has the non-technical sense of 'saying' or 'word'.[192] In grammatical contexts, ῥῆμα is used both in a general and a more specific sense. On the one hand, ῥῆμα can refer to any verbal (rhematic) form, including both verbs and participles. On the other hand, when ῥῆμα is opposed to μετοχή (participle), it refers to the 'verb' in the strict sense.[193] In other words, just as ὄνομα can comprise all 'nominal' forms, ῥῆμα can cover

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[187] For Aristotle's use of κύριον ὄνομα, see *Po.* 21.1457b1–6. Cf. Matthaios (1996) 65–67.

[188] Matthaios (1999) 224 points out that κύριον ὄνομα in Aristarchus means 'dasjenige Nomen (ὄνομα), das in Opposition zu anderen ὀνόματα die geltende bzw. die Haupt-Benennung eines Objektes zum Ausdruck bringt.'

[189] Matthaios (1999) 214–244.

[190] E.g. [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 33,6–35,2.

[191] For Dionysius' use of κύριον ὄνομα, see *Lys* 3.10,7–8; *Lys.* 3.12,10; *Lys.* 4.12,22; *Isoc.* 11.70,20; *Dem.* 13.156,1; *Comp.* 3.14,14–15; *Comp.* 21.95,14–15 (κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν opposed to μεταφορικοῖς ὀνόμασιν); *Pomp.* 2.228,6–7.

[192] For the non-technical use of ῥῆμα, see *Ant. Rom.* 1.28.2; 4.18.2; 10.7.3.

[193] In the history of the theory of the parts of speech (*Comp.* 2.6,20–7,13; see section 4.2.1), Dionysius says that the μετοχαί were separated from the προσηγορικά. Most modern scholars, however, think that participles were classified as ῥήματα before they were regarded as a separate word class. Dionysius' reconstruction in *Comp.* 2.7,11 (τὰς μετοχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν προσηγορικῶν) seems incompatible with his own classification of participles as ῥήματα.

all 'verbal' forms. The term μετοχή occurs twice, the term μετοχικόν thrice in Dionysius' works.[194] The word μενόντων is the only word that Dionysius classifies as a participle (τὸ μετοχικὸν ὄνομα).[195] The words ἐπιμιγνύντες, κατῳκηκότας and σκηριπτόμενος, however, are called ῥήματα (not μετοχαί).[196] In the case of ἐπιμιγνύντες and κατῳκηκότας, their classification as 'verbs' can be explained by the fact that in the relevant context these words are considered 'verbal' forms, which adopt the verbal *accidentia*. Thus, in *Amm.* II 7–8, Dionysius discusses how Thucydides interchanges passive and active forms of verbs (see section 4.4.2):[197] the historian uses ἐπιμιγνύντες instead of ἐπιμιγνύμενοι and κατῳκηκότας instead of κατῳκημένους.[198] The relevant contrast is here between active and passive, and not between verbs and participles: the *accidentia* active and passive are attributes of all verbal forms, including participles. Therefore, Dionysius has not used the term μετοχή in this context. Although the case of σκηριπτόμενος is less clear, we can assume that Dionysius classifies this word as a ῥῆμα again because he considers the word as a 'verbal' part of speech: in *Comp.* 20, Dionysius analyses the description of Sisyphus' torments in *Od.* 11.593–598; he shows that the composition of these Homeric verses imitates first Sisyphus' sufferings when rolling his stone to the top of a hill, and then the speed with which the stone tumbles downhill again.[199] The first observation is that 'in the two lines in which Sisyphus rolls up the rock, except

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[194] The term μετοχή occurs in *Amm.* II 11.430,13 and *Comp.* 2.7,11. The term μετοχικόν occurs in *Thuc.* 24.362,7; *Amm.* II 2.423,14; *Amm.* II 12.432,10. Usener rightly deleted τῆς μετοχῆς in *Amm.* II 11.431,1–2.

[195] *Amm.* II 12.432,10. Since Dionysius uses the term μετοχή in the same letter (*Amm.* II 11.430,13), we should not believe that the expression τὸ μετοχικὸν ὄνομα implies that the participle is a subtype of the ὄνομα (a view that Matthaios [2002] 193 attributes to Tyrannion). The term ὄνομα in the expression τὸ μετοχικὸν ὄνομα means 'word' rather than 'noun'. Likewise, in *Comp.* 6.30,2–3, Dionysius refers to κατιδών as τοὔνομα, where ὄνομα again has the general sense of 'word'.

[196] For ἐπιμιγνύντες, see *Amm.* II 7.428,8. For κατῳκηκότας, see *Amm.* 8.428,17. For σκηριπτόμενος (not mentioned in Schenkeveld [1983] 77), see *Comp.* 20.90,9–21. In *Amm.* II 7–8, one might argue that not only ἐπιμιγνύντες and κατῳκηκότας are classified as verbs, but (implicitly) also their 'passive' equivalents ἐπιμιγνύμενοι and κατῳκημένους.

[197] See *Amm.* II 7.427,17–18: Ὅταν δὲ τῶν ῥημάτων ἀλλάττῃ τὰ εἴδη τῶν παθητικῶν καὶ ποιητικῶν, οὕτω σχηματίζει τὸν λόγον.

[198] *Amm.* II 7.428,7–9: καὶ γάρ ⟨ἐν⟩ τούτοις τὸ ἐπιμιγνύντες ἐνεργητικὸν ὑπάρχον ῥῆμα τοῦ ἐπιμιγνύμενοι παθητικοῦ ὄντος χώραν ἐπέχει. *Amm.* II 8.428,17–18: ἀντὶ γὰρ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ῥήματος τοῦ κατῳκηκότας τὸ παθητικὸν παρείληφεν τὸ κατῳκημένους.

[199] *Comp.* 20.89,20–93,19. Schenkeveld (1983) 77 has not included this passage in his list of Dionysius' classifications of words. The analysis of the Sisyphus passage may be compared with 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 72.

for two verbs all the remaining words in the passage are either disyllables or monosyllables'.[200] This part of the analysis clearly refers to *Od.* 11.595–596, and that means that both σκηριπτόμενος and ὤθεσκε are classified as ῥήματα.[201] Here, Dionysius refers to the two longer words in the Homeric lines by calling them 'verbs', thus again opting for the more general classification. The other words that Dionysius classifies as ῥήματα are unproblematic.[202]

3.6.3. *ἄρθρον and ἀντονομασία*

The terminology for most parts of speech corresponds to that of technical grammatical texts, but Dionysius' term for the pronoun deserves some attention. Instead of the usual ἀντωνυμία, Dionysius normally uses the word ἀντονομασία (or ἀντονομαστικόν).[203] According to Apollonius Dyscolus, the term ἀντωνομασία (not ἀντονομασία) was used by Comanus, an older contemporary of Aristarchus.[204] Comanus preferred

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[200] *Comp.* 20.90,19–91,1: πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς δυσὶ στίχοις οἷς ἀνακυλίει τὴν πέτραν, ἔξω δυεῖν ῥημάτων τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς λέξεως μόρια πάντ' ἐστὶν ἤτοι δισύλλαβα ἢ μονοσύλλαβα.

[201] *Od.* 11.595–596: ἤτοι ὃ μὲν σκηριπτόμενος χερσίν τε ποσίν τε | λᾶαν ἄνω ὤθεσκε ποτὶ λόφον (*Comp.* 20.90,11–12). The rest of *Od.* 11.596 (ἀλλ' ὅτε μέλλοι) and *Od.* 11.597–598 are discussed in the second part of Dionysius' analysis (*Comp.* 20.92,3–93,19).

[202] The following words are also classified as ῥήματα or ῥηματικά: ἔννεπε (*Comp.* 5.23,19), ἄειδε (*Comp.* 5.23,21), ἀνόρουσε (*Comp.* 5.24,2), κλῦθι (*Comp.* 5.24,9), μνῆσαι (*Comp.* 5.24,12), τύπτε (*Comp.* 5.24,21), ἤριπε (*Comp.* 5.25,1), ἐκλίνθη (*Comp.* 5.25,2), πέτονται (*Comp.* 5.25,7), ἐκφανεῖ (*Comp.* 5.25,9), δεῦτε (*Comp.* 22.101,8), παραινεῖν (*Amm.* II 5.426,20), ἀξιοῦν (*Amm.* II 5.426,20), ἀποτειχίσαι (*Amm.* II 5.427,4–5), ὀλοφύρασθαι (*Amm.* II 5.427,5), ἐθέλοιμεν (*Amm.* II 12.431,22–432,1), περιγίγνεται (*Amm.* II 12.432,2), γίνεται (*Amm.* II 12.432,6), ἔσται (*Amm.* II 12.432,7), ἐπαινέσει and παραινέσει (*Dem.* 26.185,18–21); the latter two verbs are not listed in Schenkeveld (1983) 77. Schenkeveld does mention ἔκπεσε (*Comp.* 5.25,2) as a word classified as ῥῆμα, but in the Homeric line that Dionysius cites it is ἐκλίνθη that precedes the adverb: ἔκπεσε is not relevant here. Further, ἔρυσαν (*Comp.* 5.25,15) does not belong in Schenkeveld's list of 'cases of merismos' either, for Dionysius does not classify this word.

[203] Ἀντονομασία is found in three passages of the Teubner text: *Comp.* 2.7,7 (ἀντονομασίας, which V corrects into ἀντωνυμίας), *Comp.* 5.26,13 (ἀντονομασίας, but P and the second hand of F have ἀντωνομασίας, while the first hand of F has ἀντωνυμίας) and *Thuc.* 37.389,17 (ἀντονομασίαν, where Sylburg proposed to read ἀντωνυμίαν). Further, ἀντονομαστικόν is found in *Amm.* II 12.432,11 (where some MSS have ἀντωνυμικόν).

[204] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 4,18–19: Ἐκφεύγοντάς φασι τὸ Αἰολικὸν τοὺς περὶ Κομανὸν ἀντωνομασίας καλεῖν, εἴγε τὸ μὲν ὄνυμα οὐ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα. 'They say that Comanus and those who agree with him, in order to avoid the Aeolic form, called the pronouns ἀντωνομασίας, for the reason that ὄνομα is the common word, not ὄνυμα.' The expression τοὺς περὶ Κομανὸν ('those around Comanus') refers to Comanus himself: see Matthaios (1999) 445 n. 68. For the fragment of Comanus, see Dyck (1988) 259. On Apollonius' reference to Comanus, see Brandenburg (2005) 573.

the term ἀντωνομασία, because he considered ἀντωνυμία an Aeolic form, to which he objected. The term ἀντονομασία is not only found in Dionysius, but also in a papyrus fragment that dates from the middle of the first century AD.[205] Wouters has argued that those scholars who favoured the use of pure Attic language selected this term.[206] It is possible that Dionysius of Halicarnassus used the term ἀντονομασία for the same reasons.[207] We should observe that in one passage of Dionysius' text (*Comp.* 5.26,13), the MSS have ἀντωνομασίας (Comanus' term), which the editors correct into ἀντονομασίας. The traditional term, ἀντωνυμία, occurs only once in Dionysius (*Comp.* 6.29,20). Usener suggests that we should read ἀντονομασία here, and Schenkeveld agrees.[208] However, the terminology of *Comp.* 6 (where we also find other unusual terms such as παρακολουθεῖν and τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου instead of τὰ μόρια) might indicate that this passage is based on a specific model (see section 4.3.1); this would also explain why ἀντωνυμία is used here instead of ἀντονομασία.

Dionysius classifies three words as 'pronoun': he calls the word τουτονί an ἀντωνυμία, and the word ἡμῶν an ἀντονομαστικόν.[209] More interesting is the word αὐτοῦ, which is classified as 'either an ἄρθρον δεικτικόν *or* an ἀντονομασία'. Dionysius refers to this word as follows: ἑνικὸν καὶ κατὰ τὴν γενικὴν ἐσχηματισμένον πτῶσιν, εἴ τε ἄρθρον δεικτικὸν βούλεταί τις αὐτὸ καλεῖν εἴ τε ἀντονομασίαν, τὸ 'αὐτοῦ', '(…) the genitive singular αὐτοῦ, whether one wishes to call it a deictic article or a pronoun.'[210] For our purpose, it is important to observe that there are two possible explanations for the fact that Dionysius offers two classifications. The first possibility is that Dionysius uses a system of nine word classes, and that he refers to the fact that αὐτοῦ could, within that system, for different reasons be called either a deictic article or a pronoun.

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[205] P. Yale I 25 (nr. 1 Wouters).

[206] Wouters (1979) 58–59. See also Matthaios (1999) 445–446, 503–504 and Matthaios (2001) 69–70.

[207] On Atticism in Dionysius, see section 1.2. In his glossary of rhetorical terms, Anderson (2000) 23 defines ἀντονομασία as 'an expressive periphrasis used instead of a proper name', and also lists Dionysius, *Comp.* 2, *Comp.* 5 and *Thuc.* 37 under that heading. However, although it is true that the pronoun was understood as 'replacing the noun' (see also section 4.2.1), Dionysius does not use the term ἀντονομασία for a rhetorical figure.

[208] Schenkeveld (1983) 73.

[209] For τουτονί, see *Comp.* 6.29,20 (see also sections 5.3.6 and 7.3.2). For ἡμῶν (not in the list of Schenkeveld [1983] 77), see *Amm.* II 12.432,11.

[210] *Thuc.* 37.389,15–17. For the context, see section 5.2.

The second possibility is that Dionysius refers to the fact that different systems of word classes were used: in a system with only five or six parts of speech, αὐτοῦ would belong to the ἄρθρον (which covers both articles and pronouns), whereas in a system with eight or nine parts of speech, it would be classified as an ἀντονομασία. As Schenkeveld has pointed out, this problem is connected to a difficult text from Apollonius Dyscolus' *De pronominibus*. Together, these texts cast light on the terminology of ἄρθρον and ἀντωνυμία in the grammatical writers who were influenced by Stoic ideas.[211] I will first discuss Apollonius' text and then return to Dionysius.

Apollonius Dyscolus tells us that the Stoics did not distinguish the pronouns as a separate word class, but classified them as ἄρθρα. For them, the ἄρθρα included both ἄρθρα ἀόριστα (the later articles) and ἄρθρα ὡρισμένα (the later pronouns).[212] Apollonius adds the following information:[213]

> Καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος καὶ ὁ Θρᾷξ Διονύσιος καὶ ἄρθρα δεικτικὰ τὰς ἀντωνυμίας ἐκάλουν.
>
> 'And Apollodorus of Athens and Dionysius Thrax called the pronouns also deictic articles.'

Scholars strongly disagree on the interpretation of this sentence.[214] Three interpretations have been suggested. (1) Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax used the expression ἄρθρα δεικτικά for *all* pronouns, while completely *avoiding* the term ἀντωνυμίαι.[215] This would mean that (the later) pronouns and articles were treated as one single word class in the word class system of Dionysius Thrax. According to this interpretation, Apollonius' words καὶ ἄρθρα δεικτικά should be explained as 'also deictic articles', that is, *apart from* ἄρθρα ὡρισμένα. (2) Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax used the term ἀντωνυμίαι for pronouns, but they *also*

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[211] Schenkeveld (1983) 75.

[212] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 5,13–15: Οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἄρθρα καλοῦσι καὶ τὰς ἀντωνυμίας, διαφέροντα δὲ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ἄρθρων, ᾗ ταῦτα μὲν ὡρισμένα, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἀοριστώδη. 'The representatives of the Stoic school call the pronouns as well articles, which differ from our articles in that the former [i.e. the later pronouns] are definite articles, and the latter [i.e. the later articles] indefinite articles.'

[213] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 5,18–19.

[214] See Schoemann (1862) 119–125, Erbse (1980), Di Benedetto (1990) and the excellent discussion in Matthaios (1999) 509–514. Brandenburg (2005) does not discuss the passage in his commentary on Apollonius' *De pronominibus*. For the various ancient grammatical terms for 'pronoun', see Lallot (2001).

[215] See Di Benedetto (1990) 20–26.

('gelegentlich') called the pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά: according to the latter interpretation all pronouns could be called either ἀντωνυμίαι or ἄρθρα δεικτικά.[216] According to this interpretation, Apollonius' words καὶ ἄρθρα δεικτικά should be explained as 'also deictic articles', that is, *apart from* ἀντωνυμίαι. (3) Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax used the term ἀντωνυμίαι for pronouns, but they called only the *deictic* (not all) pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά.[217]

Di Benedetto has convincingly argued that the third of these interpretations, which is defended by Erbse, is incorrect, because in the context of Apollonius' remark, he uses the term ἀντωνυμία for all pronouns and not in the restricted sense of 'deictic pronouns'.[218] We may add that Dionysius of Halicarnassus' classification of αὐτοῦ as ἄρθρον δεικτικόν confirms that Erbse is wrong in assuming that only 'demonstrative' pronouns were classified as ἄρθρα δεικτικά. Matthaios correctly argues that the expression ἄρθρα δεικτικά does not designate demonstrative pronouns only: ἄρθρα δεικτικά is an equivalent of the Stoic expression ἄρθρα ὡρισμένα, which included the later personal, demonstrative and anaphoric pronouns.[219] It seems clear, then, that Dionysius Thrax called *all* the pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά, just as the Stoics called them ἄρθρα ὡρισμένα. Two possibilities remain: did Dionysius Thrax and Apollodorus, when referring to pronouns, use *only* the expression ἄρθρα δεικτικά (1), or did they use *both* the term ἀντωνυμίαι and ('gelegentlich') the expression ἄρθρα δεικτικά (2)?

Di Benedetto and Schenkeveld follow the first interpretation: they think that Dionysius Thrax did not treat the pronoun as a separate word class. Schenkeveld has argued that Apollonius' use of the word καί in καὶ ἄρθρα δεικτικά indicates that Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax called pronouns *both* ἄρθρα ὡρισμένα (as the Stoics) *and* ἄρθρα δεικτι-

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[216] For this option, see Schoemann (1862) 120: '[I]ch halte es für viel wahrscheinlicher, dass er [i.e. Dionysius Thrax] sich in diesem Punkte an die Tradition der Schule gehalten, und etwa nur gelegentlich in Erörterungen über das Wesen und die Function der Pronomina und mit Beziehung auf die bei den Stoikern übliche Benennung derselben gesagt habe, sie könnten auch ἄρθρα δεικτικά heissen.' See also Matthaios (1999) 513.

[217] See Erbse (1980) 255, who translates Apollonius' sentence as follows: 'Und wirklich nannten Apollodorus und Dionysios die (scil. entsprechenden, d.h. deiktischen) Pronomina sogar "deiktische Glieder".' Schoemann (1862) 120–121 already mentions this interpretation.

[218] See Di Benedetto (1990) 20–26. Schoemann (1862) 121 also mentions this argument. Matthaios (1999) 511–512 rejects Erbse's interpretation.

[219] Matthaios (1999) 512–513.

κά.[220] All this would imply that Dionysius Thrax did not recognise the ἀντωνυμία as a separate word class: and that is exactly what a scholiast seems to report when saying that Dionysius Thrax 'combined the pronoun with the article' (συνῆπτε τῷ ἄρθρῳ τὴν ἀντωνυμίαν).[221] This statement may be based on Apollonius' remark about Dionysius Thrax, in which case it does not have an independent value as a source; but even if that is true, it is an important ancient interpretation of Apollonius' words.[222] Matthaios has shown that, before Dionysius Thrax, Aristarchus already distinguished the ἀντωνυμία as a separate word class.[223] Therefore, if we follow the interpretation of Di Benedetto and Schenkeveld concerning Dionysius Thrax, one should not believe that '*after* Dionysius Thrax and Apollodorus pronouns acquired names of their own', as Schenkeveld believes.[224] We should rather suppose that after Aristarchus, who used a system of eight word classes (including the ἀντωνυμία as a separate word class), Stoic influence on grammar became so strong that Dionysius Thrax adopted a different classification of the parts of speech (with fewer word classes), in which the pronouns belonged to the ἄρθρα. The pronouns would then have gotten the names ἄρθρα ὡρισμένα and ἄρθρα δεικτικά. Matthaios rejects this interpretation: he does not believe that Dionysius Thrax did not use the term ἀντωνυμία, because Aristarchus already used that term before him.[225] But it seems that we should not exclude the possibility that Dionysius Thrax did not follow his teacher in this respect.

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[220] Schenkeveld (1983) 76: '(…) the most acceptable exegesis seems to me that Stoics called both demonstrative and anaphoric pronouns ἄρθρα ὡρισμένα a), and that Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax followed Stoic views when they called these words ἄρθρα δεικτικά also b), i.e. apart from the Stoic nomenclature.'

[221] Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 160,27–28.

[222] For the problematic nature of the text, see Matthaios (1999) 511. Di Benedetto (1990) 26–27 argues that the scholion correctly interprets Apollonius Dyscolus' information about Dionysius Thrax.

[223] Matthaios (1999) 432–519.

[224] Schenkeveld (1983) 76. My italics.

[225] Matthaios (1999) 511: 'Ferner hat die Interpretation von Di Benedetto zur Folge, daß sich der *terminus post quem* für die Anerkennung des Pronomens als selbständiger Wortart und die Einführung des Terminus ἀντωνυμία auf die Grammatikergeneration nach Dionysios Thrax und Apollodor verschiebt. Diese Schlußfolgerung ist aber unannehmbar. Denn wie unsere Ausführungen gezeigt haben, haben Aristarch und seine unmittelbaren Zeitgenossen das Pronomen bereits als eigenständige Wortart anerkannt und es ἀντωνομασία—so Komanos—bzw. ἀντωνυμία (…) genannt.' But I do not see why it is impossible that Dionysius Thrax distanced himself from Aristarchus and started to call the pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά. A parallel case is the grammarian Tyrannion. Matthaios (2002) 194 believes that, unlike Aristarchus, Tyrannion did not regard

Matthaios himself adopts the second interpretation: Dionysius Thrax used the term ἀντωνυμίαι for pronouns (just like Aristarchus), but sometimes he added that they could *also* be called ἄρθρα δεικτικά.[226] According to this interpretation, Dionysius Thrax would not have used a word class system in which pronouns and articles were taken together as one word class, but he would have agreed with Aristarchus in treating the ἀντωνυμία as a separate word class; he would merely have allowed for two possible *alternative terms* for pronouns, namely ἀντωνυμία and ἄρθρον δεικτικόν. This interpretation reduces Apollonius' remark on Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax to a terminological matter (that is, not a problem concerning the word class system).

Apollonius' information about Dionysius Thrax remains difficult to interpret. One thing is clear: Dionysius Thrax was influenced by Stoic ideas on the parts of speech. The question is to what extent the Stoics exercised their influence. According to the first interpretation, Dionysius Thrax was so strongly influenced by Stoic ideas that he distanced himself from the word class system of his teacher Aristarchus, adopting a system of fewer word classes and classifying the pronouns as ἄρθρα. In this case, Apollonius would be saying that Apollodorus of Athens and Dionysius Thrax called the pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά *apart from* ἄρθρα ὡρισμένα. According to the second interpretation, Dionysius Thrax did not change the Aristarchean system but merely allowed for an alternative name for pronouns, thus showing his respect for the Stoic terminology. In this case, Apollonius would be saying that Apollodorus of Athens and Dionysius Thrax called the pronouns ἄρθρα δεικτικά *apart from* ἀντωνυμίαι. I cannot solve the problem, but I would like to mention one more argument in favour of the first interpretation: Apollonius' claim that Apollodorus and Dionysius Thrax called the pronouns 'also ἄρθρα δεικτικά' directly follows his observation that the Stoics did not call the pronouns ἀντωνυμίαι but ἄρθρα ὡρισμένα (see above); within this context, it would be more natural to understand that, just like the Stoics, Dionysius Thrax called the pronouns ἄρθρα (namely ἄρθρα ὡρισμένα and also ἄρθρα δεικτικά), rather than that, unlike the Stoics, he called them ἄρθρα δεικτικά *as well as* ἀντωνυμίαι.

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the participle as a separate word class but as a subtype of the ὄνομα. If Stoic influence caused Tyrannion to disagree so strongly with Aristarchus, could it not have had a similar effect on Dionysius Thrax?

[226] Matthaios (1999) 513; Matthaios (2002) 193.

We can now return to our own Dionysius and his classification of αὐτοῦ as either a pronoun or a deictic article (*Thuc.* 37.389,16–17; see above). The explanation of Dionysius' text depends on the interpretation of Apollonius' information about Dionysius Thrax: the two interpretations of Apollonius' remark that we have discussed above correspond to two different interpretations of Dionysius' classification of αὐτοῦ. According to Matthaios, Dionysius of Halicarnassus' view that one could call the word αὐτοῦ either a 'deictic article' or a 'pronoun' (εἴ τε ἄρθρον δεικτικὸν βούλεταί τις αὐτὸ καλεῖν εἴ τε ἀντονομασίαν) agrees with the alleged use of these terms by Dionysius Thrax:[227] both Dionysius Thrax and Dionysius of Halicarnassus would have used ἄρθρον δεικτικόν and ἀντωνυμία (ἀντονομασία) as *alternative* terms. Matthaios points out that the particles εἴ τε / εἴ τε are not disjunctive, but indicate that the two options distinguished are both possible. For this reason, he rejects the explanation of Schenkeveld, who argues that Dionysius of Halicarnassus' double classification of the word αὐτοῦ shows that he knows of two different word class systems, namely one with nine word classes (in which the ἀντονομασία is a separate word class) and one with fewer parts (in which pronouns and articles constitute one single word class—the ἄρθρον).[228] Matthaios concludes: 'Es ist unwahrscheinlich, daß Dionysios von Halikarnaß den Terminus ἄρθρα δεικτικά als Hinweis auf eine Untergruppe des sowohl Artikel als auch Pronomen umfassenden Redeteils ἄρθρον hat gelten lassen. Denn die Kategorien Artikel und Pronomen stellten seiner Ansicht nach sonst zwei selbständige Wortarten dar.' Here, I would like to raise two objections. First, it is true that Dionysius of Halicarnassus elsewhere classifies τουτονί and ἡμῶν as ἀντονομασίαι (see above). However, we have also seen that Dionysius classifies appellatives sometimes as ὀνόματα and sometimes as προσηγορικά, and that he classifies participles sometimes as ῥήματα and sometimes as μετοχαί: he uses both general terms and more specific terms. I would suggest that this same principle might apply to his use of ἄρθρον and ἀντονομασία: according to this interpretation, the word αὐτοῦ could be classified either in a general way as ἄρθρον δεικτικόν or in a more specific way as ἀντονομασία. My second objection to Matthaios' analysis is his interpretation of the particles εἴ τε /

[227] Matthaios (1999) 513: 'Wie bei Dionysios Thrax und Apollodor erscheint der Ausdruck ἄρθρον δεικτικόν auch bei Dionysios von Halikarnaß als eine Alternative zum Terminus ἀντωνυμία bzw. ἀντονομασία für die Bezeichnung des Pronomens.'

[228] Schenkeveld (1983) 76; Matthaios (1999) 513 n. 408.

εἴ τε. I agree that these words indicate that the two options are both acceptable for Dionysius. However, I do not agree that this would be inconsistent with Schenkeveld's suggestion that the two alternative classifications refer to two different word class systems. In my view, it is possible that Dionysius refers to the existence of a system with fewer than nine word classes (without the category of the ἀντωνυμία) on the one hand, in which αὐτοῦ would be classified as an ἄρθρον, and of a system of nine word classes on the other hand, in which it would be classified as an ἀντονομασία. Dionysius would in that case mean to say the following: '(…) whether one wishes to call αὐτοῦ a deictic article (as do the Stoics, and Dionysius Thrax, who treat pronouns and articles in one word class) or a pronoun (as do the grammarians who use a system of eight or nine word classes).' In my view, the fact that Dionysius uses εἴ τε / εἴ τε merely shows that he gives equal value to both possibilities:[229] Dionysius leaves the question open, because he is not interested in the use of grammatical 'systems' of word classes with an exact number of μόρια λόγου. I conclude that I prefer Schenkeveld's interpretation of Dionysius' classification of αὐτοῦ as referring to two different word class systems. But both Apollonius' reference to Dionysius Thrax and Dionysius of Halicarnassus' classification of αὐτοῦ remain difficult problems, which are closely related to our poor knowledge of the most obscure period in the history of grammar.[230]

3.6.4. *πρόθεσις and σύνδεσμος*

We have seen that Dionysius uses several grammatical terms both in a more general and in a more specific sense: ὄνομα ('noun') covers both ὄνομα ('proper noun') and προσηγορικόν ('appellative'), ῥῆμα ('verbal part') covers both ῥῆμα ('verb') and μετοχή ('participle'); the classification of the word αὐτοῦ as either an ἄρθρον δεικτικόν or an ἀντονομασία might also be interpreted as indicating that ἄρθρον as a general

[229] See Smyth (1956) 647.

[230] To make things even more difficult, Dionysius (*Comp.* 2.7,7–8; see section 4.2.1) tells us that the ἀντονομασίαι were separated from the ὀνόματα. This would mean that, if one takes different phases of the history of the word class system into account, one could classify the word αὐτοῦ as either an ὄνομα or an ἀντονομασία, but not as an ἄρθρον. But the history of the theory of the parts of speech is a rather isolated passage in Dionysius' work; we have already pointed out that his classification of participles as ῥήματα does not agree with his view (in *Comp.* 2.7,11) that the participles were separated from the προσηγορικά.

term covers both the pronouns and the articles. Dionysius' treatment of πρόθεσις ('preposition') and σύνδεσμος ('conjunction') is similar in this respect. The classification of κατ- in κατιδών as πρόθεσις is unproblematic, as is the classification of τε and ἄρα as σύνδεσμοι.[231] However, the words ἐπί and ἐν are called σύνδεσμοι (not προθέσεις), although Dionysius allows for an alternative classification of ἐπί as πρόθεσις.[232] In *Comp.* 22, Dionysius analyses a Pindaric ode, and classifies the words of the first two cola according to their word classes. In his discussion of the first colon (Δεῦτ' ἐν χορὸν Ὀλύμπιοι), he calls the word ἐν a σύνδεσμος.[233] When discussing the second colon (ἐπί τε κλυτὰν πέμπετε χάριν θεοί), he remarks the following:[234]

> ἐν δὲ τῇ κατὰ μέρος συνθέσει τοῦ κώλου τοῖς μὲν ἐπί τε συνδέσμοις ἀφ' ὧν ἄρχεται τὸ κῶλον, εἴτε ἄρα πρόθεσιν αὐτῶν δεῖ τὸ ἡγούμενον καλεῖν, τὸ προσηγορικὸν ἐπικείμενον μόριον τὸ κλυτὰν ἀντίτυπον πεποίηκε καὶ τραχεῖαν τὴν σύνθεσιν.
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> 'In the detailed arrangement of the clause, the placing of the appellative word κλυτάν after the connectives ἐπί τε, with which the clause opens (or perhaps the first of these should be called a preposition) has made the composition dissonant and harsh.'

As Schenkeveld remarks, according to a system with nine parts of speech, both ἐν and ἐπί should be classified as προθέσεις, not as σύνδεσμοι. Dionysius himself says that ἐπί might be called a πρόθεσις, but he does not say that with regard to ἐν. Possibly, the juxtaposition of ἐπί τε has reminded Dionysius that he could give a more precise classification, since some people would not regard these words as belonging to the same word classes. In any case, Dionysius' mention of two possible classifications for ἐπί (σύνδεσμος or πρόθεσις) could be explained in two ways. The first possibility is that Dionysius' remark points to the difficulty of the *merismos* procedure. In that case, Dionysius' idea would be that one could argue for two different classifications of the word ἐπί, which, for different reasons, could be assigned to either the prepositions or the conjunctions. We should not exclude this possibility, but the problem is that we do not know of any grammatical debate on the classification of ἐπί within a word class system of eight or nine parts of speech. The second possibility has been suggested by Schenkeveld:

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[231] See *Comp.* 6.30,2 (κατ-); *Comp.* 22.102,16 (τε); *Comp.* 25.129,5 (ἄρα).
[232] *Comp.* 22.102,15–17.
[233] *Comp.* 22.101,7–21.
[234] *Comp.* 22.102,15–17.

he argues that the alternative classifications offered by Dionysius are related to the existence of different word class systems: the classification of ἐπί as a σύνδεσμος 'is a sure sign of a system with less than nine (or eight) parts.'[235] In other words: in a system with five or six parts of speech, the σύνδεσμος would also have covered those words that in a system of eight or nine parts would have been identified as prepositions.

In order to support Schenkeveld's interpretation, I would like to point to a passage from Apollonius Dyscolus' Περὶ συνδέσμων.[236] According to Apollonius, Posidonius (probably the Stoic philosopher who lived ca. 135–50 BC) had objected to those people who thought that σύνδεσμοι do not indicate (δηλοῦσι) anything but merely connect the phrase (τὴν φράσιν συνδέουσι).[237] Posidonius thought that σύνδεσμοι did have a meaning of their own, and to prove this he pointed out that ἐπιδοῦναι ('to give besides') differed from ἀποδοῦναι ('to give back') and ἀπαιτεῖν ('to demand back') from προσαιτεῖν ('to beg'). Thus, he showed that ἐπί, ἀπό and πρός did in fact 'indicate' something, and he did so 'being confident that the preposition and the conjunction are one part of speech' (πιστούμενος ὅτι ἓν μέρος λόγου ἥ τε πρόθεσις καὶ ὁ σύνδεσμος). Apollonius Dyscolus, however, did not agree that πρόθεσις and σύνδεσμος were one word class, and therefore he had to find another way of proving that σύνδεσμοι have meaning.[238] Posidonius' view seems to correspond to that of the Stoics, which Apollonius reports elsewhere: 'the Stoics also called prepositions "prepositive conjunctions" (προθετικοὺς συνδέσμους), considering it better to name this class from its distinctive position than from its force, as was done for the conditional (συναπτικοὶ) and copulative (συμπλεκτικοὶ) conjunctions, and all the other types.'[239] It seems clear, then, that for Posidonius, as

[235] Schenkeveld (1983) 73–74. See also Aujac (1981) 154 n. 2.

[236] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Conj.*, *G.G.* II 1, 214,4–20 = Posidonius fr. 45 Edelstein-Kidd. Cf. Dalimier (2001) 236–240.

[237] The view that conjunctions do not have a meaning goes back to Aristotle's definition in *Po.* 1456b38: see Sluiter (1997b) and my section 4.3.2. See also Kidd (1988) 199–204 (the commentary ad Posidonius fr. 45).

[238] See Apollonius Dyscolus, *Conj.*, *G.G.* II 1, 214,17–215,13; cf. Dalimier (2001) 240–243.

[239] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* IV.5: ἔνθεν γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς προθετικοὺς ἐκάλουν συνδέσμους τὰς προθέσεις, ἄμεινον ἡγησάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξαιρέτου συντάξεως τὴν ὀνομασίαν θέσθαι ἤπερ ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως, καθάπερ οἵ τε συναπτικοὶ καὶ συμπλεκτικοὶ καὶ οἱ ὑπόλοιποι.

for the other Stoics, the σύνδεσμος covered both the conjunctions and the prepositions that were distinguished by grammarians like Apollonius Dyscolus.

On these grounds, we may conclude that Dionysius' classifications of ἐν and ἐπί as σύνδεσμοι belong to a system with less than eight (or nine) parts of speech.[240] His remark that ἐπί could be classified as either a σύνδεσμος or a πρόθεσις indicates that he does not make a rigid choice for the use of a system of nine parts of speech: instead, he implies that the classification of ἐπί depends on the word class system that one uses. Taking into account the Posidonius fragment, we may assume that Dionysius is thinking here of the classification that the Stoics would make. In that case, he is implicitly referring to the Stoic system that consisted of five (or six) parts of speech, namely ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ἄρθρον, ῥῆμα, (μεσότης) and σύνδεσμος.

3.6.5. *ἐπίρρημα*

Dionysius' use of the term ἐπίρρημα is of high importance.[241] As I have pointed out above, Dionysius' works and the fragments of Tryphon are the earliest extant texts in which the word ἐπίρρημα occurs (see sections 3.2 and 3.3.2).[242] It is interesting that the grammarian Philoxenus (who came from Alexandria to Rome in the first half of the first century BC) still uses the term μεσότης for the adverb: this is the term that the Stoics used, and we also find it in the fragments of Aristarchus.[243] Given the fact that Tryphon was a contemporary and fellow citizen of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, we may regard Dionysius' use of the term ἐπίρρημα as

[240] In *Comp.* 2.7,10, Dionysius states that the prepositions were separated from the conjunctions (τὰς προθέσεις ἀπὸ τῶν συνδέσμων). This analysis seems to confirm the view that his classification of ἐν and ἐπί represents the use of an older system; these words would be σύνδεσμοι before they were treated as a separate word class (προθέσεις). Dionysius' classification of participles as verbs and his classification of a pronoun as a 'deictic' article, however, cannot be related to his history of the word class theory: there, the participles are said to be separated from the appellatives (not from the verbs) and the pronouns from the nouns (not from the articles) (see above).

[241] The term ἐπίρρημα occurs seven times in Dionysius' works: *Dem.* 26.185,18–19; *Dem.* 26.185,19; *Comp.* 2.7,9; *Comp.* 5.24,16; *Comp.* 5.24,19–20; *Comp.* 5.25,4; *Comp.* 5.25,11.

[242] See Tryphon, fr. 65 Von Velsen (= Apollonius Dyscolus, *Adv.*, *G.G.* II 1, 146,15–23).

[243] Philoxenus, fr. 578 Theodoridis: here, Philoxenus classifies the word ἐτῶς as a μεσότης. See Matthaios (1999) 559–560. On Philoxenus and his works, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there.

an important sign that his works reflect the most recent developments in grammatical theory.[244] He classifies seven words as adverbs.[245]

Schenkeveld has rightly drawn attention to the three types of adverbs that Dionysius mentions in *Comp.* 5.24,18–19: ἐπιρρήματα τρόπου (adverbs of manner), τόπου (place), and χρόνου (time) (see section 5.3.4). The ἐπιρρήματα τρόπου are usually called ἐπιρρήματα ποιότητος, but Schenkeveld's suggestion that the ἐπιρρήματα τρόπου are 'unique' in ancient theory was not correct: Sluiter refers to some later texts, in which the term is used as well.[246] In the examples to which Dionysius refers, ἐξοπίσω and ἑτέρωσε are probably adverbs of place, σήμερον is an adverb of time, while ἐπιστροφάδην and βοτρυδόν must be adverbs of manner.[247] It is interesting to notice that the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus mentions βοτρυδόν among his examples of the adverbs that end on -δον, which are always adverbs of manner (ποιότητος).[248]

3.6.6. *Does Dionysius use a system of nine word classes?*

In his history of the theory of the parts of speech, Dionysius of Halicarnassus mentions systems of three (Aristotle and Theodectes), four (Stoics), five (later Stoics), six, and nine μόρια λόγου: although he adds that other people made more distinctions, the system with nine μόρια is the last one he explicitly mentions (see section 4.2.1).[249] Does this mean that Dionysius himself also used the system of nine word classes? In view of the fact that Dionysius mentions each of the nine word classes not only in the *Comp.* 2 but also in other chapters of *On Composition* and in the other three treatises where grammatical theories are used (*Dem.*, *Thuc.* and *Amm.* II), Schenkeveld states that '(…) we may safely ascribe

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[244] The term ἐπίρρημα also occurs in a fragment of Tyrannion in Herodian, but the latter grammarian may be using his own terminology while presenting the views of Tyrannion: see Matthaios (1999) 559–560.

[245] The list of Schenkeveld (1983) 77 is not complete, for it does not include the words ἱκανῶς and εὐμενῶς (*Dem.* 26.185,18–19). The remaining 'adverbs' are ἐπιστροφάδην, ἐξοπίσω, ἑτέρωσε, βοτρυδόν and σήμερον (*Comp.* 5.24,15–25,11).

[246] Schenkeveld (1983) 81 and (1994) 279; these adverbs are also mentioned in Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 281,11f.; 60,3ff.; 433,21; for more places, see Sluiter (1990) 132 n. 358.

[247] Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 81.

[248] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Adv.*, *G.G.* II 1, 196,13. See also *Adv.*, *G.G.* II 1, 146,4; 197,20; 205,4.

[249] *Comp.* 2.7,9–13.

to DH the use of the system of nine word classes.'[250] The system of nine word classes seems to have been a common alternative to the system of eight μέρη λόγου. The nine-part system differs from the system that we find in the *Technê* in that the appellative noun (προσηγορία) is not treated as a subdivision of the ὄνομα, but listed as a separate part of speech.[251] As I have pointed out above (section 3.2), this separation of proper and appellative noun was taken over from the Stoics, for whom the distinction was based on the ontological difference between individual and common quality.[252] The adoption of this originally Stoic element in the grammatical word class theory resulted in a system with the following μέρη λόγου: ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ῥῆμα, μετοχή, ἄρθρον, ἀντονομασία, πρόθεσις, ἐπίρρημα and σύνδεσμος. We know two grammatical papyri that adopt this system.[253] Schenkeveld argues that Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses this same system with nine word classes.[254]

There are, however, some passages in Dionysius' works that do not seem to support the conclusion that Dionysius used the system of nine word classes: in these passages, Dionysius appears to classify certain words differently from what a system of nine parts of speech would have required. First, we have seen that ὄνομα and ῥῆμα are in some cases used as general terms covering two word classes: ὄνομα covers both ὄνομα and προσηγορικόν, while ῥῆμα covers both ῥῆμα and μετοχή. Second, we have seen that Dionysius' classification of ἐν and ἐπί as σύνδεσμοι points to the use of a system with fewer word classes. According to Dionysius, the prepositions are either covered by the term σύνδεσμος or they are separately classified as προθέσεις. A similar explanation is possible in the case of his classification of αὐτοῦ as a 'deictic article': pronouns are either covered by the general term ἄρθρον or they are separately classified as ἀντονομασίαι. In other words, although Dionysius knows the names of nine word classes, in many cases he gives clas-

[250] Schenkeveld (1983) 72. See also Morgan (1998) 154. Schenkeveld (1983) 73 remarks that, although the distinction between ὄνομα and προσηγορία is originally Stoic, 'it would be dangerous (…) to call the nine-parts system typically Stoic.' In fact this would not only be dangerous, but even wrong: the system with nine parts of speech seems to have been quite common among grammarians; the Stoics however distinguished only five μέρη λόγου (in later times six, including the μεσότης); these parts of speech were essentially different from the grammatical 'word classes'.

[251] Cf. Quintilian *Inst. orat.* 1.4.20 (see section 4.2.3).

[252] *FDS* 536 = Diogenes Laertius VII.58.

[253] P. Yale I 25 (nr. 1 Wouters; first century AD) and P. Heid. I 198 (nr. 12 Wouters; third century AD).

[254] See also Matthaios (2001) n. 115.

sifications that do not fit into the most elaborate system that is available to him. How can we explain this?

According to Schenkeveld, Dionysius normally uses a system of nine parts of speech, but in some instances 'uses a system of less than nine (or eight) parts and mixes it with the full-blown one'.[255] I would like to suggest a slightly different interpretation. In my view, it would be more correct to avoid ascribing any 'system' of word classes to Dionysius in the first place. The fact that his classifications in some instances fit into a system of nine and in other instances into a system of five or six word classes (without ἀντωνυμία and πρόθεσις) does not mean that he is actually using two different grammatical systems. Dionysius is not a grammarian, and he only uses grammatical theories inasmuch as they can help him to clarify his own rhetorical ideas. His rhetorical instructions do not demand that he adopt a specific grammatical 'system' of word classes. Therefore, instead of assuming that Dionysius uses a system of nine parts of speech, which he sometimes mixes up with a system of fewer μέρη λόγου, it would be better to accept that Dionysius is not so much interested in the exact number of word classes: he is not concerned with grammatical systems, but with the composition of texts. This is especially clear in his discussions of specific texts. A good example is his analysis of the arrangement of a Pindaric poem in *Comp.* 22 (see section 3.6.4 above). Dionysius analyses the austere beauty of the σύνθεσις of the verses, which are characterised by rough sounds and dissonant combinations. In his discussion, he points to 'the connectives ἐπί and τε', and immediately adds 'or perhaps the first of these should be called a preposition'.[256] Of course, the classification of ἐπί, or of any other word, for that matter, does not have any effect on his analysis of the euphonic aspects of the composition of the Pindaric dithyramb; therefore, Dionysius leaves it to the reader to decide what he wants to call the specific parts of speech.

In fact, Dionysius himself makes it explicitly clear that the exact number of μόρια λόγου is not important for his purpose, and that he does not support any grammatical 'system' at all. At the end of his discussion of the different word class systems that have been adopted by earlier thinkers (consisting of three, four, five, six, nine, or more μόρια λόγου), Dionysius concludes the following:[257]

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[255] Schenkeveld (1983) 73.
[256] *Comp.* 22.102,15–17.
[257] *Comp.* 2.7,13–16.

> ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐ μικρὸς ἂν εἴη λόγος. πλὴν ἥ γε τῶν πρώτων εἴτε τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων εἴθ' ὅσων δή ποτε ὄντων μερῶν πλοκὴ καὶ παράθεσις τὰ λεγόμενα ποιεῖ κῶλα, (…)
>
> 'The subject could be discussed at considerable length, but it is enough to say that the combination or juxtaposition of these primary parts, whether there be three, four or any number of them, forms what are called clauses (…).'

Unlike Quintilian, who gives a similar history of the word class theory (see section 4.2.3), Dionysius does not choose any of the systems that he mentions. He leaves the question open, 'whether there be three, four or any number of them'. In *Dem.* 48, he adopts the same attitude: 'The primary parts of speech, which some call the elements, whether they be three, as Theodectes and Aristotle believe—nouns, verbs and conjunctions—or four, as Zeno and the Stoic school say, or more, are always accompanied by two phenomena of equal importance, tone and time.'[258] Again, Dionysius does not select any of the systems known to him, but makes clear that the number of τὰ πρῶτα μόρια τῆς λέξεως is not relevant to his rhetorical investigations.[259] Our conclusion should be that Dionysius does not use a system of nine word classes, nor does he mix different systems of word classes. This teacher of rhetoric makes use of the grammatical word classes when he needs them, but he does not select any of the systems that we find in grammatical treatises. We can also put this in a more general way: as we have seen in section 1.6, Dionysius incorporates many ideas from different disciplines, but he does not want to deal with the too technical details of metrical, grammatical or philosophical problems. Several times, Dionysius emphasises that, although he makes use of theories from grammar, music, metrics, and philosophy, the technical details of these studies are not relevant for his investigations. These disciplines are only important for him as far as they support his rhetorical instructions.[260] For modern scholars,

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[258] *Dem.* 48.232,20–233,2: τοῖς πρώτοις μορίοις τῆς λέξεως, ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα ὑπό τινων καλεῖται, εἴτε τρία ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὡς Θεοδέκτῃ τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ, ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα καὶ σύνδεσμοι, εἴτε τέτταρα, ὡς τοῖς περὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Στωικόν, εἴτε πλείω, δύο ταῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ μέλος καὶ χρόνος ἴσα.

[259] A similar lack of interest in the exact terminology of the word classes seems to be expressed in *Comp.* 17.68,13–14: πᾶν ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα καὶ ἄλλο μόριον λέξεως, ὅ τι μὴ μονοσύλλαβόν ἐστιν, ἐν ῥυθμῷ τινι λέγεται. 'Every noun and verb, and every other part of speech, if it does not consist of a single syllable only, is spoken in some sort of rhythm.'

[260] See *Comp.* 14.50,1–11; *Comp.* 15.59,2–14; *Comp.* 18.73,10–13.

this implies that they should not interpret Dionysius as if he were a grammarian, or, for that matter, a philosopher.[261]

3.7. *The* accidentia *of the parts of speech: συμβεβηκότα versus παρεπόμενα*

An important part of the ancient grammatical doctrine of the parts of speech was the theory of the *accidentia*: the categories that are applicable to each word class. In Greek technical grammar, these *accidentia* are called παρεπόμενα. They traditionally include both inflectional and derivational categories.[262] The *Technê Grammatikê* lists five παρεπόμενα for the noun (γένη, εἴδη, σχήματα, ἀριθμοί and πτώσεις) eight for the verb (ἐγκλίσεις, διαθέσεις, εἴδη, σχήματα, ἀριθμοί, πρόσωπα, χρόνοι and συζυγίαι) and also mentions the *accidentia* of the participle, article and pronoun.[263] Dionysius of Halicarnassus refers to the *accidentia* at several passages in his rhetorical works. In this section, I will discuss Dionysius' technical terminology for the *accidentia* and some related terms. In the next section (3.8), I will deal with the specific categories that he distinguishes.

Apart from occasional references to particular *accidentia*, there are four passages (*Amm.* II 6–12, *Comp.* 6, *Comp.* 25, *Dem.* 52) where Dionysius mentions a number of *accidentia*.[264] In the analysis of Thucydides' style in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* (*Amm.* II 6–12; see section 4.4.2), Dionysius points out that the historian uses for example active instead of passive verb forms, singular instead of plural nouns, masculine instead of feminine nouns, a present instead of a future tense, etc. In

[261] Dionysius' views on the referents of the μόρια λόγου (such as οὐσία, συμβεβηκός, τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον; see *Comp.* 5.23,13–27,6) will be analysed in the discussion of Dionysius' views on natural word order (section 5.3.3), since we can only interpret these views by paying close attention to their context. The same is true for Dionysius' remarks on σῶμα, πρᾶγμα and πρόσωπον (which are designated by words), and his use of the terms σημαῖνον (that which signifies) and σημαινόμενον (that which is signified): these subjects will be discussed in section 4.4.2. For σῶμα, πρᾶγμα and πρόσωπον, see *Comp.* 12.46,19–47,2; *Dem.* 40.215,14–15; *Amm.* II 14.433,6–434,12. For σημαῖνον and σημαινόμενον, see esp. *Amm.* II 13.432,14–433,5 (cf. sections 2.3 and 4.4.2).

[262] Cf. Robins (1997[4]) 43–46.

[263] [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 24,6–7 and 46,5–47,2: the *accidentia* of the noun are gender, type, form, number and case. The *accidentia* of the verb are mood, voice, type, form, number, person, tense and conjugation.

[264] *Amm.* II 6.427,7–12.432,13; *Comp.* 6.28,20–29,14; *Comp.* 25.134,23–135,6; *Dem.* 52.242,15–24.

his discussion of the three ἔργα of composition (*Comp.* 6; see section 4.3.1), Dionysius says that the second activity is the selection of the correct grammatical form of nouns, verbs and other parts of speech: one should select the number, case and gender of nouns, and the voice, mood and tense of verbs, in order to attain the most effective composition. Finally, there are two passages (*Comp.* 25; *Dem.* 52) where Dionysius describes how children learn to read (see section 3.3.3). These two texts will be the starting point for my discussion of the *accidentia* (the other texts where the *accidentia* are treated are discussed in sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.2). In *Dem.* 52, Dionysius gives the following information:[265]

> ταύτην γὰρ ὅταν ἐκμάθωμεν, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν στοιχείων τῆς φωνῆς ἀναλαμβάνομεν, ἃ καλεῖται γράμματα. ἔπειτα ⟨τοὺς⟩ τύπους τε αὐτῶν καὶ δυνάμεις. ὅταν δὲ ταῦτα μάθωμεν, τότε τὰς συλλαβὰς αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ περὶ ταύτας πάθη. κρατήσαντες δὲ τούτων τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια, ὀνόματα λέγω καὶ ῥήματα καὶ συνδέσμους, καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τούτοις, συστολάς, ἐκτάσεις, ὀξύτητας, βαρύτητας, γένη, πτώσεις, ἀριθμούς, ἐγκλίσεις, τὰ ἄλλα παραπλήσια τούτοις μυρία ὄντα.
>
> 'When we learn this [i.e. grammar (γραμματική)] properly, we begin by learning by heart the names of the elements of sound, which we call letters. Then we learn their shapes and values. When we have discovered this, then we learn how they combine to form syllables, and their properties. Having mastered this, we learn about the parts of speech, I mean nouns, verbs and conjunctions, and their *accidentia*: shortenings, lengthenings, high pitches, low pitches, genders, cases, numbers, moods, and countless other related things.'

The corresponding passage (*Comp.* 25) is worded more briefly:[266]

> τὰ γράμματα ὅταν παιδευώμεθα, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν ἐκμανθάνομεν, ἔπειτα τοὺς τύπους καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, εἶθ' οὕτω τὰς συλλαβὰς καὶ τὰ ἐν ταύταις πάθη, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη τὰς λέξεις καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐταῖς, ἐκτάσεις τε λέγω καὶ συστολὰς καὶ προσῳδίας καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις.
>
> 'When we are taught to read ("letters"), first we learn by heart the names of the letters, then their shapes and their values, then, in the same way, the syllables and their properties, and finally the words and the *accidentia* that apply to them, by which I mean lengthenings and shortenings and variations in pitch and similar functions.'

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[265] *Dem.* 52.242,15–24.
[266] *Comp.* 25.134,23–135,6.

Despite some differences, the passages in *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25 are quite similar, and they serve the same purpose in their context.[267] In both passages Dionysius draws a comparison between rhetoric and grammar, in order to prove that slow and gradual learning finally leads to success: having completed a process of long and laborious learning one will in the end succeed in mastering a technique, which one can then apply with great ease. Part of the process is that one learns the parts of speech and their *accidentia.* For these categories of the parts of speech Dionysius does not use the term παρεπόμενα.[268] Dionysius' term for *accidentia* is συμβεβηκότα, which he uses in both *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25 (it does not occur in *Comp.* 6 and *Amm.* II). There is one other passage where τὰ συμβεβηκότα refer to the *accidentia*: earlier in *Comp.* 25, Dionysius quotes fictitious opponents who do not believe that Demosthenes composed poetic prose (see section 6.3) by 'keeping a careful watch on the length and quantities of his syllables, and taking great trouble over the cases of nouns, the moods of verbs and all the *accidentia* of the parts of speech' (παραφυλάττων τὰ μήκη καὶ τοὺς χρόνους καὶ τὰς πτώσεις τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τὰς ἐγκλίσεις τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ πάντα τὰ συμβεβηκότα τοῖς μορίοις τοῦ λόγου).[269] The term συμβεβηκότα does not only refer to the *accidentia* that apply to the various parts of speech: Dionysius also employs the words συμβεβηκότα and συμβέβηκε(ν) when discussing properties or characteristics of style, letters, and the human body.[270]

Dionysius does not use the verb παρέπεσθαι in discussions of the *accidentia*, but we do find the related words ἀκολουθεῖν and παρακολουθεῖν in his works. In *Dem.* 48, which seems to be influenced by musical theory, Dionysius states that 'two phenomena of equal importance, namely

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[267] *Dem.* 52 mentions τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια, while *Comp.* 25 has τὰς λέξεις. Further, the ὀξύτητας and βαρύτητας of *Dem.* 52 are summarised in the προσῳδίας of *Comp.* 25. Finally, *Comp.* 25 does not mention the genders, cases, numbers and moods that occur in *Dem.* 52.

[268] Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 82. Τὰ παρεπόμενα in *Lys.* 19.31,6 refers to the circumstances of actions.

[269] *Comp.* 25.131,18–132,8. I think that the only specific *accidentia* of the parts of speech mentioned here are the cases of nouns and the moods of verbs: παραφυλάττων τὰ μήκη καὶ τοὺς χρόνους seems to be one unit, and the 'lengths' (μήκη) and 'quantities' (χρόνοι) of syllables do not belong to the *accidentia* of the parts of speech.

[270] Properties of a certain style: *Thuc.* 3.328,10; *Thuc.* 25.364,14; *Amm.* II 1.421,17; properties of letters: *Comp.* 14.50,10; properties of the human body: *Dem.* 50.237,3. In *Thuc.* 22.358,17, Dionysius says that figures (σχήματα) 'apply' (συμβέβηκε) to both simple words and composite expressions.

tone (μέλος) and time (χρόνος), always accompany (ἀκολουθεῖ) the primary parts of speech, whether there be three, four or more of them.'[271] In *Comp.* 6, Dionysius uses the word παρακολουθεῖν when referring to the *accidentia* that 'apply' to the verb.[272] Like παρέπεσθαι, the term (παρ)ακολουθεῖν seems to have its origin in Aristotelian philosophy.[273] Both terms indicate that certain attributes 'closely follow' something to which they belong. Apollonius Dyscolus also uses παρακολουθεῖν for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech.[274]

Apart from συμβεβηκότα and (παρ)ακολουθεῖν, one more technical term should be mentioned. In *Comp.* 6, Dionysius tells us that the second activity of composition is to decide how every part of speech should be 'formed' (σχηματισθέν). The verb σχηματίζω is a technical grammatical term, which refers to the morphological formation of words.[275] Dionysius uses the term in that specific sense, but also in a wider (syntactical and rhetorical) sense with regard to word order, figures of

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[271] *Dem.* 48.232,20–233,2: τοῖς πρώτοις μορίοις τῆς λέξεως, ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα ὑπό τινων καλεῖται, εἴτε τρία ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὡς Θεοδέκτῃ τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ, ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα καὶ σύνδεσμοι, εἴτε τέτταρα, ὡς τοῖς περὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Στωικόν, εἴτε πλείω, δύο ταῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ μέλος καὶ χρόνος ἴσα. 'The primary parts of speech, which some call elements, whether they be three, as Theodectes and Aristotle believe—"nouns", "verbs" and "conjunctions"—or four, as Zeno and the Stoic school say, or more, are always accompanied by two phenomena of equal importance, tone and time.' This is a shorter version of Dionysius' history of the theory of the parts of speech in *Comp.* 2.6,17–7,21: see section 4.2.1. Dionysius mentions Aristoxenus at *Dem.* 48.233,8–9 (cf. section 1.5).

[272] *Comp.* 6.29,11–12: εἴ τινα τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἄλλα παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκε. See section 4.3.1. Dionysius uses παρακολουθεῖν in various other contexts. It can e.g. refer to the qualities 'belonging' to the three styles (*Dem.* 34.205,3) and to propriety (τὸ πρέπον) 'accompanying' the three other means of composition (*Dem.* 47.232,17).

[273] See Aristotle, *Rh.* 1399a11ff. on the τόπος ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος. Cf. Matthaios (1999) 206.

[274] See Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 4,3. Aristarchus uses the term παρακολουθεῖν in a grammatical context (that is, if Apollonius preserves Aristarchus' phrasing) when he denies the existence of plural forms of the 'composite' third person reflexive pronouns (i.e. ἑαυτῶν, ἑαυτοῖς) for the reason that the pronouns of the first and second person do not have such forms either: Apollonius, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 71,27–29 (= Aristarchus fr. 125a, 8–9 Matthaios): τῶν πρώτων καὶ δευτέρων οὐκ ὄντων ἐν συνθέσει πληθυντικῇ, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῖς τρίτοις παρηκολούθει ταὐτόν. 'Since the first and second persons do not exist in the plural composite, the same thing necessarily applies also to the third persons.' Cf. Ax (1982) 104–105 and Matthaios (1999) 206–207.

[275] For σχηματίζειν as the morphological forming of words, see also *Thuc.* 37.389,15–16 (κατὰ τὴν γενικὴν ἐσχηματισμένον πτῶσιν), *Thuc.* 37.389,19–21 (τῷ πληθυντικῷ καὶ οὐδετέρῳ ⟨καὶ⟩ κατὰ τὴν αἰτιατικὴν ἐσχηματισμένῳ πτῶσιν) and *Amm.* II 5.426,15–16 (τὰ ῥηματικὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως ὀνοματικῶς σχηματίζει).

speech and figures of thought.[276] Both σχῆμα and σχηματισμός can refer to the form of a word and to a construction.[277] In the specific sense of word formation, σχηματίζειν and the corresponding noun σχηματισμός are also found in the fragments of Aristarchus and Tryphon, in the grammatical papyri and in Apollonius Dyscolus.[278]

Dionysius' use of the term συμβεβηκότα provides important evidence for the history of the theory of the *accidentia*. In 1922, Karl Barwick argued that συμβεβηκότα was the term that the Stoics used for the *accidentia* that applied to their μέρη λόγου, and his most important piece of evidence was Dionysius' use of this term in *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25 (which I have quoted above).[279] Barwick thought that Dionysius follows a Stoic source in these two passages, because in the same texts he also distinguishes between the ὄνομα, τύπος and δύναμις of letters, a distinction that belongs, according to Barwick, to Stoic theory.[280] Although I agree that the Stoics may have used the term συμβεβηκότα for the *accidentia* of their parts of speech, I do not agree with Barwick's argument that Dionysius' reference to the distinction between name, type and value of letters in *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25 indicates that he used a Stoic source for these chapters; nor do I think that συμβεβηκότα was used for the *accidentia* by Stoics only. I have three objections to this analysis. First, we have already seen that Dionysius also uses συμβεβηκότα in another passage (*Comp.* 25.131,18–132,8), where we do not find the same remarks on the name, type and value of letters, or any other Stoic theory. Second, Stoic terminology in the two passages does not necessarily point to the use of a Stoic source, for we know that many grammarians of the second and first century BC were influenced by Stoic ideas. Therefore, passages in which Stoic distinctions are mentioned should not automatically be traced back to Stoic sources. This brings us to

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[276] See e.g. *Thuc.* 23.359,27 (σχηματίζειν τὰς λέξεις ⟨καὶ⟩ τὰς νοήσεις); *Amm.* II 7.427,18 (σχηματίζει τὸν λόγον); *Amm.* II 8.428,11 (σχηματίζει τὸν τρόπον); *Amm.* II 11.430,19–20 (σχηματιζόντες τὴν φράσιν).

[277] Cf. Blass *DAB* I (1979[3] [1868]) 211–212.

[278] For Aristarchus' use of the term, see Matthaios (1999) 204–205 and 257–258; for Tryphon, see fr. 56 Von Velsen; for the papyri, see P. Yale I 25 (nr. 1 Wouters), P. Heid. I 197 (nr. 6 Wouters) and P. Lit. Lond. 182 (nr. 2 Wouters); for Apollonius' use of the term, see Schneider, *G.G.* II 3, 268 (*index vocabulorum*).

[279] Barwick (1922) 107–108. See also Barwick (1957) 47–48.

[280] Barwick (1922) 107–108: '[U]nd daß Dionys. v. Hal. an den Stellen, wo er von den συμβεβηκότα spricht, einer stoischen Quelle folgt, geht daraus hervor, daß er ebendaselbst an den γράμματα dreierlei unterscheidet, ὄνομα, τύπος und δύναμις: eine Lehre, die wir bereits oben als stoisch kennen gelernt haben.'

the third and most important objection against Barwick's analysis. As I have argued in section 3.3.3, the relevant passages from *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25 describe the contemporary practice of grammatical education. If we take into account the purpose of Dionysius' argument in these passages, we will easily see that it is not very probable that in this context Dionysius refers to specific Stoic theories. Dionysius intends to point out that his readers know very well that slow and gradual learning in grammatical education finally leads to good results. Likewise, Dionysius argues, rhetorical training demands much exercise and patience, but in the end orators are able to compose texts with great ease. Of course, this comparison between grammar and rhetoric would not be very convincing when it did not refer to the contemporary practice in grammar schools, for it depends on the audience's knowledge of grammatical teaching. In Dionysius' words, it is 'something that we all know' (ὃ γὰρ ἅπαντες ἴσμεν).[281] For these reasons, I do not agree with Barwick that Dionysius directly follows Stoic sources in *Dem.* 52 and *Comp.* 25.

How can we then reconstruct the early history of the theory of the *accidentia*? Pinborg has rightly argued that the general concept of accidence is of Aristotelian origin.[282] Scholars disagree, however, on various problems concerning the ancient theory of grammatical *accidentia*. The most important questions are the following. (1) Did the Stoics know a theory of *accidentia*? And if so, did they use the term συμβεβηκότα or παρεπόμενα? (2) Which term did the early philologists and technical grammarians use? I will briefly consider these questions, paying special attention to the information that Dionysius of Halicarnassus offers.

(1) Pinborg argues that the Aristotelian concept of accident is inconsistent with Stoic epistemology.[283] Frede, on the other hand, thinks that the accidents of the parts of speech were treated in Stoic grammar, and that the use of the concept of 'accident' in grammar may have been of Stoic origin.[284] In my view, our knowledge of Stoic grammar does not support Pinborg's view that the Stoics did not know 'the purely Aristotelian concept of accident'.[285] The word συμβεβηκότα occurs three

[281] *Comp.* 25.134,21–22.

[282] Pinborg (1975) 102. For the Aristotelian concept of accidence and its connection to the grammatical *accidentia*, see Ildefonse (1997) 81–86.

[283] Pinborg (1975) 102.

[284] Frede (1987a) 332.

[285] Pinborg (1975) 111 thinks that the grammatical *accidentia* are the result of direct Peripatetic influence on grammar. See also Matthaios (1999) 207.

times in the Stoic fragments: the concept of 'accidents' (συμβεβηκότα) is used to describe predicates (*FDS* 695), corporal accidents such as form and sweetness (*FDS* 746, compare *Dem.* 50.237,3); the consequence of a cause is also an 'accident' (*FDS* 762).[286] I would like to add that in *Comp.* 5, Dionysius distinguishes between 'substance' and 'accident' in a passage that is almost certainly based on Stoic theories (see section 5.3.3).[287] There, τὰ συμβεβηκότα do not refer to the *accidentia* of the parts of speech, but to the predicates that are expressed by verbs: Dionysius tells us that nouns (ὀνόματα) indicate the substance (οὐσία), while verbs (ῥήματα) indicate the accident (τὸ συμβεβηκός).[288] If the passage on natural word order is indeed inspired by Stoic views (as I will argue in section 5.3), this could be an important sign that the Stoics knew the concept of accidence.

Schenkeveld has suggested that the Stoics may have used the term παρεπόμενα for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech.[289] However, there is no evidence for the use of παρεπόμενα by the Stoics: this term is mentioned nowhere in the Stoic fragments. Elsewhere, Schenkeveld draws attention to the fact that Dionysius does not use the term συμβεβηκότα in *Comp.* 5–6: 'Now the background of *Comp.* 5–6 seems quite Stoic, so take τὰ συμβεβηκότα, which does not occur here, as a distinctly Stoic term is uncalled for.'[290] I agree that at least *Comp.* 5 has a Stoic background (see section 5.3), but I object to the *argumentum e silentio* that Schenkeveld uses: the omission of the term συμβεβηκότα in *Comp.* 6

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[286] *FDS* 695 (κατηγορήματα καὶ συμβεβηκότα) = *SVF* II.182. *FDS* 746 (bodily *accidentia* such as form [σχῆμα] and sweetness [γλυκύτης]) = *SVF* II.381. *FDS* 762 (αἴτιον and συμβεβηκός) = *SVF* I.89.

[287] *Comp.* 5.23,17–18.

[288] Ildefonse (1997) 290 relates Dionysius' remark on the priority of οὐσία over συμβεβηκός to the Aristotelian concept of accident. For the pair οὐσία and συμβεβηκός this is in itself possible, but the rest of *Comp.* 5 shows that Dionysius' experiment is based on Stoic ideas. My view is that *Comp.* can only be explained on the basis of the Stoic categories: otherwise, one cannot understand why common nouns should be placed before proper nouns and pronouns before common nouns. See De Jonge (2001) and chapter 5 of this study.

[289] Schenkeveld (1999) 192: 'This Latin term [*accidentia*] is a translation of συμβεβηκότα and in texts on the Stoic theory of causes and effects this word means necessary or constant consequence. But it is not found in grammatical texts as a technical term for constant attributes of verb and noun. The traditional Greek name is παρεπόμενα, a word known from Aristotelian works in the sense of necessary consequence, and it may well be that Stoics, too, used this term.' Luhtala (2000) 100 has defended Barwick's view that the Stoics used the philosophical notion of συμβεβηκότα for the grammatical accidents.

[290] Schenkeveld (1983) 85.

cannot be used as an argument for the view that the Stoics did not use that term. Moreover, συμβεβηκός and συμβεβηκότα do in fact occur as opposed to οὐσία in *Comp.* 5, as I have already mentioned. To conclude, I believe that the Stoics knew the concept of *accident* and that they used the term συμβεβηκότα for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech.

(2) The second problem concerns the terminology for *accidentia* in the early grammatical texts. Scholars used to think that the term συμβεβηκότα was chronologically prior to the term παρεπόμενα: the latter term is only found in grammatical texts from the second century AD onwards (Apollonius Dyscolus, grammatical papyri, and the *Technê Grammatikê*).[291] Recently, however, both Ax and Matthaios have questioned the chronological priority of συμβεβηκότα.[292] Ax has suggested that Apollonius Dyscolus literally quotes Aristarchus when saying that, according to the latter, the word ἄνεῳ is an adverb, because its lack of flection and lack of congruence are properties 'that did not apply (παρείπετο) to nouns'.[293] Matthaios has pointed out that Aristarchus uses the term ἐκ παρεπομένου 'in einem grammatisch-technischen Kontext', namely when reasoning for the meaning of a word 'aufgrund dessen, was aus der Bedeutung des Wortes folge' (ἐκ παρεπομένου).[294] I think that we should be very careful when using these two fragments as evidence, for the following reasons. Concerning Ax' suggestion, it should be emphasised that we do not know how closely Apollonius Dyscolus follows the words of Aristarchus: the word παρείπετο may very well be Apollonius' own phrasing, and not Aristarchus'. Concerning Matthaios' reference to Aristarchus' expression ἐκ παρεπομένου, it should be noted that the term is used here in a different sense than in technical grammar, and in my view it does not prove that Aristarchus actually used the terms παρεπόμενα or παρέπεσθαι for the *accidentia* of

[291] The terms παρεπόμενον and παρέπεται are used for the grammatical *accidentia* in Apollonius Dyscolus (cf. Lallot [1997 II] 347), in P. Iand. V 83,13 (nr. 13 Wouters; end of the 3rd century AD) and P. S.I. VII 761,7 (nr. 16 Wouters; 5th–6th century AD), and in the *Technê Grammatikê* ([D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 24,6; 46,5; 60,2; 62,1; 64,1). For the chronological priority of the term συμβεβηκότα, see Schenkeveld (1994) 279: 'The *accidentia* are called συμβεβηκότα, not yet παρεπόμενα'. In a more recent publication, Schenkeveld (1999) 192 is less certain about the chronological priority. Note that 'Longinus', *Subl.* 10.1 uses παρεπόμενα in the general sense of 'accompanying symptoms': see section 5·3·4.

[292] Ax (1982) 107 n. 38; Matthaios (1999) 205–208.

[293] Aristarchus fr. 136 Matthaios (= Apollonius Dyscolus, *Adv.*, *G.G.* II 1.1, 145,5 ff.).

[294] Aristarchus fr. 8a Matthaios. See Matthaios (1999) 206.

the parts of speech.[295] Therefore, the doubts of Ax and Matthaios about the chronological priority of the term συμβεβηκότα over παρεπόμενα are based on rather scanty evidence.

For the use of συμβεβηκότα in early times, however, there is more evidence: in a fragment of Philodemus' *On Poems*, which Janko has assigned to the critic Pausimachus, it is said that '(…) in this manner neither the diction (λέξις) nor the subject-matter (ὑποκείμενα) nor any of the συμβεβηκότα will be cause of excellence'.[296] Janko interprets the συμβεβηκότα as the 'accidents of language, i.e. declension, conjugation and prosody'.[297] This would fit another fragment from Philodemus, where Pausimachus offers a list of several *accidentia*, namely grave and acute (ἄνεσις and ἐπίτασις), aspiration and lack of aspiration (πρόσπνευσις and ψιλότης), lengthening and shortening (ἔκτασις and συστολή), prefixation and case (πρόθεσις and πτῶσις).[298] This list partly corresponds to Dionysius' list in *Dem.* 52 quoted above: he too mentions συστολάς, ἐκτάσεις and πτώσεις, and both the critic and Dionysius enumerate prosodic elements, accents and inflectional categories in one list (see below). Furthermore, the term συμβεβηκότα in the sense of the grammatical *accidentia* occurs not only in the Pausimachus fragment, but also in Philodemus' rebuttal.[299]

We have seen that Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses the term συμβεβηκότα when referring to the grammatical curriculum. I have pointed out that his reference to the teaching of letters, syllables and parts of speech (as preparation for reading and writing) presumably corresponds to the actual curriculum of grammar schools in Rome at the end of the

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[295] Matthaios (1999) 205 says: 'Es ist nun durchaus *möglich*, daß Aristarch den Ausdruck παρέπεσθαι bzw. παρακολουθεῖν über dessen Gebrauch in den Erklärungen ἐκ παρεπομένου bzw. ἐκ τοῦ παρακολουθοῦντος hinaus *auch in den Kontext der Wortartensystematik übertragen* und dazu verwendet hat, die einer grammatischen Kategorie zukommenden, akzidentiellen Merkmale zu kennzeichnen.' (My italics.) We can indeed not exclude the possibility, but we do not have any hard evidence for Aristarchus' use of παρεπόμενα as *accidentia*.

[296] Pausimachus fr. 74,1–5 Janko (Janko [2000] 268–269). In an earlier publication, Janko (1995) 225–228 assigned this text to Crates of Mallos.

[297] Janko (2000) 269 n. 1. See also Janko (2000) 182–184.

[298] Pausimachus fr. 94,13–25 Janko (Janko [2000] 300–301).

[299] Cf. Janko (2000) 182 n. 6: P. Herc. 994 fr. 19,7 (Treatise A col. b7 Sbordone): ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομά[των ἢ] τῶ[ν] ῥημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄ[λ]λων | μερῶν τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῶν | παρακειμένων αὐτοῖς συμβεβηκότων. According to Janko, this text belongs to the second book of *On Poems* (cf. Janko [1995] 225 and Matthaios [1999] 207 n. 24). Luhtala (2000) 114 n. 197 wrongly suggests that the first occurrence of the term συμβεβηκότα in the sense of *accidentia* is in the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

first century BC. The various stages that Dionysius mentions (letters, syllables, parts of speech and finally reading and writing) agree with the exposition of grammatical doctrines that we find in Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian. Blank has argued that these expositions depend on Asclepiades' *On Grammar*.[300] But if these expositions of grammatical teaching reflect the general practice of grammar schools, we do not have to trace these texts back to a specific source. Concerning the terminology of accidents, I think that Dionysius' reference shows that συμβεβηκότα (and not παρεπόμενα) was the normal term for *accidentia* in the first century BC.

Having taken the evidence into consideration, I conclude that it is most plausible that the term συμβεβηκότα was chronologically prior to the term παρεπόμενα. The Aristotelian concept of accidence was taken over by the Stoics, who used the term συμβεβηκότα. The *kritikoi*, Philodemus and presumably the grammarians of the first century BC also used this term for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech. In my view, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that Aristarchus used the term παρεπόμενα for the grammatical *accidentia*. In later times, grammarians (grammatical papyri, Apollonius Dyscolus, the *Technê Grammatikê*) preferred the term παρεπόμενα for the *accidentia*. But grammarians still understood the two terms as having the same meaning.[301] The Roman term *accidentia*, however, is a translation of the original Greek grammatical term, as Barwick has already pointed out.[302]

3.8. *Dionysius on the* accidentia *of nouns and verbs*

We now leave the discussion of the terminology of *accidentia* in general and turn to the specific categories themselves. We have already seen that under the συμβεβηκότα, Dionysius lists items from (1) prosody, (2) accentuation and (3) inflectional categories (accidents in the sense of the παρεπόμενα distinguished by grammarians of later times). In *Dem*. 52, Dionysius mentions συστολάς, ἐκτάσεις, ὀξύτητας, βαρύτητας, γένη, πτώσεις, ἀριθμούς and ἐγκλίσεις. In *Comp*. 25, he lists ἐκτάσεις, συστολὰς and προσῳδίας. So, the ὀξύτητας and βαρύτητας of *Dem*. 52 are sum-

[300] Blank (1998) xlvi and Blank (2000) 410.

[301] Cf. Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 217,23: Παρεπόμενον δέ ἐστι συμβεβηκός. See also Steinthal (1891 II) 243–244.

[302] Barwick (1922) 107.

marised in the προσῳδίας of *Comp.* 25, while the latter chapter does not include the genders, cases, numbers and moods that occur in *Dem.* 52.[303] Συστολαί and ἐκτάσεις refer to the shortenings and lengthenings of syllables, which later grammarians treat under the so-called πάθη λέξεων.[304] As we have seen, these items of prosody (ἔκτασις and συστολή) are also included in the list of *accidentia* in a fragment of Philodemus' *On Poems*.[305] That same fragment also mentions items of accentuation (ἄνεσις, grave, and ἐπίτασις, acute), be it in different terms than Dionysius, who uses ὀξύτης (high pitch), βαρύτης (low pitch) and, in general, προσῳδία (scansion).[306] The combination of items from prosody, accentuation and inflection under the term συμβεβηκότα in both Philodemus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus indicates that the technical grammatical distinctions that we know from later texts, such as the grammatical papyri, Apollonius Dyscolus and the *Technê Grammatikê*, were not yet established in the second and first century BC. Besides, Dionysius combines theories from various language disciplines; concerning his use of *accidents* this is particularly clear in *Dem.* 48, where Dionysius says that there are two phenomena that accompany (ἀκολουθεῖ) all the parts of speech, namely tone (μέλος) and time (χρόνος).[307] These accidents are borrowed from musical theory, and it is no coincidence that Aristoxenus is mentioned in the passage that discusses the high and low pitch and rhythm of words.[308] In the rest of this section I will focus on those *accidentia* that are treated as such in technical grammar.

In the list of συμβεβηκότα in *Dem.* 52, only the γένη (genders), πτώσεις (cases), ἀριθμοί (numbers) and ἐγκλίσεις (moods) correspond to the morphological *accidentia*, which were also distinguished by technical grammarians of the first century AD onwards.[309] In *Comp.* 6, the *accidentia* are mentioned in two groups, one for nouns and one for verbs, which I will discuss in that order.[310]

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[303] Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 82.

[304] Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 82. Dionysius himself speaks of πάθη συλλαβῶν, not of πάθη λέξεων: see *Comp.* 15.59,15–16; *Comp.* 25.135,2–3 and *Dem.* 52.242,19–20.

[305] Pausimachus fr. 94,13–25 Janko (Janko [2000] 300–301).

[306] Cf. Janko (2000) 182.

[307] *Dem.* 48.232,20–233,2 (see above).

[308] *Dem.* 48.233,9.

[309] My discussion of the individual accidents builds on the analysis of Schenkeveld (1983) 83–84.

[310] In *Comp.* 6, Dionysius' terminology differs from that in the rest of his work: see my discussion in section 4.3.1.

With regard to the nouns (ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων), *Comp.* 6 mentions the following items:[311]

(1) ἑνικῶς (singular) and πληθυντικῶς (plural)
(2) ὀρθὴ πτῶσις (nominative) and πλάγιαι πτώσεις (oblique cases)
(3) ἀρρενικά (masculine), θηλυκά (feminine) and οὐδέτερα (neuter)

These *accidentia* correspond to ἀριθμοί (numbers), πτώσεις (cases) and γένη (genders) respectively. Dionysius also refers to the numbers as nouns: τὸ ἑνικόν and τὸ πληθυντικόν or τὰ ἑνικά and τὰ πληθυντικά.[312] The oblique cases are specified as αἰτιατική, γενική and δοτική, and the cases are not only mentioned in connection with nouns, but also with appellative nouns (προσηγορικά), participles (μετοχαί) and articles (ἄρθρα).[313] The terms of the genders occur as nouns (τὸ ἀρρενικόν, τὸ θηλυκόν and τὸ οὐδέτερον), as adjectives in combination with γένος (τῷ θηλυκῷ γένει) or μόριον (τὸ θηλυκὸν μόριον), and as adverbs (ἀρρενικῶς).[314]

With regard to verbs (ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ῥημάτων), *Comp.* 6 mentions the following items:[315]

(1) τὰ ὀρθὰ ἢ τὰ ὕπτια
(2) κατὰ ποίας ἐγκλίσεις ἐκφερόμενα, ἃς δή τινες πτώσεις ῥηματικὰς καλοῦσι
(3) ποίας παρεμφαίνοντα διαφορὰς χρόνων

These *accidentia* correspond to (1) voice, (2) mood, and (3) tense respectively. Elsewhere, Dionysius also mentions (4) number and (5) persons.[316] Because his terminology for the verbal accidents casts light on the

[311] *Comp.* 6.29,1–7.

[312] *Dem.* 27.189,8; *Thuc.* 24.362,3; *Thuc.* 37.389,7–21; *Amm.* II 2.423,9; *Amm.* II 9.428,19–429,17.

[313] For the specific cases, see *Thuc.* 37.389,7–21 and *Amm.* II 11.431,1–15. See further *Thuc.* 24.362,7 and *Amm.* II 2.423,13–14: ὀνοματικῶν ἢ μετοχικῶν πτώσεις, 'the cases of nouns and participles'; *Amm.* II 11.430,12–14: τὰς πτώσεις τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τῶν προσηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν μετοχῶν καὶ ⟨τῶν⟩ συναπτομένων τούτοις ἄρθρων, 'the cases of proper nouns, appellative nouns, participles and the articles attached to them'. These references to the cases of participles and articles should be added to the lists of Schenkeveld (1983).

[314] *Dem.* 27.189,8; *Thuc.* 24.362,4–5; *Thuc.* 37.389,7–21; *Amm.* II 2.423,11; *Amm.* II 10.429,18–430,11; *Amm.* II 11.430,20–431,1 (τῷ τε θηλυκῷ γένει τῆς προσηγορίας τὸ θηλυκὸν ἄν ἔζευξαν μόριον); *Amm.* II 11.431,6–7. The adverb ἀρρενικῶς occurs at *Amm.* II 10.429,21.

[315] *Comp.* 6.29,7–12. See section 4.3.1.

[316] Dionysius does not mention the 'conjugations' (συζυγίαι) of verbs, which we find in grammatical texts. In Dionysius, the term συζυγία refers either to the connection or

development of grammatical theory between Aristarchus and Apollonius Dyscolus, I will discuss each of these items separately.

(1) Voice. The *Technê Grammatikê* distinguishes three voices (διαθέσεις), namely active (ἐνεργεία), passive (πάθος) and middle (μεσότης).[317] It is clear that Dionysius of Halicarnassus distinguishes only two voices, namely active and passive, and not the middle voice. In this respect, Dionysius does not differ from the early grammarians: Aristarchus and Varro do not distinguish the middle voice either.[318] As far as we know, Apollonius Dyscolus is the first grammarian who gives the διάθεσις μέση a separate treatment besides the διάθεσις ἐνεργητική and the διάθεσις παθητική.[319] In grammatical texts, the two voices are called ἐνεργητική (active) and παθητική (passive). These terms are also found in the fragments of Aristarchus.[320] The Stoic philosophers, however, used different terms, namely δραστική or ὀρθή (active) and ὕπτια (passive).[321] It is interesting that both the grammatical and the philosophical terms are found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. In *Amm.* II 7–8 (see section 4.4.2), Dionysius uses the terms ποιητικόν and ἐνεργητικόν for active, and παθητικόν for passive.[322] In the introduction of the same letter (which he cites from *On Thucydides* 24), however, he employs the terms τὰ δραστήρια (the active forms) and τὰ παθητικά (the passive forms).[323] In *Comp.* 6 (see section 4.3.1), which seems to be influenced by theories from Hellenistic poetic theory, he mentions τὰ ὀρθά (active) and τὰ ὕπτια (passive).[324] Dionysius' terminology of active and passive is impor-

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combination of letters and words (e.g. *Comp.* 3.15,1) or to a 'group' of letters that share the same characteristics (e.g. *Comp.* 14.56,6).

317 [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 46,5ff.

318 See Matthaios (1999) 302–326.

319 Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* III.30. On the middle voice in ancient grammar, see Rijksbaron (1986).

320 Aristarchus fr. 20 Matthaios. See Matthaios (1999) 306.

321 Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 401,1 (= *FDS* 803): Ἐνεργητικὴ μέν ἐστι διάθεσις (…), ἥτις παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις δραστικὴ καὶ ὀρθὴ καλεῖται. 'Active is a voice, which is called δραστική and ὀρθή by the philosophers.' For ῥήματα ὀρθά and ὕπτια, see also Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 548,34–37.

322 *Amm.* II 7.427,17–428,18.

323 *Amm.* II 2.423,8–9: καὶ τὰ μὲν παθητικὰ ῥήματα δραστήρια, τὰ δὲ δραστήρια παθητικά.

324 *Comp.* 6.29,8. See also sections 4.3.1 and 5.3.6. Steinthal (1891 II) 274 thinks that the distinction between ὀρθά and ἐγκεκλιμένα (ἐγκλινόμενα according to P) in *Comp.* 5.26,14–15 is the same as that between ὀρθά and ὕπτια in *Comp.* 6.29,8: he interprets ὀρθά as present indicatives, and ὕπτια (= ἐγκεκλιμένα) as all other tenses and moods.

tant evidence for the reconstruction of the history of grammar in the first century BC. The blending of philological terms on the one hand and Stoic terms on the other confirms that technical grammar in the period after Aristarchus was influenced by Stoic philosophy.

(2) Mood. Dionysius does not mention the specific terms for indicative, subjunctive, optative and imperative. He once refers to τὰ ἀπαρέμφατα ('infinitives') and τὰ παρεμφατικά ('finite verb forms') (see section 5.3.6).[325] Besides, Dionysius is the first extant writer who uses the grammatical term ἔγκλισις, which is the usual grammatical term for 'mood' in later grammatical texts (Apollonius Dyscolus and the *Technê Grammatikê*).[326] Although Aristarchus already mentions all the specific moods (indicative, subjunctive, etc.), he does not know the term ἔγκλισις in the sense of 'mood'.[327] We do not know whether Dionysius' contemporary Tryphon used the term ἔγκλισις, but if Dionysius' references to the grammatical curriculum in *Comp.* 25 and *Dem.* 52 refer to the educational practice of his time, as he suggests (see above), then we may conclude that the term was introduced at some point in the first century BC.[328] With regard to the moods, Dionysius uses two expressions that almost certainly betray Stoic influence. First, he tells us that some people (τινες) call the moods πτώσεις ῥηματικάς (verbal cases) (see section 4.3.1).[329] Second, he mentions a distinction between between ὀρθά (indicatives) and ἐγκλινόμενα (non-indicatives) (see section 5.3.6).[330] In later grammatical texts, the verb is defined as a word 'without case' (ἄπτωτον).[331] For Aristotle, however, πτῶσις refers to the flection of both nouns and verbs. Thus, the view that moods are 'verbal cases' might seem to be related to Aristotle's views on the verb and its cases (πτώ-

Schenkeveld (1983) 84 corrects Steinthal. The term ὕπτια refers to 'passives', whereas ἐγκλινόμενα (which is to be preferred to the reading ἐγκεκλιμένα) are non-indicatives (see below).

[325] *Comp.* 5.26,15–16.

[326] For Dionysius' use of ἐγκλίσεις ('moods'), see *Comp.* 6.29,9; *Comp.* 25.132,6; *Dem.* 52.242,23. In *Dem.* 54.246,2, the word is not used for grammatical moods, but for the tone of delivery.

[327] See Matthaios (1999) 356–360.

[328] Graefenhan corrected the title of one of Tryphon's works into Περὶ ῥημάτων ἐγκλίσεων [instead of ἐγκλιτικῶν] καὶ ἀπαρεμφάτων καὶ προστακτικῶν καὶ εὐκτικῶν καὶ ἀποφαντικῶν, but Matthaios (1999) 358 n. 299 rightly doubts the correctness of the expression Περὶ ῥημάτων ἐγκλίσεων. On this title, see also section 1.4.

[329] *Comp.* 6.29,9–10.

[330] *Comp.* 5.26,14–15.

[331] See [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 46,4. Cf. Matthaios (1999) 298 n. 9.

σεις ῥήματος). However, there is an important difference, for Aristotle's 'cases of verbs' are not moods, but tenses: according to Aristotle, ὑγιαίνει ('is healthy') is a verb (ῥῆμα), whereas ὑγίανεν ('was healthy') and ὑγιανεῖ ('will be healthy') are not verbs but 'cases of verbs' (πτώσεις ῥήματος).[332] In other words, only the forms that indicate the present tense (τὸν παρόντα χρόνον) deserve the full title of verb, while the forms of the past and future tense, which indicate 'the (time) beyond' (τὸν πέριξ), are *cases* of a verb.[333] Matthaios argues that Dionysius' reference to πτώσεις ῥηματικάς betrays Aristotelian influence. Schenkeveld, however, draws attention to a passage from Macrobius, who states that the Stoics called only the indicative *rectum*, thus comparing the indicative to the nominative (*denique Stoici hunc solum modum rectum, velut nominativum, vocaverunt*).[334] Although Matthaios believes that the Stoics only used the term πτῶσις for nouns, Macrobius' text strongly suggests that they compared the cases of nouns to the moods of verbs, and, in particular, the nominative to the indicative.[335] In my view, this would explain both the expression πτώσεις ῥηματικάς (verbal cases) and the distinction between ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα (indicatives and non-indicatives). The terms ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα will be discussed more fully in section 5.3.6.

(3) Tense. Concerning tenses, Dionysius of Halicarnassus distinguishes between the 'present' (ὁ παρὼν χρόνος) and the 'future' (ὁ μέλλων χρόνος); we do not know whether he also knew a term for the past tense, since his examples concern present and future tenses only.[336] Schenkeveld and Matthaios argue that Dionysius' terminology shows Aristotelian influence: the term ὁ παρὼν χρόνος is found in Aristotle's *Poetics*, but the traditional grammatical term is ὁ ἐνεστὼς χρόνος.[337] The latter term seems to be of Stoic origin, and Aristarchus also uses it to designate the present tense. The Aristotelian tradition was not only preserved in Dionysius of Halicarnassus' use of the term ὁ παρὼν χρόνος, but also in the Latin translation *praesens*.[338]

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[332] Aristotle, *Int.* 16b16–18.
[333] Aristotle, *Int.* 16b18. Cf. Whitaker (1996) 68–69.
[334] Macrobius, *De diff., G.L.* V, 611,36. Cf. Schenkeveld (1984) 335.
[335] Matthaios (1999) 299.
[336] *Amm.* II 12.431,22–432,2. Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 82–83 and Matthaios (1999) 329–330.
[337] Aristotle, *Po.* 1457a17–18. Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 83–84. For the classification of ἐθέλοιμεν as a future tense, see section 4.4.2.
[338] Cf. Matthaios (1999) 330–335 and 344.

(4) Number. Dionysius uses the category number (ἀριθμός) not only in connection with nouns (see above), but also in connection with verbs.[339] Dionysius' terms, ἑνικόν (singular) and πληθυντικόν (plural), are the traditional ones, which Aristarchus already uses.[340] The term for dual is not attested in Dionysius' works.

(5) Person. Dionysius once refers to the first person as τὸ τοῦ λέγοντος πόσωπον ('the person of the speaker') and to the third person as λόγος περὶ τῶν προσώπων ('speech about persons').[341] He uses these terms when pointing out that in a certain passage Thucydides changes from the third to the first person.[342] Matthaios has argued that the distinction between grammatical persons ultimately goes back to Aristotle's distinction between ὁ λέγων ('the speaker'), πρὸς ὃν λέγει ('to whom he speaks') and περὶ οὗ λέγει ('about which he speaks').[343] Dionysius' terminology largely corresponds to that of Aristarchus, who refers to the first person as τὸ λέγον πρόσωπον ('the speaking person'), to the second as πρὸς αὐτόν ('to him') and to the third person as περὶ αὐτοῦ ('about him').[344]

3.9. *Conclusion*

In this chapter, I have collected and interpreted Dionysius of Halicarnassus' views on the parts of speech. In this way, I have reconstructed as it were a hypothetical grammar that was used by Dionysius. This is a helpful procedure if one wishes to describe the history of grammar in the first century BC. However, we should realise that Dionysius is not a grammarian, but a rhetorician who makes use of grammatical theory only if he can use it for his own purposes. For this reason, I have argued (*pace* Schenkeveld) that Dionysius does not use a 'system' of nine word classes. He is neither interested in the exact classification of words, nor in the precise number of the μόρια λόγου. His attitude towards grammar as a discipline of which the technical details should be left to the

[339] *Amm.* II 9.429,10–17: ἤκουσεν is classified as singular, φθονοῦντες and ἀπιστοῦσιν (indirectly) as plurals.
[340] See Matthaios (1999) 377.
[341] *Thuc.* 48.407,4–5. Cf. Matthaios (1999) 394.
[342] *Thuc.* 48.407,2–15 on Thuc. 6.78.1.
[343] Aristotle, *Rh.* 1358a37. See Matthaios (1999) 393–394.
[344] See Matthaios (1999) 387–393.

grammarians also explains his fluctuating terminology concerning linguistic matters. As we have seen, Dionysius refers to the voices (active and passive) sometimes by the Alexandrian and sometimes by the Stoic terms. One of the reasons for the variety of terms is, of course, that he does not care about systematic terminology: he is only interested in the effects of the use of active and passive verbs on stylistic composition. Dionysius' profession also accounts for his terminology and his concept of the μόρια λόγου. I have argued that Dionysius prefers the expression μόρια λόγου (and μόρια λέξεως) because a rhetorician uses the expression μέρη λόγου for the parts of a text (e.g. introduction, narrative), and the expression μέρη λέξεως for the aspects of expression (selection of words, composition). Similarly, Dionysius prefers ὄνομα as the most general term for 'word', because in rhetoric λέξις (the grammatical term for 'word') refers to 'style' and 'expression'. The concept of Dionysius' μόρια λόγου comprises two aspects: they are both word classes and parts of the phrase. The former aspect is especially relevant when Dionysius refers to the remarkable use of a specific word class (e.g. the active instead of the passive use of a verb). The latter aspect is especially relevant when Dionysius deals with composition (σύνθεσις), the putting together of 'parts'.

We have seen that in his use of the parts of speech Dionysius is influenced by several ancient language disciplines, in particular Alexandrian philology and Stoic philosophy. In general, Dionysius follows the Alexandrian distinctions and terminology concerning word classes and their *accidentia*. A number of aspects of the grammatical theories in his work, however, betray Stoic influence. In this respect, Dionysius of Halicarnassus is similar to grammarians like Dionysius Thrax and Tyrannion. Among the Stoic aspects of Dionysius' treatment of the μόρια λόγου are the distinction of ὄνομα and προσηγορία (προσηγορικόν) as two separate word classes (a Stoic element in an Alexandrian word class system) and the use of the Stoic terms τὰ ὀρθά (active) and τὰ ὕπτια (passive) (I have not yet been able to assign Dionysius' use of the term ποιητικόν in the sense of 'active' to any of the earlier traditions). I have argued that the terminology for moods, πτώσεις ῥηματικάς ('verbal cases') and ὀρθά (indicatives) and ἐγκλινόμενα (non-indicatives), is also Stoic. Dionysius' reference to pronouns as ἄρθρα δεικτικά ('deictic articles') corresponds to an ancient testimony on Dionysius Thrax, who seems to have adopted this same expression under Stoic influence. Dionysius' idea that the parts of speech are στοιχεῖα ('elements') is also Stoic. Further, I have argued that Dionysius' term for *accidentia*, συμβε-

βηκότα was also used by the Stoics. In chapter 4 and 5, we will see that in the field of syntax Dionysius is also influenced by Stoic theories, as the Stoic expressions ὁ κατάλληλος λόγος and ἀκολουθία indicate.[345] But apart from the philological and the Stoic tradition, there were other language disciplines that made use of the parts of speech theory, and in some cases Dionysius follows views that were developed in these disciplines. Thus, in his terminology for tenses, Dionysius seems to follow the Peripatetic tradition, naming the present tense ὁ παρὼν χρόνος instead of ὁ ἐνεστὼς χρόνος, which is the Alexandrian and Stoic expression. Dionysius' use of the 'persons' can be traced back to Aristotelian ideas on communication. It is important to realise that if a certain term is called 'Stoic', this does not imply that Dionysius borrowed that term from Stoic sources. Grammatical treatises of the first century BC seem to have mixed ideas of both Alexandrian and Stoic origin; Dionysius' terminology shows the same integration of philological and philosophical ideas and may therefore be based on grammatical texts of the first century BC.

Two grammatical terms are important because Dionysius' works are the earliest extant texts in which they appear: the term ἐπίρρημα (adverb) first occurs in Tryphon and Dionysius (both active in Augustan Rome). The grammarian Philoxenus (also active in the first century BC) still uses the term μεσότης (which also designates the 'adverb' in the fragments of Aristarchus). The term ἐγκλίσεις ('moods') is first attested in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Because he uses the term when referring to grammatical school practice, we may assume that it was introduced in earlier periods.

In general, Dionysius' descriptions of 'how we learn to read' (τὰ γράμματα ὅταν παιδευώμεθα) (*Comp.* 25 and *Dem.* 52) deserve to be taken into account more seriously than some modern scholars have done. I do not think that these passages are directly based on Stoic texts (*pace* Barwick), nor do I believe that Dionysius' description is unrealistic (*pace* Schenkeveld). Dionysius tells us that one learns first letters (γράμματα), then syllables (συλλαβαί), then words (λέξεις) or parts of speech (τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια) and their *accidentia* (συμβεβηκότα); finally one starts writing and reading. Grammatical papyri confirm that the writing of separate letters, syllables and words was practiced. Both Dionysius' passages on

[345] In section 5.3, it will be argued that Dionysius' investigation into natural word order (*Comp.* 5), too, is based on Stoic ideas, in particular on the Stoic theory of categories.

the grammatical curriculum depend on his audience's recognition of the fact that this is the way children learn to read. Therefore I believe that Dionysius' description corresponds to the practice of grammar schools of his time, which he must have known very well.

To conclude, Dionysius of Halicarnassus' treatment of the parts of speech confirms Matthaios' reconstruction of the history of the word class system in the period between Aristarchus and Apollonius Dyscolus.[346] After Aristarchus, the Alexandrian scholars were deeply influenced by Stoic theories. This Stoic influence resulted in a number of grammatical works that must have combined Alexandrian and Stoic ideas on language. Most of these works are lost, but the few extant fragments of Dionysius Thrax and Tyrannion show that they adopted Stoic views in their classification of the word classes. The works of these grammarians have not survived, but my investigations have shown that the grammatical discourse of the Augustan period was indeed characterised by a deep amalgamation of Alexandrian and Stoic theories on language. This integration of philological and philosophical ideas would finally culminate in the work of Apollonius Dyscolus (2nd century AD).

The next two chapters will further confirm the view that Dionysius brings theories from different language disciplines together in a useful way. In chapter 5, I will show that Dionysius' views on style and word order, which are related to Stoic ideas on syntax, foreshadow Apollonius Dyscolus' syntactic theory. But first, it is time to focus on Dionysius' use of the μόρια λόγου in the rhetorical and literary context of his works. In chapter 4 we will find that his use of the parts of speech is not only related to the traditions of philologists and philosophers, but also to the disciplines of poetical criticism and musical theory.

[346] Matthaios (2002).

CHAPTER FOUR

LINGUISTICS, COMPOSITION, AND STYLE: DIONYSIUS' USE OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH

4.1. *Introduction*

In the previous chapter, I have examined Dionysius' knowledge of the grammatical theory of the parts of speech, in order to establish his place in the history of grammar. But Dionysius did not write grammatical treatises. As a rhetorician, he used the theories of grammarians for his own purposes. His works on style and rhetorical composition offer a unique possibility for us to observe how the two language disciplines that were arguably the most prominent in the ancient world, namely grammar and rhetoric, were integrated into a coherent set of ideas. While the connections between grammar and philosophy in antiquity have been the subject of several modern publications, scholars have paid less attention to the relation between ancient grammar and rhetorical theory.[1] A rhetorician who focuses on aspects of style can apply the theory of the parts of speech in several ways. Dionysius seems to have used that grammatical theory more frequently than other teachers of rhetoric.[2] One might say that there are three different capacities in which Dionysius deals with the theory of the μόρια λόγου. As a rhetorician (section 4.3), he regards the parts of speech as the building blocks for the composition of texts. Thus, the description of particular types of composition is partly based on the way in which writers use the parts of speech. The μόρια λόγου are so important that they even figure in the general definition of 'composition' (σύνθεσις) at the beginning of the work *On Composition*. This definition of σύνθεσις as 'a certain arrangement of the parts of speech' leads to a doxographical overview of earlier thinkers on the parts of speech. Here, we observe

[1] For studies on the connections between ancient philosophy, grammar, and rhetoric, see section 1.1.

[2] However, I will compare passages from 'Demetrius', 'Longinus', Quintilian and later rhetoricians who make use of grammatical terminology (see sections 4.3. and 4.4).

Dionysius' second role: as a 'historian of linguistics' (section 4.2), he discusses the early history of the theory of the parts of speech. Finally, as a literary critic (section 4.4), Dionysius discusses the style of Thucydides by analysing the historian's use of the parts of speech: in this context, the theory of the parts of speech is employed as an instrument for literary analysis.

It is important to realise that Dionysius' 'history of linguistics' is subservient to his ideas on composition and style. In fact, it would be more correct to state that there are only two purposes for which Dionysius needs the parts of speech. On the one hand, the theory of the μόρια λόγου offers the rhetorician the starting point for the process of composition, which puts 'the parts of the phrase' together as elements. On the other hand, the theory enables the critic to reduce the stylistic particularities of a phrase to the way in which specific *parts* of the phrase have been used. Whereas Dionysius can indeed be called a rhetorician and a literary critic, his role as a 'historian of linguistics' is a very limited one. However, since Dionysius' history of the μόρια λόγου in *On Composition* 2 is inextricably bound up with the definition of composition (σύνθεσις), I have chosen to discuss this passage in relation to the use of the parts of speech in composition and stylistic analysis. When I speak of Dionysius' three 'capacities', the reader should understand that only two of them are really part of Dionysius' own intentions, while the third one (that of historian of linguistics) is subservient to the other two. This will be illuminated in the following section.

4.2. *Dionysius as a historian of linguistics*

Partes orationis quot sunt?[3] 'How many parts of speech are there?' It is with this question that the Roman grammarian Donatus (who was active around 350 AD) starts his *Ars Minor*. His answer is: *octo*, 'eight'. Traditionally, we learn that the system of eight word classes, which we find in the works of Apollonius Dyscolus and in the *Technê grammatikê*, was the result of a long cumulative process: Plato identified two parts of speech, Aristotle three or four, the Stoics five or six, and Aristarchus and Dionysius Thrax eight.[4] This presentation of the history of the word class

[3] Section 4.2 has been published in a slightly different form as De Jonge (2005a).
[4] Cf. Sluiter (1998) 24–25.

system has been criticised in recent years, but it is characteristic for the traditional historiography of linguistics, represented by scholars like Lersch (1838–1841), Schoemann (1862), Steinthal (1863), Benfey (1869), Robins (1967 and later) and Lallot (1988).[5] However, as far as we know, the first text that presented the history of the word class system in this way is Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *De compositione verborum*.[6] In this section, I intend to make clear that Dionysius can be considered the prototype of the traditional western approach to the history of linguistics. In *Comp.* 2, Dionysius discusses the history of the theory of the μόρια (or μέρη) λόγου.[7] Brief as it may be, this passage may be considered one of the very first histories of linguistics, which would make Dionysius one of the first *historians* of linguistics.[8] First, I will discuss the relationship between Dionysius' history of the word class system and the rest of his work *On Composition*. Second, I will comment on some particularities of Dionysius' 'history of linguistics'. Finally, I will compare Dionysius' approach with that of Quintilian and modern historians of linguistics. Thus, I hope to answer the question what kind of historian of linguistics Dionysius actually was.

4.2.1. *Dionysius' history of the theory of the parts of speech*

Dionysius' history of the theory of the parts of speech can be found immediately after his definition of σύνθεσις (composition) in the second chapter of *On Composition*:[9]

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[5] For objections to the traditional presentation of the history of the word class system, see Taylor (1987), Sluiter (1993) 131, Schenkeveld (1994) 270, Blank (1998) 174 and Matthaios (1999) 492. See also section 4.2.4.

[6] Cf. Taylor (1987) 3. Dionysius' *method* of discussing earlier thinkers goes back to Aristotle: see section 4.2.2.

[7] Apart from Dionysius' history of the word class theory (*Comp.* 2.6,17–7,21), the account of Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 1.4.17–21) will be discussed in this chapter (section 4.2.3). Somewhat diverging accounts are Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 515,19–521,37 and Priscian, *Inst.* II.15–17 (*G.L.* II, 54,5–55,3).

[8] It is, however, very well possible that Dionysius (and Quintilian) used an older source (which is now lost) for the history of the word class system. We might think of Asclepiades of Myrlea (see section 4.2.3).

[9] *Comp.* 2.6,17–7,21 (for a shorter version of Dionysius' overview, see *Dem.* 48.232,20–233,2; cf. section 3.7). In this passage, it is impossible to translate the terms ὀνόματα, ῥήματα, σύνδεσμοι etc. in a consistent way, because these terms have a different scope in each of the stadia that Dionysius distinguishes (see section 3.2): for example, we cannot use the term 'noun' for Aristotle's ὄνομα. Even in a system of eight or nine parts of speech, the word class σύνδεσμοι covers more than our 'conjunctions' or 'connectives'. However, some readers may find it useful to have an indication of the meaning of the

Ἡ σύνθεσις ἔστι μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ δηλοῖ τοὔνομα, ποιά τις θέσις παρ' ἄλληλα τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων, ἃ δὴ καὶ στοιχεῖά τινες τῆς λέξεως καλοῦσιν. ταῦτα δὲ Θεοδέκτης μὲν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ οἱ κατ' ἐκείνους φιλοσοφήσαντες τοὺς χρόνους ἄχρι τριῶν προήγαγον, ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα καὶ συνδέσμους πρῶτα μέρη τῆς λέξεως ποιοῦντες. οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους γενόμενοι, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ τῆς Στωικῆς αἱρέσεως ἡγεμόνες, ἕως τεττάρων προὐβίβασαν, χωρίσαντες ἀπὸ τῶν συνδέσμων τὰ ἄρθρα. εἶθ' οἱ μεταγενέστεροι τὰ προσηγορικὰ διελόντες ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνοματικῶν πέντε ἀπεφήναντο τὰ πρῶτα μέρη. ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀντονομασίας ἀποζεύξαντες ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἕκτον στοιχεῖον τοῦτ' ἐποίησαν. οἳ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιρρήματα διελόντες ἀπὸ τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ τὰς προθέσεις ἀπὸ τῶν συνδέσμων καὶ τὰς μετοχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν προσηγορικῶν, οἳ δὲ καὶ ἄλλας τινὰς προσαγαγόντες τομὰς πολλὰ τὰ πρῶτα μόρια τῆς λέξεως ἐποίησαν· ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐ μικρὸς ἂν εἴη λόγος. πλὴν ἥ γε τῶν πρώτων εἴτε τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων εἴθ' ὅσων δή ποτε ὄντων μερῶν πλοκὴ καὶ παράθεσις τὰ λεγόμενα ποιεῖ κῶλα, ἔπειθ' ἡ τούτων ἁρμονία τὰς καλουμένας συμπληροῖ περιόδους, αὗται δὲ τὸν σύμπαντα τελειοῦσι λόγον.

'Composition is, as the name itself indicates, a certain arrangement of the parts of speech, or the elements of diction, as some call them. Theodectes and Aristotle and the philosophers of their time increased the number of these to three, making ὀνόματα ('nouns'), ῥήματα ('verbs') and σύνδεσμοι ('conjunctions') the primary parts of speech. Their successors, and in particular the leaders of the Stoic school, raised the number further to four, separating the ἄρθρα ('articles') from the σύνδεσμοι ('conjunctions'). Next, later generations distinguished the προσηγορικά ('appellative nouns') from the ὀνοματικά ('proper nouns') and presented the primary parts as five. Others detached the ἀντονομασίαι ('pronouns') from the ὀνόματα ('proper nouns') and made this the sixth element. Yet others divided the ἐπιρρήματα ('adverbs') from the ῥήματα ('verbs'), the προθέσεις ('prepositions') from the σύνδεσμοι ('conjunctions') and the μετοχαί ('participles') from the προσηγορικά ('appellatives'); while others introduced still further divisions and so made the primary parts of speech many in number. The subject could be discussed at considerable length, but it is enough to say that the combination or juxtaposition of these primary parts, whether there be three, four or any number of them, forms what are called clauses. Next, the joining together of these clauses constitutes what are called the 'periods', and these make up the complete discourse (λόγος).'

Before we take a closer look at Dionysius' history of the word class system itself, we should consider the relationship between this passage and his theory of composition. Dionysius' reason for giving a history of the word class theory is that he regards the μόρια or μέρη λόγου

terms in Dionysius' survey. There is no completely satisfactory solution to this problem, but I have decided to preserve the Greek terms in the translation, while adding the usual (partly anachronistic) translations of these terms between inverted commas.

as the central units of composition. Composition is defined as 'a certain arrangement of the parts of speech', and Dionysius adds that some people call these 'elements of diction' (στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως). I have already pointed to the interesting background of this remark: we know that the Stoic philosophers considered the parts of speech στοιχεῖα (elements), but they referred to them as τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου (the elements of meaningful utterance), whereas their στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως were the letters (the elements of articulate sound). Dionysius is the only author who refers to the parts of speech as στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως (see sections 2.2, 3.2 and 3.3). I have suggested (in section 3.5) that Dionysius' use of στοιχεῖα λέξεως for the parts of speech unites a philosophical perspective (the parts of speech as elements) and a rhetorical approach to language as expression (λέξις). In any case, by using the term στοιχεῖα Dionysius emphasises the symmetry between the different levels of language: the parts of speech constitute the λόγος, just as the letters are the building blocks of the syllables. This view of language as a hierarchical structure characterises Dionysius' entire treatment of composition: σύνθεσις plays a role on all levels of language, and the units on one level are the building blocks (or elements) of the units on the next level. Thus, syllables are composed of letters, words (or parts of speech) of syllables, clauses of words, periods of clauses, and the discourse of periods. As I have pointed out above (section 2.2), this atomistic view on language is found in many other ancient texts, such as the treatises on metre and music by Hephaestion and Aristides Quintilianus.[10] We may also compare Apollonius Dyscolus' approach to syntax (σύνταξις), which seems to be influenced by Stoic ideas.[11]

[10] Cf. Van Ophuijsen (1987) 8–9 and Barker (1989) 393–394.

[11] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.2: ὡς τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰς συλλαβὰς ἀποτελεῖ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιπλοκάς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ σύνταξις τῶν νοητῶν τρόπον τινὰ συλλαβὰς ἀποτελέσει διὰ τῆς ἐπιπλοκῆς τῶν λέξεων. καὶ ἔτι ὃν τρόπον ἐκ τῶν συλλαβῶν ἡ λέξις, οὕτως ἐκ τῆς καταλληλότητος τῶν νοητῶν ὁ αὐτοτελὴς λόγος. 'And just as the elements (i.e. letters) compose syllables according to their combinations, so, in turn, the structural combining (*syntaxis*) of meanings will in a certain way produce syllables (i.e. sentences) by combining words. Just as the word is made of syllables, so the complete sentence is made by the grammatical collocation of meanings.' (Translation adapted from Householder.) On this text, see Blank (1982) 30–31 and Sluiter (1990) 44–46. Note that Dionysius' formulation (*Comp.* 2.7,18) τελειοῦσι λόγον resembles Apollonius' concept of the αὐτοτελὴς λόγος, but Dionysius' λόγος is a text (discourse) not a sentence. See also Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* IV.16: Ἔφαμεν γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῆς ἐκδόσεως, ὡς τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπέχει τοῖς στοιχείοις τῆς λέξεως. 'Back at the beginning of this treatise we said that that the elements of the sentence behaved similarly to the elements of the word.' (Translation by Householder.) Swiggers & Wouters (1995) 37 n. 46 also

When we compare Dionysius' version of the history of the word class theory with other (ancient and modern) versions, we can detect a number of interesting differences.

(1) Dionysius starts his overview with Aristotle and his student Theodectes, thereby omitting Plato, whereas modern historians of grammar usually observe that Plato already distinguished ὄνομα and ῥῆμα.[12] It is interesting, though, that Dionysius states that Theodectes and Aristotle 'increased' the number of the parts of speech: προήγαγον, the word he uses, literally means 'carried forward'. This word already contains the idea of gradual progress, which characterises the whole passage on the history of the word class system. When Dionysius says that Aristotle distinguished three 'parts of speech', ὄνομα, ῥῆμα and σύνδεσμος, he is probably referring to the *Rhetoric*, for in his *Poetics* Aristotle had also mentioned the ἄρθρον, the invention of which Dionysius attributes to the Stoics.[13]

(2) Dionysius gives the Stoics credit for the distinction of the ἄρθρον. He attributes the distinction of the προσηγορικόν (appellative) to οἱ μεταγενέστεροι, 'later people'. Since we know that the distinction between proper noun and appellative noun was definitely an invention of the Stoic philosophers, a fact also known in antiquity, we might interpret the words οἱ μεταγενέστεροι as 'later generations of Stoic philosophers'.[14] I would prefer this interpretation to that of Usher, who translates '[s]ubsequent *grammarians*' (my italics), for until now, Dionysius has only mentioned philosophers.[15]

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point to the similarity between the approaches of Dionysius and Apollonius. See further Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 211,27–212,1: καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων συλλαβαί, ἀπὸ δὲ συλλαβῶν λέξεις, ἀπὸ δὲ λέξεων διάνοιαι, ἀπὸ δὲ διανοιῶν ὁ τέλειος λόγος. 'For syllables are composed of letters, and words of syllables, and thoughts of words, and the complete text of thoughts.' The διάνοιαι in the latter text might be compared to Apollonius' νοήσεις. For the Stoic ideas on language as a hierarchical structure, see *FDS* 539–541; cf. Pinborg (1975) 97–98 and Sluiter (1990) 43–44.

[12] Ancient histories of the word class system never start with Plato: Quintilian (1.4.17–20) begins, like Dionysius, with Aristotle and Theodectes. See also *FDS* 543–546, overviews that start with either Aristotle or the Stoics. Modern histories that start with Plato's distinction of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα are, for example, Pinborg (1975), Robins (1966), Robins (1986), Lallot (1988) and Robins (1997[4]).

[13] Janko (2000) 186–187 thinks that Dionysius and Quintilian are referring to an Aristotelian dialogue in which Theodectes appeared. See section 3.3.1.

[14] Cf. *FDS* 536.

[15] Usher (1985) 21. More correct translations are those of Rhys Roberts (1910), 'later

(3) Another particularity is the fact that, according to Dionysius, the pronoun (ἀντονομασία) was separated from the proper noun (ὄνομα), whereas most ancient and modern scholars think that the pronouns, before they were recognised as a separate group, belonged to the ἄρθρα.[16] The question of why Dionysius thinks that the pronoun was separated from the ὄνομα (and not from the ἄρθρον), can probably be answered by referring to ancient grammatical theory on the ἀντωνυμία.[17] According to Apollonius Dyscolus, the pronoun can replace the noun: therefore, it can be combined with a verb, thus forming a complete sentence, which normally consists of a noun and a verb.[18] Apollonius also tells us that the function of the pronoun is expressed in its name: an ἀντωνυμία, or (as Dionysius calls it) ἀντονομασία, is a word that is used 'instead of' (ἀντί) the ὄνομα (noun).[19] Taking this theory

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inquirers', and Aujac (1981), 'les générations postérieures'. According to other sources, the Stoics were also responsible for the distinction of the adverb, to which Antipater allegedly gave the name μεσότης (Diogenes Laertius VII.57 = *FDS* 536). Matthaios (1999), however, has pointed out that Aristarchus (217–145 v. Chr.), who was active before Antipater of Tarsos (*fl.* 150) already knew the eight canonical word classes, including the μεσότης. He also discusses (548ff.) the relation between Aristarchus and Antipater, and concludes that Aristarchus, like Antipater, borrowed the *term* μεσότης from older Stoic sources, which did, however, not give that name to a separate 'part of speech'. The first extant texts in which the term ἐπίρρημα (in the sense of adverb) occurs are the fragments of Tryphon and the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. See section 3.2.

[16] See *FDS* 542: τέταρτον ὑφ' ἓν ἄρθρον καὶ ἀντωνυμία, τὸ μὲν φάσκοντες ἀόριστον ἄρθρον, τὸ δὲ ὡρισμένον ἄρθρον. Cf. Lallot (1988) 17 and Robins (1997[4]) 41. Steinthal (1890–1891 II) 214ff. follows Dionysius' view that the pronoun was separated from the noun. Matthaios (1999) 491ff. disagrees with Dionysius and Quintilian, but also with the traditional view that the ἀντωνυμία was separated from the Stoic ἄρθρον: the ἄρθρον, he argues, had an entirely different function than that of being a combination of two grammatical word classes, 'pronoun plus article'.

[17] For the use of the term ἀντονομασία (instead of ἀντωνυμία), see section 3.6.3.

[18] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.15: Οὐ τοῦτο δέ φημι, ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀντωνυμίας αὐτοτέλεια συνίσταται, ὅπου φαμὲν οὕτως, ἐγὼ περιπατῶ, σὺ περιπατεῖς. τότε γὰρ συνίσταται ἡ αὐτοτέλεια, ὅταν ἀντ' ὀνόματος παραληφθῇ ἡ ἀντωνυμία καὶ δυνάμει πάλιν ἡ αὐτὴ σύνταξις ᾖ. 'I am not here claiming that you cannot have a complete sentence with a pronoun (ἀντωνυμία), such as "I'm walking, you're walking". For then, too, completeness is achieved, when a pronoun (ἀντωνυμία) is used in place of a noun (ἀντ' ὀνόματος) which gives virtually the same construction (σύνταξις).' (Translation adapted from Householder.) Cf. [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 63,1: ἀντωνυμία ἐστὶ λέξις ἀντὶ ὀνόματος παραλαμβανομένη. 'A pronoun is a word that is used as a substitute for a noun.'

[19] The pronoun does not only replace the noun, but it was, according to Apollonius Dyscolus (*Synt.* I.19), even invented for the sake of the construction of verbs in the first and second person. Nouns always refer to third persons, and because verbs are also used in the first and second person, the pronoun was 'invented'. Although Apollonius Dyscolus discusses the invention of the pronouns themselves and not the invention of

into account, we can explain why Dionysius thinks that the pronouns were separated from the nouns (and not, as modern scholars think, from the ἄρθρον). Dionysius' idea is presumably that words such as οὗτος ('this one') were originally classified as nouns (ὀνόματα), because they replaced nouns in the construction of a sentence.[20] In later times this type of words would have received the name ἀντονομασίαι (or ἀντωνυμίαι), that is 'instead of-nouns'.

(4) A further difference between Dionysius and other historians of grammar concerns the view that the participle (μετοχή) was separated from the appellative (προσηγορικόν). According to most scholars, the participles originally belonged to the verbs (ῥήματα) before they were treated as a separate group.[21] In order to explain Dionysius' different opinion, it is again useful to take into account the ancient grammatical theory on this part of speech. The participle (μετοχή) owed its name to the fact that it 'participated' in the morphological and syntactical qualities of two other word classes, namely verb *and* noun. Apollonius Dyscolus explains in his *Syntax* that participles were invented because users of language needed verbs with cases and genders, so that they could express congruence (καταλληλότης).[22] Thus, the participle is derived from a verb, but, like a noun, it has case, number and gender. When we take into account that in ancient grammar the participle was considered a sort of intermediate form between noun and verb, it should not surprise us that Dionysius suggests that the participle was separated from the appellative, and not from the verb. We should keep

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the term ἀντωνυμία, it is probable that Dionysius' idea on the separation of the word class 'pronoun' from the word class 'noun' is based on the same theory.

[20] I give the example of οὗτος because Dionysius classifies τουτονί as an ἀντωνυμία in *Comp.* 6.29,20. I emphasise that Dionysius does not give the argument on pronouns replacing nouns: this is my reconstruction of his reasoning, on the basis of Apollonius Dyscolus' arguments.

[21] See *FDS* 542: τρίτον ὑφ' ἓν ῥῆμα ⟨καὶ⟩ μετοχή, τὸ μὲν ῥῆμα κατηγόρημα λέγοντες, τὴν δὲ μετοχὴν ἔγκλιμα ῥήματος, ὅ ἐστι ῥήματος παραγωγή. 'Third, under one part of speech they [i.e. the Stoics] list verb and participle, calling the verb predicate, and the participle an inflected form of the verb, i.e. a derivation from the verb.' Cf. Robins (1997[4]) 41. Because of a remark by Priscian (*G.L.* II, 548,2 [*FDS* 575]), historians of linguistics used to think that Tryphon was the first who distinguished the participle as a separate word class. However, Matthaios (1999) 420ff. shows that Aristarchus already recognised the participle as a separate word class, for which he also used the term μετοχή.

[22] *Synt.* I.21. On the term καταλληλότης, see section 5.2.

in mind that the words that we call adjectives also belonged to the appellatives: it is possible that Dionysius is mainly thinking of participles that are used attributively, or as substantives.

(5) Finally, Dionysius states that the ἐπιῤῥήματα (adverbs) were divided from the ῥήματα (verbs). He apparently thinks that adverbs (ἐπίῤῥημματα) originally belonged to the verbs. According to other sources, the adverbs originally belonged to the nouns. Again, we can understand that Dionysius relates the ἐπίῤ-ρημα to the ῥῆμα. He may have thought that adverbs were considered parts of verbs (rather than that adverbs were called verbs): εὖ ποιεῖν ('to do well') would have been taken as one verb, and not yet as adverb plus verb.

We may conclude that, in his reconstruction of the development of the theory of the parts of speech, Dionysius is always reasoning on the basis of the name and function of the word classes that are distinguished in the system of his own time. Thus, he presumes that the pronouns originally belonged to the nouns, that the participles were originally part of the appellatives, and that the adverbs belonged to the verbs, before these parts of speech were recognised as separate groups.

4.2.2. *Dionysius' approach to the history of linguistics*

Dionysius of Halicarnassus was, of course, not a historian of linguistics in the strict sense. As we have seen, he only mentioned the development of the doctrine of the parts of speech in the context of his own discussion of composition. Nevertheless, we might very well regard Dionysius as the first representative of a typical approach to the history of linguistics, which indeed remained the standard until the last part of the twentieth century AD.

In the opening section of this study (1.1), I distinguished two possible approaches to the history of linguistics, namely the 'internal' and the 'external' approach.[23] A historian who adopts the 'internal' approach (Rorty's rational reconstruction) considers earlier 'linguists' as his colleagues: when dealing with a certain problem, he looks for solutions that have been suggested in earlier periods in the history of linguistics. He analyses and criticises these solutions, but does not always pay attention to the fact that earlier linguists did not ask the same questions

[23] Cf. Rorty (1984) and Sluiter (1998) 24–25.

as he does. An ancient example of this approach is the way in which Aristotle discussed the philosophers who lived before him: as Guthrie has pointed out, Aristotle looked at the early philosophers 'in the light of his own view of reality, and (…) saw them as "striving" to reach the same view.'[24] The second approach to the history of linguistics is the 'external' approach (Rorty's historical reconstruction): the historian who adopts this method does not try to apply earlier linguistic theories to his own purpose; instead, he attempts to take into account the context in which earlier ideas about language were developed, and adheres to the 'principle of charity'.[25]

It is clear that Dionysius of Halicarnassus belongs to the group of historians who adopt the 'internal' approach to the history of linguistics. He discusses the history of the word class system only because he has to find an answer to the question as to which elements are the central units that one uses when composing sentences and texts. Aristotle, the Stoics and the grammarians were, of course, dealing with different problems, but Dionysius applies their views, which originated in such diverse fields as ontology, logic, philology or grammar, to the topic of his own investigation into σύνθεσις.[26]

The internal method in the historiography of science, as we find it in Aristotle and Dionysius, is often combined with a strong belief in progress: the traditional historian of linguistics looks back from the standpoint of his own linguistic system and considers earlier periods as preliminary stages that were groping for and striving towards that system.[27] This attitude is particularly characteristic for nineteenth-century

[24] Guthrie (1957) 38.

[25] Sluiter (1998) 25.

[26] Cf. Lallot (1998) 124 on the discussion of the history of the word class theory in the scholia on the *Technê Grammatikê* (Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 515,19–521,37): 'L'interprétation fine de ces textes reste à faire, et la tâche n'est pas facile, car, ici comme dans toutes les doxographies antiques, la perspective historique est biaisée par une propension naturelle et permanente à l'anachronisme: les grammairiens qui en sont les auteurs (ou les compilateurs) la présentent toujours du point de vue de la doctrine et dans le métalangage qui sont les leurs.'

[27] Cf. Schmitter (1987) 103: 'In mehreren neueren methodologischen Beiträgen zur Geschichtsschreibung der Linguistik wird den Historiographen dieses Faches vorgeworfen, sie zeichneten ein unzutreffendes Bild seiner historischen Entwicklung, weil sie die Geschichte der Linguistik insgesamt als einen Prozeß beschrieben, der durch fortschreitenden Wissens- und Erkenntniszuwachs, durch allmähliches Aufdecken der Wahrheit sowie durch kontinuierliche Verbesserung von Theorien und Methoden charakterisiert sei.'

scholars such as Benfey and Steinthal.[28] But even a more recent scholar like Robins, in spite of his own warnings against the dangers of 'looking to the past through the eyes of the present', presents the development of the word class theory in a tree diagram, which bears a remarkable resemblance to the scheme that one can extract from the second chapter of Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *On Composition*.[29] Robins presents the system of eight word classes as the result of a long cumulative process: Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and the grammarians, it is suggested, all contributed their bit to the completion of the final word class system. As we have seen, the idea of progress is also clearly present in Dionysius' account: 'Theodectes and Aristotle *increased* the number of the parts of speech to three; the Stoics *raised* the number further to four; (…) others made the primary parts of speech many in number.' In fact, the resemblance between Robins and Dionysius is of course not so remarkable at all: by now it has become clear that the traditional approach to the history of linguistics, which tends to portray the history of linguistic ideas as the 'progressive discovery of the truth' (Robins [1997^4] 3), can be largely traced back to Dionysius' *On Composition*.

There is, however, one important aspect in which Dionysius differs from later historians of linguistics. Unlike later scholars, Dionysius does not present the history of the word class theory as leading to a final and complete system of eight or nine μέρη λόγου. Although he implicitly mentions a system of nine, he adds that other people distinguished even more parts of speech. Dionysius does not express his preference for a particular system, and in the end does not seem to care how many parts of speech really exist, 'whether there be three, four or any number of

[28] See Steinthal (1891^2 II) 209–218 and Benfey (1869) 121ff. For a discussion of their approach, see also Grotsch (1982) 118–139 and Schmitter (1987) 105.

[29] For a theoretical discussion of the problematic notion of 'progress', see Schmitter (1987), esp. 103–113. Robins' tree diagram can be found in Robins (1986) 26. For his (traditional) history of the parts of speech see Robins (1997^4) 32–43. Robins (1966) 18 and Robins (1986) are similar in this respect. Possibly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quintilian were his primary sources. Grotsch (1982) 147–150 analyses Robins' approach in the following way: 'Er [Robins] weist zurück sowohl eine reine Fortschrittsansicht von der Geschichte, wie auch eine teleologische Geschichtsansicht, wie auch eine, die vom Standpunkt der Gegenwart aus alles aus der Geschichte ausscheidet, was nicht auf die Gegenwart direkt bezogen werden kann, möchte aber davon, Wertgeschichtspunkte in die Geschichtsbetrachtung einzubringen, nicht gänzlich absehen, *sofern ein gültiger Fortschritt auszumachen sei*.' (My italics.) For his own warnings, see Robins (1997^4) 3: 'It is tempting, and flattering to one's contemporaries, to see the history of a science as the progressive discovery of the truth and the attainment of the right methods (…). But this is a fallacy.'

them', as he says. This attitude is reflected in other parts of his work, where he leaves open the question of how certain words should be classified. He tells us, for instance, that the word ἐπί ('on') might be called either a σύνδεσμος ('conjunction') or a πρόθεσις ('preposition').[30] Such remarks do not only indicate that, in Dionysius' time, the system of eight word classes had not yet become a fixed canon, but also that the exact number of word classes was not so important for Dionysius' specific purpose. For the composition of a text out of words, it does not matter to which particular word classes these words belong. A 'historian of linguistics' who was more inclined to view the word class system of his own time as the final truth about the matter was Quintilian, whose *Institutio oratoria* was written at the end of the first century AD.

4.2.3. *Quintilian's history of the theory of the parts of speech*

The similarities between the passages of Dionysius (*Comp.* 2) and Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* 1.4.17–21) have often been noted.[31] Quintilian's account of the development of the word class theory is as follows:[32]

> *Tum uidebit, ad quem hoc pertinet, quot et quae partes orationis, quamquam de numero parum conuenit. Veteres enim, quorum fuerunt Aristoteles quoque atque Theodectes, uerba modo et nomina et conuinctiones tradiderunt, uidelicet quod in uerbis uim sermonis, in nominibus materiam (quia alterum est quod loquimur, alterum de quo loquimur), in conuinctionibus autem complexum eorum esse iudicauerunt: quas coniunctiones a plerisque dici scio, sed haec uidetur ex syndesmo magis propria tralatio. Paulatim a philosophis ac maxime Stoicis auctus est numerus, ac primum conuinctionibus articuli adiecti, post praepositiones: nominibus appellatio, deinde pronomen, deinde mixtum uerbo participium, ipsis uerbis aduerbia. Noster sermo articulos non desiderat ideoque in alias partes orationis sparguntur, sed accedit superioribus interiectio. Alii tamen ex idoneis dumtaxat auctoribus octo partes secuti sunt, ut Aristarchus et aetate nostra Palaemon, qui uocabulum siue appellationem nomini subiecerunt tamquam speciem eius, at ii qui aliud nomen, aliud uocabulum faciunt,*

[30] *Comp.* 22.102,16: see section 3.6.4. Again, the English translations of the Greek technical terms given here are no real equivalents: the σύνδεσμος covers more than our 'conjunctions'.

[31] Cf. Colson (1924) 45–46, Schenkeveld (1994) 270 n. 22, Lallot (1998) 124 and Matthaios (1999) 194 n. 17. On Quintilian's views on the Latin language and its divergences from Greek, see Fögen (2002).

[32] Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* 1.4.17–21. On this passage, see also Colson (1914, 1916 and 1924). I repeat my remark on *Comp.* 2.6,17–7,21 (section 4.2.1): there is no satisfactory method of translating the terms of the parts of speech in this overview. This case is even more problematic, because Quintilian himself is translating Greek terms into Latin. Again, I preserve the Latin terms in the translation, adding the usual (anachronistic) translations between inverted commas.

nouem. Nihilominus fuerunt qui ipsum adhuc uocabulum ab appellatione diducerent, ut esset uocabulum corpus uisu tactuque manifestum: 'domus' 'lectus', appellatio cui uel alterum deesset uel utrumque: 'uentus' 'caelum' 'deus' 'uirtus'. Adiciebant et adseuerationem, ut 'eu', et tractionem, ut 'fasciatim': quae mihi non adprobantur.

'The teacher responsible will then need to consider how many parts of speech there are, and what they are, although there is little agreement about the number. Earlier writers, including also Aristotle and Theodectes, listed only *verba* ('verbs'), *nomina* ('nouns') and *convinctiones* ('convinctions'): evidently, they took the force of language to be in the verbs, and the substance in the nouns, because the one is what we say, the other is what we speak about, while the 'convinctions' provided the connections between them. (I know most people say 'conjunctions', but 'convinctions' seems the better translation of *syndesmos*.) The philosophers, particularly the Stoics, gradually increased the number: to 'convinctions' were first added *articuli* ('articles'), and then *praepositiones* ('prepositions'); to 'nouns' was added the *appellatio* ('appellative'), next the *pronomen* ('pronoun'), and then the quasi-verbal *participium* ('participle'); to 'verbs' were added *adverbia* ('adverbs'). Our language does not need *articuli* ('articles'), and these are therefore distributed among other parts of speech, but in addition to the parts mentioned previously there is the *interiectio* ('interjection'). Some, belonging to the competent authorities, have gone as far as eight parts of speech:[33] so Aristarchus and, in our own day, Palaemon, who both put 'vocable' or 'appellative' under 'noun', as species of that genus. Those who distinguished 'vocable' from 'noun' make the total nine. Yet some have also separated 'vocable' itself from 'appellation', making 'vocable' indicate visible and tangible objects—'house' or 'bed'—and 'appellation' things in which either or both of these characteristics were absent, like 'wind, 'heaven', 'God', or virtue'. They have also added 'asseveration' (like *eu*) and 'derivative' (like *fasciatim*). I do not approve of these.'

There are many similarities between the accounts of Dionysius and Quintilian, and it is probable that either the Roman made use of the work of his predecessor, or that the two versions are based on the same

[33] Most translators take the words *ex idoneis auctoribus* with *secuti sunt*: 'others followed good authorities'. Russell translates 'some, with good authorities to back them'. It is, however, probable that Quintilian considered Aristarchus and Palaemon the 'competent authorities' rather than that he thought that they followed competent authorities. Thus, I would read Quintilian as follows: 'some, belonging to the competent authorities, followed eight parts of speech; so Aristarchus and Palaemon.' The only problem is the interpretation of *dumtaxat*. We may follow Matthaios (1999) 191 n. 2, who also interprets *ex idoneis auctoribus* as a partitive construction: 'Andere indes von den kompetenten—versteht sich—Autoritäten folgten acht Redeteilen.' For the expression *idonei auctores*, see also Kaster (1978).

source.[34] Blank has argued that much of the grammatical theory that is found in both Sextus Empiricus and Quintilian can be traced back to Asclepiades of Myrlea, who possibly taught in Rome in the early first century BC (see section 1.4).[35] Sextus Empiricus does not refer to the history of the word class system, but we should not rule out the possibility that Asclepiades was the model of the accounts of Dionysius and Quintilian.[36] There are, however, also differences between Dionysius and Quintilian. Dionysius states that the participle was separated from the appellative, whereas Quintilian thinks that it was separated from the verb.[37] An interesting difference is the fact that Dionysius constantly speaks of 'splitting' and 'separation', whereas Quintilian refers to the 'addition' and 'extension' of the system.[38] Dionysius uses the words χωρίζω ('to separate'), διαιρέω ('to divide'), ἀποζεύγνυμι ('to part') and τομή ('division'), while Quintilian uses the verbs *adicio* ('to add') and *accedo* ('to join', 'to be added').[39] The different vocabulary seems to reflect a difference in perspective: Dionysius reasons from the past and emphasises the many distinctions that were developed in the course of time, while Quintilian presents the history of the word class theory as gradually leading to the completion of the system in his own time. Quintilian's terminology of 'adding' seems to suggest (though not explicitly) that the early systems were not complete, whereas Dionysius' terminology of 'division' seems to imply that Aristotle's terms already covered everything, although the system was refined in later times.

These diverging perspectives are related to another difference between the two accounts. While Dionysius, as we have seen, does not really care how many parts of speech exactly exist, 'whether there be three, four or any number of them', Quintilian insists that there be clarity how many parts of speech there are, and what they are: *quot et*

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[34] Rhys Roberts (1910) 71 thinks that Dionysius and Quintilian used the same source. Brandenburg (2005) 65 also rejects the idea that Quintilian's overview directly depends on Dionysius: 'Man kann also davon ausgehen daß beide derselben Tradition verpflichtet, aber nicht unmittelbar voneinander abhängig sind.'

[35] Blank (1998) xlv–xlvi.

[36] Kroll (1907) 91–92 already suggested that Asclepiades was Dionysius' source for the history of the word class theory in *Comp.* 2.

[37] Cf. Brandenburg (2005) 65.

[38] See Brandenburg (2005) 66, who distinguishes between Dionysius' 'Meronomie' and Quintilian's 'Taxonomie'.

[39] With respect to the *number* of 'parts of speech', both Dionysius and Quintilian speak in terms of extension: Dionysius uses the words προήγαγον, προὐβίβασαν, προσαγαγόντες, while Quintilian says *auctus est*.

quae partes orationis. These words remind us of the opening of Donatus' *Ars minor*, which I quoted above (p. 168). Although Quintilian admits that there is no agreement on the exact number, he clearly opts for a system of eight or nine parts of speech, and he explicitly rejects the later additions to the system (*quae mihi non adprobantur*).[40] To explain the different attitudes of Dionysius and Quintilian, we should look at the contexts in which they were presenting their histories of the word class system. In Dionysius' account, the word classes figure as the primary building blocks of composition. Certainty about the exact number of these 'elements' was not relevant for Dionysius' purpose, since, when one composes a text, it does not really matter whether one assigns a word to one word class or another. Quintilian, on the other hand, discussed the history of the word class system in a passage about the teaching of Latin and Greek in the school of the grammarian. The procedure of *merismos* (the classification of the parts of speech) was a standard exercise in the lessons of the *grammaticus*, so that clarity about the number of word classes was necessary. Obviously, a teacher of grammar would not want to bother his students too much with the different views that various scholars had developed on the subject.[41]

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[40] Murphy (2000) 489 presents Quintilian's views wrongly by remarking that the Roman rhetorician 'is not sure how many parts of speech there are, and he concludes by saying "it is a matter of no relevance" (1.4.21).' In fact, Quintilan does not say that the number of the parts of speech in general 'is a matter of no relevance': this is only true of the question whether one should distinguish appellative and noun as two different word classes: *vocabulum an appellatio dicenda sit* προσηγορία *et subicienda nomini necne, quia parui refert, liberum opinaturis relinquo*.

[41] Another difference between Dionysius and Quintilian is the following: Dionysius distinguishes five stages in the development of the theory of the parts of speech, while Quintilian summarises these in only two stages, to which he adds two Roman developments of the system. The four stages in Quintilian's overview are organised in the following way: (1) like Dionysius, Quintilian starts with Aristotle and Theodectes, who would have known three parts of speech. (2) Next, Quintilian states that the number of parts of speech increased 'gradually' (*paulatim*), but, unlike Dionysius, in the first instance he does not present the extension of the system chronologically, but *systematically*: the starting point is the system of Aristotle, and the new word classes are discussed in relation to the three original ones, namely σύνδεσμος (*convinctio*), ὄνομα (*nomen*), and ῥῆμα (*verbum*). Within his presentation of the development of the system Quintilian does make chronological distinctions, by adding words like *primum* ('first'), *post* ('next') and *deinde* ('thereafter'). Quintilian's second stage includes the same word classes as Dionysius' fifth stage. (3) The third stage in Quintilian's overview is the Roman substitution of the interjection for the article. Quintilian remarks that some people put the appellative under 'noun' ('as species of that genus'), while other people consider *vocabulum* and *nomen* as two different word classes. That makes the total number of parts of speech eight or nine. (4) In a fourth stage, even more distinctions

4.2.4. *Dionysius, Quintilian and modern historians of linguistics*

In his influential article 'Rethinking the History of Language Science in Classical Antiquity' (1987), Daniel Taylor states that one of the key notions that are central to the traditional version of Graeco-Roman language science is 'the emphasis upon the development of the doctrine of the parts of speech, especially as it accumulates or evolves in measured stages from its beginnings in Plato to its fullest expression in Dionysius Thrax.'[42] In this section (4.2), I have tried to show in what sense Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quintilian can be considered the prototypes of modern traditional historiographers of linguistics.

Dionysius' history of the word class system is in two respects characteristic for the traditional historiography of linguistics. First, he adopts an 'internal' approach to the history of science, applying earlier views on language, which were developed in several disciplines, to his own particular subject, which is in his case the art of composition. Second, his account of the development of the word class theory is characterised by the idea that *gradual progress* was made by successive stages in the history of linguistics. Unlike many other historians of linguistics, however, Dionysius does not present the word class system of his own time as the ultimate truth. Quintilian, on the other hand, expresses his preference for a system with eight or nine parts of speech. I have explained this difference by pointing to the different contexts in which the two writers presented their views.[43]

Over the last two decades, Taylor himself and other historians of ancient linguistics (such as Schenkeveld, Law and Sluiter) have distanced themselves from the traditional approach to the history of linguistics in general and to the history of the word class theory in particular. Nowadays, scholars are more willing to recognise that Plato, the Stoics, the Alexandrian philologists and the technical grammarians all

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were added by 'others' (*alii*): *vocabulum*, *adseveratio*, and *tractio*; but Quintilian himself rejects these differentiations. The additions to the system that he mentions would increase the total number of word classes to a maximum of twelve, but Quintilian himself opts for a system of eight or nine word classes.

[42] Taylor (1987) 3.

[43] Priscian (6th century AD) seems to have been the first who both presented a history of the word class theory and adhered to a fixed number of eight *partes orationis*: see *G.L.* II, 54,5–55,3. Similar is the *Ars anonyma Bernensis* (*FDS* 549). Donatus (*G.L.* IV, 372) does not discuss the history of the word class system, but only remarks that *multi plures, multi pauciores partes orationis putant*.

had their own, different purposes; and, accordingly, that the units that they called μέρη λόγου were entirely different matters for all of them.[44] In the article mentioned above, Daniel Taylor stated that the different philosophers, philologists and grammarians 'were not playing the game by the same rules'.[45] I would like to go one step further: *they were not even playing the same game*. Philosophers were not interested in enumerating as many word classes as possible, so one would do them wrong by interpreting them as if they were grammarians. As a *historian of linguistics*, therefore, I do not agree with the way in which Dionysius and Quintilian presented the history of the word class system. As a *historian of the historiography of linguistics*, however, I conclude that their approach to the history of linguistics has been very influential.

4.3. *Dionysius as a rhetorician: the parts of speech in the theory of composition*

In the previous section, we have seen that Dionysius regards the μόρια λόγου as the primary building blocks in the procedure of composition. The emphasis on the μόρια λόγου in Dionysius' definition of composition (*Comp.* 2.6,17–19: ποιά τις θέσις παρ' ἄλληλα τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων) can be explained as follows. On the one hand, it indicates that, in Dionysius' view, words are the central units in the process of composition; on the other hand, it underlines the fact that words are components (μέρη or μόρια) and building blocks (στοιχεῖα) of larger structures (namely clauses, periods and discourse).[46] The idea that the scientific

[44] See also Matthaios (1999) 492: 'Die von Dionysios van Halikarnaß und Quintilian gegebene Erklärung für die Erweiterung des Wortartensystems durch Aufspaltung umfangreicher Redeteile läßt genauso wie die in den grammatischen Berichten vorgenommene Zuweisung der einzelnen Wortarten zum stoischen Redeteilsystem die Tatsache außer acht, daß der Begriff "Redeteil" bzw. "Wortart" von Schultradition zu Schultradition eine andere Bedeutung hat.'

[45] Taylor (1987) 5.

[46] It is remarkable that in *Thuc.* 22.358,15–17 Dionysius divides σύνθεσις into κόμματα ('cuts', i.e. short clauses), κῶλα and periods. 'Words' are not mentioned here: the 'elementary parts of speech' belong to the selection of words (ἐκλογή), not to composition. Thus, the 'comma' takes the place of the 'word'. The division of composition into comma, colon and period, which seems to be more traditional than the one into word, colon and period, is also found in Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.4.22: *comma*, κῶλον and περίοδος (see below). In the rest of Dionysius' works, however, the κόμμα plays a minor part, although it figures as an important unit in the discussion of poetry resembling prose: see *Comp.* 26.136,9ff. See also *Dem.* 39.213,1 and 43.227,4. On the *comma*, see Viljamaa

treatment of a certain subject should start from its 'elements' is a common assumption in various ancient language disciplines.[47] According to Dionysius, the combination of the parts of speech forms the clauses (κῶλα), the joining of the clauses constitutes the periods (περίοδοι), and these make up the complete discourse.[48] How does he develop the idea of composition from μόρια λόγου in the rest of his treatise on σύνθεσις?

The reader who has just been told that composition starts from the μόρια λόγου might be disappointed to find out that most parts of Dionysius' work deal in fact with other units of σύνθεσις. Many chapters concentrate on letters and syllables on the one hand and clauses on the other.[49] Still, it would be wrong to suggest that Dionysius turns out to reject his own definition of σύνθεσις. Pohl argues that Dionysius 'improves' his original definition, which started from the μόρια λόγου, by offering 'eine verbesserte Definition' that focuses on words, clauses and periods.[50] However, the passage that she regards as a 'new definition' is

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(2003) 173–176, who compares κόμματα to the intonation units in modern discourse analysis. That it is not self-evident that composition should start from words (or μόρια λόγου) is clear from 'Demetrius', who regards clauses (κῶλα) as the starting point for prose writing. See *Eloc.* 1: 'Just as poetry is organised by metres (…), so too prose is organised and divided by the so-called clauses.' Having discussed the length and use of clauses, 'Demetrius' points out that 'from the combination of such clauses and phrases are formed what are called periods' (*Eloc.* 10).

[47] See Van Ophuijsen (1987) 9 on Hephaestion, *On Metre*: '(…) this is to be explained by the assumption common to the Greek grammarians that the part is systematically prior to the whole, so that, to be scientific, the exposition of a subject must proceed from its ultimate elements of analysis, the atoms as it were, through its intermediate constituents, to the level at which the need for an exposition is felt.' See further sections 2.2 and 4.2.1 on Apollonius Dyscolus (*Syntax* I.2; cf. Swiggers & Wouters [1995] 37 n. 46) and Aristides Quintilianus.

[48] *Comp.* 2.7,14–18: see section 4.2.1 above. Viljamaa (2003) refers to this same text (*Comp.* 2.7,14–18) when he states that 'in Dionysius' opinion, the *colon* is the most important unit of linguistic expression, and indeed the central unit of the sentence structure (…).' I do not see how the passage that Viljamaa cites supports this conclusion. The starting point of composition is the arrangement of words, not the joining of clauses. Viljamaa fails to see that this is the difference between Dionysius and 'Demetrius'. For the ancient theory of the period, see Siebenborn (1987).

[49] Composition from letters and syllables is the subject of *Comp.* 14–16 (on μέλος), composition from κῶλα is treated in *Comp.* 7–9 (the second part of the discussion of the three activities of composition). Tukey (1909a) 189 argues that Dionysius' treatise deals with σύνθεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων, τῶν συλλαβῶν and τῶν γραμμάτων.

[50] Pohl (1968) 2. In a similar way, Tukey (1909a) 188 complains that the connotation of the term σύνθεσις changes in the course of Dionysius' treatise: in the first nine chapters σύνθεσις means σύνθεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων, whereas in the later chapters, σύνθεσις is ἁρμονία, which concerns the musical aspects of language; in the latter sense, σύνθεσις would also include the *selection* of (euphonious) words. In my view, however, words (μόρια

in fact a list of the ἔργα of composition: 'The functions of composition are to place the words in a proper way beside each other and to give the clauses the fitting harmony and to divide the discourse suitably into periods.'[51] In this passage, Dionysius does not reject his original definition: composition still starts from words (the 'parts of the phrase') as its basic units, even if the arrangement of clauses and periods also belongs to its functions. Pohl thinks that the rhetorical point of view (which deals with words, clauses and periods) takes the place of Dionysius' earlier grammatical point of view.[52] In my opinion, it would be more correct to say that the term μόρια λόγου, which refers to words not only as 'word classes' but also as 'parts of the phrase', enables Dionysius to combine the two perspectives. The grammatical point of view is not rejected, but it becomes an integrated part of the rhetorical process of composition: the correct use of word classes and their *accidentia* is one aspect of σύνθεσις. This aspect is especially highlighted in three passages of the work *On Composition*, namely the investigation into natural word order (*Comp.* 5), the discussion of the three activities of σύνθεσις (*Comp.* 6), and the description of the austere composition type (*Comp.* 22).[53]

In the first of these passages (*Comp.* 5) Dionysius tries out whether the juxtaposition of words according to their grammatical categories results into beautiful composition: should nouns precede verbs, verbs precede adverbs, and substantives come before adjectives? This discussion of 'natural' word order is arguably the best (though perhaps not the most successful) example of the integration of grammatical and rhetorical theory. It would thus deserve to be treated in this section as an example of the rhetorical use of the linguistic theory of the μόρια λόγου. How-

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λόγου) remain the starting point for composition throughout the treatise, even if some passages deal with the forming of (mimetic) words (*Comp.* 16) or other aspects of sound. In *Comp.* 22–24, composition still starts from words as its building blocks: see section 4.3.2.

[51] *Comp.* 2.7,18–21: ἔστι δὴ τῆς συνθέσεως ἔργα τά τε ὀνόματα οἰκείως θεῖναι παρ' ἄλληλα καὶ τοῖς κώλοις ἀποδοῦναι τὴν προσήκουσαν ἁρμονίαν καὶ ταῖς περιόδοις διαλαβεῖν εὖ τὸν λόγον. This text immediately follows the history of the theory of the parts of speech (see section 4.2.1).

[52] Pohl (1968) 2.

[53] Pohl (1968) 3 states: 'Mit dem Scheitern dieses Versuches [i.e. the discussion of natural word order in *Comp.* 5] wird der grammatikalisch-logische Gesichtspunkt endgültig aufgegeben.' In fact, however, the importance of the grammatical aspects of the art of composition are made very clear already in *Comp.* 6, where σχηματισμός (the grammatical formation of words) is the second activity of composition.

ever, the passage is also heavily influenced by philosophical ideas that (as I will argue) originate in the school of Stoic philosophers. Because of the complexity of the subject, I have chosen to give the passage on natural word order a separate treatment in the next chapter (section 5.3) of this study. Since Dionysius finally decides to abandon the approach to σύνθεσις undertaken in *Comp.* 5, the theory of natural word order in fact falls outside his theory of composition. In the next sections (4.3.1 and 4.3.2) we will therefore focus on the two other passages (*Comp.* 6 and *Comp.* 22–24) that develop the theory of 'placing the parts of speech beside each other' (θέσις παρ' ἄλληλα τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων).

4.3.1. *The parts of speech as building blocks: text as architecture*

In the sixth chapter of the treatise, Dionysius starts a discussion of the three activities (ἔργα) of the art of composition:[54] 'the first is to observe which element fitted together with which element will naturally produce a beautiful and attractive combination. The second is to judge how each of the parts that are to be fitted together should be shaped so as to improve the harmonious appearance of the whole. The third is to judge whether any modification is required in the material used—I mean subtraction, addition or alteration—and to carry out such changes with a proper view to their future purpose.'[55] It should be observed that these 'three activities of the theory of composition' (τῆς συνθετικῆς ἐπιστήμης τρία ἔργα) do not correspond to the earlier three συνθέσεως ἔργα mentioned above (section 4.3).[56] The three 'functions of composition' (mentioned in *Comp.* 2) are the arrangement of words, clauses and periods respectively. The 'activities of the theory of composition' (treated in *Comp.* 6), however, are three techniques that apply to *each* of the levels of language (words, clauses, and periods). In other words, the first list of ἔργα introduces the three levels of composition, while the second list of ἔργα enumerates 'processes' or 'tech-

[54] See also Viljamaa (2003) 170.

[55] *Comp.* 6.27,19–28,2: ἓν μὲν ἰδεῖν, τί μετὰ τίνος ἁρμοττόμενον πέφυκε καλὴν καὶ ἡδεῖαν λήψεσθαι συζυγίαν· ἕτερον δὲ γνῶναι τῶν ἁρμόττεσθαι μελλόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἂν ἕκαστον σχηματισθὲν κρείττονα ποιήσειε φαίνεσθαι τὴν ἁρμονίαν· τρίτον δ' εἴ τι δεῖται μετασκευῆς τῶν λαμβανομένων, ἀφαιρέσεως λέγω καὶ προσθήκης καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, γνῶναί τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν μέλλουσαν χρείαν οἰκείως ἐξεργάσασθαι. I have adapted Usher's translation. In *Comp.* 6.27,19, I read ἁρμοττόμενον with P (followed by Aujac and Rhys Roberts); Usener reads ἁρμοζόμενον.

[56] Compare *Comp.* 2.7,18–21 and *Comp.* 6.27,18–28,2.

niques' that concern all levels: they should be applied first to words (which are the building blocks of clauses), then to clauses (which are the building blocks of periods), and finally to periods (which make up the λόγος). Thus, in *Comp.* 6, Dionysius explains how the three techniques are applied to the μόρια λόγου; in the next three chapters (*Comp.* 7–9) he shows that *mutatis mutandis* the same ἔργα play a role in the arrangement of clauses.[57] Finally, he adds that what he has said also applies to the so-called periods.[58] Dionysius' list of three ἔργα (attractive juxtaposition, σχηματισμός and μετασκευή) does not correspond to the lists of Roman rhetoricians. Quintilian lists order (*ordo*), linkage (*iunctura*) and rhythm (*numerus*) and Cicero divides composition into euphony, periodic structure and rhythm.[59] The first item of the latter list agrees more or less with Dionysius' general interest: words must be arranged so that the final syllables may fit the following initial syllables 'as neatly as possible, and that the words may have the most agreeable sounds'. However, Cicero does not mention the grammatical formation of words, whereas the notion of rhythm (*numerus*) is absent from Dionysius' list.[60] It seems, then, that Dionysius takes an original approach to σύνθεσις by integrat-

[57] I do not agree with Rhys Roberts (1910) 3, who, in his summary of *On Composition*, states that there are three 'processes' of composition with regard to words, and only two in the case of κῶλα. Dionysius' discussion of the ἔργα of the composition of clauses (*Comp.* 7.30,18–31,4) is clearly divided into three parts: καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα (1) ἁρμόσαι πρὸς ἄλληλα δεῖ ὥστ' οἰκεῖα φαίνεσθαι καὶ φίλα καὶ (2) σχηματίσαι ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχηται κράτιστα (3) προκατασκευάσαι τε, εἴ πού τι δέοι, μειώσει καὶ πλεονασμῷ καὶ εἰ δή τιν' ἄλλην μετασκευὴν δέχεται τὰ κῶλα. 'For also these [i.e. just like the words] one must (1) join to one another so that they appear familiar and belonging to each other and (2) give them the best form of which they are capable and (3) adapt them further, if necessary, by abbreviation, expansion and by any other change of form that clauses admit.' It is obvious that these ἔργα on the level of the clauses correspond on the level of words to (1) the putting together of the μόρια λόγου (*Comp.* 6.28,16–20), (2) the grammatical formation (σχηματισμός) of words (*Comp.* 6.28,20–29,14) and (3) the modification (μετασκευή) of words for the sake of harmony (*Comp.* 6.29,14–30,12). The repetition of the terms σχηματίσαι and μετασκευή in the passage on clause arrangement is significant. Cf. Nassal (1910) 28–29.

[58] *Comp.* 9.35,17–36,1.

[59] Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.4.22; Cicero, *Orator* 149. Cf. Scaglione (1972) 49.

[60] For these reasons, it is unclear to me how Nassal (1910) 35–36 can think that Dionysius' list of ἔργα in *Comp.* 2.7,18–21 'entspricht (…) vollständig' the list in Cicero, *Orator* 149: the only similarity is that both lists consist of three items. In *Orator* 219, Cicero has *compositio*, *concinnitas* and *numeri*. In *De oratore* 3.171, Cicero (Crassus) states that 'connection of words' (*continuatio verborum*) requires two things, namely 'juxtaposition' (*conlocationem*) and 'a certain cadence and form' (*modum quendam formamque*). Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.4.22 lists three units of composition, namely *incisa* or *commata*, cola and the period. He then discusses three 'necessary elements' of composition, namely *ordo*,

ing grammatical and rhetorical notions; but it is also possible that he was influenced by Hellenistic ideas on poetic composition, such as we find in Philodemus' *On Poems*.[61]

Before he goes into details, Dionysius illustrates the three activities of composition with the analogy of the builder of a house (οἰκοδόμος), who 'composes' a building from stones, timber, tiling, etc. The builder asks himself three questions: '(1) what stone, timber and brick is to be fitted together with what other stone, timber and brick? (2) How should each of the materials that are being joined be fitted, and on which of the sides? (3) If anything fits badly, how can that very piece be pared down and trimmed and made to fit well?'[62] The shipwright will apply the same method, says Dionysius, and 'those who are going to put the parts of speech together effectively' (τοὺς μέλλοντας εὖ συνθήσειν τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια) should proceed similarly. Their building blocks are not stone, timber and tiling, but noun, verb and the other parts of speech. The analogy between the composition of a text and the building of a house is found in other ancient texts as well.[63] For Dionysius, the idea seems to

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iunctura, numerus ('order, linkage and rhythm'). The latter bears some resemblance to Cicero, *Orator* 149, but Quintilian's treatment of the three aspects of composition seems to be independent.

[61] In *Comp.* 4.22,3–23,5, Dionysius claims to be original.

[62] *Comp.* 6.28,5–13: ὅ τε γὰρ οἰκοδόμος ὅταν πορίσηται τὴν ὕλην ἐξ ἧς μέλλει κατασκευάζειν τὴν οἰκίαν, λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ κέραμον καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, συντίθησιν ἐκ τούτων ἤδη τὸ ἔργον τρία ταῦτα πραγματευόμενος, ποίῳ δεῖ λίθῳ τε καὶ ξύλῳ καὶ πλίνθῳ ποῖον ἁρμόσαι λίθον ἢ ξύλον ἢ πλίνθον, ἔπειτα πῶς τῶν ἁρμοζομένων ἕκαστον καὶ ἐπὶ ποίας πλευρᾶς ἐδράσαι, καὶ τρίτον, εἴ τι δύσεδρόν ἐστιν, ἀποκροῦσαι καὶ περικόψαι καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εὔεδρον ποιῆσαι.

[63] The comparison between text and architecture may be traced back to Democritus fr. 21 Diels-Kranz: Ὅμηρος φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης ἐπέων κόσμον ἐτεκτήνατο παντοίων. 'Since Homer was divinely inspired, he succeeded in building a *kosmos* out of all kinds of words.' For the influence of this text on the poetic theory that regards a text as a 'universe' consisting of elements (στοιχεῖα), see Armstrong (1995) 212–213. 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 13 compares clauses (κῶλα) to stones: 'The clauses in the periodic style may in fact be compared to the stones (τοῖς λίθοις) that support and hold together the roof which encircles them, and the clauses of the disjointed style to stones which are simply thrown about near one another and not built into a structure.' Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 7.pr.1 compares *dispositio* (the ordering of the material, the second *officium oratoris*) to putting together 'stone, timber, and other building material' (*saxa atque materiam et cetera aedificanti utilia*). In *Inst. orat.* 9.4.27, a sentence whose words have not been put in their right places is compared to a construction of unhewn stones (*structura saxorum rudium*). In some cases, the analogy is limited to the use of a specific word. Thus, Cicero, *De oratore* 3.173 speaks of *componere et struere verba* ('to put and build the words together'). Many rhetorical terms seem to be based on this analogy, such as κανών, ἕδρα and ὕλη (cf. Rhys Roberts [1910] 106 n. 2). Finally, I would like to add that 'Demetrius' (*Eloc.* 91), in his discussion of compound words (σύνθετα ὀνόματα), recommends the word 'archi-

be even more important than for other rhetoricians, because he focuses on stylistic composition.[64] With regard to the organisation of subject matter (οἰκονομία), Dionysius adopts Aristotle's concept of *organic* unity, thus taking a 'biological' approach to discourse.[65] For example, Dionysius praises Herodotus because out of a great variety of subjects he has made one 'harmoniously unified body' (σύμφωνον ἓν σῶμα).[66] With regard to stylistic composition (σύνθεσις), however, Dionysius' approach is determined by the concept of *architecture*.[67] The architectural character of discourse underlies not only his views on the relation between composition and selection of words (*Comp.* 2) and his discussion of the ἔργα of composition (*Comp.* 6), but also the description of the three types of σύνθεσις (*Comp.* 22–24).[68] Some scholars have pointed to related views in 'Demetrius' and Quintilian, but one very relevant parallel has so far

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tects' (ἀρχιτέκτονας) as a useful composite. He may have selected this example as a *leçon par l'exemple*, i.e. the word 'master-builder' is well built itself.

[64] Dionysius consistently distinguishes between subject matter (ὁ πραγματικὸς τόπος) and style (ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος). Each of these components consists of two parts: ὁ πραγματικὸς τόπος deals with παρασκευή (= εὕρεσις), 'invention', and χρῆσις (οἰκονομία), 'arrangement'; ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος deals with ἐκλογὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων, 'selection of words' and σύνθεσις, 'composition'. See esp. *Dem.* 51.240,20–241,7. Kremer (1907) 2–3 offers a reconstruction of Dionysius' rhetorical system that relies on *Thuc.* 22, where Dionysius mentions κόμμα, κῶλον and περίοδος as the units of composition. This division does not correspond to the one in *De compositione verborum* (see above, pp. 183–185).

[65] Aristotle's comparison of epic to 'a single and whole animal' (*Po.* 1459a20) is reflected in *Rh.* 1415b7–9, where it is said that in some cases a speech does not need a *prooimion*, except in order to state the subject in summary (κεφαλαιωδῶς), so that 'like a body it may have a head' (ἵνα ἔχῃ ὥσπερ σῶμα κεφαλήν). Cf. Heath (1989) 20.

[66] *Pomp.* 3.238,8–11. On Dionysius' use of the Platonic concept of organic unity, see also Fornaro (1997a) 209–210. Heath (1989) 85–89 points out that by organic unity Dionysius does not mean a *thematic* integration, but rather a text in which all elements 'are brought together in the appropriate order so defined'. On Dionysius' evaluation of the unity of Herodotus' work, see also De Jong (2002) 245.

[67] Breitenbach (1911) 170–172 shows that Aristotle's ideas on the nature of discourse are influenced by Plato's concept of organic unity (*Phdr.* 264c2–5, cf. Sicking [1963]), whereas Dionysius' point of view is 'architectonic'. Breitenbach is right as far as the treatise *On Composition* is concerned, but traces of Aristotelian ideas on text as an organic unity are found in Dionysius' treatment of subject matter (as in *Pomp.* 3.238,8–11 above). In other words, the scope of *On Composition* accounts to a large extent for the difference between Aristotle and Dionysius.

[68] *Comp.* 2.8,3–16: in arts that combine materials and make from them a composite product, such as building (οἰκοδομική), carpentry (τεκτονική) and embroidery (ποικιλτική), the potentialities of composition are second in logical order to those of selection, but they are prior in potency. This is also true in the case of λόγος: σύνθεσις is logically second to ἐκλογή, but it has far more power. For *Comp.* 22.96,15–19 (analogy between the austere composition and a construction of blocks of natural stone put together), see section 4.3.2 below.

largely been ignored.[69] In Philodemus' *On Poems*, there is a fragment in which one of the Hellenistic *kritikoi* (see section 1.5) compares composition (σύνθεσις) to 'house-building' (οἰκοδομῆ[σαι]).[70] Janko considers the possibility of correcting οἰκοδομεῖν here into οἰκονομεῖν, but I think that Dionysius' comparison of the orator with an οἰκοδόμος provides a convincing argument for retaining the text as it stands.[71] The context of the fragment in Philodemus is very much in line with Dionysius' approach to composition. The critic who uses the word οἰκοδομεῖν in the relevant fragment (Pausimachus, according to Janko) points out that some claim that good poetry depends on beautiful words, whereas others think that beautiful poetry arises from commonplace words that have been well arranged.[72] The same arguments play an important role in the opening chapters of Dionysius' *On Composition*.[73] We may add that 'Longinus', in his discussion of σύνθεσις, which echoes Dionysius' view on the magical effects of good composition (see section 6.2), also speaks of τῇ τε τῶν λέξεων ἐποικοδομήσει ('piling phrase on phrase').[74] In view of the other parallels between Dionyius and the *kritikoi* (which are partly taken up by 'Longinus'), we cannot exclude the possibility that Dionysius' concept of σύνθεσις as house building is influenced by the views of Hellenistic critics of poetry.[75] Stanford interestingly compares the ancient concept of 'euphonic architecture' to an orchestral symphony.[76] Indeed, the concept of architectural discourse or poetry seems to be closely connected to the idea of musical and magical speech (see section 6.2), which is also a prominent theme in Dionysius and 'Longinus'.

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[69] For the parallels in 'Demetrius' and Quintilian, see above, n. 63. I should add that 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 33 points out that an enthymeme can have the accidental property of periodicity, just as a building (οἰκοδομούμενον) can have the accidental property of whiteness. This comparison, however, does not seem to pertain to the characterisation of composition as a process of putting building blocks together.

[70] Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 55 Janko.

[71] Janko (2000) 245 n. 4 mentions the parallel, but seems unconvinced.

[72] See Janko (2000) 245.

[73] Cf. *Comp.* 3.9,2–9. See also section 7.2.

[74] 'Longinus', *Subl.* 39.3. Cf. Janko (2000) 245 n. 4. Aristotle, *Rh.* 1365a discusses the powerful effect of 'combination and building up' (τὸ συντιθέναι καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν). Here the term ἐποικοδομεῖν probably refers to the figure of speech that builds a chain of clauses, each of which repeats one or more words from the preceding clause: see also *Rh. Al.* 3.11. Some rhetoricians simply call this figure 'climax'. See Anderson (2000) 57–58 on ἐποικοδόμησις.

[75] See also sections 1.5, 3.2, 3.3, 6.2, 6.6, and 7.2.

[76] Stanford (1967) 78–79 and 92. I may be allowed to carry this analogy one step further by remarking that, conversely, the symphonies of Anton Bruckner are often characterised as 'cathedrals'.

When discussing the concept of architectural text, we should not forget that while Dionysius was teaching in Rome, the Roman Vitruvius was writing his ten books *De architectura*. That work was probably published between 30 and 20 BC.[77] Just like Dionysius (*Preface to On the Ancient Orators*), Vitruvius starts his work by commenting on the new world order that started with Octavianus' victory at Actium (31 BC). Both Dionysius and Vitruvius are exponents of the classicism of Augustan Rome, and they both demand that their students (future orators and future architects respectively) are broadly educated. According to Vitruvius, the education programme for the architect includes, among other things, literature, history, philosophy, music, medicine, and law.[78] At the beginning of his work, Vitruvius points out that architecture consists of *ordinatio* or τάξις ('ordering'), *dispositio* or διάθεσις ('arrangement'), *eurythmia* ('harmony'), *symmetria* ('proportion'), *decor* ('propriety') and *distributio* or οἰκονομία ('allocation').[79] All these terms or their Greek equivalents play a role in rhetorical theory as well: Dionysius and Vitruvius largely use the same discourse. Where Dionysius defines composition as the juxtaposition of words or στοιχεῖα ('elements'), Vitruvius states that *dispositio* ('arrangement') is 'the apt putting together (*apta conlocatio*) of things and the elegant effect obtained by adjustments (*compositionibus*) appropriate to the character of the work.'[80] Although I do not think that there is a direct relationship between Vitruvius and Dionysius, it is, on the other hand, not impossible that Dionysius knew the Roman or his work. In any case, it is interesting to realise that not only some of their ideas but also the way they present them are rather similar and reflect the discourse of their time. I will return to the analogy between text and architecture in the discussion of the austere composition type.

I will now focus on the first level to which the three ἔργα of the theory of composition apply, namely the level of words or, as Dionysius says, τὰ πρῶτα μόρια καὶ στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως.[81] In this case the three activities of σύνθεσις are the following. First, the words that have been

[77] See Rowland & Howe (1999) 2–5.

[78] Vitruvius, *On Architecture* 1.1.1–18.

[79] Vitruvius, *On Architecture* 1.2.1–9.

[80] Vitruvius, *On Architecture* 1.2.2: *dispositio autem est rerum apta conlocatio elegansque compositionibus effectus operis cum qualitate*.

[81] *Comp*. 7.30,13–14. Here, the arrangement of the parts of speech is regarded as 'one consideration (θεωρία) of the science of composition', besides the second one, which is concerned with clauses, and the third one, which starts from periods. In *Comp*. 7.30,14, ἑτέρα is not 'the other' [aspect of composition], as Usher (1985) 59 translates it, but 'another' or rather 'the second' one (cf. Aujac [1981] 84: 'en second lieu'); the third

selected have to be juxtaposed in an attractive basic order. Although Dionysius does not use the term here, later passages suggest that this first ἔργον is called ἁρμογή ('combination').[82] Secondly, one has to decide which grammatical form the words should have: this technique is called σχηματισμός.[83] Thirdly, one has to adapt the form of the words by means of the addition, subtraction or alteration of certain letters: this final activity is called μετασκευή.[84] It is clear that the second of these processes is concerned with the μόρια λόγου *qua* word classes (i.e. selecting the correct *grammatical* form), whereas the first and third ἔργα deal with the μόρια λόγου *qua* parts of the phrase.[85] Therefore, instead of saying that the rhetorical point of view replaces the grammatical point of view, as Pohl does, we should understand that composition (σύνθεσις) comprises both grammatical considerations and matters of euphony.[86] The first step is described as follows:[87]

> πρῶτον μὲν σκοπεῖν, ποῖον ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι μορίων ποίῳ συνταχθὲν ἐπιτηδείως ἔσται κείμενον καὶ πῶς εὖ ἢ ἄμεινον (οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάντα γε μετὰ πάντων τιθέμενα πέφυκεν ὁμοίως διατιθέναι τὰς ἀκοάς).
>
> 'First, they should consider which noun or verb or other part of speech composed with which other part of speech will be suitably placed and how [it will be done] in a correct or better way (for clearly not every arrangement naturally affects the ears in the same way).'

θεωρία is concerned with periods (*Comp.* 9.35,17–36,1). On the expression τὰ πρῶτα μόρια καὶ στοιχεῖα τῆς λέξεως see section 3.5.

[82] See *Comp.* 8.32,6 on clauses. Dionysius uses σχηματισμός and μετασκευή (the second and third ἔργα) both in the context of words and in the context of κῶλα. Therefore, we may assume that ἁρμογή is als the term for the juxtaposition of words (the first ἔργον).

[83] See *Comp.* 6.28,20–21 (σχηματισθέν) and *Comp.* 6.29,6 (σχηματισθείη). The term is repeated in the discussion of the second activity of the composition of clauses in *Comp.* 7.31,1 (σχηματίσαι), thus indicating the symmetry between the different levels of composition.

[84] See *Comp.* 6.29,15 (μετασκευῆς) and *Comp.* 6.30,11 (μετασκευάζει). The term is repeated in the discussion of the third activity of the composition of clauses in *Comp.* 7.31,3–4 (μετασκευήν).

[85] For the double character of Dionysius' μόρια λόγου, see section 3.4.

[86] Pohl (1968) 2–3.

[87] *Comp.* 6.28,16–20. With Usener I read καὶ πῶς εὖ ἢ ἄμεινον. Rhys Roberts and Usher follow the MSS in reading καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἄμεινον, which is however not only 'a difficult litotes' (Rhys Roberts), but also does not seem to follow logically the first part of the question that starts with ποῖον. Rhys Roberts and Usher obscure this difficulty in their translation: 'in what combinations with one another will nouns, verbs or other parts of speech be suitably placed, and how not so well' (Usher). Aujac reads καὶ πῶς εὖ καὶ ἄμεινον.

When Dionysius says that we should first consider which part of speech should be combined with which other part (ποῖον ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι μορίων ποίῳ συνταχθέν), he is looking for a certain basic order of words.[88] In Cicero, this basic word arrangement (ἁρμογή) is called *collocatio*.[89] What are the criteria for this first process in the arrangement of the parts of speech? Dionysius explains that 'not all words combined with all words naturally affect the ears in the same way'. Now, the word πέφυκεν reminds us of the discussion of 'natural' word order in the preceding chapter, *Comp.* 5 (see section 5.3 of this study). At the end of that chapter, Dionysius has rejected the rigidity of the rules formulated there (nouns precede verbs, verbs precede adverbs, etc.), and he has even stated that these theories do not deserve any serious attention. With his remark in *Comp.* 6 he again seems to refer to the existence of some natural word order, but this time it is another type of order: one should juxtapose the parts of speech in such a way that their combination 'pleases the ears'. So this word order is based on the euphony of the selected words, and not on the word classes to which they belong: euphony has taken the place of the rules of logic here. Although Dionysius exemplifies the μόρια λόγου here as 'noun, verb or another part', his comments make it clear that these items are now treated as 'parts of the phrase' rather than as 'word classes'. He now concentrates on the aesthetic quality of composition, as the 'ear' perceives it.

The role of the ear (ἀκοή) in determining (and evaluating) good composition is an important theme in Dionyisus' treatise *On Composition*, which is also found in the theories of the Hellenistic *kritikoi* and Cicero. This seems to be the right place for a short digression on the theme of hearing and irrational judgement, because the subject will turn out to be relevant in later sections of this study as well.[90] 'Demetrius' reports that Theophrastus defined beauty in a word as 'that which is pleasant in regard to hearing (ἀκοήν) or in regard to sight (ὄψιν), or that which

[88] Rhys Roberts (1910) 3 summarises this first step as 'the *choice* of elements likely to combine effectively' (my italics, CCdJ), but Dionysius clearly means the *combination* of the selected words (cf. συνταχθέν): otherwise we would miss an essential part of composition among the ἔργα, i.e. the simple putting together of the μόρια. Besides, ἐκλογή (selection of words) is explicitly set apart from the process of composition. Kroll (1907) 92 makes the same mistake as Rhys Roberts.

[89] E.g. Cicero, *Orator* 149.

[90] See sections 6.2, 6.6 and 7.3.2.

suggests in thought great value.'[91] In this way, Theophrastus adapted Aristotle's definition, according to which beauty in a word is 'in the sounds or in what is signified' (ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαινομένῳ).[92] Thus, although Aristotle already paid attention to the vocal qualities of words, Theophrastus seems to have focused more on the *perception* of beauty (both in hearing and in sight). The notion of 'hearing' developed into an essential idea in later poetical and rhetorical theory. It figures most prominently in the ideas of some of the *kritikoi* in Philodemus' *On Poems* (see section 1.5). Although there are considerable differences between the exact views of these critics, it would be correct to say that many of them focused on the form of poetry. On the one hand, they thought that 'pleasing the ear' was the sole purpose of poetry. On the other hand, they claimed that the ear was the only criterion for the *evaluation* of poetry. The term ἀκοή occurs in a significant number of fragments in Philodemus' discussion of the views of the *kritikoi*, but the best example is perhaps Heracleodorus. He claimed that both the contents and the words of a poem were irrelevant to its quality. The only thing that matters in poetry is composition (σύνθεσις) and 'the sound that supervenes upon it'.[93] It is composition that makes that 'the hearing is delighted by verses'.[94] Like Dionysius, Heracleodorus also applied metathesis to prove the quality of a certain composition (see section 7.2). Further, he thought that 'we do not need to understand poetry to be enthralled by it'.[95] The latter view is doubtlessly related to the ideas that we find in other fragments of Philodemus' treatise, where certain critics claim that the ear is the only criterion by which we judge poetry: it has an irrational delight (τὴν χάριν τὴν ἄλογον or τὴν τέρ[ψιν] ⟨τὴν⟩ ἄλογο[ν]) in the sounds of poetry.[96]

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[91] 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 173 = Theophrastus fr. 687 Fortenbaugh: κάλλος ὀνόματός ἐστι τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀκοὴν ἢ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν ἡδύ, ἢ τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔντιμον. (Translation Fortenbaugh.)

[92] On the fragment of Theophrastus and its relation to Aristotle *Rh.* 1405b6–8, see Fortenbaugh (2005) 281–286. Dionysius, *Comp.* 16.66,8–18 (Theophrastus fr. 688 Fortenbaugh) discusses 'words that are by nature beautiful' and refers to the ideas of Theophrastus; these views on ὀνόματα φύσει καλά were probably expressed in the same passage in *On Style* from which 'Demetrius' (*Eloc.* 173) borrows Theophrastus' ideas on 'the beauty in a word'.

[93] Cf. Janko (2000) 156.

[94] Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 193 Janko (= Heracleodorus fr. 7 Janko): τέρπ[εσ]θαι τὴν ἀκ[ο]ὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ποημάτων.

[95] *P. Herc.* 1676 fr. 1–4.

[96] Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 83 and fr. 151 Janko. The euphonists were strongly influenced by musical theory. Aristoxenus, *Harmonics* 2.33 says: 'Through hearing (ἀκοῇ) we

There are two rhetoricians in particular who adopt similar views on the importance of hearing, namely Cicero and Dionysius.[97] Cicero tells us that the decision as to subject matter and words is in the 'intellect' (*prudentia*), whereas 'of sounds and rhythms the ears are the judges' (*vocum autem et numerorum aures sunt iudices*).[98] According to Dionysius, 'the ear is pleased' (τὴν ἀκοὴν ἥδεσθαι) by melody, rhythm, variety and appropriateness, the four means of composition.[99] In *On Lysias*, Dionysius gives those students who wish to learn the nature of Lysias' charm the same advice as teachers of music give to their students, namely 'to cultivate the ear, and to look for no other standard of judgement than this one' (τὴν ἀκοὴν ἐθίζειν καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο ταύτης ἀκριβέστερον ζητεῖν κριτήριον).[100] In the same passage, Dionysius expounds his views on the 'irrational feeling' (ἄλογος αἴσθησις) on which everyone can rely in judging literature. When determining whether a specific speech was really composed by Lysias or not, one should apply the irrational criterion (τὸ ἄλογον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον) rather than the rational criterion (τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον).[101] For a more detailed discussion of these ideas, I refer to Schenkeveld and Damon, who have usefully illuminated Dionysius' views.[102]

In preceding chapters, I have already mentioned some similarities between the ideas of the *kritikoi* and those of Dionysius. How should we judge the connections between Dionysius and the *kritikoi*? Goudri-

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assess the magnitudes of intervals and through reason we apprehend their functions.' (Translation Barker.)

[97] For the connections between the ideas on irrational hearing in Philodemus, Cicero and Dionysius, see Nassal (1910) 38–40, and esp. Janko (2000) 361 n. 3 and 395 n. 4. Atkins (1934 II) 133 and Schenkeveld (1968) already argued that Dionysius' theories are influenced by the views of he *kritikoi*.

[98] Cicero, *Orator* 162. See also *Orator* 67 (cited in section 6.6 of this study) and *Orator* 173: *et tamen omnium longitudinum et brevitatum in sonis sicut acutarum graviumque vocum iudicium ipsa natura in auribus nostris collocavit*. 'And yet nature herself has implanted in our ears the power of judging long and short sounds as well as high and low pitch in words'. (Translation Hubbell). On Cicero and the *iudicia vulgi*, see Schenkeveld (1989).

[99] *Comp.* 11.38,13–15. See also *Comp.* 11.40,11–16 (ἡ ἀκοὴ τέρπεται etc.) and *Comp.* 23.119,16–17: τὸ ἄλογον ἐπιμαρτυρεῖ τῆς ἀκοῆς πάθος. 'The ear's instinctive feeling will testify (…).'

[100] *Lys.* 11.19,1–10.

[101] *Lys.* 11.18,15–20,6. See also *Thuc.* 27.371,5–10.

[102] Cf. Schenkeveld (1975) 93–107 and Damon (1991) 44–45. See also Goudriaan (1989) 142–154. Schenkeveld (1975) concludes that there is no coherent system behind Dionysius' theories of evaluation, but Damon (1991) rightly argues that Schenkeveld should have taken the relative order of Dionysius' rhetorical works into account.

aan puts forward five arguments against Dionysius' dependence:[103] (1) Dionysius does not mention the *kritikoi*; (2) Dionysius compares prose and poetry and treats prose as a kind of music; (3) some specific aspects of Dionysius' theories, such as the four means of composition, do not occur in the theories of the *kritikoi*; (4) Dionysius characterises only two of his three composition types (austere and smooth), the middle composition being a combination of the extremes, whereas the *kritikoi* characterise all of them (λέξις λεία, λέξις τραχεῖα, λέξις εὐπαγής);[104] (5) the *kritikoi* are interested in the trained ear, whereas Dionysius is also interested in the untrained ear. In my view, none of these arguments is convincing: (1) Dionysius does not mention all the earlier scholars whom he knows or uses, and his silence on the *kritikoi* cannot be used as an argument; (2) Dionysius' characterisation of prose authors as poets is very similar to the remarks of the *kritikoi* on Herodotus and Xenophon as 'poets' (see section 6.6); (3) if Dionysius borrows some ideas from the *kritikoi* it does not imply that we should find all his theories in their works; (4) the similarities between Dionysius' three composition types and the λέξεις of the *kritikoi* are more significant than the terminological difference; (5) *pace* Goudriaan, both the *kritikoi* and Dionysius are interested in the 'irrational' delight of the ear (see above). Having taken these arguments into consideration, and given the many similarities between Dionysius and the *kritikoi* (see also sections 6.2, 6.6 and 7.2), I conclude that it is probable that Dionysius borrowed some of their ideas for his composition theory. In some cases, similarities may also be the result of the influence of earlier (Peripatetic or musical) theories on both the *kritikoi* and Dionysius. Finally, there are a few similarities (like the method of metathesis—see chapter 7) that can be explained as part of the general set of ideas of the rhetorical and critical traditions.

When we return to Dionysius' discussion of the three ἔργα of composition, we can now recognise that his views on the arrangement of words that should affect the ears (διατιθέναι τὰς ἀκοάς) should be interpreted within the context of the theories on euphony such as were developed by the critics of poetry. The basic ordering of the parts of speech, the first ἔργον of composition, is determined by their vocal qualities as perceived by the ear. Grammar becomes an important factor in the second technique of composition concerning words:[105]

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[103] Goudriaan (1989) 153–154.
[104] On these three types of λέξις, see Schenkeveld (1968) 198 and Pohl (1968) 99.
[105] *Comp.* 6.28,20–29,14.

ἔπειτα διακρίνειν, πῶς σχηματισθὲν τοὔνομα ἢ τὸ ῥῆμα ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅ τι δή ποτε χαριέστερον ἱδρυθήσεται καὶ πρὸς τὰ ὑποκείμενα πρεπωδέστερον· λέγω δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων, πότερον ἑνικῶς ἢ πληθυντικῶς λαμβανόμενα κρείττω λήψεται συζυγίαν, καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὴν ὀρθὴν ἐκφερόμενα πτῶσιν ἢ κατὰ τῶν πλαγίων τινά, καὶ εἴ τινα πέφυκεν ἐξ ἀρρενικῶν γίνεσθαι θηλυκὰ ἢ ἐκ θηλυκῶν ἀρρενικὰ ἢ οὐδέτερα ἐκ τούτων, πῶς ἂν ἄμεινον σχηματισθείη, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ῥημάτων, πότερα κρείττω λαμβανόμενα ἔσται, τὰ ὀρθὰ ἢ τὰ ὕπτια, καὶ κατὰ ποίας ἐγκλίσεις ἐκφερόμενα, ἃς δή τινες πτώσεις ῥηματικὰς καλοῦσι, κρατίστην ἕδραν λήψεται, καὶ ποίας παρεμφαίνοντα διαφορὰς χρόνων καὶ εἴ τινα τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἄλλα παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκε (τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοῦ λόγου μερῶν φυλακτέον, ἵνα μὴ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον λέγω).

'Then they should decide the form in which the noun or verb or whichever of the other parts of speech it may be will be situated more elegantly and in a way that fits more appropriately the underlying matter: I mean, with regard to nouns, whether they will produce a better combination if used in the singular or the plural; and whether put in the nominative or in one of the oblique cases; and, if certain words admit of a feminine instead of a masculine form or a masculine instead of a feminine form, or a neuter instead of either, how they would be shaped in a better way and so on.[106] With regard to verbs, which form it will be better to adopt, the active or the passive, and in what moods, which some call 'verbal cases', they should be expressed in order to occupy the best position, and what differences of tense they should indicate and so with all the other natural accidents of verbs (and these same provisions must be made with regard to the other parts of speech also; but I need not go into details).'

This passage is one of the earliest texts in which some of the *accidentia* of the parts of speech are discussed.[107] It is not, however, 'the oldest extant discussion of some of the accidents of the parts of speech *as such*' (my italics), as Pinborg says, for the *accidentia* are not discussed for their own sake, but only because the selection of the correct grammatical form of a word is part of the process of rhetorical composition; therefore, Dionysius does not offer a complete list of accidents.[108] Dionysius tells us that the second activity of composition is to decide how every part

[106] For this passage, see also section 4.4.1. My translation of ἐκ and ἐξ as 'instead of' is based on the fact that Dionysius is thinking of substitution of feminine for masculine forms, etc. The idea is that in the first part of the composition process one has selected certain basic grammatical forms; in the second phase (σχηματισμός), one substitutes other forms for the original ones: masculines instead of feminines, etc.

[107] For a discussion of the grammatical terms συμβεβηκότα, παρακολουθεῖν and σχηματίζω in this passage, see my section 3.7. For πτώσεις ῥηματικάς, see sections 3.8 and 5.3.6.

[108] Pinborg (1975) 117 n. 45.

of speech should be formed (σχηματισθέν) so that 'it will occupy its position more elegantly and more appropriately fitting to the ὑποκείμενον'. Usher translates the latter word as 'context', but this is not correct, for ὑποκείμενον literally means 'that which underlies' (the form); in rhetorical and literary theory, the word refers to 'subject matter' (see section 2.3).[109] In other words, σχηματισμός has two purposes at the same time. The grammatical form of the words should be selected so that it produces a pleasing harmony (that the word is situated χαριέστερον), but it should also fit the 'subject' (πρὸς τὰ ὑποκείμενα πρεπωδέστερον). According to this interpretation, Dionysius acknowledges that euphony is not the only thing that matters in the process of composition: one should also take care that the forms of words correspond to the things that are signified. For this reason, I disagree with Scaglione's observation that Dionysius is only interested words as sounds and not in words as symbols (see section 2.3).[110] In our passage, he makes it clear that the grammatical form of a word should be selected in such a way that the words do not only make a pleasing combination with one another, but also 'appropriately fit to the subject matter'. He does not explain how we should understand the latter principle, but fortunately we find some illuminating illustrations in his *Second Letter to Ammaeus* (see section 4.4.2). There, Dionysius states for example that Thucydides used the active κωλύει ('hinders'), whereas 'the meaning' (τὸ σημαινόμενον) required the passive κωλύεται ('is hindered').[111] Thucydides also speaks of 'the Syracusan' and 'the Athenian' when he 'means to say' (βούλεται … λέγειν) 'Syracusans' and 'Athenians':[112] he has used the singular instead of the plural, thus selecting the incorrect grammatical form. These are clear examples of wrong σχηματισμός, not because the forms are not harmonious, but because the words do not fit to 'that which underlies' (τὸ ὑποκείμενον).[113] I will return to Dionysius' discussion of Thucydides' use of the parts of speech in section 4.4.

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[109] Usher (1985) 57. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 82 correctly translate the word as 'sujet'. Rhys Roberts (1910) 107 renders ὑποκείμενον as 'ground scheme', but I do not see what this should mean in the relevant passage. Meijering (1987) 110 points out that in the scholia ὑποκείμενον is used as a synonym of ὑπόθεσις ('plot'). For the philosophical use of ὑποκείμενον as one of the categories, see my section 5.3.3.

[110] Scaglione (1972) 58.

[111] *Amm.* II 7.427,17–428,5. Dionysius' remark concerns Thucydides 1.144.2: οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνο κωλύει ταῖς σπονδαῖς οὔτε τόδε. 'For neither the one is hindered by the truce nor the other.'

[112] *Amm.* II 9.428,19–429,4.

[113] For the term σχηματσμός, see *Amm.* II 7.427,17–18: Ὅταν δὲ τῶν ῥημάτων ἀλλάττῃ

In his list of the *accidentia* of verbs, Dionysius states that one should select the right form of the voices, moods and tenses, so that the word 'will occupy the best position' (κρατίστην ἕδραν λήψεται). The word ἕδρα ('sitting-place') is again borrowed from the context of architecture, where it has the meaning of 'foundation'.[114] In the analogy of house building, Dionysius has already pointed out that in the second ἔργον of composition one should ask on which sides of the materials one should fit (ἑδράσαι) the stones, timber and tiling.[115]

It is interesting to observe that Dionysius, having listed the various *accidentia* of nouns and verbs, refers to the other 'parts of speech' as τῶν ἄλλων τοῦ λόγου μερῶν.[116] This is the only passage where Dionysius uses the traditional philosophical (and later grammatical) term τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου in the sense of 'the parts of speech', and not his usual expressions τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου, τὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως and, less frequently, τὰ μέρη τῆς λέξεως. Normally, Dionysius seems to avoid the traditional term in order to distinguish between 'parts of *a* speech (text)' and 'parts of speech'. It is possible that Dionysius uses the expression τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου here because he is still thinking of Chrysippus' treatise Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν, to which he referred at the end of *Comp.* 4.[117] Besides, Dionysius may have used the traditional term for the 'parts of speech' here because there is no risk of misunderstanding in this passage: after a list of the various *accidentia* of nouns and verbs, no reader will think of the parts of a text instead of the parts of a phrase. This explanation would be satisfactory for the exceptional use of the expression τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, but there are three more terminological particularities in *Comp.* 6. (1) Dionysius' remark that some people call the moods πτώσεις ῥηματικάς ('verbal cases') seems to refer to Stoic ideas (see section 3.8).[118] (2) Dionysius adopts the Stoic ter-

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τὰ εἴδη τῶν παθητικῶν καὶ ποιητικῶν, οὕτω σχηματίζει τὸν λόγον. 'When he interchanges the passive and active forms of verbs, this is how he constructs his sentence.' Σχηματισμός can refer to the formation of a single word and to the construction of a sentence, but both aspects are closely connected: if all words are given their correct grammatical form, the construction of the λόγος as a whole will also be correct.

[114] See also *Comp.* 23.112,1 and *Comp.* 23.119,11. Cf. 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 183 and 206. For ἕδρα as 'base' or 'foundation', see Plutarch, *Demetrius* 21.

[115] *Comp.* 6.28,10–12. See p. 188 n. 62.

[116] *Comp.* 6.29,13.

[117] *Comp.* 4.22,12–13. See my sections 3.5 and 5.3.1.

[118] Matthaios (1999) 299 thinks that this is a reminiscence of the Aristotelian concept of πτῶσις, but I agree with Schenkeveld (1984) 336, who thinks of Stoic influence. See section 3.8.

minology for the voices (τὰ ὀρθὰ ἢ τὰ ὕπτια), whereas he elsewhere follows the Alexandrian distinction between ἐνεργητικόν and παθητικόν (see section 3.8). (3) He uses the term ἀντωνυμία instead of his normal term ἀντονομασία (see section 3.6.3).[119] Thus, in total, there are four terminological peculiarities in *Comp.* 6. Although I think that we should be careful in assigning Dionysius' ideas to specific sources, the use of a certain model might be the best explanation of the terminological characteristics of *Comp.* 6.[120] Although three of the four departures from normal terminology seem to reflect Stoic ideas, it seems unlikely that *Comp.* 6 is based on Stoic texts, because the Stoics did not distinguish the ἀντωνυμία (pronoun) and πρόθεσις (preposition).[121] It is more plausible that *Comp.* 6 is based on the theories of the Hellenistic *kritikoi*, who share Dionysius' interest in euphonious composition. We know that the *kritikoi* also dealt with the *accidentia* of the parts of speech.[122] Besides, the *kritikoi* seem to have adopted Stoic ideas. The famous Stoic Crates of Mallos called himself a "critic" and he discussed the views of earlier *kritikoi*.[123] Therefore, the hypothesis that in *Comp.* 6 Dionysius makes use of the ideas of the Hellenistic *kritikoi* might also account for the Stoic terminology in that passage.

When we look for *rhetoricians* who share Dionysius' ideas on the use of the *accidentia* of the parts of speech in rhetorical composition, we actually do not have to go far back in time. Although Nassal has suggested that Dionysius might have been influenced by the theory of figures of his colleague Caecilius of Caleacte (which I do not believe—see below), he seems to have overlooked a very relevant testimony.[124] In one of the few extant fragments of his work *On Figures*, Caecilius

[119] *Comp.* 6.29,20.

[120] Ammon (1889) 28–37 and Pohl (1968) 80 think that Dionysius' ideas on the ἔργα of composition (*Comp.* 6–9) are influenced by Stoic ideas. However, the Stoics did not distinguish the ἀντωνυμία as a part of speech; the focus on euphony and the reference to the effect of sounds on the 'ear' seem to point in the direction of the *kritikoi.* If there is Stoic influence, Crates of Mallos (who discusses the views of the *kritikoi* in Philodemus' *On Poems*) might be the missing link, but this is mere guessing.

[121] Dionysius mentions the πρόθεσις at *Comp.* 6.30,2.

[122] See also section 3.2. Cf. Janko (1995) and Janko (2000) 186–187 on Pausimachus.

[123] See Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* I.79.

[124] Nassal (1910) 31: 'Also muß die Möglichkeit einer Beeinflussung des C. [i.e. Cicero] wie des DH. [i.e. Dionysius] in der Figurentheorie durch Caecilius eine offene bleiben.' Unlike Nassal, I do not make any claim about the possible influence of Caecilius on Dionysius (or *vice versa*): I merely point to the similarity between Caecilius' treatment of figures and Dionysius' discussion of σχηματισμός in order to illuminate the context of Dionysius' ideas.

says that 'ἀλλοίωσις ('alteration') occurs with regard to a noun, cases, numbers, persons and tenses' (καί φησιν αὐτὴν γίνεσθαι κατ' ὄνομα καὶ πτώσεις καὶ ἀριθμοὺς καὶ πρόσωπα καὶ χρόνους).[125] Although Caecilius deals with the figures of speech and Dionysius (*Comp.* 6) with the formation of single words, there are some remarkable similarities between the two accounts, especially in their use of terms. I will return to Caecilius' views on 'alteration' when I discuss Dionysius' analysis of Thucydides' style. There, Dionysius deals with the use of the parts of speech in sentence construction, and it will turn out that Caecilius' account summarised above is a very close parallel to Dionysius' discussion of Thucydides. We will now proceed to the final technique of composition, which is μετασκευή:[126]

> ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τὰ ληφθέντα διακρίνειν, εἴ τι δεῖται μετασκευῆς ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα, πῶς ἂν ἐναρμονιώτερόν τε καὶ εὐεδρότερον γένοιτο· τοῦτο τὸ στοιχεῖον ἐν μὲν ποιητικῇ δαψιλέστερόν ἐστιν, ἐν δὲ λόγοις πεζοῖς σπανιώτερον· πλὴν γίνεταί γε καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐφ' ὅσον ἂν ἐγχωρῇ.
>
> 'Next, one must decide concerning the selected words if any noun or verb requires modification, how it may be more harmonious and well positioned: this function is applied more lavishly in poetry and more scarcely in prose; but it is applied also in prose so far as possible.'

The word εὐεδρότερον takes up the architectural image of ἕδρα that we encountered in the previous passage. Again, Dionysius has anticipated the use of the term in his analogy of house building, where he discusses the third ἔργον of composition: if a certain material is 'fitting ill' (δύσεδρον), one should 'pare it down and trim it and make it fit well (εὔεδρον)'.[127] Dionysius states that, although poetry makes more use of μετασκευή, prose should apply it where possible. If we assume that Dionysius' ideas on euphonious composition are (partly) based on the views of poetical criticism, the latter statement might be taken as a sign that Dionysius is introducing a poetical approach to σύνθεσις into the field of rhetoric.[128] Indeed, there are reasons to believe

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[125] Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 75 Ofenloch. The rhetorician Tiberius preserves this fragment. We should allow for the possibility that he uses his own terminology when quoting Caecilius (see section 4.4), although there is no reason to believe that Caecilius could not have expressed the views that Tiberius quotes.

[126] *Comp.* 6.29,14–19.

[127] *Comp.* 6.28,12–13.

[128] See Janko (2000) 178: 'But the rest of this material [i.e. Pausimachus' theories on sound] undermines the originality of his [Dionysius'] *De compositione verborum*: he is, at best, applying to prose a method which others had developed for poetry.'

that the Hellenistic *kritikoi* were interested in the modification of words as Dionysius describes it. In Philodemus' *On Poems*, there are some fragments in which the critic Pausimachus speaks of the euphonious effects of 'adding and removing letters'.[129] Just like, Dionysius, Pausimachus specifically mentions the modification of 'nouns and verbs'. For 'adding' he uses the term προσλαμβάνω, for 'removing' a verb that starts with ἀπο-.[130] In the examples that follow Dionysius' explanation of the technique of μετασκευή, he uses προστίθημι for 'adding', and he further mentions the terms προσαυξάνω ('lengthening'), ἐλαττόω ('making smaller') and ἀποκρούω ('cutting off').[131] At the beginning of *Comp.* 6, however, Dionysius has divided the technique of modification into ἀφαίρεσις ('subtraction'), προσθήκη ('addition') and ἀλλοίωσις ('alteration').[132] These are standard categories in ancient linguistics, which can ultimately be traced back to Plato's *Cratylus*.[133] Where Dionysius has ἀλλοίωσις, most ancient thinkers who use these categories distinguish between (a) the substitution of one letter for another and (b) the interchanging of place of two or more letters.[134] Thus, they arrive at four (instead of three) different categories of modification. These categories are used in various language disciplines, such as philosophy, metric, grammar (etymology) and rhetoric. Dionysius' contemporary colleague Caecilius of Caleacte seems to have used the categories of modification to order the rhetorical figures of style (σχήματα).[135] He uses the same terms as Dionysius: in the fragments of his *On Figures*, we find the verb προστίθημι, and the nouns ἀφαίρεσις and ἀλλοίωσις.[136]

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[129] Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 85 Janko and P. Herc. 994 fr. 18,26–19,7.

[130] Cf. Janko (2000) 185. In his introduction, Janko (2000) 185 says that Pausimachus probably uses ἀποβάλλω, but in his text he reads ἀπο[τιθέμενα] (*On Poems* 1 fr. 85) and [ἀποτιθέμενα] (Janko [2000] 282 n. 1). Perhaps we should read ἀπο[κρουόμενα].

[131] *Comp.* 6.29,19–30,12.

[132] *Comp.* 6.27,23–28,1.

[133] Usener (1913) 288–303 shows that the four categories of change are applied in ancient metrical studies, etymology, orthography, and linguistic discussions of barbarism and solecism. He also refers to Dionysius' three categories (with ἀλλοίωσις covering both *immutatio* and *transmutatio*) in *Comp.* 6.27,23–28,1. Ax (1987) traces these categories back to Plato (see *Cratylus* 394b). See also Sluiter (1990) 12. The Stoics use the terms πρόσθεσις, ἀφαίρεσις, ἐναλλαγή and μετάθεσις.

[134] Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 90 n. 87.

[135] Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 73–76 Ofenloch. Cf. Ax (1987) 32.

[136] See Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 73 (προθέντες), fr. 74 (ἀφαίρεσιν), and fr. 75 (ἀλλοιώσεως) Ofenloch. Theon applies the four categories of change to the *paraphrasis*: see section 7.3.2.

Dionysius' examples of the μετασκευή of words make it clear that the third ἔργον of composition still deals with words *qua* parts op the phrase (μόρια λόγου).[137] One should adapt the 'parts of the phrase' so that they are well connected to each other, by adding a prefix or a deictic ι, by elision or removal of the movable ν, and other adaptations. Two examples are taken from Demosthenes, namely the use of τουτονί instead of τοῦτον and the use of κατιδών instead of ἰδών.[138] The other examples are invented, and some of them seem to be iconic: this seems to be the case in ἔγραψε ('he wrote'), which can be written instead of ἔγραψεν, and in particular in ἀφαιρήσομαι ('I will be removed'), which is the result of removing two letters from ἀφαιρεθήσομαι: ἀφαίρεσις is the grammatical term for the 'removal' of letters, and, as we have seen, Dionysius himself uses this term as one of the categories of word modification.[139] This type of examples, in which the form of a word corresponds to its meaning, is also found in the fragments of Dionysius' contemporary Tryphon: for example, in the word ἡμικύκλιον ('half-circle'), the word ἥμισυς ('half') has been reduced to *half* of its original form (ἡμι-).[140] In one case, the grammatical aspect of the μόρια λόγου ('word classes') is explicitly referred to: τουτονί is a modification of the 'pronoun' (ἀντωνυμία) τοῦτον.[141] The latter remark is also interesting for another reason. As we have seen before, Dionysius normally uses the term ἀντονομασία and not the traditional ἀντωνυμία.[142] Together with the exceptional use of the expression τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου (see above), the use of ἀντωνυμία might indicate that this particular passage in Dionysius' work (*Comp.* 6) builds on theories on the modification of the parts of speech that he has found in some source.[143] As I argued before, we should not exclude the possibility that he used a treatise on the euphonious composition of poems. This might well be the type of work of which we find the (badly preserved) traces in Philodemus' *On Poems*. With this consideration, our discussion of Dionysius' use of the parts of speech as building blocks in the process of composition (in *Comp.* 6)

137 *Comp.* 6.29,19–30,12.

138 Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 1 and *On the Peace* 6.

139 For ἀφαίρεσις, see also *Comp.* 9.34,15–35,16, where the 'reducing' of κῶλα is discussed.

140 Tryphon fr. 131 Von Velsen. See Sluiter (1990) 28, who discusses more examples.

141 For this modification, which one could regard as a case of metathesis (rewriting Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 1), see section 7.3.2.

142 See section 3.5.

143 In *Comp.* 6.30,5, Dionysius uses his normal term τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου again.

is completed. We may now turn to the role of the μόρια λόγου in the discussion of the three types of composition.

4.3.2. *The parts of speech in the description of composition types*

One of the most original parts of Dionysius' *On Composition* is the description of the three types of composition in *Comp.* 22–24. Dionysius distinguishes the austere composition (the σύνθεσις or ἁρμονία αὐστηρά), the smooth composition (the σύνθεσις or ἁρμονία γλαφυρά) and the well-blended composition (the σύνθεσις or ἁρμονία εὔκρατος).[144] It is important to realise that these three composition types are not the same as the three styles (χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως), which Dionysius discusses elsewhere.[145] In this section, it is not my purpose to analyse the theory of the three composition types as such. I will only investigate the role of the μόρια λόγου in this theory, in order to illuminate the integration of grammar and rhetoric that it reveals. We will see that the analogy between composition and architecture is developed further. In the discussion of *Comp.* 6 we have observed that the parts of speech were the building blocks that were put together, shaped and modified, according to the three activities of σύνθεσις. I will now examine how the use of these building blocks differs among the three composition types, which could be regarded as three types of architecture.

The austere composition type is introduced as follows. 'It requires that the words are firmly planted (ἐρείδεσθαι) and occupy strong positions (στάσεις), so that each word is seen on every side, and that the

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[144] See also *Dem.* 37–41. For an analysis of Dionysius' three composition types, see Pohl (1968) 22–68.

[145] The three styles are discussed in *Dem.* 1–3. For the differences between the styles and the composition types, see Pohl (1968) 22–46, esp. 45, Grube (1974) 78, and Reid (1996) 49–55. Isocrates, for example, belongs to the 'middle' or 'mixed' style, but he represents the smooth (not the well-blended) composition type. Dionysius discusses both the theory of styles and the theory of composition types in the treatise *On Demosthenes*, but he does not connect the two theories: cf. Aujac (1988) 22. Tukey (1909a) 188 rightly corrects the view of Rhys Roberts (1901) 18 n. 2, who thinks that the χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως are restricted to the selection of words. Grube (1952) 262 revived Rhys Roberts' interpretation: in his view, the first part of *On Demosthenes* deals with 'diction' only, not with 'style in the wider sense'. See also Grube (1965) 223–224. Although Grube (1952) 262 n. 15 states that 'those who interpret the expression ἡ μικτὴ λέξις in *Dem.* 3 as the mixed or third kind of style make complete nonsense of the structure of the whole treatise (…)', most recent scholars do indeed think that Dionysius deals with three 'styles' in the first part of *On Demosthenes*: see Usher (1974) 235–237, Aujac (1988) 16–24, Innes (1989) 269 and Wooten (1989) 576.

parts (τὰ μόρια) shall be at considerable distances from one another, being separated by perceptible intervals. It does not mind admitting frequently harsh and dissonant collocations, just as the sides of the stones that are put together in building as they are found (τῶν λογάδην συντιθεμένων ἐν οἰκοδομίαις λίθων) do not appear square and polished, but unwrought and rough.'[146] The word λογάδην ('as they are picked out') is mostly used of stones that are brought together for a building without being polished. Thucydides uses the word when he tells that the Athenians built a wall at Pylos, λογάδην δὲ φέροντες λίθους, καὶ ξυνετίθεσαν ὡς ἕκαστόν τι ξυμβαίνοι ('bringing stones as they picked them out, and they put them together as each stone happened to fit in').[147] The combination of the rare word λογάδην and the verb συντίθημι ('to compose') in this text is striking, and it may well be that Dionysius' analogy alludes to exactly this passage from Thucydides. In any case, Thucydides' description of the building of a wall closely corresponds to Dionysius' presentation of the austere composition. The parts of the phrase clash with each other, because they are not adapted and modified as to make them fit harmoniously. In practice, this means that the words are separated from each other by the use of hiatus or the colliding of the final letter of one word with the first letter of the next word. In his analyses of Pindar and Thucydides, two authors who represent the austere composition, Dionysius points in particular to the harsh effect of the juxtaposition of one word ending in the semivowel -ν and words starting with the consonants χ-, π-, ϑ-, τ-, δ-, λ-, and κ-. The same effect is said to be the result of the juxtaposition of a word ending in -ς and a word starting with ξ-.[148] Dionysius' explanation for the roughness is that the combinations of these letters (στοιχεῖα) cannot be pronounced within one syllable, so that the speaker has to interrupt

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[146] *Comp.* 22.96,11–19: ἐρείδεσθαι βούλεται τὰ ὀνόματα ἀσφαλῶς καὶ στάσεις λαμβάνειν ἰσχυράς, ὥστ' ἐκ περιφανείας ἕκαστον ὄνομα ὁρᾶσθαι, ἀπέχειν τε ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ μόρια διαστάσεις ἀξιολόγους αἰσθητοῖς χρόνοις διειργόμενα· τραχείαις τε χρῆσθαι πολλαχῇ καὶ ἀντιτύποις ταῖς συμβολαῖς οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει, οἷαι γίνονται τῶν λογάδην συντιθεμένων ἐν οἰκοδομίαις λίθων αἱ μὴ εὐγώνιοι καὶ μὴ συνεξεσμέναι βάσεις, ἀργαὶ δέ τινες καὶ αὐτοσχέδιοι.

[147] Thucydides 4.4.

[148] *Comp.* 22.99,7–110,20. The examples are from Pindar fr. 75 Bergk and Thucydides 1.1. Dionysius points in particular to the juxtaposition of the following words. In Pindar: ἐν χορόν, κλυτὰν πέμπετε, ὀμφαλὸν θυόεντα, πανδαίδαλόν τ' εὐκλέ' ἀγοράν, ἰοδέτων λαχεῖν, στεφάνων τᾶν, ἀοιδᾶν Διόθεν τε, ἀγλαΐᾳ ἴδετε (hiatus). In Thucydides: Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε (-ς ξ-), τὸν πόλεμον τὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων (-ν π-, -ν τ-, -ν π-, -ν κ-, -ι α-). Cf. Blass *DAB* I (1979^3 [1868]) 221.

his speech between the words that clash with one another: a certain 'pause' (σιωπή) between the words is the result.[149] Therefore, the hearing (ἀκρόασις) perceives the words not as 'one continuous clause' but as separate units.[150] For a more detailed analysis of Dionysius' views on the rough combinations of letters at word boundaries I refer to the illuminating article by Vaahtera.[151]

In his analyses of Pindar and Thucydides, Dionysius focuses on the juxtaposition (ἁρμογή) of words. However, the austere composition is also described with regard to the arrangement of its clauses and periods: on all levels, the σύνθεσις αὐστηρά is 'unstudied', and it wishes its units to be more similar to 'nature' (φύσει) than 'art' (τέχνῃ).[152] Thus, in the building of periods, the austere composition 'does not use certain additional words in order to complete the period, if they contribute nothing to the sense' (οὔτε προσθήκαις τισὶν ὀνομάτων, ἵνα ὁ κύκλος ἐκπληρωθῇ, μηδὲν ὠφελούσαις τὸν νοῦν χρωμένη).[153] Behind the term προσθήκη ('addition'), there lies an important theory that was influential in both rhetorical and grammatical theory, and which is also essential to our understanding of Dionysius' ideas on austere composition.[154] In his discussion of the grand style (λέξις μεγαλοπρεπής), the rhetorician 'Demetrius' states that connectives (σύνδεσμοι) add to the grandeur of composition, but he strongly disapproves of the idle use of 'empty additions' (προσθῆκαι κεναί).[155] Among the 'additions' that may contribute to the grandeur of language (but only if they are used in the right way) there is one particular group of words that 'Demetrius' calls σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί.[156] These 'expletive connectives' (his examples include δή and νυ) also play an interesting role in grammatical theory, where they form a subcategory of the grammatical word class of the σύνδεσμοι ('conjunctions'). These particular 'conjunctions'

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149 *Comp.* 22.101,16–21.

150 *Comp.* 22.110,6–9.

151 Vaahtera (1997) investigates the authors that Dionysius discusses and concludes that his evaluation of their use of combinations of semivowels and consonants at word boundaries is not fully consistent with the reality of the texts. Isocrates, representing the smooth composition, has in fact more clashes between consonants than Thucydides, who belongs to the austere composition.

152 *Comp.* 22.97,2–18.

153 *Comp.* 22.97,12–14. On Dionysius' use of the term κύκλος for 'a well-rounded period', see Lockwood (1937) 200.

154 See Sluiter (1997).

155 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 55–58. Cf. Sluiter (1997) 239–240.

156 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 55.

were discussed from two angles. First, it seems that this group of σύνδεσμοι became the object of discussions on the possible absence of meaning of 'conjunctions'.[157] Where Aristotle thought that σύνδεσμοι do not have meaning, most grammarians thought that this was only true for the σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί.[158] Second, these 'conjunctions' were regarded as words with a certain *stylistic* function. Dionysius' contemporary and fellow citizen Tryphon discussed the σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί in his grammatical works.[159] He compared these conjunctions with 'padding' (στοιβή): just as padding prevents the jarring and breaking of amphoras, 'in the same way, this combination of words is adopted in order to avoid the parts of the expression from being rough (τραχύνεσθαι).'[160]

The ideas of Tryphon and other grammarians seem to be echoed in Dionysius' theory of the three composition types. Dionysius himself does not discuss the 'expletive conjunctions' as a grammatical category, but he does use the term παραπλήρωμα ('filler') in his description of the composition types. In fact, he employs παραπλήρωμα in the same way as προσθήκη. His statement that the austere composition does not use meaningless προσθῆκαι (see above) is elsewhere formulated as follows: it contains unequal periods, μηδέ γε παραπληρώμασι τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἀναγκαίοις ὡς πρὸς τὴν ὑποκειμένην διάνοιαν χρωμένας ('not using filler words that are not necessary for the underlying meaning').[161] The smooth composition, on the other hand, does make good use of this kind of additions: it uses 'words that do not con-

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[157] See Apollonius Dyscolus, *Coni.*, *G.G.* II 1, 247,22–258,26. Although the σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί appear in two fragments of Aristarchus (fr. 172 Matthaios on the conjunction δέ and fr. 177 Matthaios on the conjunction ἄν), it is doubtful whether the terminology can be traced back to Aristarchus himself: see Matthaios (1999) 582–584.

[158] Aristotle, *Po.* 1456b38: σύνδεσμος δέ ἐστιν φωνὴ ἄσημος. 'A "conjunction" is a non-significant word.' See Sluiter (1997) 234.

[159] Tryphon fr. 41 and fr. 57 Von Velsen. See Sluiter (1997) 237 and Dalimier (2001) 376–385. P. Yale I 25 (first century AD) also lists the σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί as one subtype of the conjunctions. In Sch. Homer, *Iliad* 1.173–175 (ἔμοιγε καὶ ἄλλοι, οἵ κέ με τιμήσουσι) it is stated that the σύνδεσμος κε is here περισσός ('superfluous').

[160] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Coni.*, *G.G.* II 1, 247,26–29 (Tryphon fr. 41 Von Velsen): "ὃν γάρ," φησι, "τρόπον εἰς τὰς συνθέσεις τῶν ἀμφορέων εὐχρηστεῖ ἡ τῶν στοιβῶν παρένθεσις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ καταθραύεσθαι τοὺς ἀμφορεῖς, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰ τῆς φράσεως μὴ τραχύνεσθαι ἥδε ἡ σύνταξις τῶν μορίων παραλαμβάνεται."

[161] *Dem.* 39.212.20–22. For the use of παραπλήρωμα in Dionysius, see also *Isoc.* 3.58,20 (Isocrates' use of filler words that contribute nothing), *Dem.* 19.168,8 (Dionysius rewrites Isocrates leaving out the παραπληρώματα: see section 7.3.1), *Comp.* 9.33,23 (the unnecessary additions in Plato, *Menexenus* 236e) and *Comp.* 16.67,12–13 (see below).

tribute to the underlying sense, but serve as a sort of connection or bonding between what precedes and what follows, so that words ending and words beginning with a rough letter (τραχὺ γράμμα) may not clash (…).'[162] The consequence is that the austere composition, which does not use these empty words, 'is rough and harsh upon the ears' (τραχύνει … καὶ πικραίνει … τὰς ἀκοὰς).[163] In his analysis of the smooth composition of a Sapphic poem, however, Dionysius remarks that in all the nouns and verbs and other parts of speech there are only very few combinations of semivowels and voiceless consonants that do not naturally blend with each other, 'and even these do not make the euphony rough' (τραχυνούσας τὴν εὐέπειαν).[164] In other words, not only the term παραπλήρωμα, but also the verb τραχύνω seems to connect Dionysius' views on austere and smooth composition with Tryphon's definition of the expletive conjunctions.[165] Dionysius' terms παραπλήρωμα and προσθήκη are not confined to certain conjunctions, but there is good reason to believe that Dionysius recognises the 'expletive' power of (certain) conjunctions as well. When he summarises the most important aspects of the austere composition, he tells us that, among other things, it is ὀλιγοσύνδεσμος ('using few connectives') and ἄναρθρος ('lacking articles').[166] Here, we encounter a very effective integration of grammatical and rhetorical theory: the different types of composition are characterised by their use of specific parts of speech, namely the conjunction and the article.

I have argued elsewhere that we can give two explanations of the fact that Dionysius' austere composition is ὀλιγοσύνδεσμος (containing few connectives).[167] First, the reason might be that connectives can make

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[162] *Dem.* 40.215,20–216,5: τινὰς ἑτέρας λέξεις ὑπομένει πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον νοῦν οὔτ' ἀναγκαίας οὔτ' ἴσως χρησίμας, δεσμοῦ δέ τινος ἢ κόλλης τάξιν ταῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ μετ' αὐτὰς κειμέναις ὀνομασίαις παρεξομένας, ἵνα μὴ συναπτόμεναι πρὸς ἀλλήλας αἱ καταλήγουσαί τε εἰς τραχὺ γράμμα καὶ αἱ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπό τινος τοιούτου λαμβάνουσαι σπαδονισμοὺς τῶν ἤχων ποιῶσι καὶ ἀντιτυπίας (…).

[163] *Comp.* 22.100,11–12 on Pindar. See also *Comp.* 22.102,1. For the 'ear', see section 4.3.1.

[164] *Comp.* 23.116,15–20.

[165] The characterisation of sounds as 'smooth' and 'rough' seems to have its origin in musical theory: see 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 175–176 and cf. Pohl (1968) 149–150.

[166] *Comp.* 22.98,1–2. The austere composition is also ἀντίρροπος (or perhaps we should read ἀγχίστροφος with manuscript P: cf. 'Longinus', *Subl.* 22.1) περὶ τὰς πτώσεις ('flexible / quick changing in its use of cases'), ποικίλη περὶ τοὺς σχηματισμούς ('using a variety of figures') and ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπεροπτικὴ τῆς ἀκολουθίας ('in many cases neglecting the logical order'). For the latter characteristic, see section 5.2.

[167] De Jonge (2005b) 478.

the structure of a text more explicit, whereas the austere composition should aim to 'emphasise its unstudied and simple character'.[168] This explanation might be related to Aristotle's view that asyndeton is appropriate to the λέξις ἀγωνιστική (the style of an oral speech), whereas it should be absent from the λέξις γραφική (the style of a written composition).[169] According to Aristotle, asyndeton creates amplification (αὔξησις), 'because many things seem to be said at the same time', whereas the use of connectives makes 'many things seem one'. If we follow this interpretation, we might compare Dionysius' smooth composition with Aristotle's λέξις γραφική in the sense that it is more 'precise' (Aristotle calls it ἀκριβεστάτη), so that the coherence of a text is made explicit by the use of conjunctions. We cannot exclude the possibility that Dionysius is guided by this kind of considerations. However, I think that a more convincing explanation (which need not exclude the former one) is that Dionysius is thinking of the 'expletive' use of σύνδεσμοι, that is, the use of conjunctions for the sake of euphony. According to this interpretation, the austere composition is ὀλιγοσύνδεσμος because it does not avoid hiatus and clashes between semivowels and consonants by the use of 'additional words'. As we have seen, hiatus and rough sounds are characteristic of the σύνθεσις αὐστηρά.[170] The σύνδεσμος is like 'cement': in the architecture of the austere composition, it should not be used too much, because the intervals between the 'stones' of composition should not be filled in. The stones should be unpolished and the transitions between them should be rough. 'Longinus' expresses a similar view on the use of connectives with regard to sublime writing: if you insert many conjunctions (συνδέσμους), 'you will know that the rush and ruggedness (ἀποτραχυνόμενον) of the emotion, if you polish it by the use of conjunctions into smoothness, loses its sting and its fire is quickly put out.'[171]

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[168] *Comp.* 22.97,11–18.

[169] Aristotle, *Rh.* 1413b3–1414a28.

[170] It has been noticed that the writer Dionysius himself is less interested in the avoidance of hiatus than his contemporaries. See Kallenberg (1907) 9: 'Man braucht nur wenige Seiten von der Archaeologie des Dionys von Halikarnass zu lesen, um zu erkennen, dass der Verfasser in der Vermeidung des Hiatus nicht die Strenge beobachtet wie sein Zeitgenosse Diodor oder vor ihm Polybius und nach ihm Plutarch.' For Dionysius' style, see Usher (1982).

[171] 'Longinus', *Subl.* 21.1: (…) εἴσῃ κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς οὕτως παραγράφων ὡς τοῦ πάθους τὸ συνδεδιωγμένον καὶ ἀποτραχυνόμενον, ἐὰν τοῖς συνδέσμοις ἐξομαλίσῃς εἰς λειότητα, ἄκεντρόν τε προσπίπτει καὶ εὐθὺς ἔσβεσται.

As we have seen, Dionysius' austere composition is not only ὀλιγοσύνδεσμος, but also ἄναρθρος ('lacking articles').[172] It seems attractive to explain the latter characteristic in the same way as the avoidance of many conjunctions. In my view, Dionysius' discussion of the austere composition in the treatise *On Demosthenes* provides a very convincing argument for this interpretation. There, he declares that the σύνθεσις αὐστηρά uses neither many conjunctions, nor ἄρθροις συνεχέσιν.[173] Usher translates: 'the article is not consistently employed', thus interpreting the adjective συνεχής as 'successive'.[174] However, συνεχής literally means 'holding together'. Dionysius employs the substantive συνέχεια ('continuity') in his discussion of the smooth composition, where 'the words are woven together according to certain natural affinities and combinations of letters'.[175] Therefore, we may conclude that the smooth composition uses articles in order to connect the words through a continuous stream of sound, whereas the austere composition avoids the use of this kind of ἄρθρα.

These ideas on the (dis)continuity of sound are without any doubt related to the views of musical and poetical critics. Aristoxenus, the Peripatetic musical theorist whom Dionysius mentions twice, was also interested in the continuity of sounds, both in music and in the σύνθεσις of letters.[176] In his *Harmonics*, the concept of συνέχεια ('continuity') plays an important role.[177] In the first book of that work, Aristoxenus states that 'the nature of continuity (τοῦ συνεχοῦς) in melody seems to be similar to that which in speech relates to the putting together of letters.'[178] In the second book, he explains this as follows: 'The order (τάξις) which relates to the melodic and unmelodic is similar to that concerned with the combination of letters in speech: from a given set of letters a syllable is not generated in just any way, but in some ways

[172] Blass *DAB* I (1979^3 [1868]) 222–223 agrees with Dionysius' characterisation of Thucydides' composition as ἄναρθρος.

[173] *Dem.* 39.213,6–8.

[174] Usher (1974) 387. Aujac (1988) 125 offers the same interpretation: 'elle [l'harmonie austère] (…) ne met pas constamment les articles.'

[175] *Comp.* 23.116,5–8.

[176] Cf. Janko (2000) 170 n. 3. Dionysius mentions Aristoxenus in *Comp.* 14.49,2 and *Dem.* 48.233,8–9.

[177] Aristoxenus, *Elementa Harmonica* 1.27 ff. See Gibson (2005) 47 ff.

[178] Aristoxenus, *Elementa Harmonica* 1.27: φαίνεται δὲ τοιαύτη τις φύσις εἶναι τοῦ συνεχοῦς ἐν τῇ μελῳδίᾳ οἵα καὶ ἐν τῇ λέξει περὶ τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων σύνθεσιν. The translation is by Barker (1989).

and not in others.'[179] In other words, continuity between letters is only produced when one combines certain letters that fit together, but there are some letters that do not combine naturally. In the same way, not every note or interval can be sung after another one, but only certain combinations produce continuity (συνέχεια). The idea of the continuity of sound seems implied in Dionysius' treatment of the juxtaposition of words (ἁρμογή, the first ἔργον of composition) as described in *Comp.* 6 (see section 4.3.1): 'Clearly not every juxtaposition of words naturally affects the ears in the same way.'[180]

The notion of continuity also seems to be important to the ideas of the critic Pausimachus of Miletus, one of the *kritikoi* in Philodemus' *On Poems*, although it is difficult to interpret the scanty evidence.[181] For our interpretation of Dionysius' smooth composition and its continuity of sound, it may be relevant that Pausimachus' theory of euphony considered the possibility of adding and dropping letters in the case of nouns, verbs, prepositions and conjunctions.[182] Another critic in Philodemus, perhaps Heracleodorus (as Pohl thinks), shares Dionysius' views on the insertion of semivowels in order to fill in the hiatus between two words. In the work *On Demosthenes*, Dionysius says:[183]

> δείκνυται γὰρ ὑπό τε μουσικῶν καὶ μετρικῶν ὁ διὰ μέσου τῶν φωνηέντων χρόνος ἑτέρων παρεμβολῇ γραμμάτων ἡμιφώνων ἀναπληροῦσθαι δυνάμενος.
>
> 'It is shown by musical and metrical writers that the intermediate pause between two vowels may be filled in by the insertion of other letters, semivowels.'

The *kritikos* in Philodemus' second book *On Poems* uses the same term for 'insertion': in the case of clashes, 'one must insert (παρεμβάλλειν) one productive sound, as short and smooth as possible.'[184] 'Demetrius'

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[179] Aristoxenus, *Elementa Harmonica* 2.37: ἔστι δὲ τοιαύτη τις ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐμμελές τε καὶ ἐκμελὲς τάξις οἵα καὶ ἡ περὶ ⟨τὴν⟩ τῶν γραμμάτων σύνθεσιν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ πάντα τρόπον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γραμμάτων συντιθεμένη ξυλλαβὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ πῶς μέν, πῶς δ' οὔ. The translation is by Barker (1989). See also Aristoxenus, *Elementa Rhythmica* 2.30 on συνεχὴς ῥυθμοποιία ('continuous rhythmic composition'). Cf. Gibson (2005) 95.

[180] *Comp.* 6.28,18–20: οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάντα γε μετὰ πάντων τιθέμενα πέφυκεν ὁμοίως διατιθέναι τὰς ἀκοάς. See section 4.3.1.

[181] See Janko (2000) 170 and 259 n. 2 on Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 64 Janko, where he reconstructs the word [… συ]νεχ[εστ]έραν.

[182] Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 85 Janko.

[183] *Dem.* 38.210,22–211,2.

[184] Philodemus, *On Poems* 2, P. Herc. 994 cols. 27–38: (…), δεῖ παρεμβάλλειν ἓν δυνατὸν καὶ ὡς βραχύτατον καὶ λειότατον. Cf. Pohl (1968) 150. See also Janko (2000) 335 n. 1.

expresses a similar view on the addition of movable ν (a semivowel) to the accusative of Δημοσθένη and Σωκράτη for the sake of euphony, and he proceeds by informing us that musicians call a word smooth (λεῖον), rough (τραχύ), well-proportioned (εὐπαγές) or weighty (ὀγκηρόν).[185]

To summarise, Dionysius' theory of composition types clearly illustrates the many connections between different ancient language disciplines. Dionysius' ideas on the addition or insertion of letters or parts of speech (articles and conjunctions) with a view to smooth composition can be related to the traditions of musical, poetical, rhetorical and grammatical theory. The characterisation of rough sounds and the continuity of speech seem to originate in musical theory, as 'Demetrius' and Dionysius suggest.[186] The discussion of euphonious composition (σύνθεσις) and its use of inserted letters belongs to the tradition of the Hellenistic *kritikoi*, but it is also represented in the stylistic tradition. The view that certain parts of speech (in particular the σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί) can fill the composition for the sake of euphony is expressed in both rhetorical and grammatical works. Dionysius twice refers to the musical theorist Aristoxenus, and he may have known and used the work of the *kritikoi*. He also may have known the views of the grammarian Tryphon, since they were fellow citizens of Rome at the end of the first century BC (see section 1.5). It is not necessary to trace each of Dionysius' views back to one specific author. It is more interesting to conclude that Dionysius made good use of different disciplines, all of which contribute to his own theory of composition.

To complete the discussion of composition and the theory of 'filler words', I briefly return to 'Demetrius'. Despite the similarities between their views on παραπληρώματα, we should notice that there is an important difference between the author of *On Style* and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. 'Demetrius' deals with the 'expletive conjunctions' in the grand style, but he only accepts the use of these words when they contribute to grandeur. Dionysius assigns the use of 'filler words' to the smooth composition, whereas the austere composition should avoid them. In other words, 'Demetrius' considers the 'expletive conjunctions' as a source of elevation, whereas for Dionysius the filler words are primarily concerned with euphony: although the austere composition, just like the grand style, uses rhythms that are 'dignified and impressive' (ἀξιωματικοὺς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς), it *avoids* the use of παρα-

[185] 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 175–176.
[186] 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 176 and *Dem.* 38.210,22–211,2 (above).

πληρώματα.[187] These divergent points of view are closely related to the difference between the system of styles and the system of composition types. Still, the two approaches can lead to a similar evaluation of good composition, as we can see in the case of Homer's catalogue of ships. Both 'Demetrius' and Dionyius praise the passage from the *Iliad* that contains the names of Boeotian towns. 'Demetrius' argues that the connectives (σύνδεσμοι) have given the Boeotian names, which are ordinary and small, a certain dignity (ὄγκος) and greatness (μέγεθος).[188] Dionysius states that Homer has so beautifully interwoven the names with *euphonious* 'filler words' (παραπληρώμασιν), that they appear as the 'most impressive' (μεγαλοπρεπέστατα) of all names (see also section 2.5.4).[189]

4.4. *Dionysius as a literary critic: the parts of speech and the analysis of style*

Since Dionysius regards the parts of speech as the building blocks of composition, they are not only the starting point for the production of speeches, but also useful tools for the analysis of texts: the architecture of a discourse that has been built from μόρια λόγου can also be resolved into these parts again. In other words, a critic who intends to evaluate the style of a certain text can focus on the use of the parts of speech in that text, thus reducing the stylistic aspects of a text to its elements (στοιχεῖα). In this section, I will enquire how the *literary critic* Dionysius uses the grammatical theory of the parts of speech. I will concentrate on his *Second Letter to Ammaeus*, in which he analyses the style of the historian Thucydides.[190] This letter is a kind of appendix to chapter 24 of the Dionysius' treatise *On Thucydides*: Ammaeus, the addressee of the letter, considered Dionysius' remarks in that passage disappointing, because they were not illustrated with actual passages from Thucydides' work.[191] Although Dionysius thinks that citing and analysing passages

[187] *Comp.* 22.97,3–4.
[188] 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 54 and 257 on Homer, *Iliad* 2.497.
[189] *Comp.* 16.67,11–14 on Homer, *Iliad* 2.494–501.
[190] On the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*, see esp. the commentaries by Rhys Roberts (1901), Pritchett (1975) 83–104 and Aujac (1991). See also Blass *DAB* I (1979[3] [1868]) 207–244 and Ros (1938) 49–68. On the structure of this text, see Egger (1902) 233–234 and Warren (1899), who points to Dionysius' 'hastiness' in composing the letter.
[191] *Amm.* II 1.421,5–422,6. On the identity of Ammaeus, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there.

from Thucydides is the practice of 'authors of rhetorical handbooks and introductions' (οἱ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς εἰσαγωγὰς τῶν λόγων πραγματευόμενοι), he agrees to fulfil Ammaeus' wish, thus adopting 'the didactic instead of the epideictic method.'[192]

4.4.1. *Dionysius on the style of Thucydides*

Dionysius' remarks on Thucydides' style in his letter to Ammaeus should be understood in the context of the 'Thucydidism' that had emerged among critics of first century Rome.[193] In the *Orator* (46 BC), Cicero tells us that recently a new group of writers had become active who called themselves 'Thucydideans'. Cicero disapproves of these imitators of the Greek historian: 'Those famous speeches contain so many dark and obscure sentences as to be scarcely intelligible, which is a prime fault in a public oration.'[194] According to Cicero, Thucydides is to be praised only as a historian who writes about wars, but not as an orator.[195] Among historians of this period, the most famous imitator of Thucydides was Sallustius, who had died five years before Dionysius' arrival in Rome.[196] Another imitator seems to have been the Roman historian Quintus Aelius Tubero, who is the recipient of Dionysius' treatise *On Thucydides*.[197]

Dionysius regards Thucydides' style (at least in its most extreme form) as unsuitable for practical purposes. In *On Thucydides*, he even contests the view of some 'reputable critics' that this style, although not appropriate to oratory, could be a useful model for historians.[198]

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[192] *Amm.* II 1.422,6: τὸ διδασκαλικὸν σχῆμα λαβὼν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπιδεικτικοῦ. Aujac (1991) 131 renders these words as 'prenant le ton du professeur, au lieu de celui du conférencier'. She comments that Dionysius prefers an impressionistic kind of criticism to that of a teacher: 'la critique d'un homme de goût plutôt que d'un spécialiste.'

[193] On the popularity of Thucydides as a model for the writing of history in this period, see Leeman (1955). Cf. Bowersock (1979) 68–69 and Innes (1989) 269–270.

[194] Cicero, *Orator* 30: *Ipsae illae contiones ita multas habent obscuras abditasque sententias vix ut intellegantur; quod est in oratione civili vitium vel maximum.* (Translation Hubbel.)

[195] Cicero, *Orator* 31. Cf. Leeman (1955) 195–196.

[196] See e.g. Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 10.1.101.

[197] On Quintus Aelius Tubero, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there. In *Thuc.* 25.364,14–16, Dionysius states that his work should benefit those who wish to imitate (μιμεῖσθαι) Thucydides. In the final chapter of the treatise (*Thuc.* 55.418,19–21), Dionysius says: 'I could have written an essay on Thucydides that would have given you more pleasure than this one, (…) but not a more truthful one.' This statement seems to imply that Quintus Aelius Tubero admired Thucydides. Cf. Bowersock (1965) 130.

[198] *Thuc.* 50.409,8–410,7.

The contested view corresponds to the one that Cicero expresses in *Orator* 31 (see above) and *Brutus* 287: one could imitate Thucydides in the writing of history, but not in pleading cases.[199] Therefore, I think that Dionysius, who never names a Roman writer except for his addressees, may well have used the expression τινες οὐκ ἄδοξοι σοφισταί to refer to Cicero.[200] Nassal already considered the possibility that Dionysius thought of Cicero ('aber sicher nicht in erster Linie'), but finally decided that Dionysius' view must have referred to a Greek source, 'denn der Römer C[icero] besaß nicht diese detaillierte Kenntnis von Th[ucydides].'[201] Are we really to believe that Cicero, who spent so much time with Greek teachers, both in Greece and Rome, was not able to judge the style of Thucydides?[202] Nassal does so, because this belief would support his central thesis, namely that both Cicero and Dionysius followed the views of Caecilius of Caleacte: Cicero would simply have taken over Caecilius' views on Thucydides, whereas Dionysius would have corrected them. Nassal argues that Caecilius wrote a treatise between the publication of Cicero's *De oratore* (55 BC) and *Orator* (46 BC), which would account for the differences between these two works.[203] At the same time, this treatise would explain the similarities between the doctrine of Dionysius and that of the later works by Cicero. On the connections between Cicero and Dionysius, Nassal remarks the following: 'Eine Abhängigkeit des C[iceros] von DH. [i.e. Dionysius] ist aus chronologischen Gründen ausgeschlossen. Ich möchte darum in der vorliegenden Arbeit den Nachweis versuchen, daß die zwischen DH. und C. sowohl in der rhetorischen Techne als auch in der ästhetisch-rhetorischen Beurteilung griechischer Schriftsteller vor-

[199] Goudriaan (1989) 266 objects that Cicero prefers Isocrates and Theopompus as models for historiography (see *Orator* 207), so that the remarks on the imitation of Thucydides in *Brutus* 287 and *Orator* 31 would be 'insincere' ('onoprecht'). However, Cicero's preference of the periodical style of Isocrates and Theopompus (*Orator* 207) does not at all imply that historians could not imitate Thucydides as well. In other words, there is no real inconsistency in Cicero's remarks.

[200] Pavano (1958) 196 and Goudriaan (1989) 266 n. 3 state that it is impossible to discover the identity of the οὐκ ἄδοξοι σοφισταί. This is true, but I think we should at least mention the possibility that Cicero was one of them. Bowersock (1979) 69–70 points out that Dionysius must have known of Cicero's ideas on Roman classicism via his 'patron' Quintus Tubero: Cicero was a friend of Tubero's father Lucius.

[201] Nassal (1910) 105. Leeman (1963) 180 and Aujac (1991) 161 also think that Dionysius refers to Caecilius of Caleacte. Egger (1902) 77, however, considers the possibility that Dionysius read Cicero's rhetorical works and used them for his composition theory.

[202] Crawford (1978) 199 points out that Cicero was mainly taught by Greeks.

[203] Nassal (1910) 5–10.

liegenden Berührungspunkte sehr wahrscheinlich zurückzuführen sind auf die oben für C.s "Orator" vermutete bezw. geforderte griechische Schrift über Stil und Komposition.'[204] It is typical that Nassal does not even mention the possibility that the Greek Dionysius could have used the ideas of a Roman colleague. Nassal's entire theory relies on the assumption that Caecilius was significantly older than Dionysius, for which there is no convincing evidence.[205] The Suda tells us that Caecilius was active under Augustus.[206] Most modern scholars assume that Caecilius was roughly contemporary with and perhaps slightly younger than Dionysius (*fl.* 30–8 BC), who refers to his 'friend' in one of the literary letters.[207] Cicero's *De oratore*, however, was already finished in 55 BC, and the *Orator* was written in 46 BC. Therefore, it is chronologically not very probable that Caecilius influenced Cicero. Instead of assuming that Cicero relied on Caecilius, or any other Greek source that wrote on Thucydides, I think that we should simply accept the more elegant solution, namely that Dionysius knew the *Orator* and referred to Cicero in his treatise *On Thucydides*.[208]

Dionysius' criticism of the style of Thucydides especially concerns the poetic diction, the variety of figures, the dissonance of the compo-

[204] Nassal (1910) 6–7.

[205] Nassal's hypothesis about Caecilius' dates is based on the reconstruction of the Atticist movement by Wilamowitz (1900). Wilamowitz (1900) 6 suggests that the title of Caecilius' work Κατὰ Φρυγῶν (*Against the Phrygians*) indicates that Caecilius wrote that book when the battle of Atticists against Asianic rhetoric was still going on. If this is true, Wilamowitz argues, Caecilius' work must have preceded Dionysius' preface to *On the Ancient Orators*, which reports the victory of Atticism. In my view, we should avoid presenting the conflict of Atticists who objected to 'Asianic' style as a real 'battle' that was decided at a particular moment. There were many different concepts of correct 'Attic' style (see also section 1.2), and there is no reason to believe that all controversies were over after 31 BC. The title of Caecilius' book does not imply that it was written before the moment on which the Atticists attained their alleged 'victory'.

[206] See Suda s.v. Καικίλιος and s.v. Ἑρμαγόρας. Cf. Blass (1865) 174. On Caecilius of Caleacte, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there.

[207] For Dionysius' reference to Caecilius (*Pomp.* 3.240,14), see section 1.4 and esp. Tolkiehn (1908). Blass (1865) 174, Bowersock (1965) 124 and Kennedy (1994) 160 assign Caecilius' career to Augustan Rome. Brzoska (1899) thinks that Caecilius was slightly younger than Dionysius, and Weißenberger (1997) 896 states that Caecilius was born ca. 50 BC.

[208] Wisse (1995) has convincingly argued that we should no longer exclude the possibility that Romans may indeed have expressed original Roman views, without relying on Greek sources, and that Greeks may have taken over certain ideas that were developed by Romans. Goudriaan (1989) 13 thinks that it is remarkable that Dionysius does not mention Cicero in any of his works.

sition and the speed with which the ideas are expressed.[209] Dionysius thinks that Thucydides' style is only successful when it does not depart too much from the usual. The problem is that Thucydides rather frequently diverges from common words and figures, so that his style becomes obscure.[210] He describes various aspects of Thucydidean style as 'unnatural', and he points out that it does not preserve 'logical order' (ἀκολουθία) and 'grammatical congruence' (καταλληλότης). The latter terms and their connection to Dionysius' concept of 'natural' style will be the subject of section 5.2, where I will also discuss Dionysius' analysis of Thucydides' Melian dialogue in *Thuc.* 37. In the current section I will focus on the discussion of Thucydides' use of the parts of speech in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*.[211]

Before discussing Dionysius' grammatical notes on Thucydides (section 4.4.2), I should draw attention to the fact that there are two ancient texts that contain very similar observations on Thucydides. The relevance of one of these parallels has been noted before, namely that of the scholia on Thucydides. Not many scholars have noticed the second parallel: a fragment from Caecilius of Caleacte's *On Figures*.[212] I will briefly introduce both texts, to which I will also refer in my discussion of Dionysius' grammatical observations.

Usener first noticed the similarities between Dionysius' grammatical observations in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* and the scholia on Thucy-

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[209] *Thuc.* 24.363,10–12: τὸ ποιητικὸν τῶν ὀνομάτων, τὸ πολυειδὲς τῶν σχημάτων, τὸ τραχὺ τῆς ἁρμονίας, τὸ τάχος τῶν σημασιῶν. Cf. Grube (1950) 105. On the poetic character of Thucydides' style, see also section 6.4. The variation of figures (μεταβολή) is generally considered one of the most important characteristics of Thucydides' style: see esp. Ros (1938). Blass *DAB* I (1979[3] [1868]) 226 agrees with Dionysius on Thucydides' 'Gedrängtheit'. See also Norden (1915[3]) 97–98.

[210] *Thuc.* 49.408,4–10. Cf. Cicero, *Orator* 30.

[211] For Dionysius' views on Thucydides and historiography in general see Grube (1950), Grube (1974), Sacks (1983), Sacks (1986), Heath (1989) 71–89 and Toye (1995). For a comparison of the evaluations of Thucydides' style by Cicero and Dionysius, see Nassal (1910) 101–115. Although Blass agrees with many of Dionysius' observations on Thucydides, he objects to Dionysius' blunt criticism of Thucydides (Blass *DGB* [1865] 187): 'Aber allerdings (…) die schroffe Art in der er sein Urtheil ausspricht zeugt wenig von der Pietät, die er gegen einen so überlegenen Geist hätte haben müssen.' The verdict of Norden (1915[3]) 96 is even more severe: 'Dionys v. H. denkt sich nun in seinen Kritiken den Thukydides als einen höchst eigensinnigen Schriftsteller, der, ergriffen von der Sucht, Neues und Ungewöhnliches zu bieten, immer das gerade Gegenteil von dem dachte und schrieb, was normale Menschen gedacht und geschrieben hätten. Das ist die Vorstellung die dieser Mann von Originalität hat.' Etc.

[212] See, however, Ros (1938) 56 n. 17, who mentions the parallel.

dides.[213] From his comparison of these two texts he concluded that Dionysius made use of scholia that antedated the grammarian Didymus (who was contemporary to Dionysius and may have settled down in Rome at some point).[214] Usener even suggested that Dionysius had an edition of Thucydides that contained critical signs and scholia, a view that was taken over by Radermacher.[215] One important argument for this view is Dionysius' own remark (in *On Thucydides*) that there are not many people who can understand the whole of Thucydides 'and even these cannot understand certain passages without a linguistic explanation' (ἐξηγήσεως γραμματικῆς).[216] A little later, he adds that many passages from Thucydides are difficult to follow and require 'linguistic explanations' (γραμματικῶν ἐξηγήσεων).[217] As Pfeiffer points out, the term ἐξήγησις does not necessarily imply a commentary (ὑπόμνημα), but it is possible that the 'interpretations' to which Dionysius refers were indeed part of a commentary.[218] Luschnat has argued that both the scholia on Thucydides and Dionysius' *Second Letter to Ammaeus* can ultimately be traced back to a commentary on Thucydides composed in Hellenistic Alexandria.[219] Pfeiffer accepted this reconstruction and suggested that it was Aristarchus who wrote the first commentary on Thucydides.[220] Now, it is important to realise that it is not certain how far the annotations in the Thucydides scholia go back in time. Usener and Luschnat argue that the similarities between Dionysius and the scholia point to a common source. We should not exclude the possibility, however, that Dionysius influenced certain later lexicographers and grammarians, so that the scholia on Thucydides as they survive might partly be based on his observations.[221] On the other hand, Dionysius' remarks on the ἐξήγησις γραμματική seem to strengthen the belief

[213] Usener (1889) 71ff. The edition of the scholia on Thucydides is by Hude (1927). Apart from the scholia, which survived in manuscripts of the 10th–14th centuries AD, there are also two papyri that contain similar grammatical observations on Thucydides: P. Oxy. 6.853 (Pack^2 nr 1536, 2nd century AD) and P. Rainer 29.247 (3rd century AD). The author of the text of the former papyrus is engaged in a polemic with Dionysius and rejects his objections to Thucydides' style: see Luschnat (1954) 25–31.

[214] On Didymus, see section 1.4 and the literature mentioned there.

[215] Radermacher (1905) 968–969.

[216] *Thuc.* 51.410,15–17. On Thucydides' obscurity, see also Cicero, *Orator* 30 (above).

[217] *Thuc.* 55.417,22–25.

[218] Pfeiffer (1968) 223 and 225 n. 4.

[219] Luschnat (1954), esp. 22–25.

[220] Pfeiffer (1968) 225.

[221] Cf. Ros (1938) 65 n. 36, Luschnat (1954) 23–24 and Goudriaan (1989) 18 n. 2.

that he used a commentary in his letter to Ammaeus, and if such a commentary existed, it could be the origin of (part of) the scholia as well. There are also some terminological differences between the letter and Dionysius' other works (in particular *On Composition*), which seem to support the idea that Dionysius made use of a certain grammatical work. This does not mean, of course, that the entire letter to Ammaeus is copied from a grammatical source. If he used a commentary, Dionysius has surely added his own remarks and examples.

The second text that contains very similar observations on Thucydides is a fragment from Caecilius of Caleacte's *On Figures* (Περὶ σχημάτων), to which I already drew attention in my discussion of *Comp.* 6 (section 4.3.1).[222] The rhetorician Tiberius reports that 'Caecilius introduces the figure of alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) and says that this figure occurs in relation to a noun, cases, numbers, persons and tenses.'[223] He proceeds by discussing each of these *accidentia* of nouns and verbs and the kind of alteration (or grammatical variation) that occurs in their use. Thus, the alteration concerning ὄνομα is explained as ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄρρενος τὸ θῆλυ ἢ τὸ οὐδέτερον παραλαμβάνοντες, ἢ τῷ ἄρρενι ἀντ' ἀμφοῖν χρώμενοι: 'adopting the feminine or the neuter instead of the masculine, or using the masculine instead of both of the other genders.' This statement resembles Dionysius' formulation of the σχηματισμός of the genders (cited above, section 4.3.1): ἐξ ἀρρενικῶν γίνεσθαι θηλυκὰ ἢ ἐκ θηλυκῶν ἀρρενικὰ ἢ οὐδέτερα ἐκ τούτων. Next, Caecilius treats the use of singular instead of plural ('Greece' instead of 'the Greeks'), the alteration concerning 'number' and the one concerning tenses, 'when they use the present tenses instead of the past tenses' (ὅταν τοῖς ἐνεστῶσιν ἀντὶ τῶν παρῳχημένων χρῶνται). Since Tiberius only mentions Caecilius at the beginning of his treatment of ἀλλοίωσις, we should allow for

[222] Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 75 Ofenloch (Tiberius, *Rhetores Graeci* III [ed. Spengel], 80–81). Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.3.89 reports that Dionysius also wrote a book on figures (see also section 1.3), but a treatise Περὶ σχημάτων has not survived in Dionysius' name. It has been thought that at two places Dionysius indicates that he was going to write a treatise on figures, namely at *Dem.* 39.212,13–16 and *Comp.* 8.33,3–5: cf. Egger (1902) 24, Radermacher (1905) 969 and Aujac (1978) 21. However, in these passages Dionysius merely says that he does not have enough time to enumerate all figures in the treatise that he is actually writing (i.e. *On Composition* and *Demosthenes*).

[223] On the figure ἀλλοίωσις, see Anderson (2000) 16–17. On Tiberius (the author of Περὶ σχημάτων), see Solmsen (1936). Later rhetoricians who write on figures echo the views of Dionysius (see Ros [1938] 67–68), but in this section I will concentrate on the similarities between the theories of Dionysius, his contemporary Caecilius, 'Longinus' and Quintilian.

the possibility that Caecilius is not responsible for the complete text of the fragment. However, in our discussion of Dionysius' grammatical observations in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*, we will notice that there are many parallels with the examples that are mentioned in the fragment of Caecilius. There are two differences between the two treatments. First, Caecilius draws his examples not only from Thucydides, although many of them are indeed taken from the historian.[224] Second, Caecilius deals with ἀλλοίωσις in a discussion of approved figures, whereas Dionysius mentions the same kind of variations in a negative treatment of Thucydides' stylistic defects. Still, the treatment of ἀλλοίωσις in the relevant fragment from Tiberius' *On Figures* seems to correspond more to Dionysius' discussion than to later treatments, such as the one in 'Longinus', *Subl.* 23–24, who appears to correct his predecessor Caecilius (see below). Therefore, I believe that Caecilius, just like Dionysius, was acquainted with certain grammatical theories, which he may have borrowed from the grammarians who were active in Rome at the end of the first century BC. Even if their observations on Thucydides were (partly) based on a grammatical commentary, the type of comments that they make seems to be representative of the integration of grammar, rhetoric and criticism in the Augustan period. Where Hellenistic philologists point to variations in grammatical construction in order to explain a transmitted text, Dionysius uses these observations for his rhetoric and literary criticism, and Caecilius seems to have employed them for his theory of figures.

4.4.2. *Dionysius' grammatical notes on Thucydides*

In the second chapter of his letter to Ammaeus Dionysius repeats the remarks that he had made on Thucydides' style in *On Thucydides* 24.[225] Having mentioned some aspects of his selection of words, Dionysius summarises the most important characteristics of Thucydides' constructions (σχηματισμοί—for the term, see section 3.7):[226]

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[224] Solmsen (1936) 804–807 points out that in those parts where Tiberius cites Caecilius he draws more examples from Thucydides, whereas Tiberius himself prefers Demosthenes for his examples. This might indicate that his quotations from Caecilius are reliable.

[225] *Amm.* II 2.422,7–425,8.

[226] *Amm.* II 2.422,21–424,7: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σχηματισμῶν, ἐν οἷς μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη διενεγκεῖν τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ, πλείστην εἰσενεγκάμενος πραγματείαν, τοτὲ μὲν λόγον ἐξ ὀνόματος ποιῶν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ὄνομα συνάγων τὸν λόγον· καὶ νῦν μὲν τὸ ῥηματικὸν ὀνοματικῶς ἐκ-

'With regard to the constructions, in which he particularly wished to excel his predecessors, he took the greatest care. Sometimes he makes a phrase (λόγος) from a noun, and sometimes he condenses a phrase into a noun. Sometimes he expresses 'the verbal' in a nominal form, and sometimes he changes a noun into a verb. And of the nouns themselves he inverts their normal use, so that the proper noun becomes an appellative, and the appellative is expressed in the form of a proper noun, and the passive verbs become active, and the active verbs become passive; and he alters the natural uses of plural and singular and substitutes the one for the other, and he combines feminine forms with masculine forms and masculine forms with feminine forms and neuters with both, as a result of which the natural order (ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία) is ruined.[227] He sometimes changes the cases of nouns and participles from the signifying to the signified and sometimes from the signified to the signifying. And in the use of connectives and prepositions (τοῖς συνδετικοῖς καὶ τοῖς προθετικοῖς μορίοις) and even more in the words that articulate the values of words (τοῖς διαρθροῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων δυνάμεις) [i.e. articles], he allows himself full poetic licence. One can find in his work a great many constructions that are unusual through changes of persons and variations of tenses and use of metaphors of figurative expressions and acquire the appearance of solecisms (σολοικισμῶν λαμβάνοντα φαντασίας).[228] And he often substitutes things for persons and persons for things.'

After this summary of the unusal aspects of Thucydides' constructions, Dionysius goes on to enumerate the particularities of the histo-

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φέρων, αὖθις δὲ τοὔνομα ῥῆμα ποιῶν· καὶ αὐτῶν γε τούτων ἀναστρέφων τὰς χρήσεις, ἵνα τὸ μὲν ὀνοματικὸν ⟨προσηγορικὸν γένηται, τὸ δὲ προσηγορικὸν ὀνοματικῶς⟩ λέγηται, καὶ τὰ μὲν παθητικὰ ῥήματα δραστήρια, τὰ δὲ δραστήρια παθητικά· πληθυντικῶν δὲ καὶ ἑνικῶν ἀλλάττων τὰς φύσεις καὶ ἀντικατηγορῶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλων, θηλυκά τ' ἀρρενικοῖς καὶ ἀρρενικὰ θηλυκοῖς καὶ οὐδέτερα τούτων τισὶν συνάπτων, ἐξ ὧν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία πλανᾶται· τὰς δὲ ⟨τῶν⟩ ὀνοματικῶν ἢ μετοχικῶν πτώσεις τοτὲ μὲν πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ σημαίνοντος ἀποστρέφων, τοτὲ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ⟨σημαῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ⟩ σημαινομένου· ἐν δὲ τοῖς συνδετικοῖς καὶ τοῖς προθετικοῖς μορίοις καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς διαρθροῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων δυνάμεις ποιητοῦ τρόπον ἐνεξουσιάζων. πλεῖστα δ' ἄν τις εὕροι παρ' αὐτῷ τῶν σχημάτων, προσώπων τε ἀποστροφαῖς καὶ χρόνων ἐναλλαγαῖς καὶ τροπικῶν σημειώσεων μεταφοραῖς ἐξηλλαγμένα καὶ σολοικισμῶν λαμβάνοντα φαντασίας· ὁπόσα τε γίνεται πράγματα ἀντὶ σωμάτων ἢ σώματα ἀντὶ πραγμάτων, (…). The corresponding passage from *On Thucydides* that Dionysius quotes (with some changes) is *Thuc.* 24.361,12–362,18.

[227] On Dionysius' use of the term ἀκολουθία, see section 5.2.

[228] On the expression σολοικισμῶν λαμβάνοντα φαντασίας, related to the term σολοικοφανής, see below and also section 5.2.

rian's enthymemes and Gorgianic figures of style, which are less interesting for our purpose.[229] In the remaining part of the letter (chapters 3–17), Dionysius offers and discusses examples of many (but not all) of the Thucydidean characteristics mentioned above (with regard to selection of words, constructions, and figures respectively).[230] Most of these concern the use of the μόρια λόγου, especially nouns, verbs, participles, conjunctions, prepositions and articles. We will analyse these remarks in order to understand Dionysius' blending of grammar and literary criticism. Before we start our discussion of chapter 3–14, however, we should pay attention to a difficulty in Dionysius' terminology. In the passage cited above, Dionysius refers to articles as τοῖς διαρθροῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων δυνάμεις.[231] The MSS have νοημάτων here, but editors have correctly restored the ὀνομάτων that occurs in the corresponding passage in *On Thucydides* 24.[232] Schenkeveld points out that this expression does not refer to particles, since in antiquity these words were not distinguished as a group, but to articles (ἄρθρα).[233] How should we then interpret the words τοῖς διαρθροῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων δυνάμεις?[234] Schenkeveld points to the Stoic definition of the ἄρθρον as 'a declinable part of speech, distinguishing the genders and numbers of nouns'.[235] On the basis of this text, Schenkeveld argues that 'according to DH articles serve as distinctors of gender and number, and thus have to do with the

[229] *Amm.* II 2.424,6–425,8.

[230] Dionysius does not offer examples of proper nouns that become appellatives and appellatives that become proper nouns (announced at *Amm.* II 2.423,6–8). Neither does he discuss the poetic licence in the use of connectives, prepositions and articles (announced at *Amm.* II 2.423,16–424,2). See Warren (1899), who concludes that there is a lacuna after *Amm.* II 6.427,16 and 7.427,17 (where the substitution of τὸ προσηγορικόν for ὄνομα and *vice versa* was treated) and between *Amm.* II 13.433,5 and 14.433,6 (this lacuna was already indicated by Krüger and Usener). Warren points to more differences between the outline of the letter (*Amm.* II 2) and Dionysius' actual discussion of examples (*Amm.* II 3ff.), but perhaps we should not wish to make the correspondence perfectly consistent.

[231] *Amm.* II 2.424,1.

[232] *Thuc.* 24.362,11–12. Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 79.

[233] Schenkeveld (1983) 79–80 and Schenkeveld (1988).

[234] See also *Amm.* II 11.430,12–14, where Dionysius quotes instances 'in which he [Thucydides] turns the cases of proper nouns, appellative nouns, participles, and ⟨τῶν⟩ συναπτομένων τούτοις ἄρθρων away from the usual.'

[235] Diogenes Laertius VII.58: διορίζον τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς. Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 80. Pinborg (1975) 99 points out that this definition does not look very Stoic: it seems to be influenced by grammarians. The Stoics probably defined the ἄρθρον as a part of speech that indicates the οὐσία: cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 9,9. See also Luhtala (2000) 80 and my section 5.3.6.

meaning of words. But one is justified in doubting whether he himself understood what he had written.'[236] I think that Dionysius did understand what he had written, and I do not believe that the definition of the ἄρθρον from Diogenes Laertius is relevant here. The verb διαρθρόω means 'to articulate', but LSJ also give the meaning 'to fill up so as to form an organic whole'.[237] We have seen (section 4.3.2) that in the discussion of the three composition types Dionysius points out that the austere composition is ἄναρθρος ('lacking articles').[238] He also tells us that the σύνθεσις αὐστηρά does not use ἄρθροις συνεχέσιν ('articles that hold together').[239] Where the smooth composition produces a continuous stream of sound through the use of articles and conjunctions, the austere composition wants the words to stand firmly apart: it avoids the use of ἄρθρα that would make the transitions between the words smooth. Thucydides is the most important representative of the austere composition. When Dionysius states that the historian allows himself poetic licence in the use of connectives, prepositions and especially in τοῖς διαρθροῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων δυνάμεις, he must be thinking of the omission of these parts of speech for the sake of the roughness of sound.[240] The term δύναμις often refers to phonetic value or sound in Dionysius' works.[241] Elsewhere, Dionysius points out that modification of the parts of speech, which may involve the addition or omission of a preposition (κατιδών or ἰδών), is applied more frequently in poetry than in prose.[242] The same thing seems to be true of the omission of articles and the parapleromatic σύνδεσμοι (see above, section 4.3.2). Therefore, it seems clear that when Dionysius refers to Thucydides' poetic use of prepositions, σύνδεσμοι (including our 'particles') and articles, he actually means the avoidance of these parts of speech. He describes the articles as 'words that connect (or fill up) the (phonetic) values of words' because their presence or absence can cause the words either to form one continuous stream of sound or to stand firmly apart. The latter option is the one that Thucydides, as a representative of the austere composition, prefers. Pritchett mentions examples of the

[236] Schenkeveld (1983) 80.
[237] LSJ refer to Aristotle, *Historia Animalium* 521a10 and *Ethica Nicomachea* 1098a22.
[238] *Comp.* 22.98,1–2.
[239] *Dem.* 39.213,6–8. See section 4.3.2.
[240] On Thucydides' poetic license, see section 6.4.
[241] Cf. Rhys Roberts (1910) 296.
[242] *Comp.* 6.29,17–30,3.

omission of the article from Thucydides' work, which seem to support Dionysius' analysis.[243]

In the third chapter of the letter, Dionysius starts his demonstration of Thucydides' characteristics. Having briefly mentioned a number of archaic words, he turns to the inventiveness and versatility that Thucydides shows in his constructions (σχηματισμοί). In the fourth chapter, he illustrates the periphrasis of one single noun or verb (λέξιν εἴτε ὀνοματικὴν εἴτε ῥηματικήν) by the use of more words.[244] He does not comment upon the first example (Thuc. 1.138.3), but it seems clear that Dionysius regards the words διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρου ἄξιος θαυμάσαι ('especially in this respect deserving more respect than any other') as periphrastic here.[245] Dionysius' analysis of the next example (Thuc. 2.37.1) is unfortunately lost in a lacuna.[246] After that lacuna, he seems to be discussing the opposite of periphrasis, namely the expression of a phrase in one single word, a Thucydidean characteristic that had been announced at the beginning of the letter (τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ὄνομα συνάγων τὸν λόγον).[247] The example (Thuc. 4.12.1) concerns the word παρεξειρεσία ('outrigger'). In order to make it clear that this strange word is the condensed form of a whole phrase (λόγος), Dionysius rewrites the sentence, thus explaining what Dionysius 'wants to signify' (βούλεται δηλοῦν).[248] The scholia on Thucydides give different explanations of the term.[249]

In the next chapter (*Amm.* II 5), Dionysius deals with passages in which Thucydides 'casts the verbal parts of speech in the form of nouns' (τὰ ῥηματικὰ μόρια τῆς λέξεως ὀνοματικῶς σχηματίζει).[250] The example (Thuc. 1.41.1) contains the words παραίνεσις ('exhortation') and ἀξίωσις ('claim'). Dionysius states that 'the words παραινεῖν and ἀξιοῦν, which are verbs, have become nouns, παραίνεσις and ἀξίωσις'

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[243] Pritchett (1975) 94.

[244] *Amm.* II 4.425,1–426,2: ὅταν μὲν οὖν μίαν λέξιν εἴτε ὀνοματικὴν εἴτε ῥηματικὴν ἐν πλείοσιν ὀνόμασιν ἢ ῥήμασιν ἐκφέρῃ περιφράζων τὴν αὐτὴν νόησιν, τοιαύτην ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν. 'When he conveys a single noun or verb in more nouns or verbs, expressing the same idea periphrastically, he produces this sort of phrase.'

[245] See also Ros (1938) 56. Further examples of periphrasis in Thucydides are found in the rhetorical literature on figures: see esp. Spengel III 32,15 and III 76,8.

[246] Here I follow Aujac (1991) 134. Usener does not assume that there is a lacuna, but reads σύντομον instead of σημαινόμενον at *Amm.* II 4.426,8. But the transition between 'periphrasis' and 'concision' would then be rather abrupt, and it is more natural that the words καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις (*Amm.* II 4.426,7–8) refer to the preceding example.

[247] *Amm.* II 2.423,3.

[248] On metathesis, see De Jonge (2005b) and chapter 7 of this study.

[249] Hude (1927) 234–235. Cf. Ros (1938) 55 n. 14.

[250] *Amm.* II 5.426,15–16.

(τὸ γὰρ παραινεῖν καὶ ἀξιοῦν ῥήματα ὄντα ὀνοματικὰ γέγονεν παραίνεσις καὶ ἀξίωσις).[251] The scholia on Thucydides give the same explanation, and a scholiast remarks the following: τὸ παραῖνειν καὶ ἀξιοῦν, ῥήματα ὄντα, ὀνοματικῶς προήνεγκεν. 'He has expressed the words παραινεῖν and ἀξιοῦν, which are verbs, in the form of nouns.'[252] Dionysius' other examples are ἀποτείχισις (not in the received text, but Thuc. 3.95.2 has περιτείχισις) instead of ἀποτειχίσαι and ὀλόφυρσις ('lamentation') instead of ὀλοφύρασθαι. The scholia merely explain the word ὀλόφυρσιν as θρῆνον and λύπην, without deriving it from the verb that Dionysius mentions.[253]

When Thucydides turns nouns into verbs (τὰ ὀνόματα ποιῇ ῥήματα), he uses for example ἀναγκάσαι and πολεμεῖν instead of ἀνάγκη and πόλεμος.[254] Thucydides (1.23.6) writes τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀληθεστάτην αἰτίαν, λόγῳ δὲ ἀφανεστάτην, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἶομαι μεγάλους γινομένους ἀναγκάσαι εἰς τὸ πολεμεῖν. 'Now the most genuine cause, though given least publicity, I consider to have been the fact that growing Athenian power made it necessary for them to go to war.' Dionysius' explanation of this passage from Thucydides is literally the same as the one that we find in the scholia: βούλεται γὰρ δηλοῦν, ὅτι μεγάλοι γιγνόμενοι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀνάγκην παρέσχον τοῦ πολέμου. 'For he wants to signify that growing Athenian power imposed upon them the necessity of war.'[255] In the scholia, this explanation is preceded by the observation τὰ ὀνόματα ῥήματα ἐποίησεν ('he has turned the nouns into verbs'). Dionysius adds the following words to the explanation: πεποίηκεν δὲ ἀντὶ τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῦ πολέμου ὀνοματικῶν ὄντων ῥηματικὰ τό τε ἀναγκάσαι καὶ τὸ πολεμεῖν. 'But for the nouns "necessity" and "war" he has substituted the verbs "made it necessary" and "to wage war".' How should we explain the fact that the scholiast gives the verbatim text that we find in Dionysius?[256] Did Dionysius quote a text from a grammatical commentary that also survived in the scholia, or did the scholiast make use of Dionysius' comments? To answer this question, we should observe that the

[251] *Amm.* II 5.426,20–427,1. Blass *DAB* I (1979^3 [1868]) 213 agrees with Dionysius on Thucydides' 'Verbalnomina'.

[252] Hude (1927) 40.

[253] Hude (1927) 106.

[254] *Amm.* II 6.427,7–16.

[255] *Amm.* II 6.427,12–14. Hude (1927) 26. Noonan (1992) discusses the passage and defends Thucydides against the criticism of Dionysius and the scholia.

[256] Aujac (1991) and other commentators are silent on this correspondence. Noonan (1992) 38 observes the 'identical reaction' of Dionysius and the scholia, but does not explain the fact that they use exactly the same words.

combination of βούλεται and δηλοῦν is rather frequent in Dionysius: it occurs seven times in the rhetorical works. In many cases, (as in *Amm.* II 6) the words introduce Dionysius' rewriting (metathesis) of a passage, which intends to make clear 'what the author intends to signify'.[257] Apart from βούλεται δηλοῦν, we also find many instances of βούλεται λέγειν in Dionysius' works.[258] In the scholia on Thucydides, however, the expression βούλεται δηλοῦν does not occur anywhere else. It does occur in the scholia on Homer, but the rewriting seems characteristic of Dionysius' method.[259] Therefore, it seems likely that the scholiast made use of Dionysius' observations on Thucydides: in his discussion of Thucydides 1.23.6 he agreed with Dionysius and decided to quote him. If this conclusion is correct, it will have far-reaching consequences for our understanding of the relation between Dionysius and the Thucydides scholia in general. Both Usener and Radermacher assumed that the scholia on Thucydides represent an independent tradition that was not influenced by a rhetorician like Dionysius.[260] Although Ros and Luschnat admit the possibility that it was Dionysius who influenced the scholia, they finally follow the authority of Usener and Radermacher.[261] I think that it is still plausible that Dionysius made use of some grammatical commentary (see above), but we should be very careful when tracing the scholiastic tradition in the form as we know it back to Alexandria. In any case, it seems that this tradition was not independent of the rhetorical tradition from the Augustan period: at least part of the comments in the scholia seem to be based on Dionysius' observations.

Dionysius now turns to Thucydides' interchanging of the *accidentia* of the parts of speech: he discusses the use of the voices (*Amm.* II 7–8), numbers (*Amm.* II 9), genders (*Amm.* II 10), cases (*Amm.* II 11) and tenses (*Amm.* II 12). Just like the early grammarians, Dionysius distinguishes only two voices (see section 3.8). In our passage (*Amm.* II 7–8), Dionysius uses the terms ποιητικόν and ἐνεργητικόν for active, and παθητικόν

[257] The expression βούλεται δηλοῦν occurs in the following passages: *Thuc.* 29.374,22; *Thuc.* 30.375,25–376,1; *Thuc.* 30.376,6; *Thuc.* 31.378,5; *Amm.* II 4.426,12; *Amm.* II 6.427,12–13; *Amm.* II 8.428,12–13. See also *Ant. Rom.* 4.41.4; 4.69.4; 5.19.5.

[258] E.g. *Thuc.* 29.374,13.

[259] For the use of βούλεται δηλοῦν in the scholia on Homer, see e.g. Sch. Homer, *Iliad* 8.185.

[260] Usener (1889) 71ff.; Radermacher (1905) 968–969.

[261] Ros (1938) 65 n. 36; Luschnat (1954) 23–24.

for passive. In the introduction of the letter (which he cites from *On Thucydides* 24), however, he uses the terms τὰ δραστήρια (the active forms) and τὰ παθητικά (the passive forms).[262] In the sixth chapter of *On Composition* (see section 4.3.1), which seems to be influenced by theories from Hellenistic poetic theory, he again uses different terms: τὰ ὀρθά (active) and τὰ ὕπτια (passive).[263] According to Schenkeveld, ποιητικόν is 'unique in this sense of active'.[264] Since it occurs only here, we might assume that Dionysius found his examples of the interchanging of passive and active in a source that used different terms than he himself when he mentioned the characteristics of Thucydides' style in his treatise *On Thucydides*.

As examples of Thucydides' use of the active instead of the passive Dionysius mentions κωλύει ('hinders') (Thuc. 1.144.2), which is used instead of κωλύεται ('is hindered') and ἐπιμιγνύντες ('mingling') (Thuc. 1.2.2), which is used instead of ἐπιμιγνύμενοι ('being mingled').[265] At the latter passage, the scholia explain οὐδ' ἐπιμιγνύντες ἀδεῶς as ἐπεμίγνυντο μὲν οὐκ ἀδεῶς δέ ('they mingled but not without fear'), thus silently substituting the middle for the active participle.[266] Thucydides' use of the passive instead of the active is illustrated by ἐνηλλάγησαν ('they had been brought into contact') (Thuc. 1.120.2), which is said to replace the active συνήλλαξαν ('they dealt with'), and by κατῳκημένους ('who had been settled') (same passage), which Thucydides is said to have used instead of κατῳκηκότας ('who had settled').[267] The latter examples return in the later rhetorical treatments of figures.[268] The scholiast also agrees with Dionysius and writes that ἐνηλλάγησαν is used ἀντὶ τοῦ συνέμιξαν καὶ ὡμίλησαν ('instead of "they mixed together" and "they consorted" ').[269]

Dionysius is not the first to discuss the interchanging of active and passive. Aristarchus already pointed out that Homer used the active ναι-

[262] *Amm.* II 2.423,8–9: καὶ τὰ μὲν παθητικὰ ῥήματα δραστήρια, τὰ δὲ δραστήρια παθητικά.

[263] *Comp.* 6.29,8. See sections 3.8 and 5.3.6.

[264] Schenkeveld (1983) 84.

[265] *Amm.* II 7.427,17–428,9. For Dionysius' use of the term ῥῆμα with regard to the participle ἐπιμιγνύντες, see section 3.6.

[266] Hude (1927) 2.

[267] *Amm.* II 8.428,10–18.

[268] See *Rhetores Graeci* ed. Spengel (1856) III 34,17, III 184,19 and III 89,27. Quintilian *Inst. orat.* 9.3.7 also mentions variation in the voices of verbs. Cf. Ros (1938) 57 n. 20.

[269] Hude (1927) 86.

ετάουσι (*Iliad* 4.45) instead of ναιετάονται.[270] He also pointed to the use of τὸ παθητικὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνεργητικοῦ ('passive instead of active') in ὁρᾶσθαι (*Iliad* 3.106) and τιμήσονται (*Iliad* 9.297).[271] The original aspect of Dionysius' discussion of this kind of variation is of course that he does not use these grammatical observations in order to correct or to explain a text, but in order to support his stylistic analysis of Thucydides. Even if he consulted certain philological or grammatical works for his examples, the way in which he used these examples was probably rather new: the basic units of technical grammar, the parts of speech and their accidentia, have now become the tools for literary criticism. Dionysius always emphasises that Thucydides' use of the parts of speech deviates from the 'natural' and from the 'usual': thus, the grammatical analysis supports his literary evaluation of the historian.[272] It seems that Dionysius' friend and colleague Caecilius of Caleacte similarly used the accidentia of the parts of speech for rhetorical purposes (see below), in particular for his treatment of the figures of style. It was 'Longinus' who brought the integration of grammar and literary criticism to perfection: in his discussion of 'changes of case, tense, person, number or gender that vary and stir up the expressions', he makes a much more refined use of these grammatical categories than Dionysius does.[273] Nevertheless, it may well be that Dionysius (perhaps with Caecilius) deserves the credit of being one of the pioneers in this field that lies between the disciplines of rhetoric and grammar. Besides, there is an important difference between Dionysius' use of grammar in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* on the one hand and the way in which Caecilius (if the fragment from Tiberius preserves his words), 'Demetrius' (see below) and 'Longinus' employ the grammatical categories on the other hand. The latter critics and rhetoricians discuss figures that one can adopt in order to achieve a grand or sublime effect. They select examples from dif-

[270] Aristarchus, fr. 55 Matthaios: see Matthaios (1999) 309–312. The same example is given in *FDS* 596.

[271] Aristarchus, fr. 57 and 59 Matthaios: see Matthaios (1999) 312–318.

[272] See e.g. *Amm.* II 6.427,7 (ἀντιστρέψας ἑκατέρου τούτων τὴν φύσιν) and *Amm.* II 9.429,9 (ἐξαλλάττων τὴν συνήθη φράσιν).

[273] 'Longinus', *Subl.* 23–27. See esp. *Subl.* 23.1: τί δὲ αἱ τῶν πτώσεων χρόνων προσώπων ἀριθμῶν γενῶν ἐναλλάξεις, πῶς ποτε καταποικίλλουσι καὶ ἐπεγείρουσι τὰ ἑρμηνευτικά; 'And the changes of cases, tenses, persons, numbers, and genders, how do they vary and excite the expressions?' See De Jonge (2008). Görler (1979) 186–198 shows that Roman poets of the Augustan period (esp. Virgil) put 'Longinus'' advices on syntactical variety into practice. He argues that Horace's *iunctura callida* (*Ars poetica* 47) is also 'eine Aufforderung zu kühnen und darum verfremdenden syntaktischen Neuerungen'.

ferent authors that illustrate each relevant figure. Dionysius, however, applies the grammatical categories in order to analyse the style of a single author (Thucydides). For him, the changes in number, case, gender, tense and voice do not contribute to grandeur, but they illustrate his mainly negative evaluation of Thucydides' style, which he regards as unsuitable for imitation.

In *Amm.* II 9, Dionysius discusses Thucydides' interchanging of the singular and the plural (see also *Amm.* II 13 below).[274] He first points out that Thucydides (6.78.1) speaks of 'the Syracusan' and 'the Athenian' when he means 'the Syracusans' and 'the Athenians', and (Thuc. 4.10.3) that he writes 'the enemy' (πολέμιος) when he means 'the enemies' (πολέμιοι).[275] Dionysius' example of the use of the plural instead of the singular is from a different character: here, Dionysius points out that Thucydides (2.35.2) starts with a singular pronoun (ἕκαστος), and then goes on with a plural participle (φθονοῦντες) and verb (ἀπιστοῦσιν).[276] On ἀπιστοῦσιν, the last word of this sentence, the scholiast

[274] *Amm.* II 9.428,19–21: Παρὰ δὲ τὰς τῶν ἑνικῶν τε καὶ πληθυντικῶν διαφοράς, ὅταν ἐναλλάττῃ τὴν ἑκατέρου τούτων τάξιν, ἑνικὰ μὲν ἀντὶ πληθυντικῶν οὕτως ἐκφέρει. 'With regard to the distinctions between singular and plural, when he changes the order of both of them, he expresses singulars instead of plurals as follows.' *Amm.* II 9.429,7–9: Ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ ἑνικοῦ τὸ πληθυντικὸν παραλαμβάνει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐξαλλάττων τὴν συνήθη φράσιν. 'He adopts the plural instead of the singular, in this way departing fom the usual expression.' The subject is announced at *Amm.* II 2.423,9–10.

[275] *Amm.* II 9.428,19–429,7. The former passage (Thuc. 6.78.1) is also discussed in *Thuc.* 48.407,2–15, where Dionysius criticises the change (in the second part of the sentence) from the third person to the first person: καὶ ἔτι τὸ κατακορὲς τῆς μεταγωγῆς ⟨τῆς⟩ ἔκ τε τοῦ πληθυντικοῦ εἰς τὸ ἑνικὸν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ περὶ προσώπων λόγου εἰς τὸ τοῦ λέγοντος πρόσωπον. 'And again, the wearisome change from the plural to the singular and from the third person to the first person.' On the terms τὸ λέγον πρόσωπον ('the speaker' i.e. the first person) and λόγος περὶ τῶν προσώπων ('utterance about persons' i.e. the third person), see Matthaios (1999) 392–395. He points out that these terms for the grammatical persons are based on Aristotle, who (*Rhetoric* 1358a37) distinguishes between ὁ λέγων (the speaker), πρὸς ὃν λέγει (the one whom he addresses), and περὶ οὗ λέγει (the subject on which he speaks). Varro's distinction concerning the three grammatical persons is between *qui loqueretur*, *ad quem*, and *de quo* (*De lingua latina* 8.20—but *ad quem* is a conjecture). Aristarchus seems to have distinguished between πρὸς αὐτόν (second person) and περὶ αὐτοῦ (third person). Because one scholion to *Iliad* 5.265 refers to Hecabe and Hector as τὰ λέγοντα πρόσωπα ('the talking persons'), Matthaios (1999) 393 believes that Aristarchus also used the expression τὸ λέγον πρόσωπον as a grammatical term for the first person. Dionysius' contemporary Tryphon wrote a treatise Περὶ προσώπων (fr. 38 Von Velsen). See also section 3.8.

[276] *Amm.* II 9.429,7–17. Thucydides 2.35.2: μέχρι γὰρ τοῦδε ἀνεκτοὶ οἱ ἔπαινοι εἰσιν περὶ ἑτέρων λεγόμενοι, ἐς ὅσον ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος οἴηται ἱκανὸς εἶναι δρᾶσαί τι ὧν ἤκουσεν, τῷ δὲ ὑπερβάλλοντι αὐτὸν φθονοῦντες ἤδη καὶ ἀπιστοῦσιν. On this variation in number, see Ros (1938) 57–58.

on Thucydides remarks that λείπει ἕκαστος: 'the word "each" is omitted'.[277] He adds that it is a figure (σχῆμα). In other words: he explains that the word ἕκαστος, which appears earlier in the sentence, should be added to the verb ἀπιστοῦσιν again, thus forming a *constructio ad sensum*, ἕκαστος being a collective pronoun. Thus, where Dionysius objects to Thucydides' interchanging of singular and plural, the scholiast gives a more positive explanation. In a similar way Quintilian's discussion of the substitution of singulars for plurals and *vice versa* differs from Dionysius' treatment: *sunt et illa non similia soloecismo quidem, sed tamen numerum mutantia, quae et tropis adsignari solent, ut de uno pluraliter dicimus* (…) *et de pluribus singulariter*. 'There are other devices, not indeed like solecisms, but involving a change of number, which are often reckoned also as tropes: speaking of a single thing in the plural (…) or of a number of things in the singular.'[278] The Latin examples are the use of *nos* ('we') instead of 'I' (Virgil, *Georgics* 2.541) and the use of *acer Romanus* ('the fierce Roman') (Virgil, *Georgics* 3.346) instead of 'the fierce Romans'. Quintilian would agree with Dionysius that writers who employ these substitutions 'depart from customary usage'. However, Quintilian explicitly states that these devices are not solecisms, whereas Dionysius' discussion illustrates the idea that Thucydides' style is not to be used as a model. Although he does not use the word solecism with regard to the interchanging of singular and plural, Dionysius does say (in the same letter) that Thucydides could be said to commit solecism (σολοικίζειν) in the use of cases (πτώσεις) (see below). That the borderline between solecisms and figures could indeed be vague is made clear in various ancient texts on σολοικισμός.[279] Elsewhere, Dionysius uses the term σολοικοφανής ('like a solecism') (see section 5.2). Just as the expression σολοικισμῶν λαμβάνοντα φαντασίας ('acquiring the appearance of sole-

[277] Hude (1927) 130.

[278] Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.3.20. Translation by Russell (2001).

[279] See e.g. *FDS* 601a: ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν σχῆμα ἔχει τινὰ αἰτίαν εὔλογον καθισταμένην εἰς εὐπρέπειαν, ὁ δὲ σολοικισμὸς οὐκ ἔχει. 'For the figure has a certain plausible reason, which makes it acceptable, but the solecism does not have such a reason.' Suetonius, *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* 22 tells us a story that shows that the use of incorrect grammatical constructions could have serious consequences. Once, when the grammarian Marcus Pomponius Porcellus (who was active under Augustus and in the early years of Tiberius) was acting as an advocate, 'he was so persistent in condemning a solecism (*soloecismum*) made by his opponent that finally Cassius Severus addressed the judges and asked for an adjournment, so that his client could call in another grammarian—since he thought that the dispute with his opponent was going to turn not on a point of law but on a point of solecism (*soloecismo*).' The translation is by Kaster (1995).

cisms'), the term σολοικοφανής seems to indicate that a certain obscure construction can be sanctioned in the style of a classical author like Thucydides, but should not be imitated by Dionysius' students.[280]

For Dionysius' discussion of the use of singular and plural, we also have an interesting parallel in the fragment of his contemporary Caecilius of Caleacte on ἀλλοίωσις.[281] Caecilius first points to the variation 'concerning the plural' (κατὰ τὸ πληθυντικόν) that occurs in Thuc. 1.6.1: πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ Ἑλλας ἐσιδηροφόρει ('for entire Greece went armed'), where Greece is used instead of the Greeks. This Thucydidean example corresponds more or less to Dionysius' examples of the use of the singular instead of the plural. But Caecilius also offers two examples of 'variation concerning numbers' (περὶ δὲ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀλλοίωσις), which occurs in sentences that combine a singular with a plural: these cases corrrespond to Dionysius' discussion of the *constructio ad sensum* in *Amm.* II 13 (pp. 242–243 below). The first is taken from Eupolis: ἅπασα γὰρ ποθοῦμεν ἡ κλεινὴ πόλις ('for we, the famous city, desire'). A second example concerns the expression (in Demosthenes) ὑμεῖς ὦ βουλή ('you, council').[282] In both cases the stylistic (or grammatical) particularity concerns the *combination* of a singular with a plural, not the substitution of an independent plural for a singular. 'Longinus' has more to say on the variation concerning numbers.[283] A writer can start with a singular form that turns out to signify a plural: the example, whose source is unknown, concerns the combination of the singular λαός ἀπείρων ('a numberless people') with the plural verb κελάδησαν ('shouted'). This example fits the 'variation concerning numbers' of Caecilius, but 'Longinus' thinks that this kind of figure is actually of minor importance. 'It is still more worthy of notice that plurals sometimes make a grander impression'.[284] Here, 'Longinus' seems to correct his predecessor Caecilius, who also wrote on the sublime: according to 'Longinus', one should not bother too much about a *constructio ad sensum* (he does not use the term), for it is much more interesting how one can produce *grandeur* by the use of the plural: thus, Sophocles makes Oedipus speak six lines on marriages, marriages, fathers, sons, brothers, brides, wives,

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[280] For σολοικισμῶν λαμβάνοντα φαντασίας, see *Amm.* II 2.424,5–6 (cited above).

[281] Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 75 Ofenloch.

[282] Eupolis fr. 104. The words ὑμεῖς ὦ βουλή are not found in our text of Demosthenes, but see *Third Olynthiac* 31: ὑμεῖς δ' ὁ δῆμος.

[283] 'Longinus', *Subl.* 23–24.

[284] 'Longinus', *Subl.* 23.2.

and mothers, so that his misfortunes seem to be plural as well.[285] Likewise, 'Longinus' adds, one can speak of 'Hectors and Sarpedons'. The opposite technique, the contraction of plurals to singulars, can also give the effect of sublimity: 'Longinus'' examples here include a passage from Demosthenes, who says ἔπειθ' ἡ Πελοπόννησος ἅπασα διειστήκει ('then the Peloponnese as a whole was split').[286] This kind of 'compressing the number of separate individuals into a unified whole' agrees with Caecilius' example ('entire Greece') from Thuc. 1.6.1 (above).[287]

Some of the examples mentioned above are related to the ancient ideas on the anomaly that can exist between the form and the meaning of a word. Both Stoic philosophers and philologists seem to have pointed to the anomaly in collective nouns (δῆμος, λαός), singulars that refer to a plurality, and names of towns such as Ἀθῆναι and Πλαταιαί, plurals that refer to a single city.[288] The Stoic Chrysippus wrote a work Περὶ τῆς ἀνωμαλίας (*On Anomaly*) in which he probably dealt with words that showed an anomaly between σημαῖνον (form) and σημαινόμενον (meaning).[289] As a philologist, Aristarchus also commented on Homeric words of which the form did not seem to agree with the meaning.[290] In connection with his observations on this type of words, he also pointed out that Homer sometimes uses the plural instead of the singular, for example στέμματα (*Iliad* 1.14), which refers to one garland, and πύλαι,

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[285] Sophocles, *Oedipus Rex* 1403–1408; 'Longinus', *Subl.* 23.3.

[286] Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 18.

[287] 'Longinus', *Subl.* 24.1: τὰ ἐκ τῶν πληθυντικῶν εἰς τὰ ἑνικὰ ἐπισυναγόμενα. Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.3.8 also mentions the *figura in numero*: either a plural follows a singular (*Romani* corresponding with *gens*), or a singular follows a plural (the example is a problematic passage from Virgil, *Eclogues* 4.62–63). For examples of variation in numbers in later rhetoricians, see Ros (1938) 58 n. 23.

[288] Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* I.154 uses the word ἀνωμαλίαι.

[289] See *FDS* 194 (= Diogenes Laertius VII.192) and *FDS* 640 (= Varro, *De lingua latina* 9.1). On the Stoic views on anomaly, see Siebenborn (1976) 98–100 and Ax (1996) 290. The account of Dahlmann (1932) 52–53 is illuminating: 'Dies zeigt, daß die Stoiker (…) τὸ τῷ σημαινομένῳ δηλούμενον und τὸν τῷ τύπῳ τῆς φωνῆς χαρακτῆρα (…), den eigentlichen Sinn des Gegenstandes und seine sprachliche Form oder, wie es in dem ganz stoisch-chrysippischen Stück bei Varro VIII 40 heißt, das, was die *vox significat, quam intellegimus* und die *vox quae ex syllabis est ficta, eam quam audimus*, unterschieden und eine Anomalie, die zwischen beiden besteht, betonten. Ähnliche Unstimmigkeiten bezüglich des Geschlechtes und der Zahl (154) führt auch Sextus (adv. gramm. 148ff.) an und nennt das Anomalie (…). Aus all diesem ergibt sich, was Chrysipp unter Anomalie verstanden hat: ein Plural bezeichnet einen einzelnen Gegenstand, ein maskulines Wort einen femininen Begriff, eine Privativform eine Sache, die keinen entsprechenden Sinn hat. Das sind alle Anzeichen dafür, daß die φωνή dem σημαινόμενον nicht gerecht wird.'

[290] See Aristarchus fr. 82 Matthaios. See Matthaios (1999) 282–283.

which refers to one single gate.[291] The plural names of cities he also explained in this way. In later times, the technical grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus points out that there are various words whose grammatical form is in conflict with their meaning (δηλούμενον). His examples are μάχομαι, which has a 'passive' form and an active meaning, παιδίον, which is a neuter but refers to a boy or a girl, and Θῆβαι, which is a plural whereas it signifies a single city.[292]

Dionysius' next subject is the use of genders: masculine, feminine and neuter.[293] Again, Thucydides' interchanges are said to 'depart from the normal forms' (ἐκβεβηκυῖαι τῶν συνήθων).[294] Dionysius first mentions some individual words with unusual genders: he argues that Thucydides uses τάραχος for ταραχή, ὄχλος for ὄχλησις, and τὸ βουλόμενον and τὸ δυνάμενον instead of βούλησις and δύναμις.[295] More interesting is Dionysius' last example (Thuc. 4.78.3): ὥστε εἰ μὴ δυναστείᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ ἰσονομίᾳ ἐχρῶντο τῷ ἐπιχωρίῳ οἱ Θεσσαλοί.[296] 'So that if the Thessalians had not been under despotic rule rather than enjoying equal civil rights by the law of their country (...).' Dionysius points out that Thucydides has made the feminine (τὸ θηλυκόν) word ἐπιχώριος ('of the land', adjective) neuter (οὐδέτερον). Dionysius wants to take the adjective ἐπιχωρίῳ with ἰσονομίᾳ. 'What is signified by the expression' (τὸ σημαινόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς λέξεως), he says, is the following:[297] ὥστε εἰ μὴ δυναστείᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ ἰσονομίᾳ ἐχρῶντο τῇ ἐπιχωρίῳ οἱ Θεσσαλοί. 'So that if the Thessalians had not been under despotic rule rather than enjoying

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[291] Aristarchus fr. 38 Matthaios. See Matthaios (1999) 283.

[292] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Conj.*, *G.G.* II 1, 215,16–216,2. Cf. Matthaios (1999) 282–283 and Dalimier (2001) 246–247.

[293] *Amm.* II 10.429,18–430,11. The subject is announced at *Amm.* II 2.423,11–13: θηλυκά τ' ἀρρενικοῖς καὶ ἀρρενικὰ θηλυκοῖς καὶ οὐδέτερα τούτων τισὶν συνάπτων, ἐξ ὧν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία πλανᾶται. 'He connects feminine forms with masculine forms and masculine forms with feminine forms and neuters with both, as a result of which the natural order is ruined.' Thus, the outline promises a discussion of the *combination* of unusual genders; the substitution of genders of particular words (*Amm.* II 10.429,18–430,6) is not announced: cf. Warren (1899) 319.

[294] *Amm.* II 10.429,19.

[295] The word τάραχος is in fact not found in Thucydides. See Usener (1889) 106 and Ros (1938) 59 n. 24. On the use of ὄχλος for ὄχλησις, see Blass, *DAB* I (1979[3] [1868]) 214. Τὸ δυνάμενον is not found in our Thucydides text either. The word τὸ βουλόμενον, which Dionysius adopts in his quotation of Thuydides 6.24.2, does not occur in our text of that passage: see Aujac (1991) 164.

[296] The Thucydides MSS have τὸ ἐγχώριον, Hude (OCT) corrects it into [τὸ] ἐγχωρίῳ.

[297] On the phrase τὸ σημαινόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς λέξεως, see also section 2.3.

national equality of civic rights.' The latter metathesis only changes the article τῷ into τῇ, thus restoring the agreement with ἰσονομίᾳ.[298]

For the interchange of genders, the fragment from Caecilius provides another parallel to Dionysius' discussion. In his treatment of ἀλλοίωσις ('variation'), Caecilius states that 'they change nouns by adopting the feminine or the neuter instead of the masculine, or using the masculine instead of both of the other genders' (ὀνόματα μὲν ἀλλοιοῦσιν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄρρενος τὸ θῆλυ ἢ τὸ οὐδέτερον παραλαμβάνοντες, ἢ τῷ ἄρρενι ἀντ' ἀμφοῖν χρώμενοι). Just like Dionysius, Caecilius draws his example from Thucydides (2.44.4), who speaks of τὸ φιλότιμον instead of ἡ φιλοτιμία, using the neuter instead of the feminine.[299] This example clearly fits the first examples of Dionysius.[300] When we turn to the field of philology, we observe that Aristarchus already commented on words whose gender Homer was supposed to have changed, making πύλος instead of πύλη, χόλος instead of χολή, etc.[301] He also claimed that it is characteristic for the language of Homer that he sometimes combines a feminine substantive with a masculine adjective: Aristarchus used this principle to defend certain readings in the Homeric text.[302] Thus, in *Iliad* 15.626 he preferred the feminine form of the substantive ἀήτη ('blast') to the masculine form ἀήτης, reading ἀνέμοιο δὲ δεινὸς ἀήτη ('the terrible blast of the wind'). In order to prove that Homer could use a feminine substantive with a masculine adjective, he pointed to the Homeric expression κλυτὸς Ἱπποδάμεια ('the renowned Hippodameia', *Iliad* 2.742).[303]

In this context, I should also point to an interesting passage that can be found in Sextus Empiricus' arguments against the grammarians.

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[298] See Ros (1938) 59–60, who points out that the original text was probably ἐχρῶντο ἐγχωρίῳ (as in Hude's edition). The scholia interpret τὸ ἐγχώριον as ἐγχωρίως: see Hude (1927) 268.

[299] Caecilius fr. 75 Ofenloch. The same example in the Epitome Alexandri, *Rhetores Graeci* III 33,16 Spengel (= Caecilius fr. 75a Ofenloch), but there τὸ φιλότιμον is said to be used instead of ὁ φιλότιμος.

[300] 'Longinus', *Subl.* 23 merely mentions the γενῶν ἐναλλάξεις. Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.3.6. mentions Virgil's *oculis capti talpae* ('blind moles', *Georgics* 1.183) and *timidi dammae* ('frightened deer', *Eclogues* 8.28). He correctly adds that there is a reason for this use of *talpa* and *damma*: these words can refer to both males and females. These rather unsatisfying examples make the impression as if Quintilian took over the *figurae* concerning *genus in nominibus* from Greek predecessors without knowing where to find appropriate Latin equivalents to the Greek examples.

[301] Aristarchus fr. 35 Matthaios. See Matthaios (1999) 275.

[302] Aristarchus fr. 33 Matthaios. See Matthaios (1999) 276.

[303] Cf. Matthaios (1999) 276.

When he attacks the grammarians' claim that some nouns are maculine by nature, others feminine and others neuter, Sextus Empiricus gives various arguments that are opposed to the concept of natural gender. One of them is that one word (for example στάμνος, 'jar') can be feminine for the Athenians and masculine for the Peloponnesians.[304] Further he points out that even 'the same people will use the same names differently, pronouncing them sometimes masculine, sometimes feminine, and saying both ὁ λιμός and ἡ λιμός ("hunger").'[305] Sextus Empiricus' argument in fact seems to be directed against scholars like Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who thinks that he can censure Thucydides for writing τάραχος for ταραχή. Sextus would object (as he does against the grammarians) that no noun is feminine by nature; and if the reason for the criticism were that the noun is feminine by common usage, he would answer that 'the criterion of what is said correctly and what not will not be any expert grammatical rule, rather the non-expert and simple observance of usage.'[306]

So far, Dionysius has been rather neutral in his analysis: he has merely pointed to the 'unusual' of Thucydides' variations in the use of the parts of speech and their *accidentia*. In the next chapter (*Amm.* II 11), his judgement becomes more severe, when he comes to speak on the historian's use of cases (πτώσεις) of proper nouns, appellatives, participles, and the articles attached to them (⟨τῶν⟩ συναπτομένων τούτοις ἄρθρων).[307] He tells us that Thucydides does not write as 'those who construct the expression in conformity with common usage' (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀκολούθως τῇ κοινῇ συνηθείᾳ σχηματίζοντες τὴν φράσιν) (see also sections 5.2 and 7.3.1).[308] Because he combines words that do not agree with the cases and genders that would be required according to

[304] Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* I.148.

[305] Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* I.149: οἱ αὐτοὶ δὲ διαφόρως ταὐτὰ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀρρενικῶς ἐκφέρουσιν ὁτὲ δὲ θηλυκῶς, λέγοντες τὸν λιμόν καὶ τὴν λιμόν. The translation is by Blank.

[306] Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* I.153: γενήσεται τοῦ τε εὖ λεγομένου καὶ μὴ κριτήριον οὐχὶ τεχνικός τις καὶ γραμματικὸς λόγος ἀλλ' ἡ ἄτεχνος καὶ ἀφελὴς τῆς συνηθείας παρατήρησις. The translation is by Blank.

[307] *Amm.* II 11.430,12–15: Ἐν οἷς δὲ τὰς πτώσεις τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τῶν προσηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν μετοχῶν καὶ ⟨τῶν⟩ συναπτομένων τούτοις ἄρθρων ἐξαλλάττει τοῦ συνήθους, οὕτως σχηματίζει [τῇ φράσει]. 'When he changes the cases of proper nouns and appellative nouns and participles and the articles attached to them departing from the usual, he makes the following construction.' The subject announced at *Amm.* II 2.423,13–16 seems a combination of the actual subjects of *Amm.* II 11 (the use of cases) and *Amm.* II 13 (*constructio ad sensum*). Cf. Warren (1899) 319.

[308] *Amm.* II 11.430,18–20.

regular grammar, Thucydides could even be said to commit solecism (σολοικίζειν).[309] The first example (Thuc. 8.64.5) is as follows:[310]

> σωφροσύνην γὰρ λαβοῦσαι αἱ πόλεις καὶ ἄδειαν τῶν πρασσομένων ἐχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄντικρυς ἐλευθερίαν, τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπούλου εὐνομίας οὐ προτιμήσαντες.
>
> 'For the states, having acquired a moderate constitution and security in their actions, moved towards downright independence, showing no regard for the hollow pretence of law and order offered by the Athenians.'

Dionysius has two objections to this construction: προτιμήσαντες (masculine) should agree with the feminine noun πόλεις, and εὐνομίας (genitive) should be an accusative (as direct object with the participle).[311] He corrects these 'mistakes' and rewrites the sentence as follows:

> σωφροσύνην γὰρ λαβοῦσαι αἱ πόλεις καὶ ἄδειαν τῶν πρασσομένων ἐχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄντικρυς ἐλευθερίαν, τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὕπουλον εὐνομίαν οὐ προτιμήσασαι.

The second example concerns a passage (Thuc. 4.10.2) in which the historian has combined the dative τῷ πλήθει with the participle καταπλαγέντες ('frightened by their number'). Dionysius would prefer an accusative (πλῆθος … καταπλαγέντες, 'fearing their number'), and he compares the use of the verb φοβεῖσθαι ('to fear'), which normally takes the accusative and not the dative.[312] This is a remarkable piece of syntactical theory, which we could compare with the Alexandrian procedure of analogy.[313] The Alexandrians philologists determined the cor-

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[309] *Amm.* II 11.431,9. On Dionysius' use of the term solecism, see also section 5.2.

[310] The MSS of Thucydides have τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὕπουλον αὐτονομίαν. Rhys Roberts (1900b) has convincingly argued (against Usener [1889] 107) that Dionysius preserves the correct text of Thucydides here. Indeed, the editions of Hude (Teubner, Leipzig 1901) and Stuart Jones / Powell (OCT 1942) have adopted Dionysius' reading (which is confirmed by a scholion, see Hude [1927] 419) in the text of Thucydides.

[311] A scholiast explains προτιμήσαντες here as φροντίσαντες ('regard', with genitive): see Hude (1927) 419.

[312] *Amm.* II 11.431,13–15.

[313] See Pfeiffer (1968) 229, Siebenborn (1976) 56–84, Schenkeveld (1994) 283–287 and Ax (1996) 286. On the basis of two fragments from Varro (*De lingua latina* 8.23 and 9.1), Lersch (1838–1841) and Steinthal (1890–1891) reconstructed the ancient controversy between anomalists (represented by the Stoic Crates of Mallos) and analogists (represened by Aristarchus). However, since Fehling (1956–1957) has expressed the view that Varro's presentation of the controversy between supporters of analogy and supporters of anomaly is a rhetorical construct that Varro needs for his exposition (i.e. that the debate did not take place in the form that Lersch and Steinthal reconstructed), scholars disagree about the existence and the nature of that debate. Siebenborn (1976)

rect forms of words by comparing a doubtful form with an established form (a bipartite proportion), or by comparing a doubtful form and an established form of one word with the same forms of another word (a quadripartite proportion, such as ἔκειρε: κείρων = ἔπειρε: πείρων).[314] When the words that were compared were similar both with regard to their form and with regard to their meaning, the comparison was called a 'perfect' analogy.[315] Varro gives the example *bonus*: *malus* = *boni*: *mali*. Dionysius seems to adopt a similar procedure, not in order to establish the correct form of one word, but in order to determine the correct syntax, more precisely the combination between a verb and its object. He argues that καταπλήττομαι takes the accusative and he tries to prove this by comparing that verb to another verb (φοβοῦμαι), which can be used with the same meaning.[316] Dionysius points out that one would not say τῇ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀργῇ φοβεῖσθαι ('being afraid through the anger of the gods') but τὴν τῶν θεῶν ὀργήν ('to fear the anger of the gods'). We might think that this is not a very strong argument, because two verbs that have the same semantic value do not necessarily combine with the same case. Nevertheless, it is a striking example of syntactical reasoning, which seems to foreshadow Apollonius Dyscolus' investigations into syntactical regularity. Apollonius also mentions φοβοῦμαι as one of the verbs that require the accusative, and he compares this verb with τρέμω, φεύγω and φρίσσω, all of which can mean 'to fear'.[317] Although these verbs do not indicate an activity (οὐδεμιᾶς ὄντα ἐνεργείας ἐμφατικά), they are still combined with an accusative. In other words, the peculiarity of these verbs is that the accusative σε in the sentence τρέμω σε cannot be changed into the subject of a corresponding passive sentence. Apollonius explains this fact by assuming an ellipsis

97–98 and Ax (1996) 289–295 hold to the opinion that there was a real controversy between two schools (Alexandria and Pergamon), even if it is difficult to determine the exact extent and effects. Blank (1982) 1–4 denies that there was a conflict at all. Taylor (1987) 6–8 and Schenkeveld (1994) 286–287 emphasise that there is no sufficient evidence for the belief that a large-scale quarrel between analogists and anomalists took place.

[314] On this example, see Siebenborn (1976) 71–72, Schenkeveld (1994) 283 and Ax (1996) 284. It may be that Aristarchus only used the bipartite proportion.

[315] Varro, *De lingua latina* 10.68. Cf. Callanan (1987) 107–108.

[316] *Amm.* II 11.431,9–15. Aujac (1991) 164 suggests that Dionysius introduces the example with φοβεῖσθαι because he was not entirely certain that the verb καταπλήττομαι really requires an accusative; Thucydides in fact uses that verb with a dative more than once. Rhys Roberts (1901) 181 remarks that Dionysius himself uses ἐκπλήττεσθαι with a dative in *Pomp.* 1.221,12.

[317] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* III.166.

of διά (a preposition that requires the accusative) in the construction of these verbs:[318] φουβοῦμαι σε is actually φοβοῦμαι διὰ σε. Dionysius' use of the analogy between καταπλήττομαι and φοβοῦμαι in order to prove that the former verb requires an accusative is parallelled by Apollonius, *Synt.* III.167, where it is argued that δέομαι takes the genitive because it signifies (σημαίνει) something similar as λείπομαι with the genitive.[319]

Dionysius' analysis of these ungrammatical constructions is of high importance to his judgement on Thucydides. He wrote the treatise *On Thucydides* with the intention that those readers who wished to imitate the historian would know which aspects of his treatment of subject matter and style should be avoided.[320] It is precisely the 'unusual' that makes his style unfit for imitation (μίμησις). The illustrations of Thucydides' deviations in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* support Dionysius' argument, and the solecisms to which he points form the strongest warning that one should not copy his style indiscriminately. Dionysius points to another instance of the incongruency of cases in Thucydides in his discussion of tenses (below).

When we look for other ancient discussions of the variation of cases, we find different kinds of treatments. Aristarchus considered the 'changes of cases' (ἐναλλαγαὶ τῶν πτώσεων) characteristic of the Homeric language.[321] The explanation that Homer used one case instead of another one seems to have been one of the most important principles in Aristarchus' philological work.[322] In the field of criticism, 'Longinus' mentions the variations of cases (πτώσεων ἐναλλάξεις) as a source of the sublime, but he does not offer any examples.[323] Later rhetoricians strangely cite the opening of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as examples of the variation of cases, and remark that the poet changed from the accusative to the nominative, probably meaning that the opening words ἄνδρα and μῆνιν (accusatives) are taken up by the relative pronouns ὅς and ἥ (nominatives).[324] It is quite remarkable that this normal grammatical phenomenon could be considered a rhetorical figure. More interesting is a passage from 'Demetrius' (*On Style* 65), who states that

[318] See Sluiter (1990) 67 n. 113 and Lallot (1997 II) 259 n. 403.
[319] See Lallot (1997 II) 259 n. 406.
[320] Cf. *Thuc.* 1.325,11–16 on his earlier treatment of Thucydides in *On Imitation*.
[321] See Matthaios (1999) 285–289.
[322] See Aristarchus fr. 42 Matthaios and cf. Matthaios (1999) 285.
[323] 'Longinus', *Subl.* 23.1.
[324] *Rhetores Graeci* III 34,1 Spengel and III 168,10 Spengel. Cf. Ros (1938) 60 n. 27.

grandeur in figures is produced from 'not staying in the same case'.[325] He illustrates this technique with a passage from Thucydides 4.12.1, the same text that Dionysius cites as an example of the expression of a phrase in one single word (see above): καὶ πρῶτος ἀποβαίνων ἐπὶ τὴν ἀποβάθραν ἐλειποψύχησέ τε, καὶ πεσόντος αὐτοῦ ἐς τὴν παρεξειρεσίαν. 'The first to step on the gangway, he fainted, and when he fell on the outrigger (…).' In this sentence, the subject (Brasidas) is first qualified by a *participium coniunctum* in the nominative (ἀποβαίνων) and then by a genitive absolute construction (πεσόντος αὐτοῦ): in other words, the subject of ἀποβαίνων and πεσόντος is the same, but it appears in two different cases. In order to prove the grandeur of this figure, 'Demetrius' rewrites the sentence in a way that destroys the striking effect of the orginal.[326]

In *Amm.* II 12, Dionysius discusses 'the style that deviates from the syntactical congruence with regard to the tenses of verbs' (ἡ δὲ παρὰ τοὺς χρόνους τῶν ῥημάτων ἐκβεβηκυῖα τὸ κατάλληλον φράσις). The expression τὸ κατάλληλον refers to the congruence of a syntactically regular sentence. The term plays an important role in the work of Apollonius Dyscolus, and it seems to be of Stoic origin.[327] According to Diogenes Laertius VII.59, the Stoics defined solecism as λόγος ἀκαταλλήλως συντεταγμένος (see below p. 244). In *Amm.* II 12, the concept of τὸ κατάλληλον is not only used with regard to the use of tenses, but also with regard to the use of cases (see below).[328] I will more thoroughly discuss Dionysius' use of this term and related ideas on syntax in section 5.2. For Dionysius' terminology for the tenses 'present' (ὁ παρὼν χρόνος) and 'future' (ὁ μέλλων χρόνος), see section 3.8.

Dionysius offers two examples of Thucydides' change of tenses. In the first passage from Pericles' funeral speech (Thuc. 2.39.4), Dionysius thinks that 'the future verb' ἐθέλοιμεν (which is in fact a present potential optative in a conditional clause—'we should wish') should have been combined with the future verb περιέσται ('we will have advan-

[325] 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 65: τὸ μηδὲ τῆς αὐτῆς μένειν πτώσεως.

[326] Ros (1938) 55–56 points out that the sentence does not only contain a change from *participium coniunctum* to genitive absolute, but (in the subsequent words) also a change of subject (first Brasidas, then 'the shield'). The text of Thucydides (which diverges from the quotation in 'Demetrius') is as follows: καὶ τραυματισθεὶς πολλὰ ἐλιποψύχησέ τε καὶ πεσόντος αὐτοῦ ἐς τὴν παρεξειρεσίαν ἡ ἀσπὶς περιερρύη ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν (…).

[327] See section 5.2. See also Blank (1982) 27–28 and Sluiter (1990) 50–52.

[328] *Amm.* II 12.431,16–17; *Amm.* II 12.432,8–9. See further section 5.2 and cf. Blank (1982) 55.

tage') in the main clause instead of Thucydides' present tense περιγίγνεται ('we have the advantage').[329] Although this kind of construction is in fact not uncommon in Greek (the present indicative in the apodosis refers in such cases to general present time), Dionysius thinks that it is not regular (ἀκόλουθον).[330] For the determination of ἐθέλοιμεν as a 'future', Schenkeveld refers to Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* III.98.[331] In that passage, Apollonius says that according to some, it does not make sense to attribute tenses to the optative, since 'wishes are for the coming to pass of something which does not yet exist' (ἐν τοῖς οὐκ οὖσιν αἱ εὐχαὶ γίνονται εἰς τὸ ἐγγενέσθαι). In *Synt.* III.100, he says that wishes (which are expressed in the optative) refer to 'that which is not present with us': ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ συνοῦσιν αἱ εὐχαὶ γίνονται. Thus, it seems that because they regarded the optative as the mood of wishes and prayers, grammarians associated this mood with future situations. This seems to be the reason for Dionysius' qualification of ἐθέλοιμεν as a future.

The second example of the change of tenses is Thucydides 4.10.3:[332]

> τοῦ τε γὰρ χωρίου τὸ δυσέμβατον ἡμέτερον νομίζω, ὃ μενόντων μὲν ἡμῶν σύμμαχον γίνεται· ὑποχωρήσασι δὲ καίπερ χαλεπὸν ὂν εὔπορον ἔσται.
>
> 'I consider the inaccessibility of the spot to be in our favour, which, if we stand our ground, is our ally. But if we withdraw, the position, although it is difficult in itself, will be easy to pass through.'

Dionysius tells us that the verb γίνεται ('is') points to the present, whereas ἔσται ('will be') points to the future (τὸ μὲν γὰρ γίνεται τοῦ παρόντος ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ἔσται τοῦ μέλλοντος χρόνου δηλωτικόν). Further, there is an incongruent construction:[333] Thucydides has expressed the par-

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[329] The Thucydidean text is in Dionysius' version as follows: καίτοι εἰ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ πόνων μελέτῃ, καὶ μὴ μετὰ νόμων τὸ πλέον ἢ τρόπων ἀνδρείας ἐθέλοιμεν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίνεται ἡμῖν τοῖς τε μέλλουσιν ἀλγεινοῖς μὴ προκάμνειν καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ ἐλθοῦσι μὴ ἀτολμοτέροις τῶν ἀεὶ μοχθούντων φαίνεσθαι. 'And yet, if we would wish to face danger in a spirit of easy indifference rather than after laborious preparation, and with a courage born of habit rather than from respect for the law, we have the advantage of not suffering hardships when they are yet to come, while in actually confronting them we show ourselves no less courageous than those who are always toiling.'

[330] See Smyth (1956) 535: 'εἰ with the optative (instead of ἐάν with the subjunctive) is not infrequent in the protasis with a primary tense of the indictative (…) in the apodosis. The reference is usually either to general present time (with the present indicative), or to future time.' Smyth also refers to Thuc. 2.39. On Dionysius' example see Krüger (1823) 233 and Aujac (1991) 164–165.

[331] Schenkeveld (1983) 84.

[332] *Amm.* II 12.432,3–13.

[333] Cf. Blank (1982) 55.

ticiple μενόντων and the pronoun ἡμῶν in the genitive case, but ὑποχωρήσασιν in the dative. According to Dionysius, it would be more appropriate (οἰκειότερον) to put ὑποχωρήσασι in the genitive as well. Again, there is a scholion on Thucydides that agrees with Dionysius' view: it explains ὑποχωρήσασι as ὑποχωρησάντων.[334] Indeed, some modern scholars think that the dative form in Thucydides' text is corrupt: Hude prints a crux in his Thucydides edition, and Ros thinks it is only explained by Thucydides' preference of variation and incontinuity.[335]

Dionysius calls μενόντων a μετοχικὸν ὄνομα, which Aujac translates as 'substantif participial'.[336] She thinks that this is the term for a participle in a genitive absolute construction, and refers to Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.141. I do not think that her interpretation is correct, for two reasons. First, Dionysius frequently uses adjectives in the neuter for the parts of speech, either or not with a substantive (προσηγορικόν, ῥηματικόν, τὰ προθετικὰ μόρια, etc.).[337] Therefore, it is more probable that Dionysius uses ὄνομα here in the general sense of 'word' rather than as 'substantive': μενόντων is a 'participial word', i.e. a participle. Second, the passage in Apollonius Dyscolus to which Aujac refers (*Synt.* I.141) does not deal with a μετοχικὸν ὄνομα, but with σύνταξις μετοχική: the construction of the participle. Apollonius here discusses the construction of a participle with an infinitive (ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον θέλων ὑβρίσαι οὗτος ἐστιν), which has nothing to do with Dionysius' example.

Caecilius of Caleacte also seems to have discussed the variation concerning tenses. In the fragment from Tiberius' *On Figures*, two examples are mentioned:[338] Demosthenes has used the present instead of the perfect in τοὺς ὁρῶντας ὑμῖν μάρτυρας παρέξομαι ('I will bring forward for you those men who saw it'): the present participle ὁρῶντας is said to replace the perfect ἑωρακότας ('those men who have seen it').[339] The second example seems to concern a historical present (ὁρῶ instead of εἶδον in Euripides' *Andromeda*).[340] Finally, Caecilius also mentions the funeral speech from Thucydides (2.35.1), where he thinks that ἐπαινοῦσι ('they praise') is used instead of ἐπῄνεσαν ('they praised'). Indeed, Pericles refers in this passage to his predecessors, who have spoken at pre-

334 Hude (1927) 232.
335 Hude (1913), Ros (1938) 62.
336 Aujac (1991) 139.
337 See Schenkeveld (1983) 70–71.
338 Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 75 Ofenloch.
339 Demosthenes, *Against Neaira* 34.
340 Euripides, *Andromeda* fr. 145 Nauck.

vious occasions: 'most of the men who have spoken here praise the one who has added this speech to the usual ceremony.'[341] In this case, the present tense makes that Pericles' words refer to the general usage at the occasions of a funeral speech. In narrative, on the other hand, the present can of course be used to highlight certain events: 'Longinus' notes that the historical present occurs frequently in Thucydides. The effect of this use of the present instead of the past tense he describes as follows: 'you will transform the passage from a narrative into a vivid actuality.'[342] Quintilian offers an example of present instead of past tense from Cicero's *In Verrem*.[343] Interestingly, he adds that 'there is a figure corresponding to every kind of solecism'. Dionysius did not share this view, at least not as far as Thucydides' style was concerned. Where other rhetoricians treat the variation of tenses as a figure, he thinks that Thucydides departs from τὸ κατάλληλον.

In *Amm.* II 13, Dionysius discusses constructions that concern 'the turning away from the signified to the signifying' (πρὸς τὸ σημαῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ σημαινομένου πράγματος τὴν ἀποστροφήν), and *vice versa* (see also section 2.3).[344] These are sentences in which a collective noun in the singular is combined with a plural verb (*constructio ad sensum*). In these cases, the verb is not connected with the grammatical form of the noun, but with that which it signifies. Thus, in the first example (Thuc. 6.35.1), τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ('the populace of the Syracusans') is combined with the plural verb ἦσαν ('were').[345] The second example (Thuc.

[341] Thucydides 2.35.1: Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἤδη εἰρηκότων ἐπαινοῦσι τὸν προσθέντα τῷ νόμῳ τὸν λόγον τόνδε.

[342] 'Longinus', *Subl.* 25: οὐ διήγησιν ἔτι τὸν λόγον ἀλλ' ἐναγώνιον πρᾶγμα ποιήσεις. Sicking and Stork (1997) have recently rejected this interpretation of the historical present. In their view, the historical present is not used to present certain events as 'lively', but rather to highlight those events that are primarily important for the purpose of the story. In my view, the explanation that 'Longinus' offers is in fact not so far removed from the modern interpretation: part of the confusion is caused by the usual translation of ἐναγώνιον as 'vivid' or 'lively'. This adjective in fact refers to something that belongs to the ἀγών ('debate' or 'speech'): in other words, the historical present belongs to the direct way of speaking of an orator or actor. See De Jonge (2008). For more examples of tense variation from the rhetoricians who write on figures, see Ros (1938) 61 n. 28.

[343] Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.3.11 on Cicero, *In Verrem* 5.116.

[344] *Amm.* II 13.432,14–433.5. Krüger (1823) 234 argues that there is no Greek or Latin author who did not use this construction (*et quis vel Graecus vel Latinus auctor eam* [*structuram*] *non usurpaverit?*), and he points to the use of that construction in [Dionysius of Halicarnassus] *Ars Rhetorica* 383,7–8, which is however not anymore considered to be the work of Dionysius.

[345] The text of Thuc. 6.35.1 runs as follows: τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς

5.4.2) is slightly different: here, the subject changes from Λεοντῖνοι ('men of Leontini') to ὁ δῆμος ('the populace').[346] As we have seen, Dionysius has already discussed Thucydides' interchanging of the singular and the plural (*Amm.* II 9 p. 299–231 above): there, he pointed to the substitution of one singular word for a plural (e.g. 'the Syracusan'). In relation to that passage, I have also referred to Caecilius' discussion of the variation concerning numbers (περὶ δὲ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀλλοίωσις), where he mentions a *constructio ad sensum* (ποθοῦμεν ἡ κλεινὴ πόλις), and we have observed that 'Longinus' offers a similar example (λαός … κελάδησαν).

All the examples mentioned here concern the syntax of collective nouns: both of Dionysius' examples contain the word δῆμος, and later rhetoricians cite sentences with the words πόλις and λαός. Grammarians were also interested in the constructions of this kind of words. In the *Technê Grammatikê*, we find the following definition of the περιληπτικόν ('collective noun'): περιληπτικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ τῷ ἑνικῷ ἀριθμῷ πλῆθος σημαῖνον, οἷον δῆμος χορός ὄχλος. 'A collective noun is a noun in the singular number that signifies a plurality, such as "people, chorus, crowd".'[347] The scholia add the following explanation: 'Therefore poets, who know the meaning of the word, react to the signified (πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον) and bring in plural verbs, as in ἀγρόμενοι πᾶς δῆμος ('the entire population being gathered', *Iliad* 20.166) and ἡ πληθὺς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν ἀπονέοντο ('the multitude departed to the ships of the Greeks', *Iliad* 15.305).'[348] Apollonius Dyscolus also mentions the former example when he speaks about collective nouns, 'which are said in the singular, but thought in the plural.'[349] Already Aristarchus pointed to a similar construction in *Iliad* 2.278 (φάσαν ἡ πληθύς, 'the crowd

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ἀλλήλους ἔριδι ἦσαν. 'The populace of the Syracusans were engaged in great strife with one another.'

[346] The text of Thuc. 5.4.2 is cited as follows: Λεοντῖνοι γὰρ ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐκ Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν σύμβασιν πολίτας τε ἐπεγράψαντο πολλοὺς καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἐπενόει τὴν γῆν ἀναδάσασθαι. 'For when the Athenians left Sicily after the convention, the men of Leontini enrolled many new citizens, and the populace turned its mind to the idea of redistributing the land.' The scholia on Thucydides do not say anything about these passages.

[347] [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 40,4–41,1. Translation by Kemp (1987).

[348] Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 241,4–8: Ἐντεῦθεν οὖν καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ εἰδότες τὴν δύναμιν τῆς λέξεως πολλάκις πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον ὑπαντῶσι καὶ ῥήματα πληθυντικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἐπάγουσιν, οἷον ⟨Υ 166⟩ ἀγρόμενοι πᾶς δῆμος καὶ ⟨Ο 305⟩ ἡ πληθὺς ἐπὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν ἀπονέοντο.

[349] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.67: ἀθροιστικὰ ὀνόματα, ἅπερ ἑνικῶς μὲν λέγεται, πληθυντικῶς δὲ νοεῖται.

said').[350] However, he seems to have called this a σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ νοητόν, whereas Dionysius and the later grammarians call it a construction πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον. This can be explained by the fact that grammatical theory after Aristarchus (from Dionysius Thrax onwards) was heavily influenced by Stoic philosophy. The Stoics distinguished between the expression or form of a word (τὸ σημαῖνον) and its meaning (τὸ σημαινόμενον) (see also section 2.3).[351] Thus, Dionysius seems to have adopted the Stoic terminology in this passage.

We have already seen that Dionysius' terms ἀκολουθία and κατάλληλος likewise reflect the Stoic ideas on syntax and grammatical congruence. The Stoics also had a theory of solecism (σολοικισμός): a grammatical irregularity in a combination of words, which they seem to have defined as λόγος ἀκαταλλήλως συντεταγμένος ('a meaningful utterance put together incongruently').[352] Later sources tell us that solecism can occur in various forms, including gender and number (both of which Aristotle already mentions in his account of ἑλληνίζειν), case, person, tense, voice and mood.[353] It is possible that the Stoics also discussed the kind of solecisms to which Dionysius refers in this letter. For we are told that the Stoic Chrysippus stated that Homer committed a solecism (σολοικίζειν) when he combined the verb δῷσι with the subject 'Zeus', 'thus using a plural instead of a singular verb'.[354] Although this example is in itself rather dubious because δῷσι is a normal Homeric singular, the fragment may be regarded as evidence that Stoics discussed this type of solecism. The type of solecism here mentioned (even if it is not a true one) concerns the combination of a singular with a plural, just

[350] Aristarchus fr. 82 Matthaios. See Matthaios (1999) 384.

[351] See Sluiter (1990) 22–23. They further distinguished the τυγχάνον (the thing in reality to which a word refers).

[352] See *FDS* 594 and *FDS* 600–604a. Cf. Sluiter (1990) 23 and Ildefonse (1997) 273–275. On the ancient definitions of solecism, see Baratin (1989) 262–278 and Hyman (2003) 180–181.

[353] See *FDS* 601a. In *Rh.* 1407a19, Aristotle states that ἑλληνίζειν ('purity of language') is the foundation of style, which depends on five rules: the use of σύνδεσμοι (μέν and δέ), the use of specific words (ἰδίοις ὀνόμασι), the avoidance of ambiguous terms (ἀμφιβόλοις), the correct agreement (ἀποδιδόναι … ὀρθῶς) of genders (τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων), and the use of number (τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα καὶ ἕν, 'many, few or one'). Next, Aristotle (*Rh.* 1407b) points out that a text should not be difficult to understand. Solecism (σολοικίζειν), which is explained as τὸ μὴ ἀποδιδόναι ('lack of correspondence'), can for example occur when the word 'seeing' is used with both 'sound' and 'colour', where the word 'perceiving' would be appropriate. See Siebenborn (1976) 24 and Basset (2003) 54–56.

[354] *FDS* 601d.

like the Thucydidean construction (δῆμος … ἦσαν) to which Dionysius objects. Elsewhere, Dionysius refers to Chrysippus' works Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν (*On the Syntax of the Parts of Speech*).[355] It is possible that Chrysippus discussed solecism in that work, but he also wrote a separate work *On Solecisms* (Περὶ σολοικισμῶν).[356] But when we take the Stoic influence on technical grammar in the first century BC into account, we may as well conclude that Dionysius' remarks in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* reflect grammatical ideas on καταλληλότης and syntax. It is possible that the grammatical treatises of Asclepiades, Tyrannion and Tryphon (see section 3.2) contained similar views, although Matthaios argues that Tryphon was not interested in καταλληλότης (see section 5.2).[357]

The final subject that is relevant to our investigation into the integration of grammar and literary criticism is found in *Amm.* II 14. In this chapter, Dionysius discusses passages in which Thucydides has treated πράγματα as πρόσωπα and σώματα as πράγματα.[358] The traditional interpretation is that both πρόσωπα and σώματα refer to 'persons', and that Dionysius discusses first the treatment of things as persons, and next the treatment of persons as things.[359] However, Schenkeveld thinks that Dionysius here mixes up two different theories, namely one theory that distinguishes between '*abstractum* and *concretum*' (πρᾶγμα and σῶμα), and one theory that distinguishes between *persona* and *res* (πρόσωπον and πρᾶγμα). The former distinction is found in the *Technê Grammatikê*, where the ὄνομα is defined as a part of speech that is subject to case inflection and signifies something *corporeal* (σῶμα) or *non-corporeal* (πρᾶγμα).[360] Schenkeveld's reason for supposing that Dionysius mixed up two different linguistic theories is the obscure example that

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[355] *Comp.* 4.22,8–23,1: see sections 3.2.2. and 5.3.1 For the title of Chrysippus' work, see *FDS* 194. For the Stoic influence on stylistic theory, see Atherton (1993) 483–486, but she does not mention Dionysius here.

[356] See *FDS* 194 (= Diogenes Laertius VII.192).

[357] On Tryphon and syntax, see Matthaios (2003). Matthaios (2003) 128 concludes that unlike Apollonius Dyscolus Tryphon did not examine καταλληλότης.

[358] *Amm.* II 14.433,6: Πρόσωπα δὲ παῤ αὐτῷ τὰ πράγματα γίνεται … 'In Thucydides things become persons (…).' *Amm.* II 14.433,18: Πράγματα δὲ ἀντὶ σωμάτων τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γίνεται. 'Things are used instead of persons by him as follows.'

[359] See Pritchett (1975) 96, Usher (1985) 423–425 and Aujac (1991) 140–141. For the contrast between σῶμα and πρᾶγμα, see also *Dem.* 40.215,14; *Comp.* 12.46,21–47,1. For the contrast between πρόσωπον and πρᾶγμα, see *Comp.* 20.88,11–15; *Dem.* 13.156,6–7.

[360] [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 24,3: ὄνομά ἐστι μέρος λόγου πτωτικόν, σῶμα ἢ πρᾶγμα σημαῖνον.

Dionysius offers when discussing the treatment of πράγματα as πρόσωπα (Thuc. 1.71.7): πρὸς τάδε βουλεύεσθε εὖ, καὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον πειρᾶσθε μὴ ἐλάσσον' ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἢ οἱ πατέρες ὑμῖν παρέδοσαν. 'Therefore you must take good counsel, and strive to ensure that the Peloponnese you lead forth may be no less powerful than when your fathers left it in your care.' Dionysius first points out that Thucydides has used ἐξηγεῖσθαι ('to lead forth') here in the sense of προάγειν ἔξω τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἡγουμένους αὐτῆς ('to lead the Peloponnese outside as its leaders'). According to Dionysius, this could not possibly happen to the territory (χώρᾳ), but only to 'its reputation and its material resources' (τῇ δὲ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν), 'and this is what Thucydides means to signify'.[361] There are two problems here. First, already Krüger has pointed out that Dionysius' interpretation of the word ἐξηγεῖσθαι is obscure.[362] It seems that Dionysius' explanation προάγειν ἔξω τὴν Πελοπόννησον means 'to expand the Peloponnese' (*Peloponnesum augere*, according to Krüger), which would rather agree to the expression μὴ ἐλάσσον' ἐξηγεῖσθαι as a whole. A better explanation of ἐξηγεῖσθαι would be 'to lead the Peloponnesians to other countries' (*ducere Peloponnesios in externas terras*, according to Krüger), which would fit Dionysius' discussion of the treatment of things as persons. Second, Dionysius states that ἐξηγεῖσθαι could not happen to the Peloponnese, but that it could happen to its reputation and πράγμασιν, thus somewhat obscuring the distinction between things and persons: in this opposition the Peloponnese should be a thing, but Dionysius' explanation opposes it to other 'things' instead of persons.[363] The example would have been easier if Dionysius had pointed out that one could not 'lead' a country (a thing) but only its inhabitants (persons), so that Thucydides treated a thing (the Peloponnese) as a person. For this reason, Schenkeveld concludes that Dionysius has identified the distinction πρᾶγμα / σῶμα (*abstractum / concretum*) with the distinction πρόσωπον / πρᾶγμα (*persona / res*), and that he did not realise that the example from Thucydides 1.71.1 was a case of the antithesis πρᾶγμα / σῶμα (*abstractum / concretum*).[364] Although I agree that Dionysius' example and his explanation are somewhat problematic, I do not think that we have to attribute the difficulties to

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[361] *Amm.* II 14.433,13–17: τὸ γὰρ ἐξηγεῖσθαι νῦν τέθηκεν ἐπὶ τοῦ προάγειν ἔξω τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἡγουμένους αὐτῆς· τοῦτο δὲ τῇ χώρᾳ μὲν ἀδύνατον ἦν συμβῆναι, τῇ δὲ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν τοῖς περὶ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχουσιν δυνατόν, καὶ βούλεται τοῦτο δηλοῦν.

[362] Krüger (1823) 235–236.

[363] See Aujac (1991) 165.

[364] Schenkeveld (1983) 78.

the alleged confusion of two different theories. The word σῶμα (*concretum* according to Schenkeveld) does not occur in Dionysius' discussion of the first example, but only in the next one, which is a clear and unproblematic example of the treatment of persons (σώματα) as things, namely the use of τὸ ὑμέτερον ('your way') instead of ὑμεῖς ('you') in Thuc. 1.70.2.[365] With regard to this second example, Dionysius states the following: τὸ γὰρ ὑμέτερον ἀντὶ τοῦ ὑμεῖς παρείληπται, πρᾶγμα ὑπάρχον ἀντὶ σώματος. 'For "your way" has been submitted for "you", a thing taking the place of a person.' If Dionysius was using a theory on *abstractum pro concreto* in the first example (τὴν Πελοπόννησον … ἐξηγεῖσθαι), we would expect him to have used the term σῶμα in that case, but there he only speaks of πρόσωπα. Further, if Schenkeveld were right that Dionysius' first example concerns a case of *abstractum pro concreto*, we would have to assume that the Peloponnese is the *abstractum*, and τῇ δὲ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν the *concreta*. This could work for πράγματα, but it could not for δόξα ('reputation'). For this reason, Schenkeveld's suggestion that Dionysius was thinking of an antithesis πρᾶγμα / σῶμα does not make the passage more understandable. In other passages, the distinction between πρᾶγμα and σῶμα does not differ from the one between πρᾶγμα and πρόσωπον (see section 2.3). I think, then, that Dionysius does regard the expression τὴν Πελοπόννησον … ἐξηγεῖσθαι as a case of personification, because he thinks that ἐξηγεῖσθαι should be used with a personal object. This interpretation is supported by the explanations in the scholia on Thucydides. Here we find the following interpretation of ἐξηγεῖσθαι: ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν ἑτέρων, 'to rule over, to be master of other people'.[366] Although this interpretation differs from the one that Dionysius offers, it seems to support the idea that ἐξηγεῖσθαι is considered a verb that governs a personal object. In spite of the obscurity of Dionysius' comment, we may conclude that he regards τὴν Πελοπόννησον … ἐξηγεῖσθαι as a case of personification: the Peloponnese is a thing (πρᾶγμα) that is treated as a person (πρόσωπον).

In the discussion of chapter 3–14 of the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*, we have compared Dionysius' grammatical notes with the observations of philologists (Aristarchus and the scholia on Thucydides), rhetoricians

[365] *Amm.* II 14.433,18–434,12. It should be noted that σῶμα is also the term that Dionysius uses in the outline of the letter in *Amm.* II 2.424,6–7: ὁπόσα τε γίνεται πράγματα ἀντὶ σωμάτων ἢ σώματα ἀντὶ πραγμάτων (see above).

[366] Hude (1927) 57. Another scholion on the same passage says: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄγειν τὸ ἐξηγεῖσθαι ('ἐξηγεῖσθαι is used instead of "to bring"').

('Demetrius', Caecilius of Caleacte, Quintilian), a literary critic ('Longinus'), technical grammarians (in particular Apollonius Dyscolus) and philosophers (the Stoics). We have not only observed that similar ideas on the substitution and combination of the *accidentia* of the parts of speech are found in all these disciplines, but also that the use of these ideas diverges from discipline to discipline. Most illustrative are the different treatments of Thucydides' deviating language in the scholia, Caecilius and Dionysius respectively. They all point to similar passages in Thucydides' work where the historian expresses his ideas in an unusual way. The scholia comment on these passages in order to explain them, so that the reader of Thucydides will be able to understand what he means to say. Caecilius of Caleacte includes some of these same passages in his account of the figure ἀλλοίωσις: the implication seems to be that orators could use these figures in their speeches, thus imitating the variations of Thucydides and other authors. Dionysius however objects to Thucydides' unusual expressions, and in some cases he even refers to them as solecisms. He points to the historian's deviating language in order to prevent his readers from imitating Thucydides' style, which he considers inappropriate for both historians and orators. Dionysius' integration of grammar and literary criticism in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* supports his views on Thucydides' style, which he already expressed in his treatise *On Thucydides*. The grammatical notes on his use of the parts of speech confirm the evaluation of Thucydides as an author whose style should not be copied indiscriminately.

4.5. *Conclusion*

In this chapter, I have investigated Dionysius' use of the grammatical theory of the parts of speech. We have seen that Dionysius employs the μόρια λόγου both as a rhetorician and as a literary critic. His definition of σύνθεσις emphasises that composition starts from the parts of speech as its building blocks. Although this definition is directly followed by a history of the theory of the μόρια λόγου in the sense of 'word classes' (here we have seen Dionysius' role as a historian of linguistics), the other aspect of words, that of 'parts of the phrase' is similarly relevant for Dionysius' composition theory. We have examined two passages from the work *On Composition* that make clear that the grammatical point of view is essential to Dionysius' views on σύνθεσις. In *Comp.* 6, he argues that words should be combined and shaped in a form

that is appropriate both with regard to grammar and with regard to euphony. In *Comp.* 22–24, Dionysius describes the three different types of composition, and he argues that the use of the parts of speech is one of the factors that contribute to the smoothness or austerity of the σύνθεσις. In both passages, the concept of architecture is very prominent. As a literary critic Dionysius supports his criticism of Thucydides' style by pointing to specific deviations in the historian's use of grammatical constructions (σχηματισμοί). Dionysius' stylistic analyses foreshadow Apollonius Dyscolus' work on syntax: the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* contains a number of syntactic observations that have so far been ignored by scholars who study the history of syntax in antiquity. In chapter 5, I will come back to Dionysius' views on syntax.

I hope to have shown that the integration of grammar and rhetorical theory on the one hand and grammar and literary criticism on the other is fundamental to Dionysius' works. He has taken up linguistic views that were developed in the context of philology and technical grammar and uses them for his own purposes. More specifically, Dionysius seems to have incorporated theories from various disciplines. First, it is plausible that he used theories on σύνθεσις that were developed by the Hellenistic *kritikoi*, who also used the theory of the parts of speech in their theory of composition. Further, he seems to have employed a philological commentary on Thucydides, from which he may have taken the examples of deviating style. On the other hand, we have seen that, conversely, the later scholia partly seem to rely on Dionysius. Finally, he knew Stoic works on the syntax of the parts of speech; the extent to which Dionysius actually made use of the Stoic works is not yet clear, but I will argue in the next chapter (5) that Dionysius' discussion of natural word order (*Comp.* 5), which is another example of the integration of grammar and rhetoric, is indeed based on Stoic theories. As to specific 'sources' I want to be very careful. We may make an exception for the philological work on Thucydides that Dionysius seems to have used in his *Second Letter to Ammaeus*. Apart from that, I will not make any specific claims on the sources that he may have used for different parts of his work. Dionysius knew a large number of works from various language traditions in which the parts of speech played a role (philology, philosophy, poetic criticism, and probably technical grammar). Some of these works he mentions himself, and others he may have used without mentioning them. Thus, it is possible that he knew the work of the grammarians Asclepiades of Myrlea, Tyrannion or Tryphon. Indeed the history of the theory of the parts

of speech might rely on a discussion of the μέρη λόγου in a treatise by one of those grammarians. However, we will never know to what extent Dionysius depended on this kind of work. It is more rewarding to conclude that Dionysius was one of the very first rhetoricians who systematically integrated various language disciplines in order to support his own purposes as a rhetorician. The theory of the parts of speech has proven to be a perfect example of this successful synthesis.

CHAPTER FIVE

NATURA ARTIS MAGISTRA: DIONYSIUS ON NATURAL STYLE, SYNTAX AND WORD ORDER

5.1. *Introduction*

In the two preceding chapters, we have examined the close connections between grammar, rhetorical theory and literary analysis in Dionysius' treatises. In the present chapter, which will concentrate on Dionysius' views on natural style, syntax and word order, the fruitful cooperation between these disciplines will become even more manifest. Apart from rhetoric and grammar, philosophy will also play a significant role in this chapter. Our investigations will depart from the observation that 'the natural' (τὸ φυσικόν) is a recurrent theme throughout Dionysius' rhetorical works (see also section 2.5.2). On closer inspection, it becomes manifest that we find two different concepts of nature (φύσις) in his treatises. On the one hand, nature corresponds to the artless and the usual. On the other hand, there is a passage in which Dionysius adopts a philosophical concept of nature: in this case, nature corresponds to the rules of logic.

Throughout his works, Dionysius uses the terms φύσις and φυσικός in the sense of the 'usual' and 'normal': according to this concept, natural style imitates the language of laymen, who are not trained in the use of rhetorical expression. The term φύσις is here opposed to τέχνη (see also section 2.5.2).[1] This concept of nature is applied to various aspects of writing: not only word order can be natural, but also syntax (grammatical constructions), style in general and even the organisation of the ideas in a speech. Dionysius' ideas on natural style, syntax and word order are of course closely related: they will be discussed in section 5.2. I will argue that we can trace a development in Dionysius' analysis of the styles that he regards as natural or unnatural.

[1] Untersteiner (1959) discusses the contrast φύσις and τέχνη in Dionysius' works, but his discussion is not in all respects satisfactory: see section 5.2.

In the early works, Dionysius merely describes certain plain and simple passages (in particular those of Lysias) as natural, and he characterises the more figured style as 'unnatural'. In the later works, Dionysius adopts a syntactic framework, including a technical terminology, which allows him to be more precise about the exact nature of the passages that he considers to be natural or unnatural. Thus, syntactic theory contributes to the analysis of style.

A different concept of nature is adopted in *Comp.* 5. Here, Dionysius conducts an experiment by which he aims to discover whether attractive and beautiful composition depends on the arrangement of words that 'nature demands'. Natural word order is in this case determined by a number of logical rules, which claim that the parts of speech (τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου) should be arranged according to a fixed order.[2] Because the experiment proves that Homer's verses do not always follow the rules of nature, Dionysius decides to reject the natural principles. In section 5.3, I will argue that the concept of natural word order in *Comp.* 5 is largely determined by Stoic ideas. In the final part of this chapter, I will compare Dionysius' ideas with some other ancient views on natural word order, namely those of the rhetoricians and critics 'Demetrius' (section 5.4.1), 'Longinus' (section 5.4.2) and Quintilian (section 5.4.3).

Since part of this chapter concentrates on natural word order, I should add some introductory remarks on the importance of order in the ancient language disciplines. Order (τάξις, *ordo*) is a central concept in ancient rhetorical theory, both in the organisation of arguments (*dispositio*) and in the treatment of expression (*elocutio*).[3] In the latter department, aspects of word order can be discussed in connection with euphony, rhythm and figures of speech.[4] In grammatical theory,

[2] On ancient ideas on natural word order (esp. in Dionysius), see also Scaglione (1972) 74–96, Schenkeveld (1983) 85–89 and De Jonge (2001).

[3] On *ordo* and related Greek concepts (τάξις, κόσμος, οἰκονομία) in ancient rhetoric, see Ernst (2003), esp. 416: 'In der Rhetorik erscheint [*ordo*] überall dort, wo es gilt, größere oder kleinere gedankliche (*dispositio*) bzw. sprachliche (*elocutio*) Einheiten der Rede (*partes orationis*, Argumente, Stadien eines erzählten Vorganges bzw. Sätze, Wörter, Silben) in eine sachlich angemessene, taktisch zweckmäßige oder ästhetisch ansprechende Reihenfolge zu bringen.'

[4] In grammar, the order of words in a sentence is mainly discussed in the context of syntax (σύνταξις). In rhetorical theory, word order generally belongs to the field of composition (σύνθεσις). Σύνθεσις and σύνταξις are complex terms, both of which are used with different meanings. Although σύνθεσις is more frequent in rhetoric, it also occurs in the works of grammarians (e.g. [D. Thrax], *G.G.* I 1, 22,5: λόγος δέ ἐστι πεζῆς λέξεως σύνθεσις διάνοιαν αὐτοτελῆ δηλοῦσα). Likewise, σύνταξις is more frequent in grammar, but it is also used in rhetorical theory (e.g. DH, *Comp.* 5.24,14

order plays an equally important role, not only on a practical, but also on a theoretical level. On the one hand, grammarians are concerned with the correct order of words in a sentence.[5] On the other hand, they discuss the theoretical order in which the parts of speech and their *accidentia* should be treated in a grammar.[6] The idea that there is one particular order that is *natural* (φυσικός, *naturalis*) occurs in both grammatical and rhetorical discussions of τάξις (*ordo*), on all the levels mentioned. In rhetoric, the distinction between an *ordo naturalis* and an *ordo artificialis* occurs both on the level of thoughts (the order of the parts of a speech, the arguments, and the narrated events) and on the level of expression (the order of letters, syllables, and words). In grammar, the concept of natural order pertains not only to the actual sequence of words in a sentence, but also to the theoretical lists of the parts of speech and their *accidentia*.[7] Before we focus on Dionysius' concept of natural word order, we will first turn to his views on natural style and its relation to syntactic theory.

5.2. *Dionysius on natural style, ἀκολουθία and ὁ κατάλληλος λόγος*

Central to all of Dionysius' rhetorical teaching is the (Aristotelian) idea that writers should primarily pay attention to clarity of style, while avoiding the use of too many obscure periphrases and figures of speech.[8] It is for this reason that Dionysius frequently criticises authors like Thucydides, Isocrates, Isaeus and Plato (in his more 'poetic' passages): when discussing the style of these writers, Dionysius constantly

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and *Dem.* 27.188,3). Both σύνθεσις and σύνταξις are used not only for the composition of sentences, but also for the internal composition of words. For the terms σύνθεσις and σύνταξις, see also Donnet (1967) 24–30. Donnet shows that σύνταξις refers both to grammatical constructions and to the order of words in a sentence. Σύνθεσις is similarly complex: on this term, see Rhys Roberts (1910) 326–327, Pohl (1968) 1–8, Scaglione (1972) 24–26 and Aujac (1981) 9 n. 1.

[5] See e.g. Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.132. Cf. Sluiter (1990) 61–69 and Lallot (1997 II) 68 n. 281.

[6] For the theoretical order of the parts of speech, see Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.13–29. For the order of the moods, see *Synt.* III.59 and III.62. For the order of the voices, see *Synt.* III.87. On these lists, see esp. Lallot (1997 II) 19 n. 51.

[7] On a practical level, Apollonius Dyscolus speaks of ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία (see section 5.2). His theoretical hierarchy of the parts of speech is also supposed to be in accordance with nature: see esp. *Synt.* I.26.

[8] On the importance of the Aristotelian concept of σαφήνεια, see sections 1.5 and 7.3.1.

points out that their expressions deviate from normal and customary language. We should realise that Dionysius' criticism is not a purpose in itself, but serves to underline his instructions to future orators: Dionysius' main concern is that his students and other readers should learn to write in a clear and perspicuous style. In many cases, Dionysius rewrites the obscure expressions of classical writers in the style of 'those who construct the expression in conformity with common usage' (see sections 4.4.2 and 7.3.1).[9] The distinction between φύσις and τέχνη, two notions that heavily determine Dionysius' thoughts about language in general, regularly leads to the identification of normal and customary expressions with 'the natural'.[10] Although τὸ φυσικόν is an important concept throughout Dionysius' works, the treatment of this concept in his earlier works differs from that in his later works.[11] In the treatises from the earliest period (in particular the first three books of *On the Ancient Orators*), Dionysius regularly refers to the existence of a 'natural' style, which is in his view most clearly represented by Lysias. But in these works the concept of natural style is still very general and not so well defined: Dionysius does not discuss the syntax that characterises natural composition, nor does he point to the grammatical particularities of the opposite type of σύνθεσις, which he regards as artificial. In his later works, however, the concept of 'the naturalness' of style and word order is applied in a more specific way. In *On Demosthenes*, *On Thucydides*, and the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*, there are two things in particular that enable Dionysius to be more precise about natural style and word order than in his earlier works. First, he introduces the technique of metathesis (rewriting), which makes it possible to compare the 'artifical' style of Thucydides with a more 'natural' version that expresses the same idea (see section 7.3.1). Second, Dionysius adopts a grammatical framework, including a more sophisticated terminology: technical grammatical terms like ἀκολουθία, referring to the ideal combination of logical order and correct syntax, κατάλληλος, 'congruent', and σολοικισμός, 'grammatical irregularity', allow Dionysius to give a more precise description of what he considers to be natural or deviant. Dionysius' views on ἀκολουθία and καταλληλότης in his later works seem to

[9] *Amm.* II 11.430,18–20. For the text, see section p. 235.

[10] Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 91. For a similar idea in Apollonius Dyscolus, see Lallot (1997 II) 68 n. 281. On the role of φύσις in Dionysius' discussion of mimetic words, see section 2.5.3.

[11] On the relative order of Dionysius' rhetorical works, see section 1.3.

foreshadow the important role that these terms will play in Apollonius Dyscolus' *Syntax*.[12] In this section, I will first deal with the general concept of natural style in Dionysius' earlier works, and then turn to the more technical ideas on ἀκολουθία and καταλληλότης in his later works.

In order to understand what Dionysius means by a 'natural' style and 'natural' composition, we should pay close attention to Dionysius' discussion of Lysias, the author who was universally considered to be the champion of 'the natural'. In *On Lysias*, Dionysius points out that among the most important characteristics of Lysias' style are the purity of his vocabulary, the expression of ideas in everyday language, and his lucidity (σαφήνεια).[13] Dionysius regularly refers to these qualities in terms of nature (ἡ φύσις) and the natural (τὸ φυσικόν): Lysias' style in general is described as 'displaying the natural to a high degree' (πολὺ τὸ φυσικὸν ἐπιφαίνουσα), which makes it suited to the portrayal of 'the reality of human nature' (ἀλήθειαν … φύσεως).[14] Further, Lysias' composition is said to be natural (σύνθεσιν … φυσικήν), and his speeches display an 'uncontrived, natural moral tone' (ἦθος τε οὐ πεπλασμένον ἀλλὰ φυσικόν).[15] Thus, Lysias' naturalness pertains to many different aspects of his writings, which are, however, all related to each other: the naturalness of his composition (σύνθεσις) and word order is an aspect of his natural style (λέξις) in general, which in its turn is part of the natural (in the sense of 'realistic') portrayal of the speaker's character. The concept of φύσις behind these ideas is complex. What does Dionysius mean when he describes Lysias' style as 'natural'? He does not mean to say that Lysias' composed his speeches instinctively, nor that he did not make use of artistic techniques. In fact, Lysias' speeches are supposed to be the product of an art (τέχνη) that *imitates* nature (φύσις).[16]

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[12] Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 91–92.

[13] See esp. *Lys.* 2–4.

[14] *Lys.*10.17,12–13; *Lys.* 13.23,14–15.

[15] *Isoc.* 2.57,3–4; *Is.* 9.103,8–9. See also *Is.* 3.95,4–7 (a comparison between the styles of Lysias and Isaeus): ἡ μὲν γὰρ [i.e. ἡ Λυσίου λέξις] ἀφελής τε καὶ ἠθικὴ μᾶλλον ἐστι σύγκειταί τε φυσικώτερον … 'The style of Lysias is plainer and has a stronger moral flavour and its composition is more natural (…).' *Is.* 7.100,3–5: παρὰ Λυσίᾳ μὲν ἡδεῖά ἐστιν ἡ εἰσβολὴ καὶ δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο μᾶλλον ἢ ὅτι φυσικῶς πως εἴρηται καὶ ἀφελῶς. 'In Lysias, the introduction is pleasant and the main reason for this is that its expression is natural and simple.' There are many more passages in which some aspect of Lysias' speeches is described as natural.

[16] In *Is.* 16.114,9–13 (already cited above), Dionysius points out that Lysias' narratives are not really natural, but that they are the product of τέχνη, 'whose greatest achievement was to *imitate* nature' (τὸ μιμήσασθαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς τέχνης] μέγιστον ἔργον ἦν). 'Longinus', *Subl.* 22.1 expresses the same idea: see section 5.4.2. In spite of

Dionysius does not always make it very clear in which sense he regards Lysias' style as natural. In most cases, it is simply implied that natural speech corresponds to the speech of a layman, who is not trained in rhetorical skills:[17] correspondingly, natural word order is just an order of words found in everyday language. Dionysius' preference for this kind of language is based on very practical considerations: the orator is supposed to speak in the assembly, before an audience that mainly consists of laymen (ἰδιῶται).[18] Therefore, if the orator wishes to be heard

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Dionysius' clear statements on art imitating nature, it has been wrongly supposed that Dionysius is guided by the idea that speeches are the product of an instinctive and irrational process. See Untersteiner (1959) 80–81, who points to *Thuc.* 34.381,17–25. In that passage, Dionysius distinguishes two stages in the treatment of content: first, the invention (εὕρεσις) of ideas, which depends for the most part on talent (φύσις); second, the employment (χρῆσις) of the material, which depends on art (τέχνη). It is true that Dionysius assigns a certain role to 'talent' in the field of content (τὸ πραγματικὸν μέρος), but it is also clear from the same passage and from his other works that τὸ τεχνικόν is indispensable in all rhetorical and historical writing, especially in the field of style (τὸ λεκτικὸν μέρος). Invention depends more on φύσις because it does not pertain to the form of a text. As Goudriaan (1989) 237–238 points out, Untersteiner's translation of φύσις as 'libera ispirazione' and 'individualità' refers to a romantic ideal that does not fit with Dionysius' theories. Untersteiner's interpretation is governed by a tradition of Italian scholars, to which Pavano (1936) also belongs. These scholars divide ancient theories of art and literary criticism into two approaches, namely a τέχνη-related rationalism and a φύσις-related irrationalism, the latter of which is supposed to be superior. Unlike his Italian colleagues, Untersteiner regards Dionysius as an exponent of the school that emphasised the role of irrationalism in the creation and evaluation of art. (He refers in particular to Dionysius' method in *On Dinarchus*, on the authenticity of the speeches handed down under the name of Dinarchus.) In my view, it is better to avoid unspecific terms like irrationalism and rationalism (cf. Goudriaan [1989] 467). Dionysius clearly supposes that both in the production and in the reception of a text, 'nature' and 'art' work together. Thus, in *Dem.* 47.232,4–6, it is said that nature (φύσις) is the creator (δημιουργός), while the arts (αἱ τέχναι) are the mothers (μητέρες) of every work (ἔργον). With regard to the judgement of works of art, Dionysius (*Thuc.* 27.371,20–22) states that the rational criterion (of the expert critic) and the irrational criterion (of the layman), although they can be applied as separately, will lead to the same evaluation: συνῳδὸν ἔσται τό τε λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριον. 'Reason and instinct will combine in one voice.' On the two criteria, see section 7.3.2. On the two criteria and Dionysius' alleged rationality or irrationality, see further Goudriaan (1989) 142–154, 230–240 and 466–468.

[17] See e.g. *Is.* 9.103,7–12: according to Dionysius, Lysias' opening words display a moral flavour that is not contrived (πεπλασμένον) but natural (φυσικόν): 'nobody would say that these are the words of an orator, but only that it is the language of any ordinary person who is exposed to unjust litigation' (οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι ῥήτορος εἶναι, ἀλλὰ παντὸς ἰδιώτου καταστάντος εἰς ἀγῶνα ἄδικον). For the natural speech of the layman (ἰδιώτης), see also e.g. *Is.* 11.107,5.

[18] See esp. *Dem.* 15, where Dionysius points out that a speech should not only address the well-educated few, but also 'the majority of ordinary men' (τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ἰδιώταις).

and understood, he should to a certain extent adopt the language of ordinary people, in order to avoid offending the ears of the audience.[19]

In some cases, Dionysius gives a more sophisticated explanation of the 'naturalness' of Lysias' style, as in the following passage: 'the most effective style (…) is that which most resembles natural speech; and nature demands that the expression should follow the thought, not that the thoughts should follow the expression' (κράτιστον δὲ ἐπιτήδευμα (…) τὸ ὁμοιότατον τῷ κατὰ φύσιν. βούλεται δὲ ἡ φύσις τοῖς νοήμασιν ἕπεσθαι τὴν λέξιν, οὐ τῇ λέξει τὰ νοήματα) (see also section 2.3).[20] According to the latter explanation, natural language is language that directly expresses the thoughts (τὰ νοήματα), without adding ornaments or changing the order in which the ideas occur. This concept of natural order, as one that closely follows the (logical or chronological) order of the ideas, holds both on the level of the sentence (σύνθεσις) and on the level of the text (οἰκονομία). Thus, in Lysias' narratives the events are reported in the order in which they actually happened: in a natural style, the organisation of the text mirrors the chronological order of events.[21] The narratives of Isaeus, on the other hand, are characterised by (among other things) 'the fact that things that were done are told in other than their chronological order' (τῷ μὴ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τὰ πραχθέντα εἰρῆσθαι), and by 'the fact that everything is told neither as it was natural to have been done nor as a layman would recount it' (τῷ [ὡς] μὴ πάντα μηδ' ἅμ' ὡς φύσιν εἶχε πραχθῆναι μηδ' ὡς ἂν ἰδιώ-

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Therefore, the middle style, which avoids the excesses of the plain and the grand style, is to be preferred: its mixed character corresponds to the mixed nature of the audience, which consists of both specialists and laymen. See also *Lys.* 3.10,13–21: predecessors of Lysias, like Gorgias, confused 'the ordinary man' (τὸν ἰδιώτην) with their artificial expressions. Goudriaan (1989) 510–521 convincingly argues that Dionysius' view that the middle style addresses a mixed audience is influenced by Peripatetic ideas. One may doubt whether the role of the assembly in Dionysius' time was as important as in the classical period, but Goudriaan (1989) 29–38 points out that meetings of ἐκκλησίαι were still frequently held in the east of the Roman world at the beginning of the principate, even if the most important issues were, of course, not decided there. Ordinary people also attended these assemblies, and orators had to address them in an appropriate way.

[19] *Mutatis mutandis*, the same thing is true for a historian like Thucydides: in Dionysius' view, history is not the property of a few well-educated specialists. Therefore, Thucydides should have written in a more accessible style, instead of producing such obscure passages that cannot be understood without a linguistic commentary. See *Thuc.* 51 and cf. Grube (1950) 108.

[20] *Isoc.* 12.72,4–6. A similar idea is found in Plato, *Republic* 400c12–d4, where it is said that rhythm and harmony should follow the words (λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον), not *vice versa*.

[21] Cf. *Is.* 11.106,15–16: καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς φύσιν εἶχε γενέσθαι τε καὶ ῥηθῆναι, λέγει. 'And he reports what follows as it was natural for it to happen and to be described.'

της τις εἴποι λέγεσθαι).[22] From the latter passage it becomes clear that, according to Dionysius, a style in which 'expression follows the ideas' coincides with the language of laymen.[23] We may conclude, then, that a natural style is a style that presents the ideas in a straightforward way; at the same time, Dionysius supposes that this is also the way in which ordinary people would express themselves.

The concept of natural style is closely connected with the rhetorical theory of the three styles (see section 1.5). In his treatise *On Demosthenes*, Dionysius includes a discussion of the grand style (*Dem.* 1), the plain style (*Dem.* 2) and the middle style (*Dem.* 3ff.). The grand style is described as 'unusual, redundant, elaborate, and full of every kind of additional ornaments' (ἐξηλλαγμένη καὶ περιττὴ καὶ ἐγκατάσκευος καὶ τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις κόσμοις ἅπασι συμπεπληρωμένη).[24] The opposite style, represented especially by Lysias, is 'simple and plain' (λιτὴ καὶ ἀφελής), and its power consists in its 'resemblance to the language of ordinary speech' (τὴν πρὸς ἰδιώτην ἔχειν λόγον [καὶ] ὁμοιότητα).[25] The middle style, finally, is formed by a combination of the other two styles.[26] In his treatment of the three χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως, Dionysius frequently describes the difference between the plain and the grand style in terms of φύσις.[27] While Lysias is the champion of 'the natural', Thucydides is Dionysius' favourite example of an unnatural and artificial style.[28]

Having examined the most important characteristics of Dionysius' concept of natural style, I will now focus on the grammatical terminology that he adopts in order to trace the precise causes of natural

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[22] *Is.* 15.113,17–114,1.

[23] We may compare Horace's advice on *ordo* in *Ars Poetica* 42–44: *ordinis haec virtus erit et venus, aut ego fallor,* | *ut iam nunc dicat iam nunc debentia dici,* | *pleraque differat et praesens in tempus omittat.* 'This, or I am mistaken, will constitute the merit and beauty of order, that the poet just now say what ought just now to be said, put off most of his thoughts, and waive them for the present.' (Translation adapted from Smart.)

[24] *Dem.* 1.130,1–3.

[25] *Dem.* 2.130,6–8. I follow the text of Usher (1974) and Aujac (1988), who delete καί.

[26] Although Dionysius calls the middle style ἡ μικτή τε καὶ σύνθετος ἐκ τούτων τῶν δυεῖν ('the style that is mixed and formed by combining the other two'), it is not entirely clear whether Dionysius regards this style as an Aristotelian mean or as a mixture of the grand and the plain style: see Hendrickson (1904), Bonner (1938), Grube (1965) 221, Goudriaan (1989) 504–510 and Wooten (1989) 576–580.

[27] See e.g. *Dem.* 9.145,7–11 (below), *Dem.* 9.147,9: τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἀπαγγελίαν, 'the natural expression'. *Dem.* 13.157,16–17: φυσική τις ἐπιτρέχει τοῖς Λυσίου λόγοις εὐστομία καὶ χάρις … 'A certain natural euphony and charm flows over the speeches of Lysias (…).'

[28] Cf. *Dem.* 2.130,25–131,3. For Dionysius' evaluation of Thucydides, see section 4.4.1 and the literature mentioned there.

and unnatural composition. An illuminating passage is *On Demosthenes* 9, where Dionysius summarises the aspects that distinguish Thucydides' style from that of others (see also section 2.5.5): the most characteristic aspect of the historian's style is 'that the thoughts are not expressed by direct means and not in a simple and plain way, as is the normal practice of other writers, but that the language is removed and turned away from what is customary and natural (κατὰ φύσιν) towards expressions that are unfamiliar to most people and different from what nature (ἡ φύσις) demands'.[29] Here we do not only have a clear link between that which is customary (ἐν ἔθει) and that which is in accordance with nature (κατὰ φύσιν), but it is also implied that the natural use of language is simple (ἁπλῶς) and plain (ἀφελῶς). *On Demosthenes* belongs to the works of Dionysius' middle period, in which his technique of literary analysis has considerably developed (see section 1.3).[30] Thus, no longer does Dionysius restrict himself to describing the artificial style as 'unnatural', but he illustrates his point with a metathesis (rewriting) of a passage from Demosthenes, which he thinks much resembles the style of Thucydides:[31]

Demosthenes, *Philippics* 3.110:	Dionysius' metathesis:
πολλῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λόγων γινομένων ὀλίγου δεῖν καθ' ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν περὶ ὧν Φίλιππος, ἀφ' οὗ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιήσατο, οὐ μόνον ὑμᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ⟨Ἕλληνας⟩ ἀδικεῖ …	πολλῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λόγων γιγνομένων καθ' ἑκάστην σχεδὸν ἐκκλησίαν, περὶ ὧν ἀδικεῖ Φίλιππος ὑμᾶς τε καὶ τοὺς ⟨ἄλλους⟩ Ἕλληνας, ἀφ' οὗ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιήσατο …
'Many speeches, Athenians, are made in all but every assembly about the outrages that Philip, ever since he made peace with us, has been committing not only against you but also against the rest of the Greeks (…).'	'Many speeches, Athenians, are made in almost every assembly about the outrages that Philip has been committing against you and the other Greeks ever since he has made peace with us (…)'

Dionysius' remarks on his metathesis further clarify his ideas on natural style and word order. According to Dionysius, there are three devices that have made Demosthenes' style 'removed from the customary' (τοῦ

[29] *Dem.* 9.145,6–11. For the Greek text, see pp. 87–88.

[30] Cf. Bonner (1939) 59–80.

[31] *Dem.* 9.144,14–145,24. For a discussion of the method of metathesis in general I refer to chapter 7 and to De Jonge (2005b). On Dionysius' analysis of *Phil.* 3.110, see also Bonner (1939) 68–69.

συνήθους ἐξηλλαγμένην) and 'laboured' (περίεργον). First, Demosthenes uses ὀλίγου δεῖν instead of the more usual σχεδόν. Second, the pair ἀδικεῖ Φίλιππος has been broken up and has 'carried away the ἀκολουθία over a long distance'.[32] Third, the phrase 'not only against you but also against the rest of the Greeks' (οὐ μόνον ὑμᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας) could have expressed the sense by means of the simple connection (διὰ τῆς συμπλοκῆς μόνης), that is, without the extra negation: therefore, Dionysius has simplified this phrase by using the connectives τε καί.[33] From this analysis it appears that Dionysius' concept of customary and natural expression is related to vocabulary (ὀλίγου δεῖν), σύνδεσμοι (οὐ μόνον … ἀλλὰ καί) and word order (Demosthenes' hyperbaton Φίλιππος … ἀδικεῖ has interrupted the logical order of the sentence). Now, it is important to notice that Dionysius presents his own metathesis as the basic form of language, from which Demosthenes' sentence deviates (see also section 7.3.2). Dionysius points out that in Demosthenes' version, ὀλίγου δεῖν 'has been adopted instead of' (παραληφθὲν ἀντί) the more customary word σχεδόν: this formulation reveals Dionysius' view that the natural and normal expression used in his paraphrase 'underlies' the artificial expression of Demosthenes. Similarly, Dionysius tells us that ἀδικεῖ Φίλιππος 'has been split up' (διαιρεθέν) in Demosthenes' version; Dionysius presents his metathesis as the basic and natural order, from which Demosthenes has consciously deviated, thus interrupting the ἀκολουθία.[34]

The use of the term ἀκολουθία ('logical order'), which appears only in the works of his middle and later period, marks a significant development in Dionysius' treatment of style in general and that of natural word order and syntax in particular. Apart from ἀκολουθία, the term κατάλληλος ('syntactically congruent') should be mentioned as an important term in Dionysius' more developed syntactic analyses.[35] We have already encountered both terms in our discussion of Dionysius' grammatical notes on Thucydides (section 4.4.2). The terms ἀκολουθία and κατάλληλος occur in both philological and philosophical contexts, but the author that makes the most systematic use of these terms is the technical grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus (second century AD). The

[32] For the expression κομίζεσθαι τὴν ἀκολουθίαν, see also *Thuc.* 53.413,8.

[33] See *Dem.* 9.145,18–24.

[34] A similar case is discussed in *Comp.* 9.35,7–16: see section 7.3.2.

[35] The term σολοικισμός ('solecism') is also important, but this seems to have been a more common term among philosophers and grammarians and even in common language.

question presents itself how Dionysius got to know these terms and the grammatical theory behind them. He may have acquired his knowledge from the grammarians who were active in Augustan Rome, or he may have studied the works of earlier philologists, grammarians or philosophers (see section 1.4). But the interesting thing is that Dionysius' contemporary Tryphon, who is often considered to have been the great model of Apollonius Dyscolus, presumably did not use the terms ἀκολουθία and κατάλληλος. Having closely examined the fragments of Tryphon, Matthaios argues that Tryphon did not deal with the concept of καταλληλότης: 'Ausblickend dagegen unterscheidet sich Tryphon vom Syntaxtheoretiker Apollonius Dyskolos dadurch, daß er die für den syntaktischen Bereich wesentliche Frage nach der καταλληλότης und nach ihren Bedingungen nicht stellte.'[36] The term ἀκολουθία is not found in the extant fragments of Tryphon either.[37] Given the fact that both Apollonius and Dionysius are interested in Stoic ideas, we might suppose that they have borrowed the syntactical terminology from the philosophers: both ἀκολουθία and κατάλληλος are found in Stoic works (see below).[38] The term κατάλληλος also occurs in the scholia on Homer, so Dionysius may also have found the terms in the works of Alexandrian philologists (cf. section 4.4.1).[39] But because of the limited number of fragments of Tryphon and grammarians like Tyrannion and Asclepiades, we should be cautious and avoid drawing sweeping conclusions about the discipline from which Dionysius borrowed the syntactic terminology and the theory behind it.

Blank and Sluiter have usefully analysed Apollonius Dyscolus' use of the terms ἀκολουθία and καταλληλότης.[40] Καταλληλότης, 'syntactical congruence', denotes the mutual agreement between the parts of a sentence: a sentence is κατάλληλος if all the words agree with each other, both syntactically and semantically.[41] A sentence that is completely κατάλληλος, is called τὸ ἑξῆς or ἀκολουθία: the latter terms indi-

[36] Matthaios (2003) 128.

[37] Von Velsen (1965) reads ἀκολουθίαν in Tryphon fr. 33, but here we should read ἀκολούθως: see Matthaios (2003) 104–105.

[38] For the Stoic use of the term καταλληλότης, see Blank (1982) 31. According to Diogenes Laertius VII.59, the Stoics defined solecism as λόγος ἀκαταλλήλως συντεταγμένος.

[39] Cf. Blank (1982) 55–57.

[40] For καταλληλότης, see Blank (1982) 24–39, Sluiter (1990) 50–52 and 61–69, Lallot (1997 I) 45–47, and Luhtala (2000) 163–167. For ἀκολουθία, see esp. Sluiter (1990) 13–16.

[41] Cf. Sluiter (1990) 50: 'Καταλληλότης refers to the mutual relationships of the constituents of a sentence; it is the notion into which symmetry of structure and semantics merge.' Blank (1982) 28 suggests that καταλληλότης is the term that represents

cate the correct, grammatical order of a sentence whose words agree with each other and at the same time occupy their proper places.[42] In Stoic philosophy, the term ἀκολουθία was used to denote the rational order that pervades the whole cosmos.[43] This idea of cosmic orderliness is implicitly preserved in Apollonius' grammatical works, for he seems to have thought that the rational order of the universe was reflected in the orderly structure of language.[44] Ἀκολουθία therefore denotes not only a logical, but also a *natural* order;[45] in some cases, the latter aspect of the concept of ἀκολουθία is made more explicit by the addition of the words κατὰ φύσιν.[46] Where τάξις designates the order as such, ἀκολουθία implies that the constituents of the order follow from each other, so that the order may be regarded as logical or natural.

Coming back to Dionysius, we can observe that in his rhetorical works of the middle and later period (see section 1.3), he makes use of ideas on syntax that are related to Apollonius' views mentioned above.[47] In his earlier works, Dionysius merely points to the naturalness of Lysias' composition in a general way, and he criticises the artificiality of authors like Isaeus; but he does not yet describe the grammatical order and syntax that characterises the natural and artificial styles. In his later works, however, he develops a grammatical apparatus

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ἀναλογία in syntax. For the use of κατάλληλος in writers before Apollonius (including Dionysius), see Blank (1982) 55–57.

[42] See Sluiter (1990) 61–62. In his *Syntax*, Apollonius normally uses the expression τὸ ἑξῆς: see e.g. *Synt.* I.132 and cf. Lallot (1997 II) 68 n. 281. For ἀκολουθία as the rational order of words, see *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 42,8–9. Ἀκολουθία can also refer to a group of correlative words: see Steinthal (1891 II) 346 and Sluiter (1990) 84 and 130.

[43] See Sluiter (1990) 13–16.

[44] See Blank (1982) 31. This idea is implicitly present in various ancient accounts of natural word order: see especially sections 5.3 and 5.4.3 (on Dionysius, *Comp.* 5 and 'Longinus', *Subl.* 22.1).

[45] See Blank (1982) 16–17 and Lallot (1997 II) 68 n. 281.

[46] For ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία, see Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 42,8–9; Dionysius, *Thuc.* 24.362,6, *Thuc.* 53.413,3 and *Amm.* II 2.423,12–13. See also section 5.4.2 for 'Longinus', *Subl.* 22.1: τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἱρμοῦ παντοίως πρὸς μυρίας τροπὰς ἐναλλάττουσι τάξιν.

[47] The adjective κατάλληλος occurs four times in Dionysius: *Dem.* 27.189,9; *Thuc.* 31.378,9; *Thuc.* 37.389,21; *Amm.* II 12.431,17. The opposite ἀκατάλληλος occurs twice: *Dem.* 27.188,3 and *Amm.* II 12.432,9 (for the latter passage, see section 4.4.2). The substantive καταλληλότης, which we find in Apollonius, does not occur in Dionysius' works. The term ἀκολουθία is rather frequent in Dionysius' later works; it only occurs in *Dem.*, *Thuc.*, *Amm.* II and *Comp.* Dionysius uses the word ἑξῆς only in the sense of 'following' or 'in close succession', not with the technical meaning that the term has in Apollonius.

that describes the unnatural style in a more precise way. In particular, Dionysius frequently points out that a passage deviates from ἀκολουθία because the construction of the parts of speech is not congruent (κατάλληλος). We have already encountered some interesting illustrations of this approach in the preceding chapter (section 4.4.2). For example, we have seen that Dionysius points out that a participle should have had the feminine instead of the masculine form in order to agree with a corresponding feminine noun.[48] With regard to a sentence that combines a future (in fact an optative present) and a present tense, he describes the style as 'deviating from the syntactical congruence' (ἐκβεβηκυῖα τὸ κατάλληλον).[49] He also points to the fact that a pronoun and a participle that should agree with each other are expressed in two different cases, thus forming an 'incongruent construction' (σχηματισμὸς ἀκατάλληλος).[50] Thus, by combining the grammatical theory of the parts of speech with an implicit theory of syntax (indicated by the terms ἀκολουθία and κατάλληλος), Dionysius has found a useful tool for analysing the precise character of different styles and composition types. In particular, the syntactic analysis enables him to pin down the causes of the style that he regards as 'unnatural'.

Another tool that enables Dionysius to be more precise about the defects of unnatural composition is the method of metathesis (rewriting) (see section 2.3 and chapter 7). In the first instance, it might seem attractive to compare Dionysius' rewritings with the paraphrases that we find in Apollonius Dyscolus. However, there is an important difference between the rewriting techniques of the rhetorician and the grammarian. Apollonius frequently rewrites sentences from daily usage or literary texts in order to bring out their meaning.[51] Sluiter has pointed

[48] *Amm.* II 11: see section 4.4.2., p. 236.

[49] *Amm.* II 12: see section 4.4.2., p. 239.

[50] *Amm.* II 12: see section 4.4.2., pp. 240–241.

[51] The grammarian Nicanor (first half of the second century AD) held that one could remove all grammatically unnecessary words in order to bring out the basic structure of the sentence (τὸ ἑξῆς). Nicanor called the unnecessary parts of the sentence διὰ μέσου: see Sluiter (1990) 68–69. The expression διὰ μέσου also occurs three times in Dionysius' works, but he does not use it to denote 'unnecessary parts': (1) In *Thuc.* 25.365,9–13, Dionysius objects to the arrangement of a sentence from Thucydides 4.34.1: he says that the last part (of the sentence) should immediately follow the first part, and that 'the intervening parts' (τῶν δὲ διὰ μέσου) should take the next place. (2) In *Dem.* 38.210,22–211,2, hiatus is described as the pause that exists in the middle between (διὰ μέσου) the vowel at the end of one word and the vowel at the beginning of the next word. (3) In *Comp.* 25.129,6–7 (καὶ τί γε δὴ διὰ μέσου παρεμπεσὸν τὸ 'καὶ σκοπῶ' according to Usener-Radermacher), Dionysius seems to use the expression διὰ

out that these paraphrases are primarily intended as interpretations of the original sentences.[52] Apollonius' paraphrases often contain ungrammatical Greek: they bring out the meaning of an utterance without pretending to give the normal expression: thus, Apollonius' paraphrases are *theoretical* constructions.[53] Dionysius' rewritings, on the other hand, show the future orator how he should write himself: they are practical models of correct writing, which are intended to correct the artificial and obscure writings of authors like Thucydides.[54] Thus, while Apollonius' paraphrases sometimes produce unfamiliar or even ungrammatical Greek, Dionysius' metatheses intend to correspond to the regular structure of ordinary Greek.[55]

In order to illustrate further how Dionysius' employs syntactic theory in his analyses of 'natural' style and word order, I will discuss two more passages, one from *On Demosthenes* and one from *On Thucydides*. My discussion of these passages aims to show that the grammatical framework on the one hand and the method of metathesis on the other enable Dionysius to give a more detailed analysis of what he regards as '(un)natural' style.

In *On Demosthenes* 23–32, Dionysius draws a comparison between the funeral speech in Plato's *Menexenus* and the encomium of Athens in Demosthenes' *On the Crown*. It has been pointed out that this comparison is rather unfair, since Plato probably intended Aspasia's funeral speech as a satirical parody of contemporary rhetoric.[56] Dionysius could

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μέσου for the words καὶ σκοπῶ (quoted from Demosthenes' *Against Aristocrates*), which he considers an intrusion that rightly obscures the metre of the rest of the passage; without the intrusion, the passage would have been 'in rhythm' rather than rhythmical. Aujac (1981) 181 however, following the MSS, reads καὶ ἔτι γε, νὴ Δία, μέσου παρεμπεσόντος τοῦ 'καὶ σκοπῶ' etc.

[52] Sluiter (1990) 65–69.

[53] Cf. Lallot (1997 I) 59: 'Il va sans dire qu'il s'agit, dans tous ces exemples, d'un ordre *théorique* (ou "profond", pour parler comme Householder), celui de la "séquence normale" (τὸ ἑξῆς), qui peut toujours être altéré par transposition (…), hyperbate.'

[54] As I have pointed out above, Dionysius' criticism of Thucydides is not an aim in itself, but serves to guide future orators and historians (like Tubero). With regard to Thucydides' style, Dionysius' message is: 'Do not try this at home!'

[55] On the ungrammatical Greek of Apollonius' paraphrases, see Sluiter (1990) 65–68.

[56] See e.g. Blass, *DAB* II (1979[3] [1874]) 469 and Walsdorff (1927) 18–21. For the parodic character of the funeral speech in the *Menexenus*, see Blass *DAB* II (1979[3] [1874]) 464 and Tsitsiridis (1998) 88–92, who prefers the term 'pastiche'. For Dionysius' analysis of the *Menexenus*, see Clavaud (1980) 25–29, who points to 'le peu d'aptitude de Denys à saisir l'humour de Platon'.

have selected a more typical passage from Plato's work, if he had wished to present a text that could really challenge Demosthenes' superiority.[57] It is important to realise, however, that Dionysius' aim in this treatise is to present Demosthenes as the greatest model for all rhetorical writing. Thus, Dionysius first argues that the middle style is to be preferred to the grand and simple styles. Next, he points out that among the authors who applied the middle style Demosthenes was the most successful orator. Therefore, Dionysius has to prove that Demosthenes' style is superior to that of two other representatives of the middle style, namely Isocrates and Plato. His analysis of the *Menexenus* serves the purpose of showing that Plato does not in all respects succeed in applying the middle style: in many cases, he uses too artificial expressions, which belong to the grand rather than the middle style.[58] Plato is criticised for his obscurity, his excessive use of figures of speech, in particular the theatrical figures of Gorgias such as antitheses and balanced clauses, his periphrases, and his bombastic language.[59] Dionysius' objections to Plato's style closely correspond to his criticism of Thucydides' unnatural style (see above). Just as he did with regard to Thucydides, Dionysius also rewrites some sentences from the *Menexenus* in a clearer and more straightforward style.[60] In *On Demosthenes* 27, Dionysius analyses a sentence from the *Menexenus* that he describes as 'prolonged, grammatically irregular, and having neither force nor coherence' (διὰ

[57] See Bonner (1939) 67 and Usher (1974) 234 and 359 n. 1. In *Dem.* 23.179,17–23, Dionysius objects to the habit of other critics, who select the worst passage from Plato and compare it with the finest passage from Demosthenes. Dionysius promises that, unlike these other critics, he will draw a fair comparison. The promise turns out to be empty: Dionysius was probably too eager to convince his audience of the superiority of his great model Demosthenes. He may have selected the *Menexenus* because of the popularity of the funeral speech that it contains: see Cicero, *Orator* 151 and cf. Blass, *DAB* II (1979[3] [1874]) 469. But it is remarkable how easily Dionysius (*Dem.* 23.180,1–4) rejects the possibility of comparing Demosthenes' speech with Plato's *Apology*: the *Apology* 'never saw even the threshold of a law-court or an open assembly, but was written for another purpose and belongs to the category neither of oratory nor of dialogue.' For a discussion of this 'tantalizingly cryptic' argument, see Reid (1997). Many modern scholars have sharply rejected Dionysius' biased attitude towards Plato. The classicist and composer Diepenbrock (1911) 164, who speaks of a 'dwaling' ('aberration'), belongs to a long tradition of scholars who denounced Dionysius' treatment of Plato. At the beginning of this tradition stands Gnaeus Pompeius Geminus, who forced Dionysius to defend his criticism of Plato in the letter that is addressed to him.

[58] On Dionysius' evaluation of Plato's style, see Walsdorff (1927) 9–24.

[59] See *Dem.* 24.183,1–10; *Dem.* 26.187,5–10; *Dem.* 25.184,16–19; *Dem.* 29.192,5–11.

[60] *Dem.* 24.183,1–10; *Dem.* 27.188,12–189,16.

μακροῦ τε γὰρ καὶ ἀκατάλληλον καὶ οὔτε δεινότητα ἔχον οὔτε σύνταξιν).[61] His criticism is mainly directed at the first part of the sentence:[62]

> τῆς δ' εὐγενείας πρῶτον ὑπῆρξε τοῖσδε ἡ ⟨τῶν προγόνων⟩ γένεσις, οὐκ ἔπηλυς οὖσα οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐκγόνους τούτους ἀποφηναμένη μετοικοῦντας ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, ἄλλοθεν σφῶν ἡκόντων, ἀλλ' αὐτόχθονας …
>
> 'The first factor of their nobility was their birth, which was not foreign nor did it reveal these descendants as immigrants to the land, their parents having come from abroad, but as natives (…).'

According to Dionysius, this sentence contains a number of shortcomings, which would not occur in the language of people who practice 'pure language' (καθαρᾷ διαλέκτῳ). First, he points to some instances of the abnormal usage of words. For example, Dionysius objects to the combination of γένεσις with ἀποφηναμένη: 'for it is not *natural* for birth in itself to reveal something' (…), but 'it is we who reveal a statement.'[63] Next, he focuses on the grammatical construction:

> τίς δὲ βουλόμενος σῴζειν τὴν ἀκολουθίαν, εἰπὼν τὴν γένεσιν καὶ περὶ ταύτης τὸν λόγον ἀποδιδοὺς ἐπιζεύξειεν ἂν τὸ ἄλλοθεν σφῶν ἡκόντων, τὸ ἀρρενικὸν τῷ θηλυκῷ καὶ τῷ ἑνικῷ τὸ πληθυντικόν;
>
> 'What writer who was concerned with preserving the grammatical sequence would first speak of ἡ γένεσις and then, while developing his account of this, connect to it ἄλλοθεν σφῶν ἡκόντων, linking masculine to feminine and plural to singular?'

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[61] *Dem.* 27.188,1–189,16. The text is uncertain: σύνταξιν is the reading of one of the MSS, which is followed by Usener & Radermacher. Aujac (1988) follows the reading of another manuscript, σαφήνειαν, which may well be correct. Other MSS have a lacuna here.

[62] Plato, *Menex.* 237b2–c3.

[63] *Dem.* 27.189,1–3: οὔτε γὰρ ἡ γένεσις αὐτή τι ἀποφαίνεσθαι φύσιν ἔχει … ἀλλ' ἀποφαινόμεθα μὲν ἡμεῖς τὰ λεκτά … Dionysius seems to think that ἀποφαίνεσθαι is wrong because he interprets the verb as 'to point out'; Tsitsiridis (1998) 199 translates the word as 'erscheinen lassen', and rejects Dionysius' criticism. Dionysius has two more objections. First, the combination of the word γένεσις with the adjective ἔπηλυς is obscure, since 'foreign' is an attribute of ourselves, not of our birth. Tsitsiridis (1998) 199 points out that γένεσις ἔπηλυς is actually not an unusual hypallage. Further, Dionysius objects to Plato's formulation 'birth did not reveal the descendants as immigrants'. He remarks that people cannot be said to be 'immigrants' in the land in which they were born: 'people are only immigrants if they come from elsewhere to the land that receives them.' Dionysius' point seems to be that 'birth' (γένεσις) automatically happens in the land where one is born, so that it necessarily assigns children to the land where they are born. Plato, however, seems to use the word γένεσις in the sense of 'descent' (corresponding to προγόνων): see Tsitsiridis (1998) 199 and, differently, Aujac (1988) 170.

Dionysius' objection concerns what we would call a *constructio ad sensum*: Plato uses the pronoun σφῶν, as if the subject had been οἱ πρόγονοι, and not ἡ τῶν προγόνων γένεσις.[64] Of course, we do not have to agree with Dionysius that Plato is wrong in applying this construction. What matters for our purpose is that Dionysius' grammatical terminology proves to be an effective tool in analysing the specific character of a style that he considers unusual and unnatural.[65] For, instead of merely pointing to the 'unnaturalness' of the composition, as he did in his early works, Dionysius is now able to offer a more precise description of Plato's expression: the combination of a masculine plural with a feminine singular has ruined the ἀκολουθία. As I have pointed out above, the term ἀκολουθία describes a sentence whose construction is grammatically correct and whose words are all put in their proper place.[66] In some cases, the aspect of word order is dominant, as in *Dem.* 9 (see above, pp. 259–260), where Dionysius objected to a hyperbaton that splits up the corresponding noun and verb Φίλιππος … ἀδικεῖ. In other cases, as in *Dem.* 27, it is the other aspect of ἀκολουθία that is more relevant, namely correct syntax: in this case, the point is that Plato has failed to preserve the correct construction. Dionysius proceeds by saying that 'the sentence would have been syntactically correct (κατάλληλος) if Plato had referred back to γένεσις, which was the subject of the sentence (ὑπὲρ ἧς ὁ λόγος ἦν) and had added ἄλλοθεν αὐτῆς ἡκούσης'.[67] The term κατάλληλος does not so much refer to 'coherence' (Usher), but rather to the syntactic agreement between γένεσις and αὐτῆς. The problem of incongruity could of course also be solved in another way, namely by substituting οἱ πρόγονοι for ἡ τῶν προγόνων γένεσις, so that ἄλλοθεν σφῶν ἡκόντων would agree with the subject of the sentence. Dionysius adopts this second solution and rewrites the sentence with a correct syntactic structure. His metathesis at the same time solves the other shortcomings of the sentence (concerning the abnormal usage of γένεσις), to which Dionysius has objected earlier on (see above):

> τῆς δ' εὐγενείας πρῶτον ὑπῆρξαν τοῖσδε οἱ πρόγονοι, οὐχὶ ἐπήλυδες ὄντες οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐκγόνους τούτους ἀποφήναντες μετοικοῦντας ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, ἄλλοθεν σφῶν ἡκόντων, ἀλλ' αὐτόχθονας.

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[64] Cf. Tsitsiridis (1998) 199. In *Amm.* II 13, Dionysius objects to *constructiones ad sensum* in Thucydides: see section 4.4.2.

[65] Dionysius mentions the word φύσις in *Dem.* 27.189,2.

[66] Cf. Blank (1982) 27 and Sluiter (1990) 61–62.

[67] *Dem.* 27.189,9–11: ἦν γὰρ δή που κατάλληλος ὁ λόγος, εἰ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν ἀναφέρων, ὑπὲρ ἧς ὁ λόγος ἦν, ἐπέθηκεν· 'ἄλλοθεν αὐτῆς ἡκούσης.

Finally, we turn to *On Thucydides*, which belongs to Dionysius' latest works. We have already seen that Dionysius regards Thucydides' style as unnatural, because it deviates from the ordinary use of language.[68] At the end of *On Thucydides*, Dionysius again summarises the historian's most distinctive qualities in terms of the 'unusual' and 'unnatural': one of the items in a long list of Thucydidean characteristics is the use of 'figures that are awkward and moved away from natural collocation, and which would not even find a place in any kind of poetry' (τοὺς σκαιοὺς καὶ πεπλανημένους ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν συζυγίας καὶ οὐδ' ἐν ἁπάσῃ ποιητικῇ χώραν ἔχοντας σχηματισμούς).[69] Earlier in the same treatise, Dionysius describes the unnatural composition of Thucydides in a more specific way, by pointing to irregularities in his syntactic constructions. A good example is *Thuc.* 37: in that chapter, Dionysius starts a discussion of the Melian dialogue, and analyses the first sentence of the Melian representatives, which runs as follows:[70]

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[68] See section 4.4. In *On Thucydides*, there are several aspects of Thucydides' work (concerning both style and content) that are described as 'unnatural': (1) in *Thuc.* 11.341,5–7, Dionysius objects to the unnatural order in which Thucydides reports the events, and to the fact that he mentions first the false and then the true cause of the Peloponnesian war: ἥ τε γὰρ φύσις ἀπήτει τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων ἄρχειν καὶ τἀληθῆ πρὸ τῶν ψευδῶν λέγεσθαι (cf. *Is.* 11.106,15–16); (2) in *Thuc.* 12.342,1, Dionysius remarks that Thucydides' narrative has an unnatural starting-point: τὸ μὴ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν ἀρχήν; (3) in *Thuc.* 24.362,6–7, Dionysius points out that Thucydides changes the natural uses of gender and number, so that the natural word order is ruined: ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία πλανᾶται; (4) in *Thuc.* 53.413,2–4, Dionysius objects to the fact that Thucydides 'figures' stray from the natural order and make the impression of solecisms: τῶν σχημάτων τὸ πεπλανημένον ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθίας καὶ τὸ σολοικοφανὲς. An exception is *Thuc.* 42.398,8–11: in that passage, Dionysius praises the speech of the Plataeans in Thucydides 3.53–59 because it is 'adorned with authentic natural colouring' (ἀληθεῖ δέ τινι καὶ φυσικῷ κεκοσμῆσθαι χρώματι). Dionysius' criticism of Thucydides' style should be seen as a contribution to the debate among critics of the first century BC in Rome on the usefulness of Thucydides as a model for the writing of history (see also section 4.4). Dionysius (*Thuc.* 50.409,8–410,7) disagrees with those critics who approve of imitation of Thucydides' style. See Leeman (1955).

[69] See also section 6.4. The text of the complete list is as follows: *Thuc.* 52.412,6–17: Θουκυδίδου μιμητὴς ⟨οὐδεὶς⟩ ἐγένετο κατὰ ταῦτά γε, καθ' ἃ δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρειν, κατὰ τὴν γλωσσηματικὴν καὶ ἀπηρχαιωμένην καὶ ποιητικὴν καὶ ξένην λέξιν, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ὑπερβατοὺς καὶ πολυπλόκους καὶ ἐξ ἀποκοπῆς πολλὰ σημαίνειν πράγματα βουλομένας καὶ διὰ μακροῦ τὰς ἀποδόσεις λαμβανούσας νοήσεις, καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις κατὰ τοὺς σκαιοὺς καὶ πεπλανημένους ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν συζυγίας καὶ οὐδ' ἐν ἁπάσῃ ποιητικῇ χώραν ἔχοντας σχηματισμούς, ἐξ ὧν ἡ πάντα λυμαινομένη τὰ καλὰ καὶ σκότον παρέχουσα ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀσάφεια παρῆλθεν εἰς τοὺς λόγους.

[70] Thucydides 5.86. Dionysius' discussion of the Melian dialogue (Thucydides 5.84–111) covers *Thuc.* 37–41.

> Ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια τοῦ διδάσκειν καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἀλλήλους οὐ ψέγεται· τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου παρόντα ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα διαφέροντα αὐτοῦ φαίνεται.
>
> 'The reasonableness of instructing each other at leisure is not open to objection. But the acts of war, which are not in the future but already here at hand, manifestly differ from this.'

The analysis of this sentence adopts the same procedure as that of the passage from the *Menexenus*, which I have discussed above:[71] first, Dionysius points to the grammatical irregularity, subsequently he analyses the exact nature of the incongruence, and finally he rewrites the sentence with a correct syntactical structure.[72] However, Dionysius' remarks on this text have puzzled modern scholars to a great extent. Dionysius objects to Thucydides' use of the genitive singular αὐτοῦ (ἑνικὸν καὶ κατὰ τὴν γενικὴν ἐσχηματισμένον πτῶσιν … τὸ αὐτοῦ).[73] This word, he thinks, fails to preserve the ἀκολουθία, because it does not agree with the feminine singular ἐπιείκεια, 'nor with the accusative plural neuter' (τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε τῷ θηλυκῷ καὶ ἑνικῷ καὶ ὀνοματικῷ προσαρμοττόμενον σῴζει τὴν ἀκολουθίαν οὔτε τῷ πληθυντικῷ καὶ οὐδετέρῳ ⟨καὶ⟩ κατὰ τὴν αἰτιατικὴν ἐσχηματισμένῳ πτῶσιν). The problem is that Thucydides' sentence does not contain any accusative plural neuter. For that reason, it has been suggested that Dionysius did not read φαίνεται but φαίνετε, and that the 'accusative plural neuter' was τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου παρόντα ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα διαφέροντα, which would have been the direct object of φαίνετε.[74] Both Usener and Pavano adopt this conjecture for the text of Dionysius.[75] Some other scholars think not only that Dionysius read φαίνετε, but also that this was actually what Thucydides himself had written.[76] But Classen has convincingly argued that this cannot have been the case: Thucydides uses the active verb φαίνειν nowhere else.[77] In my view, the conjecture φαίνετε is not only wrong for Thucydides', but also for Dionysius' text, for the following reason.

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[71] See *Thuc.* 37.389,5–390,3.

[72] For Dionysius' analysis of this sentence, see also Bonner (1939) 91 and Grube (1950) 107.

[73] For Dionysius' classification of αὐτοῦ as either a 'deictic article' or a 'pronoun', see section 3.6.3.

[74] See Classen (1912) 285: Bücheler suggested the conjecture.

[75] Usener: *Thuc.* 37.389,7; Pavano (1958) 152.

[76] Stahl and Van Herwerden read φαίνετε in Thucydides 5.86: see Classen (1912) 285.

[77] Classen (1912) 285 also argues that φαίνετε would break the parallellism with ψέγεται, but this is not a very strong argument in view of Thucydides' preference for variation.

In his metathesis, Dionysius rewrites Thucydides' sentence by substituting αὐτῆς for αὐτοῦ, thus making the pronoun agree with ἐπιείκεια; but he does not change anything else, and writes φαίνεται, according to all manuscripts.[78] Now, if he had read φαίνετε in the first instance, then he should also have written it in his metathesis: there is no reason whatsoever to believe that Dionysius *rewrites* φαίνετε as φαίνεται, for his metathesis exclusively serves the purpose of correcting the supposedly wrong form αὐτοῦ.[79] Therefore, I think that the correctness of the manuscripts should not be doubted in this case: both Dionysius' quotation of Thucydides and his own metathesis contain the form φαίνεται.[80] What 'accusative neuter plural' did Dionysius then think of? One might consider the possibility that διαφέροντα was used as a transitive verb ('to carry away'), which could be combined with an accusative. However, such a construction would not make any sense, and αὐτά could not be used by itself without agreeing with another word. The conclusion should be that Dionysius was just mistaken in this case, and that he meant to say 'nominative' where he wrote 'accusative'.[81] In any case, his objection to Thucydides' construction is not correct: as many modern commentators have pointed out, the word αὐτοῦ refers to τοῦ διδάσκειν καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἀλλήλους.[82] But even if Dionysius is wrong, it is worth observing how his method of stylistic analysis has developed.[83]

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[78] *Thuc.* 37.390,1–3: ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια τοῦ διδάσκειν καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἀλλήλους οὐ ψέγεται, τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου παρόντα ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα διαφέροντα αὐτῆς φαίνεται.

[79] I agree with Aujac (1991) 99, who reads φαίνεται both times. Pavano (1958) 246 also realises the difficulty of reading φαίνετε in the first instance and φαίνεται in the second and hesitates whether Dionysius consciously or unconsciously misread Thucydides: 'Utrum ille igitur incuriose ap. Thuc. φαίνετε pro φαίνεται re vera legerit, an potius verbum a Thucydide prolatum malitia immutaverit, dubitare licet.'

[80] See also Pritchett (1975) 123–124. I would like to add that there are some interesting textual uncertainties in this passage, esp. in *Thuc.* 37.389,12–13 (ἔπειτα συνάψας τῷ ἑνικῷ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὀρθὴν ἐξενηνεγμένῳ πτῶσιν 'τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου παρόντα ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα'). The first καί is not in all MSS, and ἐξενηνεγμένῳ is an emendation by Sylburg: the MSS have ἐξενηνεγμένα. Thus, perhaps one should read ἔπειτα συνάψας τῷ ἑνικῷ κατὰ τὴν ὀρθὴν ἐξενηνεγμένα πτῶσιν 'τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου παρόντα ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα', in which case Dionysius classifies the neuter plurals as nominatives.

[81] This is of course a solution that I would rather avoid, for I would prefer applying the *principle of charity*. However, it seems that one has to choose between two evils: either one radically changes the text and ignores the unanimity of the MSS at two places (*Thuc.* 37.389,7 and 37.390,3), or one assumes that Dionysius, who was not a grammarian and had presumably obtained his linguistic knowledge only recently, was in this case inaccurate in his use of grammatical terminology.

[82] See e.g. Classen (1912) 285 and Pritchett (1975) 123.

[83] Cf. Bonner (1939) 91.

The use of syntactic theory and technical terminology has enabled him to put his finger on what he regards as the cause of the alleged unnaturalness of Thucydides' style.

Dionysius states that Thucydides' sentence fails to preserve the ἀκολουθία, and he points out how it should be constructed (σχηματισθείς) in order to be syntactically congruent (κατάλληλος). As I have pointed out before, ἀκολουθία is characteristic of a sentence whose parts occupy their proper places, while at the same time being in grammatical agreement with one another. It is the latter condition of ἀκολουθία that Thucydides has not satisfied, according to Dionysius. In the same passage, we also found another important grammatical term, namely σολοικισμός (solecism), which we already encountered in our discussion of Dionysius' grammatical notes on Thucydides in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus* (section 4.4.2). In *Thuc.* 37, Dionysius points out that 'if one would propose to assign Thucydides' sentence to the figures (σχήματα), then one should call all the solecisms (σολοικισμοί) of number and case-usage "figures"'.[84] The boundaries between figures and solecisms were indeed rather vague in ancient rhetorical theory. The term σχῆμα has a wide range of meanings, but it specifically refers to a form of expression that deviates from the normal style of speaking.[85] As such, it refers to both grammatical figures and rhetorical figures (of speech and thought). Now, deviation can be considered either a quality or a mistake: in the former case it is called a σχῆμα, but in the latter case it is called a σολοικισμός.[86] It is this ambiguous status of deviating expressions, between 'figures' and 'grammatical irregularities', to which Dionysius refers when objecting to Thucydides' use of numbers and cases. The term σολοικισμός (or σολοικίζειν) appears five times in Dionysius' works, all in two treatises belonging to the later period, namely *On Thucydides* and its appendix *Second Letter to Ammaeus*.[87]

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[84] *Thuc.* 37.389,7–10: τοῦτο τὸ τελευταῖον εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς σχήμασιν ἀξιώσει φέρειν, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοι πάντας τοὺς σολοικισμούς, ὅσοι γίγνονται παρὰ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ παρὰ τὰς πτώσεις, σχήματα καλῶν;

[85] See Lausberg 499. A discussion of Dionysius' views on figures falls outside the scope of this study. I will restrict myself to a few remarks on the linguistic aspects of σχήματα.

[86] See Lausberg 498. For the ambiguous status of σχήματα between grammar and rhetoric, see Schenkeveld (1991). For Dionysius' views on figures of speech and solecisms, see also Schenkeveld (1983) 90–92.

[87] *Thuc.* 24.362,13–16 (= *Amm.* II 2.424,2–6): see section 4.4.2. *Thuc.* 33.381,6–7: σχήματα, ὧν ἔνια σολοικισμῶν παρέχεται δόξαν, 'figures some of which have the appearance of solecisms'. *Thuc.* 37.389,9: see above. *Amm.* II 2.424,2–6 (= *Thuc.* 24.362,13–16): see

He uses the word σολοικισμός exclusively to describe Thucydides' use of language: other authors are never criticised for their σολοικισμοί. In some cases Dionysius explicitly hesitates whether Thucydides' unusual language is figurative or ungrammatical. Thus, he refers to figures that 'make the impression of solecisms'.[88] In four cases, he expresses that same idea by using the adjective σολοικοφανής ('appearing to be a solecism') to describe the historian's constructions (σχηματισμοί).[89] We can explain this term as follows. On the one hand, Dionysius wants his readers to avoid the obscurity of Thucydides' style. On the other hand, the authority and status of the historian presumably makes that Dionysius tries to avoid characterising his language as ungrammatical. The term σολοικοφανής is the solution for this ambiguous attitude towards the historian. For Dionysius' audience the deviating expressions would be solecisms, but when Thucydides uses them they just *make the impression* of being ungrammatical.

Apart from the passage discussed above, there are many more cases in which Dionysius describes Thucydides' deviations (ἐξαλλαγαί) as failing to preserve the ἀκολουθία. In the discussion of the three composition types in *On Composition*, the austere composition type (σύνθεσις αὐστηρά), of which Thucydides is one of the main representatives, is described as 'in many cases neglecting the logical order' (ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπεροπτικὴ τῆς ἀκολουθίας) (see section 4.3.2).[90] In three cases, Dionysius points out that Thucydides' expressions violate 'the natural order' (ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία).[91]

Dionysius' discussions of passages from Demosthenes, Plato and Thucydides allow us to conclude the following. We have seen that in the

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section 4.4.2. *Amm.* II 11.431,9 (σολοικίζειν): see section 4.4.2. In *Comp.* 18.82,6, the word σολοικισμός is part of a citation from Hegesias.

[88] See *Thuc.* 33.381,6–7 (preceding note).

[89] *Thuc.* 29.373,23: τὰς τῶν σχηματισμῶν πλοκὰς σολοικοφανεῖς, 'combinations of figures that verge upon solecism'. *Thuc.* 53.413,2–4: τὸ πεπλανημένον ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθίας καὶ τὸ σολοικοφανές, 'that which strays from the natural sequence and that which makes the impression of solecism'. *Thuc.* 55.417,24: τὸ σολοικοφανὲς ἐν τοῖς σχηματισμοῖς, 'the apparently ungrammatical construction in his figures'. *Din.* 8.308,3: τοὺς δὲ σολοικοφανεῖς σχηματισμούς, 'the figures that make the impression of solecism'. Dionysius uses the term σολοικοφανής only in his discussions of Thucydides. Σολοικοφανής is further found only in later writers: see Galenus 16.512,3 and Eustathius 630.46. Dionysius' term σχηματισμός ('configuration') refers both to the grammatical formation of a word (with the correct gender, case, number, tense, etc.) and to the formation of clauses and periods: see sections 3.7 and 4.3.1.

[90] *Comp.* 22.98,2–3. See p. 208.

[91] *Thuc.* 24.362,6, *Thuc.* 53.413,3 and *Amm.* II 2.423,12–13.

descriptions of style (and its various aspects) in his earlier works, Dionysius frequently uses the concept of the 'natural' (φυσικόν), arguing that some sentence or composition is or is not written 'according to nature' (κατὰ φύσιν): φύσις is here used as opposed to τέχνη and refers to the expression that imitates the artless language of laymen. This concept remains very important in Dionysius' later works, but he also develops a more effective way of analysing the exact character of what he regards as natural (and unnatural) style, syntax, and word order. There are two things that have brought Dionysius' observations on a higher plane. First, he adopts a grammatical framework, including not only the theory of the parts of speech and its *accidentia*, but also some interesting ideas on syntax: what he used to label as 'natural' or 'unnatural' can now be described as (ἀ)κατάλληλος, and, what is more, the exact causes of incorrect syntax or illogical word order can be identified. Second, the method of metathesis enables Dionysius to compare a passage that does not preserve the ἀκολουθία with a version whose syntax and word order is clear and correct. In chapter 7 of this study, I will return to the procedure of metathesis. The following section, however, will be devoted to a concept of natural word order that differs from the ideas that I have discussed so far.

5.3. *Dionysius' experiment concerning natural word order (*Comp. *5)*

In *On Composition* 5, Dionysius reports on an experiment by which he investigated the effects of natural word order.[92] In this experiment, 'nature' (φύσις) does not refer to everyday language or artless expression, but rather to the rules of logic. In this section, I will examine the philosophical background of Dionysius' discussion. I will first discuss the possible connection between his remarks on Stoic treatises on syntax (*Comp.* 4) on the one hand and his experiment on natural word order (*Comp.* 5) on the other. Then, I will analyse Dionysius' experiment, paying close attention to the philosophical background of the ideas involved in this passage. I will argue that Dionysius' experiment is partly based on the Stoic theory of categories.

[92] On this passage, see also Scaglione (1972) 77–79, Schenkeveld (1983) 85–89, Paximadi (1989) and De Jonge (2001) 160–162.

5.3.1. *The Stoic treatises and Dionysius' natural starting point*

Before we turn to a discussion of Dionysius' experiment, we should first consider his remarks at the end of *On Composition* 4. In that passage, Dionysius prepares the way for his investigations into natural word order. First, he comments on the (disappointing) contributions of previous writers to the theory of composition, in particular the Stoic treatises on syntax with their dialectical approach. Subsequently, Dionysius tells us that, disappointed by the Stoic books, he himself tried to find a 'natural starting point' for his investigations. It is important to pay close attention to Dionysius' words in *Comp.* 4, because many scholars have suggested that the Stoic treatises that he mentions are actually the source of the experiment on natural word order in *Comp.* 5.

Having criticised a number of Hellenistic writers (Polybius, Hieronymus, Hegesianax, etc.) for their neglect of the art of composition, Dionysius adds that we should not be surprised about the poor composition of these literary writers: for even philosophers, who publish dialectical treatises (διαλεκτικὰς τέχνας), are inept in the arrangement of their words, and the worst specimens of composition are the works of the Stoic Chrysippus.[93] The disappointing quality of the Stoic texts is the more remarkable, Dionysius says, since some of these philosophers themselves made a study of the subject of composition, and even wrote handbooks on the syntax of the parts of speech (τέχνας … ὑπὲρ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μορίων).[94] In other words, even those people who studied the syntax (σύνταξις) of the parts of speech did not compose (συντιθέναι) satisfactory texts themselves.[95] Next, Dionysius turns from practice to theory: he now focuses on predecessors who wrote treatises on the theory of composition. He reports that, when he had decided to write a treatise on composition (σύνθεσις), he first investigated what earlier writers had said about the subject.[96] In particular, he consulted the works of the Stoic philosophers, because he knew that they paid much attention to ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος.[97] However, it turned out that the Stoic works did not contribute anything useful. The title of the two books by

[93] *Comp.* 4.20,19–21,15 (Chrysippus fr. 25 Dufour). See section 3.3.1.
[94] *Comp.* 4.21,15–22,3. See section 3.3.1.
[95] Note that in this passage Dionysius equates σύνταξις with σύνθεσις, which seems to pave the way for his philosophical approach to composition in *Comp.* 5. On σύνταξις and σύνθεσις, see section 5.1.
[96] *Comp.* 4.22,3–5.
[97] *Comp.* 4.22,5–8.

the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus, Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν (*On the Syntax of the Parts of Speech*), turned out to be misleading: Chrysippus' books did not contain a rhetorical, but a dialectical investigation (see also section 3.3.1).[98] They dealt with 'the combination (σύνταξις) of true and false propositions, possible and impossible ones, propositions that are contingent, changing their truth value, ambiguous ones and others of such a kind'.[99] Dionysius' judgement is clear: 'These works contribute nothing helpful or useful to civil oratory, at least as far as the attractiveness and beauty of style (ἡδονὴν καὶ κάλλος ἑρμηνείας) are concerned; and these qualities should be the aim of composition.'[100] Therefore, Dionysius put the Stoic treatises aside (at least, that is what he says), and tried to find a different approach to the art of composition:[101]

> ταύτης μὲν τῆς πραγματείας ἀπέστην, ἐσκόπουν δ' αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἐμαυτοῦ γενόμενος, εἴ τινα δυναίμην εὑρεῖν φυσικὴν ἀφορμήν, ἐπειδὴ παντὸς πράγματος καὶ πάσης ζητήσεως αὕτη δοκεῖ κρατίστη εἶναι ἀρχή.
>
> 'I abandoned this enquiry and, independent and relying on myself, I considered whether I could find some natural starting point, since that seems to be the best beginning of every operation and every enquiry.'

So, after he had concluded that the Stoic treatises were useless for his purposes, Dionysius started looking for a φυσικὴ ἀφορμή, 'a natural starting point'. According to Rhys Roberts, the latter words suggest a 'Stoic point of view'.[102] Likewise, Aujac & Lebel remark: 'La recours à la nature est un démarche typiquement stoïcienne.'[103] However, the search for a natural starting does not necessarily point to Stoic influence. Of course, a Stoic philosopher would have appreciated Dionysius'

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[98] *Comp.* 4.22,8–23,1 (Chrysippus fr. 199 Dufour). On Dionysius' reference to Chrysippus' works on syntax, see Kroll (1907) 91 n. 2, Barwick (1957) 21, Frede (1987a) 324–325, Baratin (1989) 217–218, Atherton (1993) 142 n. 7, Luhtala (2000) 24 and Van Ophuijsen (2003) 81 and 93. The misleading character of some philosophical book titles is a phenomenon that also annoyed Antonius in Cicero's *De oratore* 2.61: 'Whenever I happen to come across your philosophers, misled by the labels of their books (because they almost always bear titles derived from familiar and important subjects, for example, on virtue, on justice, on the honorable, on pleasure), then I don't understand a single word—so entangled are they by their narrow and minutely detailed discussions.' (Translation May & Wisse.)

[99] *Comp.* 4.22,14–17: for the Greek text, see section 3.3.1., p. 108 n. 81.

[100] *Comp.* 4.22,18–23,1: for the Greek text, see section 3.3.1., p. 109 n. 82.

[101] *Comp.* 4.23,1–5.

[102] Rhys Roberts (1910) 97.

[103] Aujac & Lebel (1981) 204.

method;[104] but many Stoic ideas had become part of the general intellectual discourse of the first century BC, and this is particularly true of the idea that one should take nature as one's model. Besides, the view that one should be guided by nature can be found in almost all Hellenistic philosophies.[105] Therefore, Dionysius' search for a 'natural' point of departure fits into a Stoic context, but it does *in itself* not prove that the experiment concerning natural word order was influenced by Stoic philosophy.

We should notice how strongly Dionysius emphasises that his new approach is his own idea, and that it does not depend on the work done by his predecessors: he abandoned the Stoic treatises, and relying on himself (αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἐμαυτοῦ γενόμενος), he looked for a natural starting point. In spite of this clear statement, many scholars have assumed that Dionysius borrowed his chapter on natural word order (*Comp.* 5) from the Stoic sources that he had criticised earlier on.[106] Although I will argue that Dionysius' experiment in *Comp.* 5 is indeed partly based on Stoic views, I do not think that Dionysius copied the entire chapter from Chrysippus, as some scholars have suggested.[107] I rather think that Dionysius combined some Stoic ideas on language with his own rhetorical approach to word order. Before I clarify my interpretation, I will first point out which indications make us believe that Dionysius' experiment concerning natural word order makes use of Stoic ideas. Modern scholars have pointed to three elements in particular, namely the 'natural starting point', the repeated reference to Stoic treatises at the end of *Comp.* 5, and the Stoic terminology of the passage. I will briefly examine the value of these three possible indications.

First, Dionysius does not only speak of a 'natural' starting point, but at the beginning of *Comp.* 5 he also states that the arrangement of words should be 'as nature demands'.[108] As I have already pointed out, this fact is not decisive in itself, since the importance of nature was generally acknowledged among intellectuals of the first century BC. In section 5.2, we have seen that the concept of nature is very prominent

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[104] Cf. Usher (1985) 47 n. 1: 'A theory of which a Stoic theorist would have approved.'

[105] Cf. Pellicer (1966) 267–270.

[106] See Kroll (1907) 91 n. 2, Jensen (1923) 149, Barwick (1957) 21, Pohl (1968) 3, and Schenkeveld (1983) 86: 'Therefore, there is a considerable chance at least that DH has been led to the problem of a natural word order by these Stoic *technai*, if he has not taken over from these his exposition in ch. 5.'

[107] See esp. Kroll (1907) 91 and Barwick (1957) 21.

[108] *Comp.* 5.23,13. See section 5.3.2.

in all Dionysius' rhetorical works. The second argument for the Stoic character of the experiment on natural word order concerns the fact that Dionysius refers to the Stoic treatises not only before he turns to his experiment (at the end of *Comp.* 4), but also *after* the passage on natural word order (at the end of *Comp.* 5). There, Dionysius summarises both his study of the dialectical treatises and his own experiment on natural word order together in one concluding remark:[109]

> διὰ ταύτας μὲν δὴ τὰς αἰτίας τῆς τοιαύτης θεωρίας ἀπέστην. ἐμνήσθην δ' αὐτῶν καὶ νῦν οὐχ ὡς σπουδῆς ἀξίων, καὶ τὰς διαλεκτικὰς παρεθέμην τέχνας οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαίας, ἀλλ' ἵνα μηδεὶς δοκῶν ἔχειν τι αὐτὰς χρήσιμον εἰς τὴν παροῦσαν θεωρίαν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῆται εἰδέναι, θηρευθεὶς ταῖς ἐπιγραφαῖς τῶν πραγματειῶν ὁμοιότητά τινα ἐχούσαις καὶ τῇ δόξῃ τῶν συνταξαμένων αὐτάς.
>
> 'For these reasons I abandoned such a theory. I have recalled these ideas at the present time not because they deserve serious attention, and I have cited the dialectical handbooks not because they are essential reading, but in order to dissuade anyone from supposing that they contain anything useful for the present enquiry, and hence regarding it as important to know about them, because he has been captivated by the titles of their works, which have some affinity with the subject, and by the reputation of their authors.'

The word παρατίθεμαι can mean both 'to quote' a text and 'to cite' the title of a book.[110] Now, does this word refer to the fact that Dionysius has mentioned Chrysippus' writings on the parts of speech at the end of *Comp.* 4, or does he mean that he has quoted these Stoic texts in *Comp.* 5? On the one hand, it is possible that at the end of *Comp.* 5 Dionysius summarises two useless projects, namely both his study of the Stoic τέχναι and his experiment concerning the natural ordering of the parts of speech. On the other hand, since Dionysius refers in one breath both to the θεωρία on natural word order and to the dialectical handbooks, it seems reasonable to suppose that the theory of natural word order was at least related to the ideas that Dionysius found in the Stoic treatises. This does not necessarily mean that the philosophical handbooks were the 'source' of Dionysius' text. It is also possible that Dionysius borrowed some philosophical ideas from the Stoic τέχναι and that he developed his own theory of natural word order on the basis of these Stoic ideas. In that case, we might say that the Stoic treatises were the *source of inspiration* rather than the source of Dionysius' experiment

[109] *Comp.* 5.26,20–27,6.
[110] Cf. LSJ s.v. παρατίθημι.

in *Comp.* 5. It should be noted that both projects (the study of Stoic works and the experiment concerning natural word order) are rejected for exactly the same reasons: Chrysippus' treatises turned out not to contain anything useful to civil oratory as far as 'attractiveness and beauty of expression' (ἡδονὴν καὶ κάλλος ἑρμηνείας) was concerned; and, likewise, the experiment on natural word order is abandoned because in many cases the logical rules do not lead to a composition that is pleasing (ἡδεῖα) and beautiful (καλή):[111] according to Dionysius, attractiveness and beauty are the two aims of composition, and neither the Stoic books on syntax nor the experiment on natural word order could help the future orator to achieve these aims.

Apart from the φυσικὴ ἀφορμή and the summary of the two projects at the end of *Comp.* 5, there is a third indication that makes modern scholars believe that the passage on natural word order is influenced by Stoic ideas: the terminology that Dionysius uses in *Comp.* 5 displays a Stoic flavour. We may especially think of the terms οὐσία, συμβεβηκός, and the pair τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον. Although Ildefonse has interpreted οὐσία and συμβεβηκός as Peripatetic terms, I think that Schenkeveld was right in pointing to the Stoic background of these terms in *Comp.* 5.[112] I will discuss these and other relevant terms in the subsequent sections (see especially sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4).

It is on these grounds that scholars have argued that *Comp.* 5 has a Stoic background or, according to some, even a Stoic origin. The three arguments mentioned (the natural starting point, the reference to the Stoic treatises at the end of *Comp.* 5, and the Stoic terminology) are all relevant, but the most important thing, in my view, has so far been ignored. I think that there is one more reason to believe that *Comp.* 5 was inspired by Stoic ideas: I will argue that a number of 'natural' (that is, ontological and logical) rules that Dionysius discusses in *Comp.* 5 can only be explained when we take into account the theory of the Stoic categories.[113] Dionysius discusses a number of rules that allegedly determine the word order of the parts of speech: for example, nouns precede verbs, and verbs precede adverbs. Some of these rules

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[111] *Comp.* 5.26,17–20.

[112] See Ildefonse (1997) 290 and Schenkeveld (1983) 88–89. In *Comp.* 5.23,16 Schenkeveld reads αἰτίαν instead of οὐσίαν: see section 5.3.3.

[113] In De Jonge (2001) 163–164, I have already briefly discussed the connections between Dionysius' experiment concerning natural word order and the Stoic categories.

can be explained on the basis of Aristotelian logic, but in some cases the Stoic categories account for the order that Dionysius proposes. In particular, the order of pronoun and appellative noun and the order of appellative noun and proper noun seem to be based on the order of the corresponding Stoic categories: substance precedes common quality and common quality precedes individual quality.[114] In my discussion of Dionysius' experiment, I will point out how the Stoic categories are related to the principles that determine Dionysius' natural word order (see especially sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.6).

Kroll and Barwick argued that Dionysius copied the entire chapter on natural word order, including the Homeric examples, from Chrysippus' books Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν.[115] However, although Dionysius' experiment concerning natural word order is definitely inspired by Stoic ideas, it is doubtful that *Comp.* 5 as a whole has been taken over from these Stoic treatises. Some aspects of Dionysius' experiment seem to be based on grammatical and rhetorical rather than philosophical ideas.[116] Therefore, I believe that Dionysius has combined certain philosophical views from Stoic treatises with theories that he derived from the grammatical and rhetorical traditions, if he did not develop these ideas himself.[117] In the course of this study, we have seen that the combining of approaches from different language disciplines is typical of Dionysius' method in general. Besides, this interpretation would avoid making nonsense of Dionysius' claim that he, having abandoned the Stoic sources, independently tried to find a natural starting point.[118] In any case, Dionysius' new approach did not lead to the results he had hoped for: right from the start, Dionysius makes clear that he merely reports the experiment concerning natural word order so that no one may think that he omitted it through ignorance: 'Applying myself to certain speculations, I was beginning to think that

[114] For the view that pronouns should precede appellative nouns and appellative nouns should precede proper nouns, see *Comp.* 5.26,12–14. See section 5.3.6.

[115] Kroll (1907) 91; Barwick (1957) 21. See also Schenkeveld (1983) 86 and Pohl (1968) 79. Freudenburg (1993) 138 thinks that Dionysius has borrowed his Homeric examples in *Comp.* 5 'from some Stoic source now lost'.

[116] In particular, Dionysius' chapter on natural word order mentions some parts of speech (ἀντονομασία, ἐπίρρημα) that were distinguished by *grammarians*, but not by the Stoics; it is also doubtful that the Stoics intended their hierarchy of the parts of speech to be expressed in a sentence or Homeric verse: it seems more probable that they argued for a theoretical order than for a practical word order. See section 5.3.7.

[117] Cf. Sluiter (1990) 132.

[118] *Comp.* 4.23,1–5. See above.

my operation was making some progress, when I realised that my path was leading me somewhere quite different, and not in the direction I had prescribed for myself, and in which I felt I had to proceed; and so I gave up. I suppose there will be no objection if I touch upon that enquiry also, and state the reasons that caused me to abandon it, so that I may avoid the suspicion of having passed it by through ignorance and not from choice.'[119]

5.3.2. *Natural word order*

The central question in Dionysius' experiment on natural word order is the following: will a word order that is based on natural principles always result in an attractive and beautiful composition? In fact, however, Dionysius turns this question around, for his analysis aims to answer another question: is an attractive and beautiful composition always based on natural principles? The answer to the latter question turns out to be that effective composition is in some, but not in all cases in accordance with natural word order. Dionysius concludes, therefore, that the principles of nature are worthless for someone who wants to compose a text.[120] Dionysius arrives at this conclusion by testing a number of verses from Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (his corpus for this experiment) against the rules of nature.[121] Although Dionysius primarily intends to teach future orators (writers of prose), Homer is his ideal model for this experiment, for several reasons. First, according to Dionysius, prose and poetry are not essentially different: they both aim to achieve the same effects (see section 6.5).[122] Second, the ancient rhetoricians generally regarded Homer as the great model for authors of both prose and poetry. Moreover, no reader would doubt the beauty of the Homeric poems. Therefore, there was no authority that could more easily falsify the correctness of the principles of 'nature': to be in harmony with nature was generally considered to be right; but if Dionysius could show that Homer did not stick to nature, he would

[119] *Comp.* 4.23,5–12: ἁψάμενος δέ τινων θεωρημάτων καὶ δόξας ὁδῷ μοι τὸ πρᾶγμα χωρεῖν ὡς ἔμαθον ἑτέρωσέ ποι ταύτην ἄγουσαν ἐμὲ τὴν ὁδόν, οὐχ ὅποι ἐπορευόμην καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἐλθεῖν, ἀπέστην. κωλύσει δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κἀκείνης ἅψασθαι τῆς θεωρίας καὶ τὰς αἰτίας εἰπεῖν δι' ἃς ἐξέλιπον αὐτήν, ἵνα μή με δόξῃ τις ἀγνοίᾳ παρελθεῖν αὐτὴν ἀλλὰ προαιρέσει.

[120] *Comp.* 5.26,16–17: see section 5.3.6.

[121] On the Homeric quotations in Dionysius' *De compositione verborum*, see Calvani Mariotti (1990).

[122] For Dionysius' views on prose and poetry, see chapter 6 of this study.

automatically prove that the natural principles were not the best guide in the art of composition. The following introduction illuminates the general idea behind the theory of natural word order in Dionysius' experiment:[123]

> Ἐδόκει δή μοι τῇ φύσει μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἑπομένους οὕτω δεῖν ἁρμόττειν τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου, ὡς ἐκείνη βούλεται.
>
> 'Well, it seemed to me that we, following nature as much as possible, should fit together the parts of speech so as she demands.'

The double character of Dionysius' concept of τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου, which I have discussed in section 3.4, is also relevant in this passage. The μόρια λόγου are here both 'parts of the phrase' and 'word classes', for the focus is on the position of the parts of speech in their context. But, as we will see, Dionysius will be concerned not only with a word order that reflects the *logical* order of nouns, verbs and adverbs, but also with a word order that mirrors the *chronological* order of the events. Dionysius' expression τῇ φύσει μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἑπομένους has given rise to some interesting speculation. Aujac & Lebel translate these words as follows: 'nous surtout qui nous conformons à la nature', and, in a footnote, they pose the question whether we should interpret this expression as a Stoic profession of faith.[124] However, Goudriaan has rightly pointed out that the French translation is inaccurate, since Dionysius did not write τῇ φύσει μάλιστα ἡμᾶς *τοὺς* ἑπομένους.[125] Apart from that, 'une profession de foi stoïcienne' seems to be impossible for other reasons as well: Dionysius' objections to Chrysippus and other philosophers in *Comp.* 4 are quite incompatible with a supposed adherence to Stoic philosophy. Instead of taking μάλιστα with ἡμᾶς, as Aujac & Lebel do, we could also connect μάλιστα with τῇ φύσει, or with ἑπομένους, as Usher does: 'that we should follow nature as much as possible'.[126] In any case, although the words τῇ φύσει μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἑπομένους fit into a Stoic context, they do not prove a direct dependence upon Stoic sources: as I have pointed out above (section 5.3.1), the view that one

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123 *Comp.* 5.23,13–15.

124 Aujac & Lebel 77 (1981) n. 1: 'Est-ce un profession de foi stoïcienne?'

125 Goudriaan (1989) 469 n. 3.

126 Usher (1982) 47. See also Rhys Roberts (1910) 99: 'that we ought to follow Mother Nature to the utmost'. An investigation into Dionysius' use of μάλιστα does not decide the matter, for in some cases μάλιστα belongs to the preceding word or word group (e.g. *Comp.* 18.84,1), and in other cases it belongs to the following word or word group (e.g. *Comp.* 25.130,13).

should be in harmony with nature was quite common, and the importance of φύσις in Dionysius' works has sufficiently been shown in section 5.2.[127]

In the course of *Comp.* 5, Dionysius mentions eight natural principles that supposedly determine the order of words in a verse or sentence:

(1) Nouns precede verbs (*Comp.* 5.23,15–18)
(2) Verbs precede adverbs (*Comp.* 5.24,15–20)
(3) Earlier events are mentioned before later events (*Comp.* 5.25,11–14)
(4) Substantives precede adjectives (*Comp.* 5.26,11–12)
(5) Appellative nouns precede proper nouns (*Comp.* 5.26,12–13)
(6) Pronouns precede appellative nouns (*Comp.* 5.26,13–14)
(7) Indicatives precede other moods (*Comp.* 5.26,14–15)
(8) Finite verb forms precede infinitives (*Comp.* 5.26,15–16)

Dionysius explains and tests only the first three principles. When he has shown that Homer does not stick to these three rules, he rejects also the remaining five principles, without examining their validity for his audience. Therefore, it is difficult for us to determine what exactly is 'natural' about the last five principles. I will argue that in *Comp.* 5, Dionysius uses the term 'natural' (φυσικός) in at least two different ways. First, one of the principles (nr. 3) refers to the *chronological* sequence in which events take place in reality. The rest of the rules adopt a logical concept of nature. The idea behind these rules is that the different μόρια λόγου correspond to the different features of entities in reality; the logical (and ontological) hierarchy between these different features of entities (substance, quality, accident) is supposed to be mirrored in the hierarchy of the corresponding parts of speech. Thus, the noun must precede the verb because accident (or predicate) presupposes substance (principle nr. 1), and the verb must precede the adverb because the circumstances of an action presuppose (active or passive) action (principle nr. 2). I will argue that principles nrs. 4 (substantives precede adjectives), 5 (appellative nouns precede proper nouns) and 6 (pronouns precede appellative nouns) are also based on the idea of logical and ontological priority: in my view, the order of these parts of speech rests on the hierarchy of the corresponding Stoic categories. The background of principles nrs. 7 (indicatives precede other moods) and 8 (finite verb forms precede

[127] To the many examples listed in section 5.2, add Dionysius' view that selection of words 'naturally' precedes composition: see *Comp.* 2.7,22–8,3.

infinitives) is more obscure, but it seems possible to explain them in the same way as the others. I will now proceed to discuss the natural principles one by one, giving text, translation and commentary on Dionysius' views.

5.3.3. *Nouns precede verbs*

The first rule of nature concerns the order of nouns and verbs:[128]

> αὐτίκα τὰ ὀνόματα πρότερα ἠξίουν τάττειν τῶν ῥημάτων (τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλοῦν, τὰ δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκός, πρότερον δ' εἶναι τῇ φύσει τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν συμβεβηκότων), ὡς τὰ Ὁμηρικὰ ἔχει ταυτί·
>
> ἄνδρά μοι ἔννεπε Μοῦσα πολύτροπον[129]
>
> καὶ
>
> μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά[130]
>
> καὶ
>
> ἠέλιος δ' ἀνόρουσε λιπών[131]
>
> καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις· ἡγεῖται μὲν γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τὰ ὀνόματα, ἕπεται δὲ τὰ ῥήματα. πιθανὸς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἔδοξεν εἶναί μοι. ἕτερα γοῦν παράσχοι τις ἂν παραδείγματα παρὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ποιητῇ κείμενα ἐναντίως συντεταγμένα ἢ ταῦτα συντέτακται, καλὰ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον καὶ πιθανά. οἷά τινά ἐστι ταῦτα·
>
> κλῦθί μευ αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος Ἀτρυτώνη[132]
>
> καὶ
>
> ἕσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι …[133]
>
> μνῆσαι πατρὸς σεῖο, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ.[134]
>
> ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἡγεῖται μὲν τὰ ῥήματα, ὑποτέτακται δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα· καὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν αἰτιάσαιτο τὴν σύνταξιν ταύτην ὡς ἀηδῆ.

> 'For example, I thought that I should place nouns before verbs (since the former indicate the substance, and the latter the accident, and the substance is naturally prior to its accidents). Thus Homer has these lines:

[128] *Comp.* 5.23,15–24,15.
[129] Homer, *Odyssey* 1.1.
[130] Homer, *Iliad* 1.1.
[131] Homer, *Odyssey* 3.1.
[132] Homer, *Iliad* 5.115.
[133] Homer, *Iliad* 2.484.
[134] Homer, *Iliad* 24.486.

> *A man—tell me, o Muse, his story, a man of many wiles*
>
> And
>
> *Wrath, sing, o goddess*
>
> And
>
> *The sun arose, abandoning*
>
> And similar verses: in these lines, the nouns lead, and the verbs follow. The theory is persuasive, but I decided that it was not true. At any rate, one could furnish other examples in the same poet of which the arrangement is the opposite of this, and yet these lines are no less beautiful and convincing. Such lines are these:
>
> *Hear me, daughter of aegis-bearing Zeus, the Unwearied*
>
> And
>
> *Tell me now, ye Muses, who in Olympian mansions dwell*
>
> And
>
> *Recall your father, godlike Achilles.*
>
> For in these examples the verbs lead, and the nouns are placed behind; yet no one would criticise this arrangement as unpleasant.'[135]

The order of nouns and verbs is explained in philosophical terms: nouns indicate the substance (οὐσία), while verbs indicate the accident (συμβεβηκός), and the substance (οὐσία) is naturally prior to its accidents (συμβεβηκότα). In *Comp.* 5.23,16, manuscript P reads αἰτίαν instead of the first οὐσίαν. Aujac & Lebel follow the reading of P, but Usener prints οὐσίαν (manuscript F).[136] Schenkeveld also defends the reading of P (αἰτίαν), for the reason that the combination of οὐσία and συμβεβηκός only occurs in later grammatical texts. Schenkeveld points out that the terms αἴτιον (not αἰτία) and συμβεβηκός are mentioned in a fragment of the Stoic philosopher Zeno, which according to Schenkeveld offers a 'close parallel' to the text of Dionysius:[137]

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[135] My translation is largely based on that of Usher (1985). However, in my rendering of the Homeric verses I have tried to follow the Greek word order more closely than Usher does, in order to maintain the order of nouns and verbs, verbs and adverbs, etc. For this purpose, I have also consulted the Homer translations by Lattimore (1951) and Murray / Dimock (1995).

[136] On the MSS of *On Composition*, see Aujac (1974).

[137] *FDS* 762. Cf. Schenkeveld (1983) 79. Although he rightly remarks that αἰτία does not occur in this fragment, Schenkeveld's quotation of the first sentence of *FDS* 762 (= *SVF* I.89) is incorrect, for he prints αἰτίαν instead of αἴτιον.

> Ζήνωνος. Αἴτιον δ' ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι' ὅ· οὗ δὲ αἴτιον συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον κατηγόρημα· ἀδύνατον δ' εἶναι τὸ μὲν αἴτιον παρεῖναι, οὗ δέ ἐστιν αἴτιον μὴ ὑπάρχειν. Τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον τοιαύτην ἔχει δύναμιν· αἴτιόν ἐστι δι' ὃ γίνεταί τι, οἷον διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν γίνεται τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεται τὸ ζῆν καὶ διὰ τὴν σωφροσύνην γίνεται τὸ σωφρονεῖν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι σωφροσύνης περί τινα οὔσης μὴ σωφρονεῖν, ἢ ψυχῆς μὴ ζῆν, ἢ φρονήσεως μὴ φρονεῖν.
>
> 'From Zeno: Zeno says that the cause (αἴτιον) is "the thing because of which": and he says that that of which it is a cause is an accident (συμβεβηκός): and the cause is a body, but the thing of which it is a cause is a predicate. And it is impossible that the cause is present, while the thing of which it is a cause does not exist. The saying has the following meaning: a cause is the thing because of which something happens, as being prudent happens because of prudence and living happens because of the soul and having self-control happens because of self-control. For it is impossible when self-control is present in someone that he does not have self-control, or when there is a soul in someone that he does not live, or when there is prudence in someone, that he is not prudent.'

On the basis of this text, Schenkeveld concludes that *Comp.* 5.23,15–18 contains a 'reminiscence of what in a Stoic treatise was said about ὄνομα and ῥῆμα'.[138] This may be true, but I doubt that the passage from Zeno has anything to do with it.[139] Schenkeveld says: 'Zeno's examples (φρόνησις, φρονεῖν) agree with how DH would have classified them.' However, I think that Dionysius' classifications are a bit different. According to Dionysius' statements, the nouns ἀνήρ and μῆνις would indicate the οὐσία (or αἰτία, when we follow Schenkeveld), and ἔννεπε and ἄειδε would indicate the συμβεβηκός. But is the 'wrath' (μῆνις) then a 'cause', the consequence of which is the 'singing' (ἄειδε)? And is the 'man' (ἀνήρ) the cause of the 'telling' of a story (ἔννεπε)? In fact, the examples mentioned in the Stoic fragment are not very compatible with the Homeric verses that Dionysius cites. Besides, it is true that manuscript P has αἰτίαν in *Comp.* 5.23,16, but it reads οὐσίαν in the next line (*Comp.* 5.23,17). So, even if one reads αἰτίαν with P, one will have to retain the term οὐσία in the same passage. But the juxtaposition of αἰτία and οὐσία in one sentence does not produce a satis-

[138] Schenkeveld (1983) 79.

[139] Paximadi (1989) 223–225 has already pointed out that the fragment on Zeno is not the right parallel for Dionysius' ideas on οὐσία and συμβεβηκός. However, I do not agree with Paximadi's view that Dionysius' theory of natural word order is inspired by Peripatetic sources.

factory text.[140] Furthermore, Schenkeveld too easily equates the terms αἴτιον and αἰτία. In fact, there was an important difference between these terms in Stoic philosophy: according to Chrysippus, an αἰτία is a λόγος of an αἴτιον, or a λόγος about the αἴτιον as αἴτιον.[141] Whereas αἴτιον is a (corporeal) cause in the real world, αἰτία is its incorporeal representation in language.[142] Therefore, it would be dangerous to use a fragment on αἴτιον to explain Dionysius' alleged use of αἰτία. Finally, Schenkeveld's suggestion that the combination of the terms οὐσία and συμβεβηκός only occurs in later *grammatical* texts may be right, but that does not imply that the combination was not used by earlier thinkers: in any case, Dionysius mentions the combination of οὐσία and συμβεβηκός according to all manuscripts in *Comp.* 5.23,17.

There is a further reason to believe that the term that Dionysius uses is οὐσία (substance) and not αἰτία. There is a remarkable parallel in a passage from the Roman grammarian Priscian. He argues that, in the *theoretical* order of the parts of speech, the noun precedes the verb 'because the substance (*substantia*) and person of the one who acts or suffers, which is designated through the pronoun or the noun, must naturally be earlier (*prior esse debet naturaliter*) than the act itself (*ipse actus*), which is an accident of the substance (*accidens substantiae*)'.[143] Priscian is a relatively late source, but it is clear that he preserves the same idea that we find in Dionysius: the noun precedes the verb because substance (*substantia*) precedes accident (*accidens*). In a context that is similar to that of Priscian, Apollonius Dyscolus argues that the noun precedes the verb because 'body' (σῶμα) is prior to 'disposing or being disposed' (τὸ διατιθέναι καὶ τὸ διατίθεσθαι).[144] Luhtala thinks that Priscian has modified Apollonius' theory, substituting 'Peripatetic colouring' for 'Stoic materialism'.[145] In my view, however, the distinction between substance and accident can be Stoic as well as Peripatetic. Given the fact that Diony-

[140] See the translation by Aujac & Lebel (1981) 77: 'les premiers indiquent l'auteur (αἰτία), les seconds l'événement et, par nature, l'être (οὐσία) précède l'événement.'

[141] Cf. *FDS* 762 (≈ *SVF* II.336): Αἰτίαν δ' εἶναι λόγον αἰτίου, ἢ λόγον τὸν περὶ τοῦ αἰτίου.

[142] Cf. Sluiter (1990) 134 n. 368.

[143] Priscian, *G.L.* III 164,16–21: *Sciendum tamen, quod recta ordinatio exigit, ut pronomen vel nomen praeponatur verbo, ut 'ego et tu legimus, Virgilius et Cicero scripserunt', quippe cum substantia et persona ipsius agentis vel patientis, quae per pronomen vel nomen significatur, prior esse debet naturaliter quam ipse actus, qui accidens est substantiae. licet tamen et praepostere ea proferre auctorum usurpatione fretum.* Cf. Weil (1978 [1844]) 18 n. 3.

[144] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.16.

[145] Luhtala (2005) 86: 'When the noun is said to signify substance and the verb its

sius adopts some specifically Stoic ideas in the course of his experiment concerning natural word order, I would prefer to interpret the distinction between substance and accident also as Stoic. The terms οὐσία and συμβεβηκός appear together not only in Aristotelian but also in Stoic texts. I will briefly discuss the Aristotelian and Stoic background of these terms.[146]

Wouters has suggested that the term οὐσία in the definition of the noun in the *Technê Grammatikê* points to Peripatetic influence.[147] We have seen that Dionysius of Halicarnassus' rhetorical works show Aristotelian influence (see sections 1.5 and 3.3.1).[148] Therefore we should not exclude the possibility that his use of the terms οὐσία and συμβεβηκός in *Comp.* 5 has a Peripatetic background. Indeed, Ildefonse has expressed the view that Dionysius' idea on the priority of nouns over verbs is connected to the Aristotelian concept of accidence.[149] How does Aristotle use the terms οὐσία and συμβεβηκός?[150] In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle offers a definition of συμβεβηκός: 'Accident (συμβεβηκός) means that which belongs to something and can be truly said of it, but which belongs to it neither necessarily nor for the most part.'[151] For example, the finding of a treasure is an accident of someone who is digging a hole for a plant. Elsewhere, Aristotle explains the difference between οὐσία and συμβεβηκός: 'for it is in this way that the "substance" (οὐσία) of a thing is distinguished from the "attribute" (συμβεβηκός) of it; for example, whiteness is an accident of man, in view of the fact that he is white, but he is not just whiteness. If everything were an attribute of something, there would be no first subject of which something would be attributively a predicate (that is, if "an attribute" always signifies

accidents (…), the description of the principal parts of speech has been reinterpreted in terms of Peripatetic / Platonic philosophy.'

[146] See also section 3.7, where I have discussed the term συμβεβηκότα, which various early sources use for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech.

[147] Wouters (1979) 179.

[148] For the Aristotelian influence on Dionysius' rhetorical works, see also Wooten (1994). I do not agree with Pinborg's view that Dionysius' use of the term συμβεβηκότα for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech points to Aristotelian influence: see section 3.7.

[149] Ildefonse (1997) 290. Cf. Luhtala (2005) 87 n. 3.

[150] This is, of course, 'ein weites Feld', and I will only deal with those aspects that are necessary for our understanding of Dionysius. The same *caveat* holds for my discussions of the philosophical terminology in the rest of *Comp.* 5.

[151] Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1025a14–19: Συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται ὃ ὑπάρχει μέν τινι καὶ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, οὐ μέντοι οὔτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτε ⟨ὡς⟩ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἷον εἴ τις ὀρύττων φυτῷ βόθρον εὗρε θησαυρόν. The translation is based on Apostle (1966).

that something is attributively a predicate of a subject).'[152] Outside the *Metaphysics*, the term συμβεβηκός also plays a role in Aristotle's theory of propositions.[153]

The opposition between οὐσία and συμβεβηκός seems to originate in Aristotelian philosophy. However, this does not imply that Dionysius' use of the terms must be based on Peripatetic sources, for οὐσία and συμβεβηκός also occur in Stoic texts. The word συμβεβηκός is mentioned several times in the Stoic fragments (see section 3.7), and it is explicitly associated with the predicate (κατηγόρημα).[154] This use of the term συμβεβηκός reminds us of the fact that the Stoics also use the word σύμβαμα in their grammatical observations. The latter term, which is just like συμβεβηκός derived from the verb συμβαίνω, is used for certain types of predicates.[155] Now, Müller has rightly drawn attention to a passage from Stobaeus, who reports that, according to Chrysippus, only those predicates 'materially exist' (ὑπάρχειν) that are συμβεβηκότα:[156]

> Μόνον δ' ὑπάρχειν φησὶ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα, τὸν δὲ παρῳχημένον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὑφεστάναι μέν, ὑπάρχειν δὲ οὐδαμῶς, εἰ μὴ ὡς καὶ κατηγορήματα ὑπάρχειν λέγεται μόνα τὰ συμβεβηκότα, οἷον τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑπάρχει μοι ὅτε περιπατῶ, ὅτε δὲ κατακέκλιμαι ἢ κάθημαι οὐχ ὑπάρχει ⟨…⟩
>
> 'He [i.e. Chrysippus] says that only the present exists, and that the past and the future subsist but that they do not exist, except in the way in which only the συμβεβηκότα are said to exist as predicates: for example,

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[152] Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1007a31–36: τούτῳ γὰρ διώρισται οὐσία καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός· τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν ὅτι ἔστι μὲν λευκὸς ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅπερ λευκόν. εἰ δὲ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται, οὐθὲν ἔσται πρῶτον τὸ καθ' οὗ, εἰ ἀεὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς σημαίνει τὴν κατηγορίαν. The translation is based on Apostle (1966).

[153] See Aristotle, *Int.* 21a5–14 (cf. *Cat.* 7a25–41). Here, Aristotle points out that if two propositions about the same subject are true, a combination of the two will not necessarily be true. For example, if it is true to say that 'a man is white' and that 'a man is musical', it does not follow that 'musical is white'; and even if that is true, 'musical white' is not one thing. For 'musical' and 'white' are not essential, but they only belong to the subject 'man' κατὰ συμβεβηκός ('accidentally'). See also Whitaker (1996) 153: 'subjects and predicates which are only clusters of accidents should not be considered as forming unities: the fact that they can be said to hold separately therefore does not imply that they can [may] be said to hold together.'

[154] See *FDS* 762 (cited above), *FDS* 746 (bodily accidents), *FDS* 695 (predicates).

[155] See *FDS* 696 (Diogenes Laertius VII.64), where the introduction of the συμβάματα is followed by a lacuna in our text. See also *FDS* 789–799. Luhtala (2000) 94–100 points out that συμβάματα ('congruities') are 'congruent' predicates, which means that the nominative case corresponds to a simple predicate (e.g. οὗτος περιπατεῖ). Müller (1943) 54–55 points out that every case of the congruity between a nominative case and a predicate (active, passive, or neuter) is a σύμβαμα.

[156] Stobaeus, *Anthologium* I.8.42 (106,5–23 Wachsmuth). Cf. Müller (1943) 60–61.

> 'walking' exists for me when I walk, but it does not exist when I am lying or when I am sitting down' … (*lacuna*)

The Stoics use the verb ὑπάρχειν ('to exist') only for material things: the immaterial things (namely κενόν, τόπος, χρόνος and λεκτόν, void, place, time and 'sayable') are 'something' (τι), but they do not 'exist' (ὑπάρχειν); they can at the most be said to 'subsist' (ὑφίστασθαι).[157] Unfortunately, there is a lacuna at the end of the text of Stobaeus; but Müller has convincingly argued that Chrysippus could have added that, unlike the συμβεβηκότα, the συμβάματα do *not* 'materially exist' (ὑπάρχειν).[158] In other words, there are two types (or rather aspects) of predicates (κατηγορήματα): on the one hand, there is the συμβεβηκός, which represents the predicate in the physical world: it is that which is said about something *qua* physical fact.[159] On the other hand, there is the σύμβαμα, which represents the predicate in the field of λόγος: it is that which is said about something *qua* λεκτόν.[160] The λεκτόν is immaterial and can therefore not be said to 'exist'. The following example may illuminate the difference between συμβεβηκός and σύμβαμα: in the factual event that Socrates walks, 'walking' is a συμβεβηκός; in the spoken sentence Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ, however, περιπατεῖ is a σύμβαμα.[161]

Before I point out how this Stoic concept of συμβεβηκός corresponds to Dionysius' use of the term in *Comp.* 5, I will first add some words on the Stoic use of the term οὐσία, which, according to Dionysius' statements, is prior to συμβεβηκός. According to Stoic ontology, there are two principles, namely the active principle, which is the divine λόγος, and the passive principle, which is the οὐσία (substance). These principles constitute the basis of all entities in reality:[162]

> Δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θέον.

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[157] See *SVF* II.329–332. Cf. Long & Sedley (1987 I) 162–166. The term 'to subsist' (which Galen, *SVF* II.322, regards as a case of 'over-refined linguistic quibbling of some philosophers') is illuminated by Long & Sedley (1987 I) 164: 'There's such a thing as a rainbow, and such a character as Mickey Mouse, but they don't actually *exist*.'

[158] Müller (1943) 60–61: 'Man könnte sinngemäss fortfahren: ein ὑπάρχειν kommt dagegen nicht denjenigen κατηγορήματα zu, die συμβάματα sind, d.h. den Praedikaten im Satz im Bereich der menschlichen Rede.'

[159] Cf. Müller (1943) 60. See also Ildefonse (1997) 173.

[160] For the Stoic λεκτόν, see Sluiter (2000a).

[161] Cf. Müller (1943) 60.

[162] *FDS* 744 (= Diogenes Laertius VII.134).

> 'They [the Stoics] hold that there are two principles in the universe, the active principle and the passive. The passive principle, then, is substance without quality, that is matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent in this substance, that is God.'[163]

Οὐσία (substance) is also the first 'category', which is sometimes also named ὑποκείμενον (substrate).[164] Through the divine πνεῦμα, the οὐσία, which is in itself without quality (ἄποιον), receives a certain quality (ποιόν), the second category; the third category is the disposition (πῶς ἔχον), and the fourth category is the relative disposition (πρὸς τί πως ἔχον). The exact meaning of these four 'categories' is a complex problem, but it seems clear that the Stoics used them both in their dialectical and in their physical observations.[165] In other words, the categories are both logical and ontological items, and each entity belongs to all categories, consisting of substance and quality with a certain disposition.[166] The categories are used as headings that make it possible to analyse and describe the entities that exist in reality.[167]

Coming back to Dionysius, we can now better understand the philosophical background of his ideas on the order of noun and verb. According to Dionysius, a noun indicates the οὐσία, whereas a verb indicates the συμβεβηκός and substance is prior to accidents. If my interpretation of the Stoic use of συμβεβηκός is correct, it seems reasonable to believe that the Stoics would say that accident in reality (συμβεβηκός) presupposes substance (οὐσία): according to Müller's explanation, a συμβεβηκός is the physical representation of the (incorporeal) predicate, which would be said *about* an entity. The entity itself is designated by a noun: the noun refers to quality (ποιόν), which in its turn belongs to substance (οὐσία). In this way, it seems possible to connect Dionysius' statement to Stoic theories. It is true that the priority of substance over accident could in itself be based on Aristotelian ideas on accidence, such as we have discussed above.[168] However, in view of the

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[163] The translation is by Hicks (1925).

[164] For the Stoic theory of 'categories' (which the Stoics did not call categories), see *FDS* 827–873. See also Long & Sedley (1987 I) 165–166, who, referring to Simplicius' γένη in *SVF* II.369, point out that the 'categories' are actually *genera* of the existent.

[165] On the Stoic categories, see Rist (1969) 152–172, Long (1974) 160–163, Sandbach (1975) 93–94, Hülser (1987 III) 1008–1009 and Menn (1999) 215–247. On the connection between the Stoic categories and grammatical theory, see Luhtala (2005) 21–22.

[166] See L&S 28A6.

[167] Cf. De Jonge (2001) 163.

[168] Cf. Ildefonse (1997) 290.

natural rules that Dionysius will discuss in the remaining part of *Comp.* 5 (see especially sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.6), it is more probable that Dionysius' statement about nouns and verbs rests on Stoic views on οὐσία and συμβεβηκός. For not only the latter terms, but also the expression τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον can be related to Stoic philosophy (see *FDS* 744 above), and the order of pronouns and common nouns and the order of common and proper nouns will turn out to be based on the Stoic categories.

When we focus on Dionysius' experiment, we observe that he mentions three Homeric lines that support the natural order of nouns and verbs, after which he quotes three other verses in which the opposite order (verbs precede nouns) is used. It is interesting to notice that the nouns (ὀνόματα) in the first three examples include one nominative (ἠέλιος) and two accusatives (ἄνδρα and μῆνιν).[169] In the three counterexamples, all nouns are vocatives: τέκος (or Ἀτρυτώνη), Μοῦσαι and Ἀχιλλεῦ. In other words, Dionysius does not care about the syntactic functions that the various nouns perform in the sentence: the οὐσία indicated by a noun is not necessarily the 'subject' of the sentence: in antiquity, the concept of syntactic subject is not used. Therefore, Baldwin was wrong in stating that Dionysius argues for 'putting the subject before the predicate'.[170] Modern readers would presumably not see much difference between the word order in ἄνδρά μοι ἔννεπε Μοῦσα πολύτροπον (*Od.* 1.1) and μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά (*Il.* 1.1) on the one hand, and κλῦθί μευ αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος Ἀτρυτώνη (*Il.* 5.115) and ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι (*Il.* 2.484) on the other hand: in all these verses, an imperative verb is followed by a vocative expression. For Dionysius, however, the first position in the verse seems to be the most important thing: the first three examples all start with a noun, whereas the three counterexamples start with a verb. Diony-

[169] We have already observed (section 3.6.1) that Dionysius uses the term ὄνομα here in a general sense: it includes both appellative nouns (like ἠέλιος, ἄνδρα and μῆνιν) and proper nouns (Μοῦσαι and Ἀχιλλεῦ). The sixth noun is either τέκος or Ἀτρυτώνη, or perhaps Dionysius includes both of these words among the nouns that are 'placed behind'. As I have pointed out, Dionysius only adopts the distinction between ὄνομα and προσηγορία when it is relevant. Thus, ὄνομα can refer either to a noun in general or to a proper noun: the latter is only the case when a proper noun is regarded as opposed to an appellative noun. I may add that the classification of Μοῦσαι and Ἀχιλλεῦ as ὀνόματα proves that Schenkeveld (1983) 72 is wrong in suggesting that Dionysius never classifies proper nouns.

[170] Baldwin (1959) 110.

sius' formulation also indicates that the examples are chosen because they *start* with nouns or verbs: in the first three examples, the nouns 'lead the way' (ἡγεῖται μὲν γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τὰ ὀνόματα), while in the three counterexamples the verbs 'lead the way' (ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἡγεῖται μὲν τὰ ῥήματα). Except for one (ἀνόρουσε), all verbs in the six examples are imperatives. Perhaps Dionysius' refutation would have been more convincing if he had also given one example of the order verb—noun with an indicative instead of an imperative. But for Dionysius the three counterexamples sufficiently prove that the first natural principle (nouns precede verbs) is πιθανός, but not ἀληθής. The difference between a πιθανός and an ἀληθὴς λόγος is a rhetorical *topos*, to which Dionysius appears to allude.[171] His conclusion is, then, that nobody would criticise the arrangement (τὴν σύνταξιν) of the counterexamples. In Dionysius' works, the term σύνταξις is rather unusual in the sense of 'composition' or 'arrangement', for which he normally uses the term σύνθεσις. For the Stoics, however, σύνταξις was the normal term, which also appears in the title of Chrysippus' works mentioned in *Comp.* 4 (see sections 1.5, 3.3.2 and 5.3.2). Later grammarians like Apollonius Dyscolus also wrote treatises Περὶ συντάξεως, but rhetoricians use the term less frequently.[172] Therefore, the occurrence of the term in this passage might be another indication that Dionysius' experiment is based on ideas that originate in either Stoic philosophy or technical grammar (which was in its turn influenced by Stoic ideas).

5.3.4. *Verbs precede adverbs*

Dionysius' second natural rule demands that verbs precede adverbs:[173]

> ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἄμεινον ἐδόκουν εἶναι τὰ ῥήματα προτάττειν τῶν ἐπιρρημάτων, ἐπειδὴ πρότερόν ἐστι τῇ φύσει τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον τῶν συνεδρευόντων αὐτοῖς, τρόπου λέγω καὶ τόπου καὶ χρόνου καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων, ἃ δὴ καλοῦμεν ἐπιρρήματα, παραδείγμασι χρώμενος τούτοις·
>
> τύπτε δ' ἐπιστροφάδην, τῶν δὲ στόνος ὠρνυτ' ἀεικής …[174]
> ἤριπε δ' ἐξοπίσω, ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχὴν ἐκάπυσσεν …[175]
> ἐκλίνθη δ' ἑτέρωσε, δέπας δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε χειρός.[176]

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171 Cf. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 204.
172 On the terms σύνθεσις and σύνταξις, see Donnet (1967).
173 *Comp.* 5.24,15–25,11.
174 *Iliad* 21.20.
175 *Iliad* 22.467.
176 *Odyssey* 22.17.

ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ δὴ τούτοις ὕστερα τέτακται [ἅμα] τῶν ῥημάτων τὰ ἐπιρρήματα. καὶ τοῦτο πιθανὸν μὲν ὡς τὸ πρῶτον, οὐκ ἀληθὲς δὲ ὡς οὐδ' ἐκεῖνο. τάδε γὰρ δὴ παρὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ποιητῇ ἐναντίως εἴρηται·

βοτρυδὸν δὲ πέτονται ἐπ' ἄνθεσιν εἰαρινοῖσι …[177]
σήμερον ἄνδρα φάοσδε μογοστόκος Εἰλείθυια | ἐκφανεῖ.[178]

ἆρ' οὖν τι χείρω γέγονε τὰ ποιήματα ὑποταχθέντων τοῖς ἐπιρρήμασι τῶν ῥημάτων; οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι.

'Besides, I thought that it was better to place verbs before adverbs, since that which acts or is acted upon is prior to the things that accompany them, I mean circumstances of manner, place, time, and the like, which we call adverbs. I relied on the following examples:

He struck in a circle around him, and their shameful groaning rose (…)
She fell backward and gasped her life breath from her (…)
He fell to one side, and the cup fell from his hand.

In all these cases the adverbs are placed after the verbs. This principle, like the first one, is also persuasive, but it is just as untrue as that one. For the following verses, in the same poet, have been expressed in the opposite way:

In clusters together they fly above the flowers of spring (…)
Today Eileithyia of women's child-pains shall bring forth a man to light.

Well, are the verses at all inferior when the verbs have been placed after the adverbs? No one would say so.'

Just like the first principle, the second principle of natural word order is based on a logical priority: τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον ('that which acts or is acted upon') naturally precedes τὰ συνεδρεύοντα αὐτοῖς ('the things that accompany them'). To start with the latter term, τὰ συνεδρεύοντα is often found in medical treatises, where it refers to the 'symptoms' of diseases.[179] The term is not found in technical grammatical texts, but 'Longinus' uses the verb συνεδρεύω when discussing how one can make style sublime by choosing and combining certain 'constituent features' and circumstances from reality:[180]

οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ πᾶσι τοῖς πράγμασι φύσει *συνεδρεύει* τινὰ μόρια ταῖς ὕλαις συνυπάρχοντα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης γένοιτ' ἂν ἡμῖν ὕψους αἴτιον τὸ τῶν ἐμφερο-

[177] *Iliad* 2.89.
[178] *Iliad* 19.103–104.
[179] See Gippert (1997) 1060 on Galenus.
[180] 'Longinus', *Subl.* 10.1.

> μένων ἐκλέγειν ἀεὶ τὰ καιριώτατα καὶ ταῦτα τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐπισυνθέσει καθάπερ ἕν τι σῶμα ποιεῖν δύνασθαι·
>
> 'Since with all things there are associated certain elements, inherent in their substance, it follows of necessity that we shall find one factor of sublimity in a consistently happy choice of these constituent elements, and in the power of combining them together as it were into an organic whole.'[181]

'Longinus' illustrates his point with the famous poem Sappho fr. 31 (φαίνεται μοι κῆνος …). In that poem, he argues, Sappho has excellently expressed the emotions that 'accompany' (συμβαίνοντα) the passion of love, emotions that she has taken from the 'attendant symptoms' (ἐκ τῶν παρεπομένων) and from real life (ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας).[182] Thus, like Dionysius, 'Longinus' uses the word συνεδρεύω with regard to the circumstances that accompany certain events in reality. Interestingly, 'Longinus' also uses the terms συμβαίνοντα and παρεπόμενα in this context. These words, too, point to certain 'accidental features': in grammatical texts, both συμβαίνω and παρέπομαι are used for the *accidentia* of the parts of speech, as we have seen in section 3.7. The word συμβαίνοντα is, of course, derived from the same verb as the term συμβεβηκός, which we have encountered in Dionysius' discussion of the first principle of natural word order (section 5.3.3). The passage from *On the Sublime*, then, seems to reveal that the word συνεδρεύω belongs to the same word field as συμβαίνοντα, συμβεβηκότα and παρεπόμενα: all these words are related to the idea of a distinction between substance (cf. 'Longinus'' ὕλαις) on the one hand, and accidents or attributes on the other hand.

Another parallel for τὰ συνεδρεύοντα is found in the treatise under discussion, namely in *On Composition* 16. In that passage, Dionysius deals with the combination of letters and syllables. He tells us that '(…) attractiveness of language is due to words, syllables and letters that please the ear by virtue of some affinity; and that the difference in detail between these, through which are revealed the characters, feelings, dispositions and actions of persons and their attendant qualities (… τὰ ἔργα τῶν προσώπων καὶ τὰ συνεδρεύοντα τούτοις) are made

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[181] Translation by W.H. Fyfe / Donald Russell (1995).

[182] 'Longinus', *Subl.* 10.1: οἷον ἡ Σαπφὼ τὰ συμβαίνοντα ταῖς ἐρωτικαῖς μανίαις παθήματα ἐκ τῶν παρεπομένων καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτῆς ἑκάστοτε λαμβάνει. 'Sappho, for instance, never fails to take the emotions incident to the passion of love from its attendant symptoms and from real life.' Cf. Russell (1964) 100.

what they are through the original grouping of the letters.'[183] Again, the expression τὰ συνεδρεύοντα refers to the accompanying accidents of 'actions' (ἔργα), and perhaps also those of characters (ἤθη), feelings (πάθη) and dispositions (διαθέσεις). Thus in *Comp.* 16, τὰ συνεδρεύοντα are connected with (at least) 'actions' (ἔργα). In *Comp.* 5 they are connected with τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον ('that which acts or is acted upon'), and although this expression seems to designate the *subject* of an action, Dionysius appears to be thinking of the *action itself*: For strictly speaking, verbs do not indicate 'that which acts or is acted upon', but rather 'the acting or being acted upon': τὸ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. Correspondingly, Aujac & Lebel (1981) have silently 'corrected' Dionysius in their translation: 'par nature, ce que l'on fait ou ce que l'on subit est antérieur aux circonstances (…).'[184] Again, the background of Dionysius' terminology may be either Aristotelian or Stoic. I will discuss both possibilities.

Aristotle includes ποιεῖν ('acting') and πάσχειν ('being affected') among his ten categories: 'of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance (οὐσία) or quantity (ποσόν) or quality (ποιόν) or relation (πρός τι) or where (πού) or when (ποτέ) or being in a position (κεῖσθαι) or being in a condition (ἔχειν) or doing (ποιεῖν) or being affected (πάσχειν).'[185] Examples of 'doing' (ποιεῖν) are '(he) is cutting' (τέμνει) or '(he) is burning' (καίει), while examples of 'being affected' (πάσχειν) are '(he) is being cut' (τέμνεται) or '(he) is being burned' (καίεται).[186] Aristotle's examples would more or less fit the ideas of Dionysius, who also points to verbs as the words that indicate τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον.

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[183] *Comp.* 16.63,11–18: ἡδεῖαν δὲ διάλεκτον ἐκ τῶν ἡδυνόντων τὴν ἀκοὴν γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ παραπλήσιον ὀνομάτων τε καὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ γραμμάτων, τάς τε κατὰ μέρος ἐν τούτοις διαφοράς, καθ' ἃς δηλοῦται τά τε ἤθη καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῶν προσώπων καὶ τὰ συνεδρεύοντα τούτοις, ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης κατασκευῆς τῶν γραμμάτων γίνεσθαι τοιαύτας. Usher (1985) translates 'actions and the attendant qualities of the persons described', but I prefer 'actions of persons and the attendant qualities [of those actions]': in my view, the pronoun τούτοις in τὰ συνεδρεύοντα τούτοις refers back to τὰ ἔργα (or to the entire word group τά τε ἤθη καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα), while τῶν προσώπων must be connected with τὰ ἔργα (and the rest), *not* with τὰ συνεδρεύοντα. Cf. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 116: 'les actions des personnages et toutes les circonstances annexes'.

[184] Aujac & Lebel (1981) 78.

[185] Aristotle, *Cat.* 1b25–27: Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποὺ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. My translation is based on Cooke (1949) and Ackrill (1963).

[186] Aristotle, *Cat.* 2a3–4. Aristotle returns to these categories in *Cat.* 11b1–8. For ποιεῖν and πάσχειν, see also *Physica* 225b1 ff. and *De generatione et corruptione* 322b11.

The expression that Dionysius uses, τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, also reminds us of the two Stoic principles, which I have mentioned above (section 5.3.3): the Stoics distinguish between the active principle (τὸ ποιοῦν), namely the divine λόγος, and the passive principle (τὸ πάσχον), namely substance without quality.[187] Apart from that, the Stoics also use the terms ποιεῖν and πάσχειν in order to distinguish between physical objects and immaterial things (such as the λεκτόν). Only material objects (σώματα) are able to act or to be acted upon.[188] Besides, the terms ποιεῖν and πάσχειν are not only used in the ontology of the Stoics, but they also play a role in their logic and semantics. Ποιεῖν and πάσχειν seem to be connected to the 'active' or 'direct' (ὀρθά) predicates and the 'passive' or 'reversed' (ὕπτια) predicates respectively, although the direct evidence for the connection is limited.[189] Apart from 'direct' or 'active' (ὀρθά) predicates (e.g. ἀκούει, ὁρᾷ) and 'reversed' or 'passive' (ὕπτια) predicates (e.g. ἀκούομαι, ὁρῶμαι), the Stoics distinguish also 'neuter' (οὐδέτερα) predicates (e.g. φρονεῖ, περιπατεῖ).[190] Müller has convincingly analysed the Stoic ideas in the following way: the active predicates signify a ποιεῖν πρός τι, the passive predicates signify a πάσχειν ὑπό τινος, and the neuter predicates signify 'das "reine" ποιεῖν bzw. πασχειν ohne Bezug auf eine πτῶσις πλαγία'.[191] Each of the three types of predicates corresponds to a nominative case: (1) a κατηγόρημα ὀρθόν corresponds to a πτῶσις ὀρθή that indicates τὸ ποιοῦν πρός τι, (2) a κατηγόρημα ὕπτιον corresponds to a πτῶσις ὀρθή that indicates τὸ πάσχον ὑπό τινος, and (3) a κατηγόρημα οὐδέτερον corresponds to a πτῶσις ὀρθή that indicates a 'pure' ποιοῦν or πάσχον, that is, an acting or being acted upon without any connection to an oblique case. The

[187] *FDS* 744 (Diogenes Laertius VII.134): see section 5.3.3.

[188] See *SVF* I.90; I.518; II.363. Cf. Long & Sedley (1987 I) 165: 'Since interaction is exclusively the property of bodies, the Stoics cannot allow these incorporeals to act upon bodies or be acted upon by them. How then do they play a part in the world? No satisfactory discussion of the problem has survived.' For the problematic character of the λεκτόν in this respect (which is incorporeal but nevertheless transfers meaning between speaker and listener), see Sluiter (2000a).

[189] See *FDS* 801 and cf. *FDS* 696 (Diogenes Laertius VII.64).

[190] Cf. Müller (1943) 52–62 and Luhtala (2000) 88–100. Luhtala (2000) 88–94 argues that the notion of 'action' is almost absent from the sources on the Stoic theory of the predicate for the reason that predicates signify something incorporeal, while 'acting' or 'being acted upon' is characteristic of bodies alone.

[191] Müller (1943) 58.

correspondence (or 'congruence') between the predicate and the πτῶσις ὄρθη is called σύμβαμα.[192]

Having taken these Stoic ideas into account, we may well argue that Dionysius' statement about the priority of τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον over τὰ συνεδρεύοντα reflects Stoic ideas on predicates; but we cannot exclude the possibility that the use of the term τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον is inspired by the Aristotelian categories mentioned earlier. However, in view of the explanation that I will give of some of the remaining principles of natural word order (see section 5.3.6), it seems more probable that Dionysius' statement is based on Stoic ideas.

In section 3.6.5, I have already discussed the three types of adverbs that Dionysius mentions in this passage: ἐπιρρήματα τρόπου (adverbs of manner), τόπου (place), and χρόνου (time). Here, it should be emphasised that the Stoics did not use the term ἐπίρρημα, but μεσότης for the adverb.[193] Antipater of Tarsos introduced the term μεσότης in the Stoic theory of the parts of speech. The earlier Stoics, however, including Chrysippus, did not distinguish the adverbs among their μέρη λόγου. For this reason, it seems very unlikely that Dionysius copied the complete passage on natural word order from Chrysippus' treatises on the syntax of the parts of speech, or from any Stoic source for that matter. Thus, although I think that Dionsyius' principles of natural word order are somehow based on Stoic ideas, I do not agree with Kroll and Barwick that Chrysippus was the 'source' of *Comp.* 5. I rather suppose that Dionysius made use of grammatical ideas (either or not taken from a specific treatise) that were connected with or based on Stoic theories of logic.[194]

Just as in his discussion of the first principle Dionysius chose examples that *start* with nouns and verbs respectively, he now selects verses that start with verbs and adverbs respectively. And again, the principle is rejected, because, though it seems persuasive, it is not true.

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[192] Cf. Müller (1943) 54–55 and Luhtala (2000) 94–96.

[193] See Diogenes Laertius VII.57. Cf. section 3.2.

[194] For the influence of Stoic philosophy on grammarians of the first century BC, see section 3.2 and the literature mentioned there.

5.3.5. *Prior in time is prior in word order*

The third principle of natural word order is different from the preceding ones. In this case, it is the chronological order of events that is to be reflected in the order of words:[195]

> ἔτι καὶ τόδε ᾤμην δεῖν μὴ παρέργως φυλάττειν, ὅπως τὰ πρότερα τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ τάξει πρότερα λαμβάνηται· οἷά ἐστι ταῦτα·
>
> αὖ ἔρυσαν μὲν πρῶτα καὶ ἔσφαξαν καὶ ἔδειραν[196]
>
> καὶ
>
> λίγξε βιός, νευρὴ δὲ μέγ' ἴαχεν, ἆλτο δ' ὀιστός[197]
>
> καὶ
>
> σφαῖραν ἔπειτ' ἔρριψε μετ' ἀμφίπολον βασίλεια·
> ἀμφιπόλου μὲν ἅμαρτε, βαθείῃ δ' ἔμβαλε δίνῃ.[198]
>
> νὴ Δία, φαίη τις ἄν, εἴ γε μὴ καὶ ἄλλα ἦν πολλὰ οὐχ οὕτω συντεταγμένα ποιήματα οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ταῦτα καλά·
>
> πλῆξε δ' ἀνασχόμενος σχίζῃ δρυός, ἣν λίπε κείων[199]
>
> πρότερον γὰρ δή που τὸ ἐπανατείνασθαί ἐστι τοῦ πλῆξαι. καὶ ἔτι
>
> ἤλασεν ἄγχι στάς, πέλεκυς δ' ἀπέκοψε τένοντας | αὐχενίους[200]
>
> πρῶτον γὰρ δή που προσῆκεν τῷ μέλλοντι τὸν πέλεκυν ἐμβάλλειν εἰς τοὺς τένοντας τοῦ ταύρου τὸ στῆναι αὐτοῦ πλησίον.

'Yet again, I thought that I should never relax my efforts to guard that things that are prior in time should also be taken prior in order, as in the following cases:

> *First they drew back [the victims' heads] and slaughtered and skinned them*

and

> *The bow groaned and the string twanged loud and the arrow leapt away*

and

> *Then the princess threw the ball to a maid*:
> *the maid indeed she missed, but threw it into a deep eddy*.

---

195 *Comp.* 5.25,11–26,11.
196 *Iliad* 1.459 and 2.422.
197 *Iliad* 4.125.
198 *Odyssey* 6.115–116.
199 *Odyssey* 14.425.
200 *Odyssey* 3.449–450.

> "Certainly", someone might say, "if only there were not many other lines not arranged in this order, and yet no less beautiful than these:"
>
> *And he struck, having raised himself up, with an oak-block, which he had left uncut*
>
> For evidently the stretching out is prior to the striking. And again:
>
> *He dealt the blow, standing near, and the axe cut through the sinews | of the neck*
>
> Surely it would fit someone who was about to drive the axe into the bull's sinews to have taken his stand near it *first*.'

According to Dionysius' third principle of natural word order, that what is prior in time should also be prior in word order: τὰ πρότερα τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ τάξει πρότερα.[201] Again, Dionysius proves that Homer sticks to this principle in some, but not in all cases. The term πρότερα in *Comp.* 5.25,13 is used in a different way than πρότερον in *Comp.* 5.23,17 and πρότερον in *Comp.* 5.24,17. When Dionysius stated that the οὐσία is 'prior' to τὸ συμβεβηκός and τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον is 'prior' to τὰ συνεδρεύοντα, he was referring to a *logical* priority. The formulation τὰ πρότερα τοῖς χρόνοις, however, refers to the *chronological* order of events in reality. These two different ways of using the word πρότερον were already distinguished in Aristotle's *Categories*.[202] Aristotle lists five ways in which people say that one thing is called 'prior' to another thing: (1) 'in respect of time' (κατὰ χρόνον), when one thing is older than the other; (2) 'as to implication of existence' (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν): for example, one is prior to two because two implies one; (3) with regard to some order (κατὰ τινα τάξιν), as in sciences and speeches: in grammar the letters are prior to the syllables, and in speeches the introduction is prior to the exposition; (4) what is better and more valued (τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον) is also thought to be 'prior by nature' (πρότερον τῇ φύσει; this is the strangest use of πρότερον, according to Aristotle); (5) finally, in the case that the existence of one thing implies the other (see nr. 2), that which is the *cause* (τὸ αἴτιον) of the existence of something may also be called 'naturally prior' (πρότερον τῇ φύσει). When we

[201] As we have seen in section 5.2, Dionysius frequently expresses the view that in a natural style the order of events as reported corresponds to the order of events in reality: in a more artificial style, the order can be reversed. I add one more example: in *Thuc.* 11.341,5–6, Dionysius objects to the fact that Thucydides departs from the chronological order of the events: ἥ τε γὰρ φύσις ἀπήτει τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων ἄρχειν … 'Nature required that prior events should have precedence over later ones (…).'

[202] Aristotle, *Cat.* 14a26–b23.

compare this list with Dionysius' first three principles of natural word order, we can observe how Dionysius' ways of using the term πρότερον correspond to some of the usages mentioned by Aristotle: in the discussion of the first and second principles, Dionysius' use of the term πρότερον corresponds to Aristotle's second use: for an accident *implies* a substance, and circumstances of an action *imply* an acting or being acted upon. In his discussion of the third principle, however, Dionysius' use of πρότερα agrees with Aristotle's first use: priority in respect of time (κατὰ χρόνον). We do not have to suppose that Dionysius himself was directly thinking of Aristotle's account of different kinds of priority, for he nowhere makes explicit that he is using the word πρότερον in different ways. However, Aristotle's distinctions illustrate that Dionysius may have been aware of the fact that he was referring to different types of priority.

In spite of the divergent concepts of priority behind Dionysius' principles of natural word order, they all presuppose the same underlying idea, namely that language should ideally be a perfect representation of reality. Priorities that exist in reality, whether logically or chronologically, should be similarly expressed in language, so that language perfectly mirrors reality. This idea, which underlies the entire experiment on natural word order, might be related to Stoic views on language: according to the Stoics, there was a mimetic relationship between the form and meaning of the first words (see section 2.5.3). It is remarkable that Dionysius has taken three of the five Homeric examples in passage from Homeric scenes that deal with the sacrifice of animals. The reason for his selection of these examples is presumably that the various actions of which a sacrifice consists are performed in a clearly fixed sequence. In particular, the killing of the animal and the preparations that lead to it cannot be performed in the oppositie order; this fact seems to make the sacrifice scenes particularly useful for Dionysius' refutation of the third principle of natural word order.

5.3.6. *The remaining principles of natural word order*

Having tested three principals of natural word order, Dionysius now decides to reject the remaining rules as well, without commenting on them:[203]

[203] *Comp.* 5.26,11–20.

> ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἠξίουν τὰ μὲν ὀνοματικὰ προτάττειν τῶν ἐπιθέτων, τὰ δὲ προσηγορικὰ τῶν ὀνοματικῶν, τὰς δ' ἀντονομασίας τῶν προσηγορικῶν, ἔν τε τοῖς ῥήμασι φυλάττειν, ἵνα τὰ ὀρθὰ τῶν ἐγκλινομένων ἡγῆται καὶ τὰ παρεμφατικὰ τῶν ἀπαρεμφάτων, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα διεσάλευεν ἡ πεῖρα καὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς ἄξια ἀπέφαινε. τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἐγίνετο καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων αὐτοῖς ἡδεῖα ἡ σύνθεσις καὶ καλή, τοτὲ δ' ἐκ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων ἀλλ' ἐναντίων.
>
> 'And still further, I thought it right to put the nouns before the adjectives, the appellative nouns before the proper nouns, and the pronouns before the appellative nouns; and with verbs, to take care that the indicatives should precede the other moods, and finite verb forms the infinitives, and many more similar rules. But the experiment upset all these assumptions and showed them completely worthless. For in some cases the composition was rendered attractive and beautiful by these and similar arrangements, but in other cases not by these but by opposite arrangements.'

I summarise the remaining rules of natural word order:

(4) Substantives precede adjectives[204]
(5) Appellative nouns precede proper nouns
(6) Pronouns precede appellative nouns
(7) Indicatives precede other moods
(8) Finite verb forms precede infinitives

Since Dionysius neither explains these rules nor illustrates them by giving examples, the reader himself has to understand why this particular order of words would be natural. In the present study, it will be argued that the principles (4), (5) and (6) are based on the same logical (and ontological) priority that underlies the principles (1) and (2): they can be explained by taking into account the Stoic theory of categories, which I have already mentioned above (section 5.3.3). The two final principles (7) and (8) are less clear, but I will argue that they can also be explained with the concept of logical priority that underlies most of the other rules.

The fourth principle (τὰ μὲν ὀνοματικὰ προτάττειν τῶν ἐπιθέτων) can easily be understood on the basis of the explanation that Dionysius has offered concerning the first and second principles. Just like the order noun—verb and the order verb—adverb, the order substantive—adjective seems to be based on the logical priority of substance over

[204] For Dionysius' use of the term ἐπίθετον, see section 3.6.1. When I translate this term as 'adjective', I do not mean to say that the ἐπίθετον is a separate word class for Dionysius. The ἐπίθετον should presumably be classified as an ὄνομα, but its particularity is that it qualifies other nouns.

accident. If Dionysius had commented on this principle, he could have said that the οὐσία indicated by a substantive is 'earlier' than the accident or the quality (ποιόν) indicated by an adjective (ἐπίθετον).[205]

For the explanation of the fifth principle (τὰ δὲ προσηγορικὰ [προτάττειν] τῶν ὀνοματικῶν), it is important to remember that the distinction between proper noun (ὄνομα) and appellative noun (προσηγορία) goes back to the Stoic philosophers (see section 3.2). According to the Stoics, προσηγορίαι (appellative nouns) signify a κοινὴ ποιότης (common quality), whereas ὀνόματα (proper nouns) signify an ἰδία ποιότης (individual quality).[206] Therefore, Schenkeveld suggests that Dionysius' rule of putting appellative nouns before proper nouns is based on the order of κοινά—ἴδια, and he adds 'but I have yet to find an exact parallel'.[207] I think that this parallel can be found in the following text, in which Syrianus comments on the Stoic order of common and individual qualities:[208]

> καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τοὺς κοινῶς ποιοὺς πρὸ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν ἀποτίθενται.
>
> 'Even the Stoics place the commonly qualified individuals before the peculiarly qualified individuals.'[209]

In Stoic philosophy, the ποιόν ('quality', or rather 'the qualified') is the second of the four 'categories':[210] while the first category (substance) indicates that an entity exists, the second category indicates an entity as a *qualified* substance. The ποιόν consists of two parts, namely the 'commonly qualified' (κοινῶς ποιόν) and the 'peculiarly qualified' (ἰδίως ποιόν). The former corresponds to appellative nouns (προσηγορίαι) such as 'man' or 'horse', while the latter is represented by proper nouns (ὀνόματα).[211] The text cited above tells us that the 'commonly qualified' precedes the 'peculiarly qualified': so, Socrates is first a man and only then is he Socrates.[212] We may conclude that the Stoic theory of the categories explains Dionysius' order of appellative and proper nouns:

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[205] For the terminology of ὀνοματικά and ἐπίθετα (substantives and adjectives), see section 3.2.4.

[206] *FDS* 536 (Diogenes Laertius VII.58). See also *FDS* 562A–569B.

[207] Schenkeveld (1983) 89.

[208] *FDS* 849.

[209] The translation is taken from Long & Sedley (1987 I) 169.

[210] See *FDS* 852–865 and Long & Sedley (1987 I) 166–176.

[211] *FDS* 536 (see above).

[212] Cf. Long & Sedley (1987 I) 173–174: 'This [i.e. 'the qualified'] divides up into the "commonly qualified", i.e. anything as described by a common noun or adjective; and the "peculiarly qualified", i.e. qualitatively unique individuals, as designated by proper

the order of προσηγορικά and ὀνοματικά is clearly based on the natural order of the corresponding categories, the commonly qualified and the peculiarly qualified.[213] It should be noted that this principle could not be explained on the basis of Aristotelian philosophy. This fact sheds light on our interpretation of some of the earlier rules of natural word order, which we were able to explain both from an Aristotelian and from a Stoic perspective. Since it seems to be certain that the order of proper and appellative noun is based on Stoic logic, it is preferable to assume that the order of nouns and verbs (section 5.3.3) and the order of verbs and adverbs (section 5.3.4) are also inspired by Stoic rather than Peripatetic theories.

The sixth principle (τὰς δ' ἀντονομασίας [προτάττειν] τῶν προσηγορικῶν) seems difficult to explain in the first instance. In my view, however, the Stoic theory of the categories can again provide the solution. Why should pronouns precede appellative nouns in particular, and not nouns in general? The answer is probably that Dionysius is thinking of what we call *demonstrative* pronouns, which are normally combined with appellative nouns. The only pronoun that Dionysius classifies as such in his works is indeed a demonstrative pronoun, namely τουτονί in the expression εἰς τουτονὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα (see sections 3.6.3 and 7.3.2).[214] Now, the Stoics argued that only a demonstrative reference (δεῖξις) indicates that something (corporeally) exists in reality: therefore, simple affirmative propositions are only 'definite' (ὡρισμένα) if they contain a demonstrative pronoun:[215] 'this one is walking' (οὗτος περιπατεῖ), for example, is a definite proposition. 'Someone is walking', however, is an indefinite proposition, while 'Socrates is walking' is an 'intermediate' proposition.[216] In other words, the demonstrative reference indicates that an entity is a substance (οὐσία). As Long & Sedley observe, 'it [the demonstrative reference] is the most direct way of indicating, without describing, something a speaker knows or believes to exist.'[217] It seems clear then, that there is a connection between the Stoic part

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names like 'Socrates'. The former are prior to the latter, no doubt because to be a man, or white, is part of what it is to be Socrates, and not vice versa.'

[213] For this explanation, see also De Jonge (2001) 164.

[214] *Comp.* 6.29,20. The quotation is from Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 1.

[215] *FDS* 916 (= Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* VIII.96–100). Cf. Lloyd (1978) and Graeser (1978) 206.

[216] For the differences between an ἀξίωμα ὡρισμένον (definite proposition), ἀόριστον (indefinite proposition) and μέσον (intermediate proposition), see *FDS* 916.

[217] Long & Sedley (1987 I) 207.

of speech ἄρθρον and the first category, substrate (ὑποκείμενον) or substance (οὐσία): something belongs to the first category if it exists as a material object.[218] The grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus seems to preserve the Stoic views on the connection between the parts of speech and the categories: he points out that 'pronouns (ἀντωνυμίαι) indicate substance (οὐσίαν), and nouns indicate substance together with quality (οὐσίαν μετὰ ποιότητος)'.[219] The Stoics did not use the term ἀντωνυμία (or ἀντονομασία) (see section 3.2), but their ἄρθρον probably had exactly the function that Apollonius Dyscolus attributes to the pronoun:[220] by using an ἄρθρον, one assigns something to the first category, thus indicating that it 'exists', without saying anything about its quality. Since the 'substance' (οὐσία) is ontologically prior to the 'quality' (ποιόν), the order of these categories explains why Dionysius suggests putting pronouns before appellative nouns. For pronouns indicate 'substance', while appellative nouns indicate the 'common quality'.[221]

There are two remaining principles of natural word order in Dionysius' account, both of which deal with the forms of verbs: ἔν τε τοῖς ῥήμασι φυλάττειν, ἵνα τὰ ὀρθὰ τῶν ἐγκλινομένων ἡγῆται καὶ τὰ παρεμφατικὰ τῶν ἀπαρεμφάτων (principles 7 and 8). The distinction between ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα (or, when we follow P, ἐγκεκλιμένα) has mostly been interpreted as one between indicatives and non-indicatives (see also section 3.8).[222] Steinthal, however, argues that the opposition between ὀρθά and ἐγκεκλιμένα is one between *present indicatives* on the one hand and all other tenses and moods on the other hand.[223] He attempts to equate the distinction between ὀρθά and ἐγκεκλιμένα (*Comp.* 5.26,14–15) with the disctinction between ὀρθά and ὕπτια that Dionysius mentions elsewhere (*Comp.* 6.29,8): with regard to the latter distinction, Steinthal again interprets ὀρθά as present indicatives, and ὕπτια (= ἐγκεκλιμένα) as all other tenses and moods. He thinks that τὰ ὕπτια in *Comp.* 6 are divided into moods (ἐγκλίσεις) on the one hand, and tenses (χρόνοι) on the other hand. However, we have already seen that ὀρθά and ὕπτια refer to the

[218] Cf. Luhtala (2000) 81 and De Jonge (2001) 164.

[219] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 27,9–10: οὐσίαν σημαίνουσιν αἱ ἀντωνυμίαι, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα οὐσίαν μετὰ ποιότητος. See also Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 9,9: ⟨ἀντωνυμίαι⟩ … οὐσίαν τε μόνον δηλοῦσιν. According to Luhtala (2000) 80, this is the original Stoic definition of the ἄρθρον. See also Pinborg (1975) 114–115.

[220] See Luhtala (2000) 80–82.

[221] For this explanation, see also De Jonge (2001) 164.

[222] See Schenkeveld (1983) 84, Usher (1985) 53. Aujac (1981) 80 offers a less specific translation: 'que les formes simples précèdent les formes infléchies (…).'

[223] Steinthal (1891 II) 274.

voices 'active' and 'passive' (sections 3.8 and 4.3.1).[224] This is the originally Stoic terminology: the Stoics distinguish between active (ὀρθά), passive (ὕπτια) and neuter (οὐδέτερα) predicates.[225] Although their theory of predicates was not taken over, it seems that their terminology for 'active' and 'passive' influenced the scholars of other language disciplines. I conclude that Steinthal was wrong in equating ἐγκεκλιμένα with ὕπτια. But how should we then interpret the distinction between ὀρθά and ἐγκεκλιμένα (or ἐγκλινόμενα) in *Comp.* 5? In grammatical texts, the distinction between ὀρθός and ἐγκλινόμενος (ἐγκεκλιμένος) normally refers to the opposition between the nominative case and the oblique cases of the nominal parts of speech,[226] But since Dionysius explicitly refers to the order of the 'direct' and 'inflected' forms of *verbs* (not nouns), it is clear that he is not thinking of the nominative and oblique cases.[227] In *Comp.* 6 however, Dionysius tells us that some people refer to the ἐγκλίσεις (moods) as 'verbal cases' (πτώσεις ῥηματικάς) (see sections 3.8 and 4.3.1).[228] I have related Dionysius' remark to Macrobius' statement that the Stoics call the indicative *modum rectum*, thus comparing the indicative to the nominative.[229] All this seems to support the interpretation of ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα as indicatives (the 'direct case' of the verb) and other moods ('oblique cases') respectively.

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[224] I agree with Schenkeveld (1983) 84, who argues that the distinction between ὀρθά and ὕπτια (*Comp.* 6.29,8) is one of 'gender' [i.e. voice] alone, whereas the distinction between ὀρθά and ἐγκεκλιμένα (*Comp.* 5.26,14–15) 'may well be one of indicatives v. non-indicatives'.

[225] See Müller (1943) 52–59 and Luhtala (2000) 94–96. In my view, Steinthal (1891 II) 274 is wrong in thinking that, in *Comp.* 6.29,7–12, Dionysius proceeds from more general items (non-indicatives) to more specific items (first moods and then tenses): 'da er aber (…) vom Allgemeinsten ins Besondere hinabsteigend von den ὕπτια zu den ἐγκλίσεις und dann zu den διαφοραὶ χρόνων gelangt (…)'. In fact, Dionysius deals with three equally specific *accidentia*, all of which he presents at the *same* level, namely voices, moods, and tenses: see section 4.3.1.

[226] In Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* II.106, αἱ ἐγκλινόμεναι πτώσεις are the inflected cases of the pronoun. In *Synt.* I.49, τῶν ἐγκλινομένων (textual variant κλινομένων) are 'declinables' (nouns etc.) as opposed to ἄκλιτα, i.e. words that do not have inflection (namely letters, such as α). Further, ὀρθόν and ἐγκεκλιμένον are found in discussions of rhetorical exercises (*progymnasmata*), indicating two out of five 'forms of narratives' (σχήματα διηγημάτων): the ὀρθὸν ἀποφαντικὸν σχῆμα only uses the nominative case, whereas the ἀποφαντικὸν ἐγκεκλιμένον σχῆμα uses also the other cases. See Hermogenes, *Progymnasmata* 2.4,21–5,9 Rabe.

[227] In some instances, Dionysius also refers to participles as ῥήματα (see section 3.6.2), but it is unlikely that he is thinking of the cases of participles here.

[228] *Comp.* 6.29,9–10.

[229] Macrobius, *De diff., G.L.* V, 611,36. Cf. Schenkeveld (1984) 335.

Before elucidating my interpretation of ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα as indicatives and non-indicatives, I will briefly mention one other explanation that might seem to be attractive:[230] one might suppose that ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα refer to the active verbs and other voices respectively. The term ἐγκλινόμενα is not attested in this sense, but the use of ὀρθά in the sense of 'active' is very common in Stoic logic, which, as we have seen, distinguishes between active (ὀρθά), passive (ὕπτια) and neuter (οὐδέτερα) predicates.[231] At the level of λέξις, the three predicate types correspond to three types of constructions, namely (1) a ῥῆμα (verb) with an oblique case, (2) a ῥῆμα (verb) with ὑπό and an oblique case, and (3) an intransitive ῥῆμα (verb), without an oblique case.[232] Is it possible that Dionysius' ὀρθά are 'active' verbs, and that the ἐγκλινόμενα correspond to passives?[233] A difficulty of this interpretation is that, in Stoic logic, passive and intransitive verbs are not regarded as 'inflected' (ἐγκλινόμενα) forms of the active forms: the terms ὀρθά, ὕπτια and οὐδέτερα do not refer to the *forms* of words, but to the meaning that they carry.[234] In technical grammar, however, the terms ὀρθή (= ἐνεργετικὴ διάθεσις) and ὑπτία (= παθητικὴ διάθεσις) might be taken to refer not only to the meaning but also to the forms of active and passive verbs.[235] Thus, the passive voice and the middle voice (e.g. ἐλύθην, λύομαι) might be considered inflected forms of the active verb form (e.g. λύω). In this context we should also mention the fact that in certain sources, the nominative case (πτῶσις ὀρθή), 'which indicates the substance' is associated with the *active* verbs (ῥήματα ὀρθά).[236] It seems, then, that we

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[230] In theories of accentuation, ὀρθός and ἐγκλινόμενος form a common pair, referring to accented words and enclitic words respectively: ὁ ὀρθὸς τονός or ἡ ὀρθὴ τάσις is the 'straight', that is acute, accent, which is opposed to ὁ ἐγκλινόμενος τονός or ἡ ἐγκλινομένη τάσις, the grave accent. But this distinction is irrelevant to Dionysius' discussion of word order.

[231] The active predicate indicates a ποιεῖν πρός τι, the passive predicate indicates a πάσχειν ὑπό τινος, and the neuter predicate indicates a pure acting or being acted upon.

[232] Cf. Müller (1943) 66–70.

[233] The middle voice was not yet distinguished in Dionysius' time: see section 3.8. and the literature mentioned there.

[234] Cf. Müller (1943) 67: 'Die Verb-Form selbst hat also nichts mit der Kennzeichnung als "Aktiv" zu tun: διαλέγεται τινι ist Aktiv!'

[235] See Rijksbaron (1986) 433. For ῥήματα ὀρθά and ὕπτια, see Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 548,34–37. For ὀρθή and ὑπτία διάθεσις, see Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 247,10–13 and *G.G.* I 3, 401,1–10.

[236] Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 546,5–14 (= *FDS* 780). On this text, see Luhtala (2000) 105–107. See also Sch. D. Thrax, *G.G.* I 3, 230,24–30.

should not directly exclude the possibility that Dionysius' seventh principle of natural word order (τὰ ὀρθὰ τῶν ἐγκλινομένων ἡγῆται) refers to the order of active verb forms and the other voices; nevertheless, I will not follow this interpretation, for reasons to be given below.[237]

To summarise, Dionysius' ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα (or ἐγκεκλιμένα) could theoretically refer to either active and non-active verbs, or indicatives and non-indicatives. As I pointed out above, I will here adopt the interpretation of these terms as indicatives and non-indicatives. The following arguments are decisive. First, Dionysius' view that the moods (ἐγκλίσεις) are 'verbal cases' (see above and section 3.8) supports the interpretation of ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα as indicatives and other moods:[238] Dionysius seems to have borrowed the terms of the 'direct' and 'inflected' cases of nominal parts of speech for the moods of verbs. Second, the rule that indicatives should precede the other moods would fit the other logical principles that Dionysius mentions: the idea that underlies the supposed order indicatives—non-indicatives would probably be that indicatives refer to a situation that exists in reality, whereas subjunctives, imperatives and optatives refer to situations that do not 'exist', but are only hypothetical, wished (prayed for), or commanded. Thus, the seventh principle of Dionysius' experiment concerning natural word order could be interpreted in accordance with the rules that indicate the priority of substance over accident. But there is a third argument. Important evidence that supports my interpretation comes from Priscian. According to the Roman grammarian, the indicative is (in a theoretical list) the *first* mood because, unlike the other moods, it designates the substance or essence of the content (*substantiam sive essentiam rei significat*):[239] therefore, the indicative may be compared to the nominative, which takes the first place among the cases.[240] Priscian's

[237] Another possibility, not mentioned yet, would be that ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα refer to the present tense and other tenses respectively. According to Aristotle, *Int.* 16b16–18, only present tenses are really 'verbs', whereas past and future tenses are 'cases of the verb' (see above and section 3.8). Ildefonse (1997) 205–210 observes that there are parallels between the Stoic theory of cases and the theory of tenses. As far as I know, however, the terms ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα are never used in the context of tenses. The suggestion of Steinthal (1891 II) 274 that the opposition is between *present*-indicatives and all other tenses and moods is based on the wrong assumption that the ὀρθά (as opposed to ὕπτια) in *Comp.* 6.29,8 are *present* indicatives: see above and section 3.8.

[238] The grammatical term for indicative is ὁριστικὴ (ἔγκλισις) or ὁριστικόν.

[239] The term *res* is presumably a translation of πρᾶγμα, which refers to the content (meaning) of verbs: see Sluiter (2000a).

[240] Priscianus, *Inst.* VIII.12.63, *G.L.* II, 421,20–422,2: *Indicativus, quo indicamus vel defin-*

views correspond to Macrobius' information about the Stoics, who are said to have regarded the indicative as *modum rectum* and to have related it with the nominative as the 'direct case'. We may conclude that the statements of Macrobius and Priscian strongly suggest that Dionysius' order of ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα is based on the Stoic view that the indicative, which indicates substance, is the first of the moods. Just like most other principles of natural word order, this order is based on the logical precedence of substance over accidents.

Finally, there is the natural order of παρεμφατικά and ἀμπαρέμφατα (principle nr. 8). Manuscript F reads τὰ παρεμφατικὰ τῶν ἀπαρεμφάτων, whereas P has τὰ ἀπαρεμφατικὰ τῶν παρεμφατικῶν. With Usener and Aujac, I adopt the order of F, because the word ἀπαρεμφατικός (only in P) is not attested in any ancient Greek text, whereas ἀπαρέμφατος is the normal grammatical term for 'infinitive'. The form ἀπαρεμφατικά seems to be either a mistake or a hypercorrection by a scribe who wanted to give the two words the same ending.[241] Apart from Dionysius of Halicarnassus (who uses the word only in *Comp.* 5.26,15), Apollonius Dyscolus seems to be the only ancient author in whose works the word παρεμφατικός has been preserved.[242] Apollonius, however, never uses παρεμφατικός on its own, but always in combination with an object in the genitive: παρεμφατικός τινος means 'indicative of something', such as person (προσώπου), place (τόπου), or manner (ποιότητος).[243] But what

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imus, quid agitur a nobis vel ab aliis, qui ideo primus ponitur, quia perfectus est in omnibus tam personis quam temporibus et quia ex ipso omnes modi accipiunt regulam et derivativa nomina sive verba vel participia ex hoc nascuntur, (…) et quia prima positio verbi, quae videtur ab ipsa natura esse prolata, in hoc est modo, quemadmodum in nominibus est casus nominativus, et quia substantiam sive essentiam rei significat, quod in aliis modis non est. Neque enim qui imperat neque qui optat neque qui dubitat in subiunctivo substantiam actus vel passionis significat, sed tantummodo varias animi voluntates de re carente substantia. Deinde hunc primum auctoritas doctissimorum tradidit modum in declinatione verborum. Cf. Steinthal (1891 II) 288. It is possible that Priscian draws on a discussion in Apollonius' *On Verbs*, which contained a passage on the order of the moods: see Lallot (1997 II) 193 n. 148 and see below.

241 Schenkeveld (1983) 89 wrongly states that the order of F is παρεμφατικά—ἀπαρεμφατικά: it is παρεμφατικά—ἀπαρέμφατα. The shorter form (ἀπαρέμφατα) corresponds to the term that grammarians use for the 'infinitive', while the longer form (ἀπαρεμφατικά) is not attested in any other text. Further, Schenkeveld (1983) 86 n. 75 incorrectly suggests that Aujac & Lebel (1981) adopt the order of P. In fact, Aujac & Lebel read παρεμφατικά—ἀπαρέμφατα (F), just like Usener.

242 For Apollonius Dyscolus' use of παρεμφατικός, παρέμφασις and παρεμφαίνειν, see Van Ophuijsen (1993) 764–767.

243 For παρεμφατικὰ προσώπου, see Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 63,10. For παρεμφατικὰ τόπου, see *Adv.*, *G.G.* II 1, 180,20. For ποιότητος παρεμφατικόν, see Apollonius Dyscolus, *Adv.*, *G.G.* II 1, 205,3–4. Cf. Schneider, *G.G.* II 3, 242 (*index*

do Dionysius' παρεμφατικά ('co-indicatives') indicate?[244] The other technical term that he mentions here, ἀπαρέμφατον, leads us to the answer. The term ἀπαρέμφατον, which literally means 'not-co-indicative', is the word that Apollonius Dyscolus and other grammarians use as their technical term for the 'infinitive'. The infinitive is 'not-co-indicative' for the reason that it does *not indicate anything except for* the minimal verbal *accidentia*: unlike the finite verb forms, the infinitive does *not* express person and number, but it does express the general verbal *accidentia* tense (χρόνος) and voice (διάθεσις).[245] Concerning these matters, Apollonius Dyscolus states the following:[246]

> Ἴδιον οὖν ῥήματός ἐστιν ἐν ἰδίοις μετασχηματισμοῖς διάφορος χρόνος διάθεσίς τε ἡ ἐνεργητικὴ καὶ παθητικὴ καὶ ἔτι ἡ μέση· ὧν πάντων μετέλαβεν τὸ γενικώτατον ῥῆμα, λέγω τὸ ἀπαρέμφατον, ἐπεὶ εἴπερ τῇ φύσει ἦν ἀπαρέμφατον, πῶς ταῦτα παρεμφαίνει;
>
> 'The essential features of a verb lie in the special inflections for different tenses and diatheses [voices]—active, passive and middle. The most general verb form, the infinitive ['non-(co)-indicative'], has part in all of these features. For if the infinitive was really naturally 'non-indicative', how could it indicate these?'[247]

Apollonius' explanation of the term 'infinitive' makes clear that it is called ἀπαρέμφατος (ἔγκλισις) because it does *not* indicate the *accidentia* that are expressed by finite verb forms (indicative, subjunctive, optative and imperative), namely number and person. Therefore, I think that

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vocabulorum): παρεμφατικός τινος *indicans alqd*. See also Van Ophuijsen (1993) 766–767, who translates the term as 'co-indicative'. He points out that the prefix παρα- in παρεμφατικός can mean either 'besides another subject' (i.e. besides another subject that indicates something) or 'besides another object' (i.e. besides another object that is indicated).

[244] Παρεμφατικός does not seem to be equivalent to the mood 'indicative' (at least, it does not refer to this mood *alone*), for which Apollonius Dyscolus uses the term ὁριστικὴ (ἔγκλισις) or ὁριστικὸν (ῥῆμα).

[245] Cf. Steinthal (1891 II) 286, Lallot (1997 II) 192 n. 143 and Sluiter (1990) 86–87. On the history of the term ἀπαρέμφατον, which is probably of Stoic origin, see also Matthaios (1999) 361–362. It is possible that Aristarchus was the first who used the term for the infinitive: in fr. 72 Matthaios, Aristonicus reports that Aristarchus pointed to the *infinitivus pro imperativo* (τὸ ἀπαρέμφατον instead of τὸ προστακτικόν) in *Iliad* 3.459. But we cannot prove that the use of these terms in the scholia can be traced back to Aristarchus himself. This problem is connected to the status of Aristonicus as a source of Aristarchus (see Matthaios [1999] 43–46). Aristonicus, who was active in the Augustan period, preserved parts of Aristarchus' ὑπομνήματα, but it is possible that he added his own terminology. See esp. Matthaios (1999) 45.

[246] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Syntaxis* III.60.

[247] I have adapted the translation of Householder (1981).

we are justified in concluding that Dionysius of Halicarnassus' opposition between παρεμφατικά and ἀπαρέμφατα is an opposition between 'finite verb forms' and 'infinitives'.[248] Dionysius' παρεμφατικά are those verbal forms that indicate number and person, namely the forms of the indicative, subjunctive, optative and imperative. Apollonius' ideas on the infinitive may also provide the explanation for the *order* of παρεμφατικά and ἀπαρέμφατα that Dionysius suggests: finite verb forms coindicate number and person, whereas infinitives only indicate voice and tense: thus, the finite verb forms point to the existence of one or more persons (I, you, he, etc.), and indirectly indicate 'substance'.[249] When we interpret the order of finite verb forms and infinitives in this way, we are able to connect the last principle (⟨ἡγῆται⟩ τὰ παρεμφατικὰ τῶν ἀπαρεμφάτων) with the logical rules that Dionysius discussed earlier in his experiment concerning natural word order: again, those words that (indirectly) point to a substance precede the forms that only point to certain accidents.[250]

Apollonius Dyscolus himself also discusses the place of the infinitive in the order of the verbal moods. Unlike Dionysius, however, Apollonius does not refer to the order of the infinitive and other moods in a sentence, but rather to a *theoretical* order, according to which the moods should be treated in a grammar. In his *Syntax*, Apollonius points out that indicatives, optatives and the other moods are 'subtypes of the general verb' (τὰ ὑπόλοιπα εἴδη τοῦ γενικοῦ ῥήματος), the general verb itself being the infinitive.[251] Therefore, the infinitive is the basis for each of the other moods: in fact, every verbal form of one of the moods corresponds to a combination of the infinitive with a word that conveys the meaning of the particular mood. For example, περιπατῶ ('I am walk-

[248] Cf. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 80, Usher (1985) 53, Aujac (1992) 258. See also Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron.*, *G.G.* II 1, 63,9–11, where ἀπαρέμφατος and παρεμφατικός (προσώπου) appear in the same context: καὶ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἀπαρεμφάτων, ἅπερ ἀντωνυμίᾳ συνταξόμενα παρεμφατικὰ γίνεται προσώπου· τὸ γὰρ 'ἐμὲ γράφειν' πρώτου καὶ τὸ 'σὲ γράφειν' δευτέρου. 'This is also clear from the infinitives, which become indicative of person when they are constructed with a pronoun: for "ἐμὲ γράφειν" ["that I write"] indicates the first person, and "σὲ γράφειν" ["that you write"] indicates the second person.'

[249] See also Ildefonse (1997) 199 on the Stoic views concerning the difference between predicates and infinitives: '(…) si tout prédicat est un prédicat déterminé, l'infinitif n'est pas encore un prédicat; abstrait de toute actualité sensible, abstrait de toute combinaison syntaxique, il est le prédicat en tant qu'il n'*existe* pas.'

[250] In De Jonge (2001) 160, I interpreted the order of παρεμφατικά and ἀπαρέμφατα as 'indicatives before infinitives', but I now think that it should be 'finite verb forms before infinitives'.

[251] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* III.60.

ing'; indicative) corresponds to ὡρισάμην περιπατεῖν ('I indicated that I was walking'), while περιπατοῖμι ('may I walk'; optative) corresponds to ηὐξάμην περιπατεῖν ('I prayed that I would walk'), etc.[252] In other words, the infinitive is the basis of all the other moods, and therefore it occupies the first place in the hierarchy of verbal forms. Apollonius also tells us that he has not forgotten that he had argued elsewhere that the indicative (and not the infinitive) is the primary verb form:[253] he has now changed his mind about the order of the moods, although he still allows that, for pedagogical reasons, the indicative is treated first, in spite of the fact that it is not the primary mood.[254] It is the infinitive that takes the first place. Lallot has suggested that Apollonius' change of mind may be related to the fact that in an earlier period he was interested in morphological aspects, whereas in the *Syntax* he focused on the syntactical functions of moods.[255] It is interesting that Apollonius compares the relationship between the infinitive and the other moods on the one hand to that of the primary word forms (τὰ πρωτότυπα) and the derived word forms (τῶν παραγωγῶν) on the other hand. This seems to suggest that the infinitives are not only theoretically prior to the other moods, but that they have also been invented earlier; in the same way, the primary word forms are supposed to have existed earlier than the derived word forms. In his discussion of the (theoretical) order of the parts of speech, Apollonius also uses the argument that some

[252] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* III.61.

[253] Apollonius probably defended this order of moods in his work *On Verbs*. Choeroboscus, who read this work, reports that Apollonius' order of moods was indicative, infinitive, optative, imperative, subjunctive: see Lallot (1997 II) 193 n. 148.

[254] Apollonius Dyscolus, *Syntax* III.62: Οὐ λέλησμαι ὡς ἐν ἑτέροις συμφερόμενός τισι τὴν ὁριστικὴν ἔγκλισιν παρεδεχόμην ὡς πρωτεύουσαν τῶν ἄλλων. ἀλλ' οὖν γε ἡ ἀκριβὴς ἐξέτασις τοῦ λόγου κατηνάγκασε τὸ μεταθέσθαι, συγχωρουμένου ἐκείνου, ὡς δεόντως ἀπὸ τῆς ὁριστικῆς ἐγκλίσεως ἀρχόμεθα, οὐχ ὡς πρώτης οὔσης, ὡς δὲ ἐκφανεστάτης οὔσης καὶ πολλῆς καὶ δυναμένης διδάξαι καὶ τὰς ἐγγενομένας συνεμπτώσεις καὶ τὰ ἐγγενόμενα πάθη καὶ παραγωγάς, οὐδὲ τοῦ τοιούτου μαχομένου, καθὸ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐλλειπεστέρα ἡ ἀπαρέμφατος ἔγκλισις, εἴγε καὶ τὰ πρωτότυπα τῶν λέξεων ἐν ἐλάττονι καταγίνεται ὕλῃ τῶν παραγωγῶν. 'I have not forgotten that I elsewhere picked the indicative as the primary verb form, in agreement with other scholars. But a more careful study of the argument has forced me to change my mind, although I allow that we begin [discussion of the verbal system] necessarily with the indicative mood, not because it is indeed primary, but because it is the most transparent, occurs frequently and can teach us the occurring similarities of form, phonological changes and derivations; the fact that the infinitive does not have the same richness of forms is not incompatible with the fact that it occupies the first place, for primary forms of words are also less bulky than derivatives.' I have adapted the translation of Householder (1981).

[255] Lallot (1997 II) 193–194 n. 149.

parts of speech 'were invented earlier' than other parts of speech.[256] In those cases, chronological priority corresponds to the hierarchical priority in the list of the parts of speech.

5.3.7. *Stoic logic and Dionysius' experiment concerning natural word order*

In the preceding sections, I have tried to illuminate the theoretical background of the principles of natural word order that Dionysius mentions in *De compositione verborum* 5. I have not only attempted to reconstruct the philosophical ideas that underlie the terminology that he uses, but also to supply an explanation for those rules that Dionysius himself does not illustrate. The experiment concerning natural word order as a whole shows a particular view on the relation between language and reality. The entire experiment is based on the implicit idea that language should represent reality as closely as possible: therefore, it is supposed that priorities that exist in reality should also be expressed in the order of words.

The eight principles that Dionysius mentions refer to at least two different types of priority. The third principle (prior in time is prior in word order) supposes that the chronological order of events in reality should correspond to the order in which these events are reported in language. Most other principles (1, 2, 4, 5, 6; presumably also 7 and 8) refer to a logical and ontological priority, which differentiates between more and less essential features of an entity or situation. Dionysius himself provides the explanation for two of the principles: (1) nouns precede verbs because an accident (συμβεβηκός) presupposes a substance (οὐσία), and (2) verbs precede adverbs because circumstances (συνεδρεύοντα) presuppose acting or being acted upon. I have argued that the order of (4) substantive and adjective, (5) appellative noun and proper noun and (6) pronoun and appellative noun should also be explained as based on a logical and ontological priority. Concerning the order of (7) indicatives and other moods and (8) finite verb forms and infinitives, we cannot be absolutely certain about the reason why these orders are natural. However, I have suggested that these principles, too, may be based on the idea that those verbal forms that (indirectly) indicate substance in reality are prior to other forms: the indicative points to the action of something or someone existent in the real world, other

[256] See Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.21 and I.25–26. Cf. De Jonge (2001) 162 and Grintser (2002) 91–92.

moods indicate the action that is only hypothetical, wished, or commanded, while infinitives do not indicate person and number, so that they do not point to any substance at all. The two types of priority to which Dionysius refers correspond, as we have seen (section 5.3.5), to some of the different uses of the word 'prior' (πρότερον) that Aristotle distinguished in his *Categories*.

Our analysis of Dionysius' principles of natural word order has shown that these principles depend to a large extent on Stoic ideas. Two principles (appellative nouns precede proper nouns and pronouns precede appellative nouns) can only be explained by taking into account the Stoic categories. The order of the Stoic categories (substance, common quality, individual quality, disposition and relative disposition) underlies the natural order of the parts of speech (pronoun, appellative noun, proper noun, verb) as Dionysius presents it. The order of substantives and adjectives, indicatives and other moods, and finite verbs and infinitives can also be related to Stoic ontology. It is certain, then, that Dionysius' experiment concerning natural word order has a Stoic background.

However, the Stoic character of the chapter on natural word order does not imply that Dionysius borrowed or copied that chapter from Stoic sources. As we have pointed out at the beginning of this section, some modern scholars (in particular Barwick and Kroll) have suggested that Dionysius took *Comp.* 5 over from Chrysippus' treatises Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν (*On the Syntax of the Parts of Speech*). As I have pointed out in section 5.3.1, these scholars use three arguments that would indicate Dionyius' dependence of Stoic sources. I will now briefly re-examine these three supposed indications. (1) First, there is the reference to the διαλεκτικαὶ τέχναι at the end of *Comp.* 5:[257] when he has rejected the theory of natural word order, Dionysius mentions both the experiment on natural word order and the dialectical treatises in one breath, telling us that he only mentioned them so that nobody, misled by the titles of the dialectical works, would think that they contained anything useful for the theory of rhetorical composition. This remark might indicate that Dionysius has borrowed the theories of natural word order from the Stoic treatises. However, in an earlier passage, he has claimed that he had put the Stoic works on syntax aside, and that he *himself* had looked for a natural starting point.[258] If

[257] *Comp.* 5.26,21–27,6.
[258] *Comp.* 4.23,1–5.

we take this remark seriously, we may also conclude that, at the end of *Comp.* 5, Dionysius summarises two unsuccessful projects, namely the experiment concerning natural word order on the one hand, and the study of the Stoic treatises on the other hand. (2) It has also been thought that the search for a natural starting point betrays the Stoic origin of *Comp.* 5. However, the idea that nature should be the guide and model for everything was a common idea among intellectuals of the first century BC, and it does not necessarily point to a Stoic source. Besides, Dionysius points to the importance of nature in a number of other passages of his rhetorical works: this seems to be a general view of Dionysius rather than the sign of a specific Stoic theory. (3) Finally, scholars have suggested that the terminology of *Comp.* 5 proves the Stoic origin of the chapter.[259] It is true that οὐσία, συμβεβηκός and τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον can probably be traced back to Stoic philosophy, as I have shown. However, Dionysius also uses a number of grammatical terms that did not have a place in Stoic logic. The Stoic system of the μέρη λόγου did not include the ἀντονομασία (or ἀντωνυμία), and the Stoics called the adverb μεσότης, not ἐπίρρημα (see sections 3.2 and 3.6.5). These facts weaken the argument that the entire chapter *Comp.* 5 was taken over from Chrysippus. Further, it is doubtful whether the Stoics themselves would have discussed the order of the parts of speech in a sentence or Homeric verse. Although Frede thinks that Dionysius' words imply that the Stoics dealt with practical word order in their works on syntax, we can also imagine that the Stoics merely argued for a natural hierarchy of the parts of speech (namely pronoun, appellative noun, proper noun, verb, adverb), without implying that this should be the word order of a Greek sentence.[260] In that case, Dionysius would have adopted a Stoic idea on the natural hierarchy of the parts of speech, which he himself applied to the order of words in Homeric verse: according to this interpretation, Dionysius would have gone one step further than the Stoics, by giving a *rhetorical* application to their philosophical hierarchy of the parts of speech.

I conclude that, although the experiment concerning natural word order is to a large extent based on Stoic ideas (especially their theory

[259] According to Pohl (1968) 79, the Homeric examples are also an indication for the Stoic origin of *Comp.* 5. She regards Pseudo-Plutarch, *On Homer* as a parallel. However, not only Stoic philosophers, but also grammarians and rhetoricians constantly used Homer as their main text of reference.

[260] Frede (1987a) 324–325.

of categories), it is unlikely that Dionysius directly copied this passage from a Stoic source. The chapter on natural word order combines Stoic philosophical and technical grammatical ideas with a rhetorical approach to composition. In any case, the experiment did not lead to the results that Dionysius had hoped for. It turned out that the beauty of Homeric verse did not depend on the adoption of the principles of nature. Therefore, Dionysius rejected the theory: nature may be a good guide, but Homer is the best.

5.4. *Natural word order according to 'Demetrius', 'Longinus', and Quintilian*

The concept of a natural word order does not only appear in the work of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, but also in that of other rhetoricians, literary critics and grammarians. Although the concept of natural word order is widespread in ancient rhetorical texts, there are interesting differences between the views of various rhetoricians, critics and grammarians. In this section, I will briefly discuss the ideas on natural word order of three ancient colleagues of Dionysius: 'Demetrius' (5.4.1), 'Longinus' (5.4.2) and Quintilian (5.4.3).

5.4.1. *Natural word order according to 'Demetrius'*

The rhetorician 'Demetrius' discusses 'the natural order of words' (ἡ φυσικὴ τάξις τῶν ὀνομάτων) in his account of the simple style (χαρακτὴρ ἰσχνός):[261]

> (199) Καὶ ὅλως τῇ φυσικῇ τάξει τῶν ὀνομάτων χρηστέον, ὡς τὸ "Ἐπίδαμνός ἐστι πόλις ἐν δεξιᾷ ἐσπλέοντι εἰς τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον".[262] πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὠνόμασται τὸ περὶ οὗ, δεύτερον δὲ ὃ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅτι πόλις, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐφεξῆς. (200) Γίγνοιτο μὲν οὖν ἂν καὶ τὸ ἔμπαλιν, ὡς τὸ "Ἔστι πόλις Ἐφύρη."[263] οὐ γὰρ πάντη ταύτην δοκιμάζομεν τὴν τάξιν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἑτέραν ἀποδοκιμάζομεν, καθὰ ἐκτιθέμεθα μόνον τὸ φυσικὸν εἶδος τῆς τάξεως. (201) Ἐν δὲ τοῖς διηγήμασιν ἤτοι ἀπὸ τῆς ὀρθῆς ἀρκτέον· "Ἐπίδαμνός ἐστι πόλις," ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰτιατικῆς, ὡς τὸ "λέγεται Ἐπίδαμνον τὴν πόλιν." αἱ δὲ

[261] 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 199–201. For date and authorship of 'Demetrius', *On Style*, see the literature mentioned in section 1.5. For 'Demetrius'' views on word order, see De Jonge (2007), where I compare the rhetorician's approach to that of Helma Dik (1995).

[262] Thucydides 1.24.1.

[263] Homer, *Iliad* 6.152.

> ἄλλαι πτώσεις ἀσάφειάν τινα παρέξουσι καὶ βάσανον τῷ τε λέγοντι αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ ἀκούοντι.
>
> '(199) In general, follow the natural word order, for example "Epidamnos is a city on your right as you sail into the Ionian gulf." The subject is mentioned first, then what it is (it is a city), then the rest follows. (200) The order can also be reversed, for example "There is a city, Ephyra." We do not rigidly approve the one nor condemn the other order; we are simply setting out the natural way to arrange words. (201) In narrative passages begin either with the nominative case (e.g. "Epidamnus is a city") or with the accusative (e.g. "It is said that the city Epidamnus …"). Use of the other cases will cause some obscurity and torture for the actual speaker and also the listener.'[264]

Unlike Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 'Demetrius' presents an account of natural word order that is pragmatic rather than grammatical. 'Demetrius' states that one should first mention τὸ περὶ οὗ, 'the matter about which': the topic.[265] This approach to word order strikingly resembles the descriptions of Greek word order that have been developed in recent years. In particular, 'Demetrius'' formulation reminds us of the ideas of Helma Dik, who has argued that a Greek sentence normally starts with the 'Topic'.[266] In Functional Grammar, the Topic presents 'the entity "about" which the predication predicates something in the given setting'.[267] Whereas Dionysius' natural word order in *Comp.* 5 was determined by logical and chronological arguments, 'Demetrius'' φυσικὴ τάξις seems to be entirely based on pragmatic considerations, which aim to present the information clearly to the audience.[268] Even his grammatical statements on the use of the cases (*Eloc.* 201) are not based

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[264] Translation by Innes (1995).

[265] Dover (1960) 9 wrongly states that 'Demetrius' argues for the order 'subject—verb', which he compares to Dionysius' remark (*Comp.* 5) on the order of nouns and verbs. Although he acknowledges that 'Demetrius'' remark on τὸ περὶ οὗ and ὃ τοῦτο ἐστιν does not mean that 'the syntactical subject precedes the syntactical predicate', Dover fails to observe the fundamental difference between the grammatical approach of Dionysius and the pragmatic approach of 'Demetrius'.

[266] Dik (1995) 12. I emphasise that I do not claim that the theories of 'Demetrius' and Dik are the same: there are many differences, and 'Demetrius' does not use the expression τὸ περὶ οὗ in the technical sense in which Dik uses the term 'Topic'. My point is rather that *if* one looks at ancient theory from a modern perspective, it is 'Demetrius' whose views are most *similar* to the modern pragmatic views on word order. A comparison with modern pragmatic theory can help us to see the differences between 'Demetrius' and Dionysius, but we should not read modern theories into 'Demetrius'' text. See De Jonge (2007).

[267] Simon C. Dik (1978) 19.

[268] The emendation by Piero Vettori (1499–1585) in *Eloc.* 199 (φυσικῇ τάξει instead of

on logical ideas, but only on the rhetorical view that one should always (at least in the simple style) avoid obscurity (ἀσάφεια): the use of other cases than the nominative and accusative at the beginning of a sentence would torture both speaker and listener.[269] In short, 'Demetrius'' perspective, which concentrates on the clear communication and presentation of a narrative, is completely different from the logical perspective that determines Dionysius' experiment in *Comp.* 5.

Another difference between 'Demetrius' and Dionysius is related to these divergent approaches, namely the position that the theory of a natural word order occupies in their work. Dionysius' experiment concerning natural word order falls outside his actual treatment of composition, since he rejects the natural principles *before* he starts his discussion of the functions, means and aims of σύνθεσις. 'Demetrius', however, deals with natural word order in his treatment of the simple style.[270] The simple style (χαρακτὴρ ἰσχνός) differs from the other styles in the use of normal words and clear constructions. In some cases, 'Demetrius' describes the simple style with the term συνήθης, which means 'usual', 'customary', or 'familiar'.[271] It seems clear, then, that his 'natural word order' is nothing more than the word order of everyday language. While hyperbaton fits the elevated style, the φυσικὴ τάξις is appropriate for the simple style.[272] In other words, 'Demetrius'' concept of 'nature' does not correspond to the concept of 'nature' in Dionysius' *Comp.* 5 but rather to his use of φύσις in other parts of his work (see section 5.2). In Dionysius' experiment, the natural order represented logical and chronological priorities that can be found in reality. In 'Demetrius'' account, however, 'natural' means 'normal' and 'unmodified', and his natural order contributes to the clarity of the information that is to be communicated.

φύσει καὶ) is without any doubt correct, as the formulation in *Eloc.* 200 (τὸ φυσικὸν εἶδος τῆς τάξεως) indicates.

[269] 'Demetrius'' metathesis of Thucydides 1.24.1 (*Eloc.* 201), which makes the sentence start with the accusative instead of the nominative, seems to reflect the exercises (*progymnasmata*) that were used in schools of rhetoric: see section 7.3.2.

[270] It is important to remember that 'Demetrius'' views on natural word order are part of his discussion of the simple style: he does not say that every sentence in any passage should start with τὸ περὶ οὗ. Therefore, I do not agree with the analysis of Weil (1978 [1844]) 14, who remarks that 'Demetrius' 'uses exaggerated expressions to establish a theory which he has not himself practiced in the treatise which contains it.'

[271] See esp. 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 60 and 190.

[272] Cf. Rhys Roberts (1969) 245.

It should be noted that 'Demetrius' does not strictly adhere to the natural order of words, but makes clear that the reversed order is also allowed. This attitude points to a similarity between 'Demetrius' and Dionysius: both rhetoricians conclude, on the basis of literary examples, that there is more than one possible word order. And in both accounts, Homer is the authority that proves that one should not rigidly stick to one single arrangement of words.

5.4.2. *Natural word order according to 'Longinus'*

'Longinus', the author of *On the Sublime*, touches on the subject of natural word order in his discussion of hyperbaton:[273]

'Longinus', *On the Sublime* 22.1:

> Τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ ὑπερβατὰ θετέον. ἔστι δὲ λέξεων ἢ νοήσεων ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀκολουθίαν κεκινημένη τάξις καὶ οἱονεὶ ⟨…⟩ χαρακτὴρ ἐναγωνίου πάθους ἀληθέστατος. ὡς γὰρ οἱ τῷ ὄντι ὀργιζόμενοι ἢ φοβούμενοι ἢ ἀγανακτοῦντες ἢ ὑπὸ ζηλοτυπίας ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου τινὸς (πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀναρίθμητα πάθη καὶ οὐδ' ἂν εἰπεῖν τις ὁπόσα δύναιτο) ἑκάστοτε παραπίπτοντες ἄλλα προθέμενοι πολλάκις ἐπ' ἄλλα μεταπηδῶσι, μέσα τινὰ παρεμβάλλοντες ἀλόγως, εἶτ' αὖθις ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ἀνακυκλοῦντες καὶ πάντη πρὸς τῆς ἀγωνίας, ὡς ὑπ' ἀστάτου πνεύματος, τῇδε κἀκεῖσε ἀγχιστρόφως ἀντισπώμενοι τὰς λέξεις τὰς νοήσεις τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἱρμοῦ παντοίως πρὸς μυρίας τροπὰς ἐναλλάττουσι τάξιν, οὕτως παρὰ τοῖς ἀρίστοις συγγραφεῦσι διὰ τῶν ὑπερβατῶν ἡ μίμησις ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα φέρεται. τότε γὰρ ἡ τέχνη τέλειος ἡνίκ' ἂν φύσις εἶναι δοκῇ, ἡ δ' αὖ φύσις ἐπιτυχὴς ὅταν λανθάνουσαν περιέχῃ τὴν τέχνην.
>
> 'In the same category we must place hyperbaton. This figure consists in arranging words and thoughts out of the logical sequence, and is, as it were, the truest mark of vehement emotion.[274] Just as people who are really angry or frightened or indignant, or are carried away by jealousy or some other feeling—there are countless emotions, no one can say how many—often put forward one point and then spring off to another, irrationally inserting some remark, and then wheel round again to their original position and are all the time dragged rapidly about, this way and that, by their excitement, as by a constantly veering wind, and vary their words, thoughts and the order that springs from the natural sequence in innumerable ways—so, too, in the best prose writers the use of hyperbata allows imitation to approach the effects of nature. For art is only perfect

[273] For date and authorship of 'Longinus', *On the Sublime*, see the literature mentioned in section 1.5.

[274] On the word ἐναγώνιον ('suited for debate'), see section 4.4.2.

> when it looks like nature and nature succeeds only when she conceals latent art.'[275]

The obscurity of this exposition on hyperbaton is not only caused by 'Longinus'' illustration of this figure by a *leçon par l'exemple*, but also by the fact that he uses the term 'nature' in two different ways.[276] We have seen that for 'Demetrius' the 'natural' order was in fact the usual and unmodified word order. Likewise, 'Longinus' regards hyperbaton as a *departure* from the 'logical order' (ἀκολουθία) or from 'the order that springs from the natural sequence' (τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἱρμοῦ τάξιν).[277] On the other hand, the departure *itself* is also a natural phenomenon, both in reality and in language: the order in reality can be disturbed by a veering wind; in language, inversion of the natural order occurs when people speak with emotion.[278] Thus, when prose writers consciously use the figure of hyperbaton, they in fact *imitate* 'the effects of nature' (τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα): their artistic use of hyperbaton imitates the natural type of expression of people who are carried away by emotion.[279] The difference between the approaches of 'Demetrius' and 'Longinus' concerning natural word order can be explained in the following way. 'Longinus' is interested in the 'sublime' (ὕψος) rather than in different styles of writing. In *On the Sublime*, he lists five sources of the sublime: great thoughts, strong emotion, figures of thought and speech, noble diction and dignified word arrangement.[280] The exposition of hyperbaton (*Subl.* 22) is part of the discussion of figures (*Subl.* 16–29), but it is clear that for 'Longinus' this figure is also related to emotion and dignified composition: thus, hyperbaton is for several reasons a very effective technique for writers who want to achieve sublime expression. Therefore, the deviant word order is much more interesting for 'Longinus' than the φυσικὴ τάξις that 'Demetrius' assigned to the simple style. It seems that 'Longinus' has made an effort to prove that hyperbaton, although it differs from the 'natural' order

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[275] The translation is based on those of Russell (1964) 138 and Fyfe / Russell (1995).

[276] On theory and example in 'Longinus' and 'Demetrius', see Innes (2002).

[277] For the term ἀκολουθία, see Sluiter (1990) 13–16 and section 5.2 of this study.

[278] The view that emotions influence the order of words is also found in the works of French grammarians of the eighteenth century, who borrowed their ideas partly from 'Longinus' and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. See Scaglione (1972) 222–282.

[279] Compare Dionysius' idea (*Is.* 16.114,9–13) that natural style is the product of art imitating nature: see section 5.2.

[280] *Subl.* 8.1.

in a strict sense, is in fact *not unnatural*:[281] the idealistic view of nature (φύσις), according to which everything that is good is also natural, seems to have caused 'Longinus' to state that the order of words that is normally considered to be deviant, is in fact in agreement with nature.[282]

Just like Dionysius, 'Longinus' uses a terminology that is philosophically coloured. Terms like ἀκολουθία (see section 5.2 above) and εἱρμός are typically Stoic; and so is the word ἡνωμένα, which occurs in the subsequent passage, where 'Longinus' adds that hyperbaton is used to separate τὰ φύσει ἡνωμένα ('things that are united by nature').[283] In Stoic philosophy, the word εἱρμός occurs in the discussion of fate: fate (εἱμαρμένη) is a 'concatenation of causes' (εἱρμός αἰτιῶν), which is explained as 'an inescapable ordering and interconnexion' (τάξις καὶ ἐπισύνδεσις ἀπαράβατος).[284] The Stoics thought that a certain rational order, which was created by the divine λόγος, was present in the entire cosmos.[285] The words τάξις, ἀκολουθία and εἱρμός refer to this rational order, indicating that each thing follows logically from another thing (see also section 5.2).[286] These philosophical ideas seem to have left traces in 'Longinus' terminology. When he mentions 'the (word) order that springs from the natural sequence' (τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἱρμοῦ τάξιν), 'Longinus' seems to be thinking of a use of language that perfectly mirrors the reality to which it refers. In this respect, his concept of natural word order corresponds to that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who, as we have seen, experimented with verses that reflected as much as possible the logical order of things in reality.

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[281] Quintilian (*Inst.* 9.4.26) seems to struggle with the same problem, and he therefore emphasises that hyperbaton, although it departs from the *naturalis ordo*, belongs to the tropes and figures, 'which are good features' (*virtutes*): see section 5.4.3.

[282] For a discussion of 'realistic' and 'idealistic' views of nature, see Boswell (1980) 11–13. See also De Jonge (2001) 161–162.

[283] *Subl.* 22.3: 'Thucydides is even more [than Herodotus] a master in the use of hyperbata to separate ideas which are naturally one and indivisible.' For ἡνωμένα, see *SVF* II.368 and Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* I.10 and II.149 (ἡνωμένα as *composita*).

[284] *SVF* II.917. See L&S 55J.

[285] Cf. Sluiter (1990) 13–14: 'The Stoa believes that a divine λόγος permeates the whole cosmos as a supreme rational principle, creating order everywhere. This rational order may be indicated by the terms ἀκολουθία and τάξις, τάξις representing the structural orderliness itself, i.e. the fact that one thing follows another, ἀκολουθία adding the idea that one thing follows *from* another, i.e. introducing a notion of causal nexus. Often, however, these words seem to be used as mere synonyms.'

[286] See *SVF* II.920.

In the rhetorical debate on the natural order of words, 'Longinus' takes a special stand. We recall that Dionysius of Halicarnassus altogether rejected his logical concept of natural word order, because it turned out to be useless. 'Demetrius' adopted ἡ φυσικὴ τάξις in his rhetorical theory: for him, natural word order was identical with the unmodified word order of normal language, which belonged to the simple style. 'Longinus', however, goes even further. He agrees that there is a certain normal or logical order that can be called 'natural', but at the same time he argues that the *departure* and *variation* from the normal order is also in a certain way in agreement with nature: thus, the unnatural order (both in reality and in language) is in fact also natural.

5.4.3. *Natural word order according to Quintilian*

Having dealt with three different approaches to natural word order found in Greek rhetoric and literary criticism, we finally turn to Roman theory. Quintilian's treatment of *naturalis ordo* is part of his account on *compositio*. According to Quintilian, composition consists of three necessary elements, namely word order (*ordo*), linkage (*iunctura*) and rhythm (*numerus*).[287] In his discussion of *ordo*, Quintilian first explains that 'sentences should grow and rise' (*augeri enim debent sententiae et insurgere*): stronger words should follow weaker words, so that the sentence does not end in an anticlimax. Next, there follows a passage on natural word order:[288]

> (23) *Est et alius naturalis ordo, ut 'uiros ac feminas', 'diem ac noctem', 'ortum et occasum' dicas potius, quamquam et*[289] *retrorsum.* (24) *Quaedam ordine permutato fiunt superuacua, ut 'fratres gemini': nam si 'gemini' praecesserint, 'fratres' addere non est necesse. Illa nimia quorundam fuit obseruatio, ut uocabula uerbis, uerba rursus aduerbiis, nomina adpositis et pronomin⟨a nomin⟩ibus*[290] *essent priora: nam fit contra quoque frequenter non indecore.* (25) *Nec non et illud nimiae superstitionis, uti quaeque sint tempore, ea facere etiam ordine priora, non quin frequenter sit hoc melius, sed quia interim plus ualent ante gesta ideoque leuioribus superponenda sunt.* (26) *Verbo sensum cludere multo, si compositio patiatur, optimum est: in uerbis enim sermonis uis est. Si id asperum erit, cedet haec ratio numeris, ut fit apud summos Graecos Latinosque oratores frequentissime. Sine dubio erit omne quod non cludet hyperbaton,*

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[287] Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.4.22.

[288] Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.4.23–27.

[289] The reading of A is *quamquam et*. In some MSS this reading has been corrected into *quam*: see below.

[290] I adopt Naylor's conjecture *pronomina nominibus* for *pronominibus* (A). See Naylor (1923).

sed ipsum hoc inter tropos uel figuras, quae sunt uirtutes, receptum est. (27) *Non enim ad pedes uerba dimensa sunt, ideoque ex loco transferuntur in locum, ut iungantur quo congruunt maxime, sicut in structura saxorum rudium etiam ipsa enormitas inuenit cui adplicari et in quo possit insistere. Felicissimus tamen sermo est cui et rectus ordo et apta iunctura et cum his numerus oportune cadens contigit.*

'(23) There is also a natural order: "men and women", "day and night", "rising and setting", though the reverse does occur also. (24) Some words become superfluous when you change the order. Take *fratres gemini*, "twin brothers": if *gemini* has come first, there is no need to add *fratres*. The rule given by some theorists, that nouns should precede verbs, verbs adverbs, nouns adjectives, and pronouns nouns, is much too rigid, for the contrary order is often excellent. (25) Another piece of gross superstition is the idea that as things come first in time, so they should also come first in order. It is not that this is not frequently the better course, but earlier events are sometimes more important and so have to be given a position of climax over the less significant. (26) If composition allows, it is much best to end with a verb, for the force of language is in the verbs. If this proves harsh, the principle will give way to rhythm, as often happens in the greatest orators, both Greek and Latin. Of course, every verb which does not come at the end will give us a hyperbaton; but this itself counts as a trope or a figure, and these are good features. (27) The point is that words are not measured according to metrical feet; they are therefore moved from one place to another so as to join where they fit best, just as, in constructions made of unhewn stones, the irregularity itself suggests the right stones which each piece can fit or rest upon. However the most successful style is that in which natural order, well-fitting linkage and appropriate rhythm are all found.'

Quintilian's treatment of word order has been described as 'scanty and unsystematic'.[291] I do not agree with this conclusion, at least not as far as his discusion of *naturalis ordo* is concerned. Part of the confusion on the side of modern interpreters may have been caused by the fact that Quintilian is doing two things at the same time. On the one hand, he seems to be reacting to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whose logical principles of natural word order are refuted in *Inst.* 9.4.24–25. On the other hand, Quintilian himself offers a more pragmatic account of natural word order, which is closely connected to his earlier view that 'sentences should grow', and which implies that the most forceful words should be placed at the end of the sentence. I will first deal with Quintilian's refutation of the rigid, logical principles of natural word order that he probably found in Dionysius, and next with his own, more pragmatic ideas.

[291] Naylor (1923) 156.

In *Inst.* 9.4.24, Quintilian rejects the theory of 'certain people' (*quorundam*) that nouns should precede verbs, verbs adverbs, substantives adjectives, and pronouns nouns: 'for the contrary order is often not unbecoming' (*nam fit contra quoque frequenter non indecore*). This passage appears like a perfect summary of Dionysius' chapter on natural word order, where, as we have seen, Homeric verses proved that beauty and attractiveness do not depend on the order of grammatical unities. According to the manuscripts, the idea of some people was that 'nouns should be placed before adjectives and pronouns' (*nomina adpositis et pronominibus essent priora*). However, if we compare this statement with Dionysius' rule τὰς δ'ἀντονομασίας ⟨προτάττειν⟩ τῶν προσηγορικῶν, we will easily see that Naylor's simple correction (… *pronomina nominibus essent priora*) is without any doubt correct.[292] It seems clear, then, that Quintilian's *quorundam obseruatio* ('the theory of some people') refers directly to Dionysius' experiment concerning natural word order. Quintilian refers to Dionysius three times in total, and two of these references occur in book 9 of the *Institutio oratoria*, namely in the sections on figures and on prose rhythm.[293] Besides, Quintilian's comparison between rhetorical composition and a construction of stones (*structura saxorum*, *Inst.* 9.4.27) seems to be based on the analogy that Dionysius draws in *Comp.* 6 (see below).

Apart from the grammatical rules (nouns before verbs, verbs before adverbs, etc.), Quintilian also refutes Dionysius' third principle of natural word order, according to which things that are prior in time should also be prior in word order (see section 5.3.5 above). Quintilian's formulation (*uti quaeque sint tempore, ea facere etiam ordine priora*) closely resembles Dionysius' rule: ὅπως τὰ πρότερα τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ τάξει πρότερα λαμβάνηται.[294] Like Dionysius, Quintilian rejects this piece of 'superstition', but his argument has often been misunderstood. He states that the idea that word order should follow the chronological sequence of events is wrong, *non quin frequenter sit hoc melius, sed quia interim plus ualent ante gesta ideoque leuioribus superponenda sunt*. Many modern scholars have thought

[292] Naylor (1923) 156–157. As far as I know, Russell (2001) is the only edition that has adopted Naylor's conjecture. The edition by Winterbottom (Oxford 1970) follows the MSS at this point.

[293] Quintilian, *Inst.* 3.1.16; 9.3.89 (figures); 9.4.88 (prose rhythm). Dionysius is not mentioned in *Inst.* 10, but Quintilian's reading list is presumably largely based on Dionysius' *On Imitation*.

[294] *Comp.* 5.25,11–12. See section 5.3.5.

that *superponere* means 'to put before'.[295] Thus, according to Scaglione, Quintilian states that 'certain events which occurred earlier must be mentioned first not really for that reason [sc. that they occurred earlier], but because they happen to be more important.'[296] This interpretation is wrong, for *superponere* dos not mean 'to place before', but 'to place after'.[297] In fact, Quintilian says that earlier events, if they are more important, should be placed *after* the later events: this argumentation perfectly fits his view that stronger words should be placed at the end of a sentence, and that sentences should 'grow and rise'.[298] Again, Quintilian prefers a *pragmatic* approach to the 'superstitious' idea that language should perfectly mirror the order of reality. For Quintilian, word order is not the representation of a logical or chronological order in the real world; it should not be based on priorities that exist in reality, but rather on the requirements of clear communication and on the rhetorical effects that one wishes to achieve. Quintilian is more explicit about this kind of considerations than Dionysius. The differences between the approaches of the two rhetoricians are of course also related to the fact that they focus on two different languages: it should be noted that Quintilian's view that the most important information should be placed at the end of the sentence fits only Latin, and not Greek syntax.[299]

Quintilian rejects the logical and chronological principles that Dionysius discussed in *Comp.* 5, but he also expresses his own views on *naturalis ordo*. To begin with, Quintilian refers to a number of fixed expressions, each of which consists of two opposed notions: 'men and women', 'day and night', and 'rising and setting'. Why is the word order in these expressions natural? In the first instance, the answer seems to be that this is the *customary* way of speaking. But there might be still another factor at work, namely the implicit view that in each of the formulas mentioned a positive notion precedes a negative notion.

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[295] Cf. Butler (1921) 521 ('placed before') and Cousin (1978) 238 ('les placer avant').

[296] Scaglione (1972) 76.

[297] For the meaning of *superponere* ('to place after'), see Quintilian, *Inst.* 8.4.6 and cf. Lewis & Short (1993 [1879]) s.v. *superpono*. The translations of Watson (1876) 217 ('to be put after') and Russell (2001) 175 (see above) are correct.

[298] Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.4.23 (see above).

[299] In his discussion of Latin word order, Pinkster (1990) 178–184 considers the possibility that the final position of a sentence is reserved for Focus constituents. Pinkster indeed shows (178–179) that non-finite verb constituents in the final position of a sentence often contain 'salient information', but he decides that more research on this subject is needed.

In that case, this implicit idea of natural order would correspond to one of the distinctions that Aristotle made concerning the use of the word 'prior' (which I have discussed in section 5.3.5 above):[300] Aristotle tells us that 'what is better and more valued' (τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον) is often thought to be 'prior by nature' (πρότερον τῇ φύσει). We have already seen that Dionysius of Halicarnassus' principles corresponded to two other usages of the word 'prior' that Aristotle distinguishes. Whether the order of *uiros ac feminas*, *diem ac noctem* and *ortum et occasum* is based only on customary usage or on a supposed priority of positive over negative notions, it is clear that Quintilian does not rigidly stick to this 'natural' order of words. Just like 'Demetrius' (καὶ τὸ ἔμπαλιν, *Eloc.* 200), Quintilian explicitly mentions that the reversed order is also possible: *quamquam et retrorsum*.[301]

Next, Quintilian remarks that, in some cases, change of the natural word order will make certain words superfluous: *fratres gemini* seems to be the natural order, because after *gemini* the word *frates* is not anymore necessary. Dionysius of Halicarnassus did not discuss this aspect of word order, but it is possible that Quintilian's remark is somehow related to Dionysius' order of appellative and proper nouns.[302] *Gemini* is not a proper noun, but it is more specific than *fratres*. Dionysius' order of appellative noun and proper noun was, as we have seen, based on the Stoic idea that the 'commonly qualified individuals' precede 'the peculiarly qualified individuals'.[303] It is possible that Quintilian thought that the order of appellative nouns and proper nouns, mentioned by Dionysius, was based on the idea that a general qualification would become superfluous (*supervacua*) if a more specific qualification preceded it. If this is true, Quintilian's example of 'twins' and 'brothers' may be considered a reformulation of Dionysius' rule concerning appellative and proper nouns.

Having rejected the useless grammatical rules that Dionysius had tested in his experiment, Quintilian draws up a grammatical principle

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[300] Aristotle, *Cat.* 14a26–b23.

[301] Some manuscripts have corrected *quamquam et* into *quam* ('rather than'), a reading that is adopted by Butler (1921) 518 ('in preference to the reversed order'). However, *quamquam et* is definitely correct: just like Dionysius and 'Demetrius', Quintilian states that the reversed (not natural) order is also possible.

[302] *Comp.* 5.26,12–13 (τὰ δὲ προσηγορικὰ ⟨προτάττειν⟩ τῶν ὀνοματικῶν): see section 5.3.6.

[303] *FDS* 849: see section 5.3.6.

of his own, which is particularly appropriate to the Latin language:[304] verbs should be placed at the end of the sentence, 'because the force of language is in the verbs' (*in verbis enim sermonis vis est*).[305] By consequence, he adds, every sentence that does not end with a verb will be a case of hyperbaton. But Quintilian hastens to say that hyperbaton belongs to the tropes or figures, which are 'good features' (*virtutes*). Here, Quintilian seems to struggle with the same problem as 'Longinus': if hyperbaton is a departure from the *natural* order, it might easily appear to be wrong. 'Longinus' solved the problem by pointing out that the deviant order is also natural (since it occurs when people are moved by emotions); in a similar way, Quintilian emphasises that hyperbaton is a *virtus*, and that it occurs in the greatest orators, both Greek and Latin.[306] We may compare the passages in which Dionysius hesitates whether a deviating expression is a figure or a solecism (section 5.2). It is for the sake of rhythm that one could break the rule of ending the sentence with a verb, according to Quintilian. His argumentation for the precedence of rhythm over natural word order strongly reminds us of Dionysius' ideas on prose rhythm. Words have to be transposed from one place to another for the reason that 'they are not measured according to metrical feet' (*non ad pedes verba dimensa sunt*).[307] This statement is then illustrated with the analogy of a construction of unhewd stones (*structura saxorum rudium*), which evokes Dionysius' views on the architectural character of composition (see sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2).[308] Quintilian concludes that the ideal style is the one in which the three

[304] *Inst.* 9.4.26. It is not entirely clear whether this section is stil part of Quintilian's discussion of *natural* word order. It is possible that only *Inst.* 9.4.23–25 deals with natural order, and that *Inst.* 9.4.26ff. contains remarks on *ordo* in general. However, I think that *rectus ordo* in *Inst.* 9.4.27 (cf. *Inst.* 2.5.11) is identical with *naturalis ordo* in *Inst.* 9.4.23. Besides, we have seen that 'Longinus' (*Subl.* 22.1) also discusses natural word order in the context of hyperbaton. Therefore I believe that natural word order is the subject of the whole passage *Inst.* 9.4.23–28.

[305] For the position of the verb in the Latin sentence, see Linde (1923). See also Pinkster (1990) 168–169 and 178–179, who reports that in Caesar the finite verb occupies the final position in 84% of the main sentences, whereas the percentage is much lower in writers such as Cicero and Varro.

[306] In *Inst.* 9.4.28, Quintilian adds that not all hyperbata (*transgressiones*) are to be recommended: some are too long (see also *Inst.* 8.6.67) and others are too free.

[307] Quintilian rightly observes that the metrical feet that are used in composition often exceed the boundaries of words, a fact that Dionysius (*Comp.* 17–18) does not always take into account when illustrating different rhythms with single words. Cf. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 211 n. 3.

[308] See *Comp.* 6.28,5ff. and *Comp.* 22.96,16–19.

aspects of composition, *rectus ordo*, 'well-fitting linkage' (*apta iunctura*) and 'appropriate rhythm' (*cum his numerus oportune cadens*) are all present. *Rectus ordo* seems to be identical with the *naturalis ordo*.[309] Another passage where the expression *rectus ordo* occurs suggests that this is the normal and unmodified order of words, as it occurs in everyday language.[310] Thus, for Quintilian, natural word order seems to be the unmodified and customary order of words: *rectus ordo* entails that verbs are placed at the end of the sentence, but the order can be changed for the sake of rhythm and effective linkage (*iunctura*).

To conclude this discussion, I would like to emphasise that Quintilian's view on the position of verbs is not based on any *logical* consideration, but rather on the more general idea that in Latin the most significant information should have its place at the end of the sentence.[311] In other words, Quintilian, just like 'Demetrius', presents a *pragmatic* account of natural word order, which may indeed be regarded as more useful for rhetorical writing than the logical approach that Dionysius of Halicarnassus had proven to be wrong.

5.5. *Conclusion*

In this chapter, I have discussed Dionysius of Halicarnassus' views on natural style in general, and natural word order in particular. I have distinguished between two concepts of the 'natural' that we find in Dionysius' works.

First, we have dealt with Dionysius' general ideas on natural style, syntax and word order. We have seen that 'the natural' (τὸ φυσικόν) is a central concept throughout his works. Many aspects of texts are described in terms of 'natural' or 'unnatural', both on the level of thoughts and on the level of expression. Dionysius frequently objects to a style that he regards as unnatural, by which he means that a writer deviates too much from normal usage; this can be the case both in vocabulary and in aspects of word order and syntax. In Dionysius' view, orators should always make themselves clear, and not only to the intellectual few. In his later works, Dionysius adopts a grammatical framework, including ideas on ἀκολουθία and ὁ κατάλληλος λόγος which

[309] Cf. Butler (1921) 521 and Russell (2001) 175, who both translate it as 'natural order'.
[310] In *Inst.* 2.5.11, *rectus ordo* is opposed to *sermo deflexus*.
[311] See *Inst.* 9.4.29–31.

enables him to analyse more closely the particular aspects of unnatural compositions. At the same time, he usefully applies the method of metathesis, by which he is able to point out the exact differences between a deviating and a more customary style.

Next, we have focused on *On Composition* 5, in which Dionysius uses a different concept of natural word order. Here, word order is mainly determined by the rules of logic and ontology. I have argued that Dionysius' experiment on natural word order is largely inspired by Stoic ideas on language. In particular, the order of the Stoic categories seems to underlie the supposedly natural order of the parts of speech in *Comp*. 5. Finally, we have compared Dionysius' views with the ideas of three other critics and rhetoricians. This comparison has once more made it clear that the term 'nature' can be used in very different ways. 'Demetrius' takes a more pragmatic approach to the concept of natural word order than Dionysius. 'Longinus' is determined to show that deviating word order is in fact also natural. And Quintilian not only rejects the 'superstitious' ideas with which Dionysius experimented, but also argues for a word order that is rhetorically efficient.

Our examinations in this chapter have clearly illustrated the close connections between grammar, philosophy and rhetoric in Dionysius' works. In *On Composition* 5, Dionysius decides to reject the logical approach to the problem of word order. But his analyses of style in other parts of his work make use of a grammatical apparatus that foreshadows the syntactic work of Apollonius Dyscolus. It has become manifest that Dionysius' discussions of natural style and syntax are built on a sophisticated knowledge of linguistic matters, which combines ideas from grammar and Stoic philosophy. With this observation we conclude our investigations into Dionysius' use of the parts of speech, which has been the object of our attention in chapters 3–5. In order to illuminate Dionysius' integration of language disciplines further, we will now turn to his views on prose, poetry and poetic prose.

CHAPTER SIX

THE INITIATION RITES OF STYLE: DIONYSIUS ON PROSE, POETRY, AND POETIC PROSE

6.1. *Introduction*

> 'My next subject is like the Mysteries: it cannot be divulged to people in large numbers. I should not, therefore, be guilty of rudeness, if I invited only "those with a sacred right" to approach the initiation rites of style, while telling the "profane" to "close the gates over their ears". Some people reduce the most serious subject to ridicule through their own callowness, and no doubt there is nothing unnatural in their attitude.'[1]

It is with these mystical formulas that Dionysius of Halicarnassus introduces the final chapters of his work *On Composition* (25–26). In these chapters, he tries to answer the question of how prose can be made to resemble a beautiful poem, and in what way a poem can be made similar to beautiful prose.[2] The 'initiation rites of style' (τὰς τελετὰς τοῦ λόγου) constitute the climax of Dionysius' composition theory, namely the writing of prose with poetic beauty.[3] Although word choice plays a role (thus, Plato in particular used poetic vocabulary), Dionysius focuses on rhythm, since the subject of his work is composition.[4] His views on prose rhythm reflect Aristotle's views to a certain extent, but Dionysius goes much further than Aristotle in tracing metrical elements in prose

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[1] *Comp.* 25.124,2–8: μυστηρίοις μὲν οὖν ἔοικεν ἤδη ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ εἰς πολλοὺς οἷά τε ἐστὶν ἐκφέρεσθαι, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴην φορτικός, εἰ παρακαλοίην "οἷς θέμις ἐστὶν" ἴκειν ἐπὶ τὰς τελετὰς τοῦ λόγου, "θύρας δ' ἐπιθέσθαι" λέγοιμι ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τοὺς "βεβήλους". εἰς γέλωτα γὰρ ἔνιοι λαμβάνουσι τὰ σπουδαιότατα δι' ἀπειρίαν, καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον πάσχουσιν. On the mystical formulas in this text, see section 6.2.

[2] *Comp.* 25.122,13–16: see section 6.5.

[3] Although λόγος is 'text' or 'discourse' rather than 'style', I translate τὰς τελετὰς τοῦ λόγου as 'the initiation rites of style', following Rhys Roberts ('the rites of style') and Usher ('the initiation rituals of style'). Dionysius will initiate his audience into the secrets of composing a discourse (λόγος) that resembles good poetry. Since it is the use of stylistic means (in particular rhythm, but also word choice) that leads to such λόγος, I think that we are justified in rendering τὰς τελετὰς τοῦ λόγου as 'the initiation rites of style'. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 176 translate the words as 'ces rites de langage'.

[4] *Comp.* 25.124,12–21.

writing. His metrical analyses of passages from the speeches *Against Aristocrates* and *On the Crown* serve to present Demosthenes as the champion of poetic prose.

In this way, Dionysius of Halicarnassus blurs the boundaries between prose and poetry more than any other ancient rhetorician seems to have done. In his analysis of Demosthenes' prose, he detects almost complete lines of poetry. Thus, according to Dionysius, the opening of Demosthenes' speech *Against Aristocrates* consists of an incomplete anapaestic tetrameter, an elegiac pentameter, a combination of a Sapphic line and the last part of a comic tetrameter, two slightly irregular iambic trimeters, an anapaestic line, and another iambic trimeter.[5] Dionysius tells us that, in order to obscure the metre, Demosthenes has removed one or two feet from each verse; further, he is claimed to have included three clauses *without* metre. The reason for this is that, as Dionysius states, 'it is not appropriate for prose to appear to be *in metre* (ἔμμετρον) or *in rhythm* (ἔρρυθμον); for in that case it will be a poem and a lyric, and will absolutely abandon its proper character; it is enough that it should simply appear rhythmical (εὔρυθμον) and metrical (εὔμετρον): in this way, prose may be poetic, though not actually a poem, and lyrical, without being a lyric.'[6] Now, in the first instance, the latter words might remind us of Aristotle's warning that 'prose must be rhythmical, but not metrical', since it would otherwise be a poem.[7] And indeed Dionysius

[5] *Comp.* 25.126,16–131,13. Dionysius cites the full sentence in *Comp.* 25.123,7–15 as follows: Μηδεὶς ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίσῃ με μήτ' ἰδίας ἔχθρας μηδεμιᾶς ἕνεχ' ἥκειν Ἀριστοκράτους κατηγορήσοντα τουτουί, μήτε μικρὸν ὁρῶντά τι καὶ φαῦλον ἁμάρτημα ἑτοίμως οὕτως ἐπὶ τούτῳ προάγειν ἐμαυτὸν εἰς ἀπέχθειαν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἄρ' ὀρθῶς ἐγὼ λογίζομαι καὶ σκοπῶ, περὶ τοῦ Χερρόνησον ἔχειν ὑμᾶς ἀσφαλῶς καὶ μὴ παρακρουσθέντας ἀποστερηθῆναι πάλιν αὐτῆς, περὶ τούτου ἐστί μοι ἅπασα ἡ σπουδή. 'Let none of you, people of Athens, suppose that I come here before you, led by a wish to indulge a personal hate of my own, to accuse the defendant Aristocrates here; or that it is because I have my eye on a minute misdemeanour of the man that now I am so keen to attack and expose myself to his hostility. But if I calculate and consider indeed correctly, my only concern is that you safely have the land of Chersonese and that you are not tricked into having it taken from you again.' Dionysius divides this period into ten units: for discussions of Dionysius' metrical analysis, see Rhys Roberts (1910) 256–261, Aujac & Lebel (1981) 178–182 and Usher (1985) 214–221.

[6] *Comp.* 25.125,2–7: οὐ μέντοι προσήκει γε ἔμμετρον οὐδ' ἔρρυθμον αὐτὴν εἶναι δοκεῖν (ποίημα γὰρ οὕτως ἔσται καὶ μέλος ἐκβήσεταί τε ἁπλῶς τὸν αὑτῆς χαρακτῆρα), ἀλλ' εὔρυθμον αὐτὴν ἀπόχρη καὶ εὔμετρον φαίνεσθαι μόνον· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν εἴη ποιητικὴ μέν, οὐ μὴν ποίημά γε, καὶ ἐμμελὴς μέν, οὐ μέλος δέ.

[7] Aristotle, *Rh.* 1408b30–32: διὸ ῥυθμὸν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον, μέτρον δὲ μή· ποίημα γὰρ ἔσται. ῥυθμὸν δὲ μὴ ἀκριβῶς· τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται ἐὰν μέχρι του ᾖ. 'Prose, then, is to be rhythmical, but not metrical, or it will become not prose but verse. It should not even

explicitly refers to the views on prose rhythm that Aristotle presented in the third book of his *Rhetoric*.[8] However, Aristotle would probably not have approved of Dionysius' analysis of Demosthenes' prose into almost complete verses. In any case, he would not have agreed with Dionysius' evaluation of such a style. Aristotle explicitly rejects metrical prose, and he adds that even separate rhythms should only be included to a certain extent.[9] In other words, Dionysius' reference to Aristotle in the context of prose rhythm is somewhat problematic: it seems that Dionysius uses Aristotle as an authority for his own theories, albeit the philosopher's views were actually rather different.[10]

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have too precise a prose rhythm, and therefore should only be rhythmical to a certain extent.' (Translation Rhys Roberts 1924.)

[8] *Comp.* 25.126,2–11: καὶ ὅτι ἀληθῆ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐγὼ καινοτομῶ, λάβοι μὲν ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους μαρτυρίας τὴν πίστιν· εἴρηται γὰρ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ τά τε ἄλλα περὶ τῆς λέξεως τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ βύβλῳ τῶν ῥητορικῶν τεχνῶν οἵαν αὐτὴν εἶναι προσῆκεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐρυθμίας ἐξ ὧν τις τοιαύτη γένοιτο· ἐν ᾗ τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ὀνομάζει ῥυθμοὺς καὶ πῇ χρήσιμος ἕκαστος αὐτῶν καταφαίνεται, καὶ λέξεις παρατίθησί τινας αἷς πειρᾶται βεβαιοῦν τὸν λόγον. 'And that this is true, and that I am not inventing something unheard of, anyone may prove to himself by examining the testimony of Aristotle; for in the third book of his *Rhetoric* the philosopher, when describing the various requirements of political oratory, refers specifically to the good rhythm which would fulfil those requirements. In that passage he names the most suitable rhythms, indicates where each of them may be used to effect, and tries to confirm his argument by adducing some illustrative passages.'

[9] Some scholars fail to recognise the differences between Aristotle's views on prose rhythm and the ideas that Dionysius presents in *Comp.* 25. Atkins (1934 II) 119 states: 'Following Aristotle, he [Dionysius] declares further that prose must be rhythmical without being metrical, and that all sorts of rhythm find a place in prose.' In fact, however, Aristotle does not think that 'all sorts of rhythm' can be used in prose. Like Atkins, Bonner (1938) 259 argues that Dionysius takes up the views of Aristotle and Theophrastus on prose rhythm, thus ignoring the fundamental differences between Aristotle, *Rh.* 1408b21–1409a21 and Dionysius, *Comp.* 25. These scholars attach more importance to Dionysius' reference to Aristotle (*Comp.* 25.126,2–11) than to his actual ideas in the rest of *Comp.* 25.

[10] Dionysius' reference to Aristotle's theory of prose rhythm is not the only problematic one: similar difficulties occur in Cicero and 'Demetrius'. In Cicero, *De oratore* 3.182, Crassus states that Aristotle recommends the use of dactyls and paeans (see section 6.4): *qua re primum ad heroum nos invitat*, 'for this reason he urges us, in the first place, to use dactyls.' (Translation May & Wisse [2001].) However, Aristotle's treatment of the heroic foot (*Rh.* 1408b32–33) does not seem to support Crassus' claim. Besides, Cicero interprets Aristotle's view on the heroic foot in *Orator* 192 as a negative judgement: 'Aristotle thinks the heroic measure too dignified for prose' (*iudicat heroum numerum grandiorem quam desideret soluta oratio*). Cf. Cope (1867) 304, Cope (1877 III) 86, and Hendrickson (1904) 130; on Cicero's reference, see Wisse (1989) 121–126 and Fortenbaugh (2005) 324, who concludes that Cicero is using an intermediate source or summary of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. A similar problem occurs in 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 38, who seems to suggest that Aristotle recommended the use of the paean only in the grand style: σύνθεσις δὲ μεγαλοπρεπής,

In this chapter, I will focus on Dionysius' *theory* of poetic prose rather than on his practical analyses of rhythm in rhetorical speeches.[11] Where the preceding chapters of this study (3–5) have highlighted the connections between grammar, philosophy and rhetoric, the present chapter will concentrate on the relations between rhetorical and poetical theory, and, to a lesser extent, musical theory. The questions that will concern us are the following. First, why does Dionysius conclude his work *On Composition* with a discussion of prose resembling beautiful poetry and poetry resembling beautiful prose? Second, how can we explain that, in the final chapters of that work, Dionysius takes a stand that diverges so strongly from the views of Aristotle, who, in his *Rhetoric*, emphasised the *differences* rather than the similarities between prose and poetry? Although Dionysius rejects the 'dithyrambic' style of Gorgias, we will see that his ideas on the magical effects of poetic prose echo to a certain extent the views of the famous sophist. Gorgias' views on the connection between magic, poetry and rhetoric seem to be a good starting point for a discussion of *On Composition* 25.

6.2. *The magic of poetic speech: Gorgias, Dionysius and 'Longinus'*

When Dionysius invites his readers to undergo the initiation rites of style, he quotes some words (οἷς θέμις ἐστίν … θύρας δ' ἐπιθέσθαι … βεβήλους) from a hexameter that we know from the so-called Orphic texts.[12] The second half of this hexameter is also preserved in the proem of the Orphic poem in the Derveni papyrus. The complete verse is as follows:[13]

> φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστί· θύρας δ' ἐπίθεσθε βέβηλοι.
>
> 'I will speak for those with a sacred right: but you, ye profane, close your doors!'

ὥς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης, ἡ παιωνική. 'Paeonic composition is grand, as Aristotle says.' In fact, Aristotle does not know a system of different styles. We may conclude that in their wish to speak on the authority of Aristotle, rhetoricians were sometimes perhaps too eager to drop his name; in any case, they were not always careful in quoting the exact words of the master (cf. Cope [1877 III] 83).

[11] On the more technical aspects of Dionysius' theory of rhythm and metre, see Gentili (1990a = 1990b).

[12] For Dionysius' words (*Comp.* 25.124,2–8) see section 6.1 above.

[13] Orphic fragments nr. 1 Bernabé, see also fr. 245–247 Kern.

Different versions of this formula are found in many writers from Plato onwards.[14] Why does Dionysius choose these cryptic words to introduce the subject of poetic prose? In my view, the answer to this question must start from two observations. First, it should be pointed out that initiation rites seem to be a *topos* in ancient discussions of the didactic process.[15] I have already drawn attention to the pedagogical character of the work *On Composition* as a whole (sections 1.3 and 1.6).[16] In the final chapters of this treatise, Dionysius arrives at the climax of his instructions in composition. Now that the student has been introduced to the aims, means and types of σύνθεσις, he is ready to enter the final subject of composition theory. Only those readers who have sufficiently been trained in the rules of the game will be allowed to learn the secrets of poetic prose, which crown and complete Dionysius' supervision and guidance.[17] I will return to this didactic aspect at the end of this chapter (section 6.5).

However, there seems to be a second dimension to Dionysius' reference to initiation rites, which we should not ignore. In my view, it is very appropriate that Dionysius introduces his account of poetic prose by quoting a verse that was associated with Orpheus, the mythical singer who was known for the enchanting effect of his voice and music.[18] Since Dionysius thinks that oratory and music differ from each other only in degree, and not in kind, it might be significant that he evokes the figure of Orpheus at this point in his treatise.[19] Orators

[14] Plato, *Smp.* 218b5–7. See West (1983) 82–84. In his article 'Die Mysterien der Rhetorik', Kirchner (2005) discusses the references to Mysteries and initiation in ancient rhetorical texts, in particular in Cicero, *De oratore* 1.206, *Tusc.* 4.55, Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 5.13.59–60, and some later texts. He also discusses our passage (*Comp.* 25.124,2–8): see below.

[15] Sluiter (2000b) 188 points out that some ancient commentators argue that their source text is unclear because the author wanted to exclude the uninitiated.

[16] Goudriaan (1989) 161–165 analyses the structure of *De compositione verborum* and concludes that the work can be considered to be a systematic τέχνη (as analysed by Fuhrmann [1960]). Dionysius does not intend to write an overly technical treatise with detailed discussions of technical problems, but a practical handbook that accompanies the intensive training of students.

[17] Cf. Kirchner (2005) 175.

[18] Most ancient sources merely associate the phrase with mysteries in general, without naming Orpheus. Some writers, however, do assign the words to Orpheus, in particular Tatian, *Ad Graecos* 8 (see further Bernabé [2004] 1–7). The second half of the line also occurs in the Jewish *Testament of Orpheus* that was written in the early Hellenistic period. Cf. West (1983) 34 and 82 and Kirchner (2005) 174. It seems plausible that the words were associated with Orpheus even if they were not explicitly assigned to him.

[19] For Dionysius' comparison between oratory and music, see *Comp.* 11.40,11–16: see

can achieve musical effects in particular by writing prose that makes good use of rhythm and melody. In many cases, Dionysius describes this kind of prose as 'enchanting' or 'bewitching'. Thus, Dionysius tells us that 'good melody and rhythm are conducive to pleasure, and we are all enchanted (κηλούμεθα) by them'.[20] He also argues that 'rhythm is the most potent device of all for bewitching (γοητεύειν) and beguiling (κηλεῖν) the ear.'[21] Now, it seems that it is exactly this enchanting effect of speech that Dionysius is aiming at in *Comp.* 25. Demosthenes, the author whose poetic prose Dionysius analyses in this chapter, is in other passages characterised as the most effective magician of all orators, who bewitched the Athenians with his composition technique.[22] I suggest that Dionysius' reference to an Orphic poem on initiation rites implicitly announces the magical kind of speech that is going to be the subject of the last part of the treatise *On Composition*.[23] Kirchner has recently distinguished various functions of Dionysius' reference to the Mysteries. On the one hand, it arouses the (advanced) reader's interest in the discussion of poetic prose. On the other hand, it anticipates Dionysius' reaction to critical opponents of his theory by presenting them as uninitiated in the secrets of poetic prose.[24] Further, Kirchner rightly suggests that the metaphor of mysteries announces a certain 'Rezeptionserlebnis' of Demosthenes' prose rhythm, which can be associated with ἐνθουσιασμός and μανία.[25] I agree with Kirchner on these points, but I would add that the reference to Mysteries more particu-

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section 6.5. A general discussion of Greek views on speech and music can be found in Stanford (1967) 27–48.

[20] *Comp.* 11.39,17–19.

[21] *Dem.* 39.212,3–10. See also *Comp.* 11.38,17–20: 'For who is there that is not stirred and bewitched (γοητεύεται) by one melody but has no such feeling on hearing another'. *Comp.* 3.11,5–6 (on Homer, *Od.*16.1–16): Ταῦθ' ὅτι μὲν ἐπάγεται καὶ κηλεῖ τὰς ἀκοὰς ποιημάτων τε τῶν πάνυ ἡδίστων οὐδενὸς ἥττω μοῖραν ἔχει, πάντες ἂν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι μαρτυρήσειαν. 'I am sure that everyone would testify that these lines allure and enchant the ears, and rank second to no poetry whatsoever, even the most attractive of all.'

[22] See esp. *Dem.* 22.176,15–20 and *Dem.* 35.207,14–16.

[23] Even if one does not assume that Dionysius associated the mystic formula with Orpheus, one must admit that the words do evoke the idea of mystery and magic.

[24] Kirchner (2005) 175. For Dionysius' (fictional?) opponents, who do not believe that Demosthenes was so helpless that he consciously took care of the exact length of his syllables etc., see *Comp.* 25.131,14–135,19. According to Leo (1889) 286, these opponents are 'ohne Zweifel Asianer', but it is presumably wrong to regard 'Asianists' as a group of rhetoricians who presented themselves as a school: see section 1.2.

[25] Kirchner (2005) 176 refers to *Dem.* 22.176,15–22.

larly evokes the idea of (Orphic) magic, which Dionysius associates with the effects of good poetic prose.

The relation between rhetoric and magic deserves some more attention. There are various terms that Dionysius uses to describe the enchanting effect of texts, such as κολακεύειν, γοητεύειν, κηλεῖν and θέλγειν (the verb that describes the singing of the Sirens in the *Odyssey*).[26] These terms remind us that Dionysius' ideas on the enchanting effect of poetic prose can ultimately be traced back to the views of the fifth century sophist Gorgias. In the *Encomium of Helen*, Gorgias states that poetry and magic produce very powerful effects on the listener.[27] He claims that similar emotional effects can be the result of persuasive speech in general: 'Just as different drugs expel different humours from the body, and some stop it from being ill but others stop it from living, so too some speeches cause sorrow, some cause pleasure, some cause fear, some give the hearers confidence, some drug and bewitch the mind with an evil persuasion.'[28] Apart from γοητεύειν (γοητεία) and θέλγειν, which we also found in Dionysius' works, Gorgias uses φαρμακεύειν and μαγεία when referring to the 'enchanting' power of words.[29] The connection between magic and poetry in ancient thought becomes especially apparent from the use of another term, namely ψυχαγωγία:

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[26] Κολακεύειν: *Comp.* 23.113,15; *Dem.* 45.230,2. Γοητεύειν: *Comp.* 12.46,8; *Thuc.* 6.333,4; 7.334,2; *Dem.* 35.207,15; 39.212,9. Γοητεία: *Is.* 4.96,16; *Thuc.* 6.333,4; *Thuc.* 7.334,2. Κηλεῖν: *Comp.* 3.11,5; *Dem.* 36.209,6; 39.212,9. In *Dem.* 20.171,7–8, Dionysius criticises Isocrates' style because 'it seeks to enchant and delight the ear' (θέλγειν γέ τοι καὶ ἡδύνειν ζητοῦσα τὴν ἀκοήν). For the Sirens, see Homer, *Od.* 12.40. For an analysis of Dionysius' views on the effects of τὸ καλόν and ἡ ἡδονή on the audience, see Goudriaan (1989) 180–193. On γοητεία in Dionysius, see also Lockwood (1937) 196.

[27] Gorgias, *Hel.* 9–10. Cf. Segal (1962) 99–155, De Romilly (1975) 3–22 and Macdowell (1982) 37. For Gorgias' 'definition' of poetry as 'speech with metre' (λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον, *Hel.* 9), see Graff (2005) 307, who states that 'Gorgias set little store in the distinction between prose and poetry'. However, I agree with MacDowell (1982) 37 that Gorgias is not so much interested in a 'definition' of poetry, but rather in the simple fact that poetry uses words (i.e. that it is a form of λόγος), an observation that he needs for his argument. Poetry and magic spells are just two examples of λόγος producing emotional effects; since poetry belongs to λόγος, Gorgias can use *poetic* effects as illustrative of the effects of λόγος in general. See also Russell (1981) 23 and Ford (2002) 178.

[28] Gorgias, *Hel.* 14: ὥσπερ γὰρ τῶν φαρμάκων ἄλλους ἄλλα χυμοὺς ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐξάγει, καὶ τὰ μὲν νόσου τὰ δὲ βίου παύει, οὕτω καὶ τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν ἐλύπησαν, οἱ δὲ ἔτερψαν, οἱ δὲ ἐφόβησαν, οἱ δὲ εἰς θάρσος κατέστησαν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, οἱ δὲ πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτευσαν. The translation is by MacDowell (1982). For the enchanting effect of speech, see also Ford (2002) 172–182, who shows that Gorgias was influenced by the discourse of medicine and natural philosophy.

[29] Φαρμακεύειν: *Hel.* 14. θέλγειν: *Hel.* 10. Γοητεία and γοητεύειν: *Hel.* 10 and 14. Μαγεία: *Hel.* 10.

this word was borrowed from the context of magic ritual and came to be used as the general term for the enchanting effects of speech, in particular poetry, and later also rhetoric.[30] Thus, Isocrates regretfully acknowledges that orators, unlike poets, cannot make use of metre and rhythm, poetic devices that have so much charm that they 'enchant the audience' (ψυχαγωγοῦσιν τοὺς ἀκούοντας).[31] It is well known that Plato characterises rhetoric as ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων.[32] In later theory, the term ψυχαγωγία played a central role in discussions on the function of poetry: according to the Alexandrian scholar Eratosthenes of Cyrene (3rd centrury BC), every poet aims at 'enchantment' (ψυχαγωγία), not at 'instruction' (διδασκαλία).[33] Although Dionysius does not use the word ψυχαγωγία in the context of poetry, he, too, employs the term when distinguishing between 'entertainment' and 'benefit' (ὠφελεία).[34]

Gorgias' views on the enchanting effect of speech are reflected in his own style, which ancient and modern critics regard to be particularly poetic.[35] When Aristotle observes that the first prose style was influenced by poetry, he mentions Gorgias as its most important representative.[36] But neither Gorgias' style nor his preference for a magical type of rhetoric were taken over by later rhetoricians of the fifth and fourth century: Isocrates and Aristotle do not only object to the use of (too many) poetic devices in prose, but they also reject the idea of mag-

[30] E.g. Aristotle, *Po.* 1450a33 on tragedy. Cf. De Romilly (1975) 15 and Meijering (1987) 6–12.

[31] Isocrates, *Evagoras* 10. In the subsequent passage, Isocrates proves the power of rhythm and metre by way of a theoretical metathesis (see section 7.3.1): 'if you destroy the metre of the most popular poetry, leaving words and ideas as they are, the poems will appear much inferior to their present renown.' (Translation Grube [1965] 43).

[32] Plato, *Phdr.* 261a8; see Meijering (1987) 11.

[33] Strabo 1.1.10. Many Greek and Roman critics disagreed with Eratosthenes' extreme view, notably Neoptolemus, Philodemus, Strabo and Horace. Cf. Grube (1968) 128, Pfeiffer (1968) 166–167, Meijering (1987) 5 and 58–59, Kennedy (1989) 206 and Janko (2000) 147–148.

[34] In *Dem.* 44.228,8–14, Dionysius claims that Demosthenes uses the 'mixed composition' (μικτὴ σύνθεσις) in order to address two different groups in his audience at the same time: on the one hand, there are listeners who long for 'attraction' (ἀπάτης) and 'entertainment' (ψυχαγωγίας); on the other hand, there are listeners who desire 'instruction' (διδαχῆς) and 'benefit' (ὠφελείας). In *Pomp.* 6.245,15–17, Dionysius tells us that the historian Theopompus deals with a great variety of subjects, not merely for 'entertainment' (ψυχαγωγία), but for 'practical benefit' (ὠφέλεια).

[35] Cf. Blass *DAB* I (1979[3] [1868]) 63, Norden (1915[3]) 63–75, MacDowell (1982) 17, Kennedy (1994) 20.

[36] Aristotle, *Rh.* 1404a20–39 (see below).

ical speech in prose texts.[37] For Aristotle, as we will see, clarity is the most important quality of prose style, which he considers incompatible with the enchanting effects of Gorgias' type of speeches. Isocrates distinguishes his artistic prose style from the style of poetry when he states that only poets are allowed to employ many 'ornaments' (κόσμοι) and to use rhythm and metre.[38] It is revealing that Isocrates never uses terms like γοητεία, μαγεία or κηλεῖν.[39]

However, the idea of magical rhetoric, often combined with an appreciation of rhythmical prose, returns in later times. De Romilly points to writers of the first and second centuries AD, in particular Aelius Aristides and 'Longinus'.[40] For our purpose it is interesting to see that the latter critic thinks that composition (σύνθεσις), which he lists as one of the five sources of the sublime, 'casts a spell (κηλεῖν) on us and always turns our thoughts towards what is majestic and dignified and sublime and all else that it embraces, winning a complete mastery over our minds'.[41] The comparison between music and literary composition that precedes this remark is very much in the tradition of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. 'Longinus' tells us that the music of the flute forces even the unmusical hearer to move in rhythm and to conform to the tone; likewise, the sounds of the harp exercise a marvellous 'spell' (θέλγητρον).[42] Like Dionysius, 'Longinus' devotes much attention to the role of rhythm in the aesthetical effect of composition.[43] It seems, then, that in Hellenistic and Roman times, there is a tradition of rhetoricians who focus on σύνθεσις and revert in a sense to Gorgias' magic; at the same time, they allow more licence in the use of poetic devices. These rhetoricians suppose that the effects of music and σύνθε-

[37] For Aristotle and Isocrates on prose style, see section 6.4 and Graff (2005) 306–317. De Romilly (1975) 47–66 points out that fourth century rhetoricians do not follow Gorgias' views on the connection between rhetoric and magic.

[38] Isocrates, *Evagoras* 8. In *Antidosis* 46–47, Isocrates seems to take a different stand: see section 6.4 and cf. Graff (2005) 319–321.

[39] Cf. De Romilly (1975) 55.

[40] De Romilly (1975) 75–88.

[41] 'Longinus', *Subl.* 39.3: (…) κηλεῖν τε ὁμοῦ καὶ πρὸς ὄγκον τε καὶ ἀξίωμα καὶ ὕψος καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἐν αὑτῇ περιλαμβάνει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἑκάστοτε συνδιατιθέναι, παντοίως ἡμῶν τῆς διανοίας ἐπικρατοῦσαν. The translation is by W.H. Fyfe / Donald Russell (1995). The MSS have καλεῖν, but the correction κηλεῖν is definitely right. In the same passage, 'Longinus' says that composition 'brings the speaker's actual emotion into the souls of the bystanders' (τὸ παρεστὼς τῷ λέγοντι πάθος εἰς τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πέλας παρεισάγουσαν), which again reminds us of the term ψυχαγωγία.

[42] 'Longinus', *Subl.* 39.2–3.

[43] 'Longinus', *Subl.* 39.4–41.

σις are related in the way they respond to a natural human inclination towards good melody and rhythm. The idea of a φυσικὴ οἰκειότης that connects human beings to good rhythm and melody is a 'Grundmotiv' of the theory of composition:[44] it is not only found in Dionysius and 'Longinus', but also in Cicero and Quintilian. The latter states that *compositio* is effective not only for pleasure (*ad delectationem*), but also for 'the moving of the soul', *ad motum animorum*, a Latin equivalent of the Greek ψυχαγωγία.[45] For, Quintilian adds, everything that penetrates the emotions has to go through the ear, and 'we are naturally attracted by harmony' (*natura ducimur ad modos*).[46] It is interesting to note that, in order to prove that human beings have an instinctive feeling for rhythm and melody, both Cicero and Dionysius point to the example of a musician who is booed by the public when striking a false note:[47] the judgement of melody and rhythm is a 'matter of feeling, which nature has given to all men.'[48]

It appears, then, that Dionysius' appreciation of the enchanting effect of poetic prose is closely related to his treatment of σύνθεσις as a kind of music. It seems reasonable to suppose that these ideas were influenced by the critics of poetry rather than by the rhetorical tradition. The rhetorician 'Demetrius', the author of the treatise *On Style*, does not use the terms γοητεύειν, κηλεῖν and θέλγειν, nor does he discuss the connection between music and composition as we find it in the works of later rhetoricians.[49] However, he does report that musicians speak of words as 'smooth, rough, well-proportioned and weighty.'[50] Pohl has suggested that the ideas on musical σύνθεσις can be traced back to Theophrastus, who may have adopted views from Peripatetic musical theory, such as developed by Aristoxenus.[51] Another possibility

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[44] Pohl (1968) 91. See *Comp.* 11.38,23–39,2: φυσική τις ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ἡμῶν οἰκειότης πρὸς ἐμμέλειάν τε καὶ εὐρυθμίαν. 'All of us feel naturally at home with tuneful melody and good rhythm.'

[45] Cicero, *De oratore* 3.197. Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.4.9.

[46] Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 9.4.10.

[47] *Comp.* 11.39,2–17. Cicero, *De oratore* 3.195–197; *Orator* 173. Cf. Nassal (1910) 41.

[48] *Comp.* 11.39,12–13: πάθος ὃ πᾶσιν ἀπέδωκεν ἡ φύσις.

[49] 'Demetrius' uses the word κολακεύειν only in the discussion of 'flattery' in *Eloc.* 294. Cf. Pohl (1968) 91 n. 76. It is true that, as Janko (2000) 175 observes, 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 183–186 selects his examples of elegance that depends on σύνθεσις from Plato's account of music in *Rep.* 3; but he does not make an explicit comparison between composition and music.

[50] 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 176. See also section 4.3.2.

[51] Pohl (1968) 94. Cf. Kroll (1907) 91–101.

is that Cicero and Dionysius, and later Quintilian and 'Longinus', were influenced by the Hellenistic *kritikoi*, who in their turn built on views developed in musical theory. This would correspond to the great influence of musical theory on Hellenistic poetics as we find it in Philodemus' *On Poems*.[52] Both the vocabulary of magic and the comparison between music and σύνθεσις are prominent in the fragments of the Hellenistic critics of poetry preserved in Philodemus. The word θέλγειν, for example, which we have encountered in the discussion of Gorgias and Dionysius, is also used by these critics.[53] One of them argues that poets 'enchant (θέλγειν) the soul by pleasing it', a view that is not favourably received by Philodemus, but Dionysius would probably have agreed.[54] The fragments of the *kritikoi* also contain allusions to the idea of the natural human attraction towards rhythm and melody.[55] The parallels between the *kritikoi* and Dionysius, with their focus on σύνθεσις and their views on the role of the ear in the perception of literature, are very striking. My hypothesis is that the ideas of Hellenistic critics of poetry on σύνθεσις were taken over by those rhetoricians and critics who focused on composition, in particular Dionysius, Cicero, and 'Longinus'.[56] At the end of this chapter (section 6.6), I will argue that Dionysius' ideas on prose and poetry in *De compositione verborum* are indeed closely related to the views of the *kritikoi*.

This brief sketch of ancient ideas on the connections between poetry, rhetoric, music and magic has suggested that, although Dionysius refers to Aristotle's treatment of prose style in the third book of the *Rhetoric*,

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[52] See Janko (2000) 134 and 173–176. In his discussion of rhythm, Dionysius twice refers to the teachings of Aristoxenus 'the musical theorist': see section 1.5. He may have known Aristoxenus through the work of Theophrastus (Kroll [1907] 91–101 and Dalimier [2001] 384) or through the works of the Hellenistic *kritikoi*.

[53] See also schol. Eur. *Medea* 349: καταθελγομένου καὶ καταγοητευομένου τοῖς λόγοις.

[54] Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 164 Janko. Janko assigns this view to Andromenides. See also *On Poems* 1 fr. 37 and fr. 166, where Philodemus refutes Andromenides' view that poetry enchants (θέλγοι) the soul, a process that he describes in the same fragment as ψυχαγωγία.

[55] Philodemus, *On Poems* 5: Jensen (1923) 150. See also Janko (2000) 173–176 on the link between σύνθεσις and music.

[56] Janko (2000) 173–176 traces the connection between σύνθεσις and music back to 'the orgins of Greek thought', thus following the example of Kroll (1907) 91–101, Koller (1954) and Pohl (1968) 149–154. For my purposes, it is enough to state that musical theorists (including Aristoxenus), who built on the work of Pythagoras, played an important role in the development of these ideas. In Hellenistic times, the critics of poetry seem to have borrowed the views from the musical critics: see also Pohl (1968) 91–92.

his ideas on poetic style in *On Composition* have actually more in common with the views of 'Longinus' and the Hellenistic *kritikoi*. We have seen that Dionysius' approach to poetic prose is related to the concept of magical speech and that, ironically, this concept has its ultimate origin in the speeches of Gorgias, the sophist whose style Dionysius strongly disapproves of. Having paid attention to the backgrounds of Dionysius' initiation rites, we may now enter the Mysteries ourselves. In the next section I will investigate some aspects of Dionysius' scansions of Demosthenes' poetic prose, in order to cast some light on the connection between these metrical analyses and his ideas on poetic prose. Thereafter, we will return to Dionysius' theories on the styles of prose and poetry, which we will compare more closely with the views that were developed in the Aristotelian tradition (section 6.4).

6.3. *Dionysius on Demosthenes' poetic prose: practice and theory*

Dionysius' warnings about the mystical character of his subject at the end of *On Composition* make it clear that he expected some of his readers to ridicule his ideas on poetic prose. This expectation was correct. Dionysius' views on prose rhythm have been the target of criticism in many modern publications. In the opening section of this study, I have already cited Eduard Norden, who regards Dionysius as 'ein äußerst bornierter Kopf' (see section 1.1).[57] A century later, Dover gives a similar verdict: he thinks that, as far as prose rhythm is concerned, Dionysius is 'a blind guide', who makes 'many puerile errors in scansion', and whose 'decisions on phrasal pause and hiatus are subjective, and unashamedly so'.[58] It will not be my aim to defend Dionysius against the complaints of Norden, Dover and others about his scansion of prose texts. Dionysius' analysis of rhythmical prose is indeed problematic: his divisions of clauses into metrical feet seem to be rather arbitrary,

[57] Norden (1915^3) 79.

[58] Dover (1997) 180. Blass (1901) 19 also gives a scathing judgement: 'Die nächste Thatsache, die wir nun zu constatiren haben, ist seltsamer Weise die, dass die rhytmische Kunst der Prosa des 4. Jahrhunderts den späteren Griechen und Römern ein vollständiges Geheimniss geblieben ist. Ich will mich zum Beweise nicht sowohl auf Cicero beziehen, (…), auch nicht auf Quintilian's Bemerkung (…), als auf Dionysios von Halikarnass, welcher die Rhythmik des Demosthenes zu erforschen gesucht hat und damit gänzlich gescheitert ist.' Bonner (1939) 74 remarks that Dionysius' analyses of Demosthenes' prose into metrical feet are problematic because of his 'disregard of the quantities of the Greek language'.

sometimes even inconsistent. For a good understanding of Dionysius' theory of poetic prose, however, it is important to examine the connections between that theory and his actual analysis of Demosthenes' prose rhythm. Therefore, I will discuss one illustrative case, which concerns the first sentence of Demosthenes' speech *On the Crown*:

> Πρῶτον μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχομαι πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις, ὅσην εὔνοιαν ἔχων ἐγὼ διατελῶ τῇ τε πόλει καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν τοσαύτην ὑπάρξαι μοι παρ' ὑμῶν εἰς τουτονὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα.[59]

In two separate chapters of his work *De compositione verborum*, Dionysius discusses the scansion of this sentence, and the differences are remarkable. In chapter 18, which follows a long list of various rhythmical feet (four disyllabic and eight trisyllabic) in the preceding chapter, Dionysius points out that Demosthenes' sentence consists of three clauses, each of which is divided into rhythmical feet of two or three syllables.[60] Diony-

[59] 'First of all, men of Athens, I pray to all the gods and all the goddesses, that as much good will as I have continuously shown towards the city and all of you may be accorded to me in full measure by you in this present trial.' I have cited Dionysius' version of the text in *Comp.* 18.77,13–79,8. This text corresponds to the text of the MSS of Demosthenes 18.1. In *Comp.* 25, the text is slightly different (see below).

[60] *Comp.* 18.77,13–79,8. Kroll (1907) 97–98 argues that Aristoxenus is the source of the discussion of rhythm in *Comp.* 17, on the ground that Dionysius says 'I use foot and rhythm in the same sense' (*Comp.* 17.68,14–15: τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καλῶ πόδα καὶ ῥυθμόν). However, Aristoxenus (Fragmenta Parisina 27,22) explains these terms as follows: Λεκτέον καὶ περὶ ποδὸς τί ποτέ ἐστι. καθόλου μὲν νοητέον πόδα ᾧ σημαινόμεθα τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ γνώριμον ποιοῦμεν τῇ αἰσθήσει. 'Concerning a foot we also have to explain what it is. In general a foot should be understood as that by which we indicate the rhythm and make it known to perception.' In *Elementa Rhythmica* 2.16, we find a similar definition. Ὧι δὲ σημαινόμεθα τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ γνώριμον ποιοῦμεν τῇ αἰσθήσει, πούς ἐστιν εἷς ἢ πλείους ἑνός. 'That by which we indicate the rhythm and make it known to perception is a foot, either one foot or more than one.' (Cf. Barker [1989] 187 and Gibson [2005] 93–95.) I find it rather difficult to agree with Kroll (1907) 97–98 on the basis of these texts. I also doubt that Dionysius' view that a single foot consists of either two or three syllables while longer feet are 'composite' (*Comp.* 17.73,5–8) is directly related to Aristoxenus, as Kroll (1907) 97 argues: for Aristoxenus, rhythm is not built from syllables, but from 'durations' (χρόνοι, a term that Dionysius does not mention in *Comp.* 17). In *Elementa Rhythmica* 2.13, a duration embraced by one single syllable is called 'incomposite'. Some feet are constituted from two durations, some from three and some from four. For Aristoxenus' theory of rhythm, see Gibson (2005) 82–98. Much more convincing is the view that Dionysius borrows ideas from 'metricians' (cf. *Comp.* 17.73,2). In antiquity, there seem to have been two different metrical systems. The first one, to which Hephaestion (2nd century AD) belongs, distinguishes ca. eight *metra prototypa*. The second one, which we know from Varro, derives all metres via *adiectio*, *detractio*, *concinnatio* and *permutatio* (see section 4.3.1) from the dactylic hexameter and the iambic trimeter, and does not deal with metrical feet that are larger than three syllables. Leonhardt (1989), correcting Leo (1889), discusses these two systems and points out that Dionysius' account of prose

sius argues that Demosthenes used especially the most noble and most dignified feet, such as the spondee (– –), the bacchius (– – ⏑), the cretic (– ⏑ –), the hypobacchius (⏑ – –), and the anapaest (⏑ ⏑ –). On the other hand, he carefully avoided mean and unimpressive feet, such as the pyrrhic foot (⏑ ⏑), the iambus (⏑ –), the amphibrach (⏑ – ⏑), the choree (⏑ ⏑ ⏑) and the trochee (– ⏑).[61] Thus, Dionysius arrives at the following scansion:[62]

– – ⏑, – –, ⏑ ⏑ –, – –, – ⏑ ⏑ –, – ⏑ –, – ⏑ –, – –
πρῶτον μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχομαι πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις,

⏑ – – –, – ⏑ ⏑, – ⏑ –, ⏑⏑ ⏑ –, – ⏑ ⏑ ⏑, – – ⏑, – –
ὅσην εὔνοιαν ἔχων ἐγὼ διατελῶ τῇ τε πόλει καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν

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rhythm corresponds to the second approach, typical of which is also the name *bacchius* for – – ⏑. In his *On Music* (book 1), Aristides Quintilianus (2nd, 3rd or 4th century AD) first deals with rhythmics (chapters 13–19) and then with metrics (chapters 20–29): the latter subject, unlike rhythm, is inextricably bound up with strings of words. Whereas rhythm is divided into durations (Aristides Quintilianus here draws on Aristoxenus), the basic unity of metre is the syllable. In his discussion of metrics, Aristides Quintilianus deals with five levels of metrical composition, namely elements (letters or sounds), syllables, metrical feet, metres and the poem as a whole (see section 4.2.1). In *On Music* 1.22, he lists four disyllabic feet (feet being understood as 'combinations of syllables'), namely the pyrrhic, spondee, iambus and trochee, and eight trisyllabic feet, namely choreios, molossus, dactyl, amphibrach, anapaest, bacchius, amphimakros and palimbacchius. Dionysius (*Comp.* 17) lists the same metrical feet, but he has 'hypobacchius' instead of 'palimbacchius' (⏑ – –), and 'cretic' instead of 'amphimakros' (– ⏑ –). Aristides Quintilianus goes on to list feet consisting of four, five and six syllables, which one produces by combining the di- and trisyllabic feet. Dionysius does not deal with feet consisting of four or more syllables, which he regards as σύνθετοι (*Comp.* 17.73,6–7). Barker (1989) 394 argues that Hephaestion and Dionysius of Halicarnassus are the sources of Aristides Quintilianus' account of metrics, whereas Aristoxenus is the source of his discussion of rhythm. On the treatment of metrical feet in Hephaestion and Aristides Quintilianus, see also Van Ophuijsen (1987) 53–57.

[61] *Comp.* 18.79,1–4. In *Comp.* 17.69,9–11, Dionysius characterises the iambus as 'not ignoble' (οὐκ ἀγεννής), the same quality that he assigns to the cretic (*Comp.* 17.72,6). In *Comp.* 18, however, the cretic is regarded as dignified, whereas the iambus does not contribute to beauty (*Comp.* 18.79,1–4). A possible explanation is that in *Comp.* 18 Dionysius prefers the use of longer rhythms: cf. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 214.

[62] Bonner (1969) 73 has criticised the arbitrariness of Dionysius' divisions. A striking example is the analysis of the first words of the funeral speech in Plato's *Menexenus* 236d4: ἔργῳ μὲν ἡμῖν οἵδε ἔχουσιν τὰ προσήκοντα σφίσιν αὐτοῖς. Dionysius (*Comp.* 18.76,6–10) states that 'the first rhythm is a bacchius (– – ⏑), for I should certainly not think it right to scan this clause as in iambic metre, considering that not running, swift movements, but slow and measured times are appropriate as a tribute to those for whom we mourn.' This is, of course, a remarkable case of circular reasoning: Dionysius finds what he wants to find.

˘ – –, ˘ – –, – ˘ –, – –, – ⏑̆ ⏑̆, – ˘ –, ˘
τοσαύτην ὑπάρξαι μοι παρ' ὑμῶν εἰς τουτονὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα.[63]

The scansion of εὔνοιαν (– – ⏑̆), πόλει (˘ ˘) and τόν (–) are remarkable, to say the least. Dionysius seems to think that in the rhythm of prose, a short vowel before a single semi-vowel (-αν, -ιν, -ον) may be scanned as long:[64] his list of rhythms implies that the final syllable of εὔνοιαν (ἔχων), the final syllable of πᾶσιν (ὑμῖν), and the article τὸν (ἀγῶνα) are all counted as long. The word τουτονί, which would normally be scanned as a cretic (– ˘ –), is described as 'either a bacchius (– – ˘) or a cretic (– ˘ –)'. On the other hand, τῇ τε πόλει is analysed as a 'paean' (– ˘ ˘ ˘), which would mean that the final syllable of πόλει is short. These strange elements in Dionysius' analysis, which do not follow the rules of metricians, may reflect certain changes in the perception of the quantities of syllables.[65]

Things get even more complicated when we examine *On Composition* 25. There, Dionysius points out that the same sentence of Demosthenes' *On the Crown* consists of metrical lines: this time, he divides the sentence into a cretic line, an iambic trimeter, and a sequence of cretic lines that, he says, corresponds to a poem of Bacchylides. The result of this analysis is as follows:[66]

Πρῶτον μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,	(not scanned)
– ˘ –, – ˘ –, – ˘ –, – – ‖ τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχομαι πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις,	'cretic line'[67]
˘ – – –, ˘ ˘ – ˘ –, ˘ ˘˘ ˘ – ‖ ὅσην εὔνοιαν ἔχων ἐγὼ⟨γε⟩ διατελῶ	'iambic line, incomplete by one syllable'
– ˘ – –, – ˘ –, – ˘ – ‖ τῇ [τε] πόλει καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν τοσαύ-	'cretic line'[68]

[63] Dionysius names the rhythms as follows: bacchius, spondee, anapaest, spondee, three cretics, spondee; hypobacchius, bacchius *or* dactyl, cretic, two paeans, molossus *or* bacchius, spondee; two hypobacchii, cretic, spondee, bacchius *or* cretic, cretic, catalectic syllable.

[64] Cf. Rhys Roberts (1910) 183 and Aujac & Lebel (1981) 131.

[65] Cf. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 214 n. 2. It is remarkable that the quantities of syllables in the metrical analysis in *Comp.* 25 (see below) do follow the rules of the metrical system.

[66] *Comp.* 25.130,5–131,13. See also Egger (1902) 106–107 and Aujac & Lebel (1981) 182–183.

[67] Dionysius compares this clause to the line Κρησίοις ἐν ῥυθμοῖς παῖδα μέλψωμεν (fr. 118 Bergk *P.L.G.*). Like Dionysius, Blass (1901) 168–169 also points to the presence of many cretics in the prooemium of *On the Crown*: 'Sie stehen gewiss mit Wahl und Absicht als ein gesetzter und würdiger Rhythmus.'

[68] Dionysius compares the last three units to the following verses of a poem by

– ⏑ – –, – ⏑ –, – –‖
την ὑπάρξαι μοι παρ’ ὑμῶν εἰς ‘cretic line’

– ⏑ –, ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑‖
τουτονὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα.[69] ‘cretic line’

In the third of these units, Usener reads ἔγωγε instead of ἐγώ (MSS), because Dionysius states that the addition of ‘one γε would make the iambic trimeter complete.’[70] In the fourth unit, Dionysius writes τῇ πόλει, whereas the text in *Comp.* 18 (which corresponds to our text of Demosthenes) is τῇ τε πόλει. This change makes the analysis of the words as a cretic (instead of a paean) possible. With regard to the quantities of syllables, this second analysis is more in agreement with the system of metricians than the discussion of the same sentence in *Comp.* 18: the syllables of the words εὔνοιαν, πόλει, πᾶσιν, τὸν and τουτονί have their normal length here. The line ὅσην εὔνοιαν ἔχων ἐγὼ⟨γε⟩ διατελῶ, however, does not comply with the metrical rules of the iambic trimeter, unless Dionysius counts the first syllable of εὔνοιαν as short.

It is clear that these two analyses of Demosthenes’ opening sentence are not compatible: the first aims to show that Demosthenes composed a sentence by putting various rhythms of two or three syllables together. The second aims to show that Demosthenes wrote entire lines of poetry, which he obscured by leaving out some syllables or by adding words that fall outside the metre of a complete line. While Dionysius does not find any iambic foot (which would not contribute to beauty) in his scansion in chapter 18, he does detect an entire iambic trimeter (be it a rather irregular one) in his scansion of the same passage in chapter 25. Scholars have observed the differences between the two chapters, and

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Bacchylides (fr. 23 Bergk): Οὐχ ἕδρας ἔργον οὐδ’ ἀμβολᾶς, | ἀλλὰ χρυσαιγίδος Ἰτανίας | χρὴ παρ’ εὐδαίδαλον ναὸν ἐλ- | θόντας ἁβρόν τι δεῖξαι. The metrical scheme of these lines is – ⏑ –,– ⏑ –,– ⏑ –‖– ⏑ –,– ⏑ ⏑ –,– ⏑ –‖ – ⏑ –,– ⏑ –,– ⏑ –‖– ⏑ –,– ⏑ –,–‖. Cf. Aujac & Lebel (1981) 223.

[69] This is the scansion as interpreted by Aujac & Lebel (1981) 223. However, one might suppose that τόν is scanned as long just as in *Comp.* 18.77,13–79,8. In that case, the last line would correspond more closely to the last line of Bacchylides (fr. 23 Bergk) to which Dionysius compares it. Further, the last syllable should perhaps be scanned as long because of the verse-end (*brevis in longo*).

[70] *Comp.* 25.131,4. Aujac & Lebel read ἐγώ in their text, but follow Usener’s interpretation (i.e. that Dionysius means that γε should be added after ἔγω) in their commentary. Rhys Roberts (1910) 262 does not believe that Dionysius approved of such an irregular iambic line (with long εὔ in the place of a short element). He thinks that Dionysius meant that the words cited only constitute the ‘materials’ of an iambic line; the words would need to be replaced in order to form a real trimeter.

they have rightly argued that the approach to poetic prose in *Comp.* 25 is probably a more original one than the division into rhythmical feet in *Comp.* 18.[71] But how can we explain the difference between the two theories?

In both passages, Dionysius suggests that the rhythmical effects that he discovered were consciously composed into the text. In *Comp.* 18, Dionysius contrasts Demosthenes, Plato and Thucydides with authors like Hegesias, who did not pay attention to the rhythmical arrangement of their sentences.[72] In *Comp.* 25, Dionysius repeats again and again that Demosthenes composed his crypto-metrical lines consciously and not spontaneously: if only the first colon was composed in rhythm, it could still be considered to be an accident; but 'are we to say that these effects are spontaneous and uncontrived when they are so many and various?' Dionysius does not think so.[73] Since in both chapters Dionysius is convinced that Demosthenes consciously composed his prose with the rhythms that he detects, it is impossible for us to reconcile the two analyses (the one into rhythmical feet and the other into metrical lines) on the ground that the rhythmical character of a prose text can be interpreted in two (or more) alternative ways. It seems, then, that we cannot avoid drawing the conclusion that Dionysius was somewhat careless in adopting two incompatible approaches to the problem of prose rhythm within the context of one treatise, especially since he applied them both to the same sentence from Demosthenes.

However, even if we cannot argue away these inconsistencies, we can attempt to illuminate the differences between *Comp.* 18 and *Comp.* 25 by analysing the context of Dionysius' theories in both chapters. I emphasise that I will not make any claim about the 'truth' of Dionysius' analyses, which Blass and Norden have rejected as useless.[74] I will merely try to explain how his scansions of Demosthenes' prose are connected to his theories. The aims of the two different analyses within their contexts largely account for their divergent approaches

[71] See Aujac & Lebel (1981) 28. Costil (1939) thinks that Dionysius' ideas in *Comp.* 25 are influenced by Hieronymus of Rhodos.

[72] *Comp.* 18.79,9–12. Dionysius also says (*Comp.* 18.79,4–8) that Demosthenes and other authors who take care of rhythmical composition conceal the unimpressive rhythms, interweaving them with the better: this is clearly considered to be a conscious process.

[73] *Comp.* 25.130,1–2: ταῦτ' ἔτι φῶμεν αὐτοσχέδια εἶναι καὶ ἀνεπιτήδευτα οὕτω ποικίλα καὶ πολλὰ ὄντα; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἀξιῶ.

[74] Norden (1915[3]) 79 and Blass (1901) 19.

to the problem of prose rhythm. In *Comp.* 18, Dionysius intends to show that rhythm contributes to greatness and grandeur: his central thesis at the beginning of the chapter is 'that it is through rhythms that are noble (γενναίων) and dignified (ἀξιωματικῶν) and contain greatness (μέγεθος ἐχόντων) that composition becomes dignified (ἀξιωματική), noble (γενναία), and splendid (μεγαλοπρεπής), while it is made paltry (ἀμεγέθης) and unimpressive (ἄσεμνος) by the use of those rhythms that are ignoble (ἀγεννῶν) and mean (ταπεινῶν) (…).'[75] The rhythmical analyses of passages from Thucydides, Plato and Demosthenes aim at making clear that these texts are characterised by dignity and grandeur. Thus, Dionysius focuses here on an elevated style, and it seems that in his view rhythm only contributes to one of the two aims of composition, namely τὸ καλόν, and not ἡ ἡδονή. He discusses three texts: the passage from the funeral speech of Thucydides (2.35.1) is composed in a dignified and impressive manner (ἀξιωματικῶς τε συγκεῖσθαι καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς), which is caused by the inclusion of spondees, anapaests, hypobacchii, cretics, and dactyls.[76] The passage from Plato's *Menexenus* (236d) is very dignified (ἀξιωματικήν) and beautiful (καλήν), because of its bacchii, spondees, dactyls, cretics and hypobacchii.[77] Finally, the first period of Demosthenes' *On the Crown* has a beautiful harmony (καλὴν ἁρμονίαν), because it contains none of the more ignoble rhythms.[78] It is typical that Dionysius has chosen two of the three examples from funeral speeches (Thucydides and Plato), while the third passage (Demosthenes) is a pompous introduction that starts with a prayer to the gods.[79] That this text is shown to contain only noble and dignified rhythms (according to Dionysius' rhythmical analysis in *Comp.* 18) will not surprise us when we have taken into account the focus on τὸ μέγεθος and τὸ ἀξιωματικόν in this chapter.

[75] *Comp.* 18.73,13–17.
[76] *Comp.* 18.74,9–10.
[77] *Comp.* 18.75,18–21.
[78] *Comp.* 18.79,1–4.
[79] In *Comp.* 17–18, Dionysius does not answer the question (connected to the problem of *to prepon*) what rhythms should be used in passages that deal with less elevated subjects than the examples given here. When he states that 'most of the passages of Thucydides are of this character' (*Comp.* 18.75,15–16), and adds that there are countless such passages to be found in Plato (*Comp.* 18.77,1–2), he actually seems to imply that almost the entire work of these writers is dignified, and was *meant* to be dignified.

In *Comp.* 25, Dionysius' concerns are different. Here the question is how prose can borrow the beautiful effects of poetry.[80] Therefore, the focus is not so much on dignity and grandeur, but rather on the 'poetic' that charms and impresses the audience. The aims of composition of poetic prose are now formulated in terms such as ἐκμεμάχθαι (from ἐκμάσσω, 'to impress'), τὰς ποιητικὰς χάριτας ('poetic grace') and τὸ ποιητικὸν κάλλος ('poetic beauty').[81] In the preceding section, I have argued that the concept of style in *Comp.* 25 is related to the idea of the magical power of poetic speech. Instead of looking for dignity and grandeur, Dionysius is now interested in the enchanting effects of poetry, which can be borrowed by the writers of prose texts. The new perspective corresponds to a more original approach towards prose rhythm: Demosthenes' sentence is not anymore analysed into separate, dignified rhythms, but into metrical lines that correspond to the verses of poetry.[82]

Thus, the local contexts of Dionysius' two analyses of the prose rhythm in *On the Crown* 1 account for the differences between the methods in the two chapters, even if they cannot completely take away the uncomfortable feeling with which we observe the discrepancies between these passages. Having drawn attention to the connection between Dionysius' practice and theory of prose rhythm, I will now return to Dionysius' views on the styles of prose and poetry, which I will compare with the ideas of the Aristotelian tradition.

6.4. *Aristotle and Dionysius on the different styles of prose and poetry*

In order to determine the originality of Dionysius' views on poetic prose, it is important to observe how his ideas are related to the theories on prose and poetry that were developed in the rhetorical tradition. I will first draw a (necessarily rough) sketch of the rhetorical views on prose and poetry from Aristotle onwards. Then I will discuss Dionysius'

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[80] *Comp.* 25.122,14–16 (see section 6.5).

[81] *Comp.* 25.122,18, *Comp.* 25,124,21 *Comp.* 25.126,13–14.

[82] Usher (1985) 12 states that the final chapters of *On Composition* 'add little to what Dionysius (and Aristotle and Cicero before him) had said earlier on the subject.' It may be clear from the preceding discussion that I disagree with Usher in two respects: Dionysius' approach to poetic prose in *Comp.* 25 is fundamentally different from his own discussion of rhythm in *Comp.* 17–18, and his views on metrical prose add a lot to Aristotle's ideas on rhythm in prose (see section 6.4).

views: I will show that in most of his works, he is a faithful exponent of the Aristotelian tradition: his warnings against overly poetic writing closely correspond to the views of Aristotle and later rhetoricians. However, Dionysius' discussion of prose that *resembles* beautiful poems in the final chapters of *On Composition* seems to be less connected to the traditional rhetorical views.

In the third book of his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle sharply differentiates between the styles of prose and poetry.[83] In a famous passage he states: 'Let the virtue of style be defined as "to be clear" (…) and neither mean nor overly dignified, but appropriate. The poetic style is perhaps not mean, but it is not appropriate to prose.'[84] Thus, in order to retain the perspicuity that is required in speeches, prose composition should avoid the use of compound, coined and foreign words as well as the inappropriate employment of epithets and metaphors. These types of words are suitable for poetry, because poems have more elevated subjects; in prose, however, the excessive use of these 'poetic' devices will make the style appear artificial, and thereby less convincing. Prose and poetry are also different with regard to the use of rhythm and

[83] For Aristotle's views on the styles of prose and poetry in the *Rhetoric*, see esp. *Rh.* 3: 1404a20–39 (the first prose writers, such as Gorgias, imitated the style of the poets, but they were wrong: the styles of poetry and prose are different); 1404b1–25 (prose style must be clear [σαφῆ] and neither mean [ταπεινὴν] nor overly dignified [ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα]; proper words [τὰ κύρια] make style perspicuous; in prose the subject is less elevated than in poetry); 1404b26–1405a3 (prose style only uses proper and appropriate words and metaphors [τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ μεταφορά]); 1405a3–b20 (the orator pays more attention than the poet to the use of metaphors, which gives clarity, pleasure and a foreign air [τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ξενικόν]); 1406a10–b5 (epithets that are long or inappropriate or too crowded are allowed in poetry, but less so in prose; one should nevertheless use them to a certain extent, aiming at the mean [τοῦ μετρίου]); 1407b31–32 (one should use metaphors and epithets, while taking care to avoid the poetical); 1408b11–20 (compound words, a number of epithets and foreign words are appropriate to an emotional speaker [λέγοντι παθητικῶς]; this style belongs to poetry, but it may be used in prose either in enthusiastic or in ironical passages); 1408b21–1409a21 (prose must be rhythmical, but not metrical; discussion of the different rhythms; while the other rhythms should be avoided, the paean [– ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ and ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ –] is useful for prose: this rhythm is neither too dignified nor too colloquial; besides, it is not part of any metrical system). For Aristotle's views on prose rhythm, cf. esp. Cope (1867) 303–307 and 379–392, and Hendrickson (1904) 130–131. On the difference between the vocabulary of prose and poetry according to Aristotle, see Innes (2003) 12. For a comparison of the views on prose and poetry of Aristotle and Dionysius, see Breitenbach (1911) 173–174; for a discussion of the views of Aristotle, Isocrates and Alcidamas, see Graff (2005).

[84] *Rh.* 1404b1–4: ὡρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι (…), καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν· ἡ γὰρ ποιητικὴ ἴσως οὐ ταπεινή, ἀλλ' οὐ πρέπουσα λόγῳ.

metre: prose should have rhythm, but not metre, or it will be a poem.[85] Most rhythms are inappropriate to prose: the iambus is too colloquial, and the heroic foot (including the dactyl, anapaest and spondee) is too dignified. The paean, which forms the right middle between the two extremes, is the only rhythm that may be used frequently. This rhythm is also useful for the reason that, unlike other rhythms, it is not part of any metrical system. In short, Aristotle prefers a prose style that is characterised by σαφήνεια and the avoidance of both meanness and inappropriate elevation.[86]

Having mentioned Aristotle's most important ideas on the differences between the styles of prose and poetry, I should immediately point out that the contrast is not everywhere as clear as it might seem from this account. Some scholars have rightly argued that Aristotle's 'quality of style' (λέξεως ἀρετή) is not identical with σαφήνεια:[87] prose style is more elevated than the language of common conversation, for it hovers between the inartistic and the dignified.[88] For example, we

[85] *Rh.* 1408b21–1409a21.

[86] Although Isocrates (*Evagoras* 8–11) clearly distinguishes the styles of prose and poetry, his position seems to be a bit more complicated than Aristotle's. In the *Evagoras*, Isocrates points out that poets are allowed to use κόσμοι ('embellishments') and that they compose their works in metre and rhythm, while the orators do not take part in these. In *Antidosis* 46–47, however, Isocrates claims that he and other orators compose speeches that are 'more similar to those made with music and rhythm than to those delivered in the court of justice'; and he adds that these speeches are written 'in a style that is more poetic and more varied' (τῇ λέξει ποιητικωτέρᾳ καὶ ποικιλωτέρᾳ). These ideas do not only foreshadow Dionysius' view that oratory is closely related to music (section 6.5 below), but also his observation that well composed speeches are like 'the best poems and lyrics' (*Comp.* 25.123,2–4.). For Isocrates' seemingly ambiguous attitude towards poetic prose, see Graff (2005) 309–313 and 319–322.

[87] Scholars disagree on the number and precise character of Aristotle's virtue(s) of style. Some believe that Aristotle has only one single virtue of style, which they identify as clarity (σαφήνεια): see Bonner (1939) 15, Grube (1965) 95 and Kennedy (1994) 62. Solmsen (1941) 43, however, thinks that Aristotle knows three virtues of style, namely clarity, ornament and appropriateness. Finally, there is an intermediate position: Innes (1985) 255–256, following Hendrickson (1904) 129, argues that Aristotle has only one virtue of style, which is, however, 'an interdependent package of three items—clarity, propriety, and ornamentation'. According to Innes, the theory of virtues of style thus derives from Aristotle: his single ἀρετὴ λέξεως, consisting of three elements, would have developed into the four virtues of style of Theophrastus, who separated τὸ σαφές into correct speech and clarity, and listed each 'element' of Aristotle's 'package' virtue as a separate ἀρετή.

[88] The same view is expressed in *Po.* 1458a17: Λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι. 'Excellence of style means that it is clear and not mean.' In the subsequent passage, Aristotle explains that one should make a blend of standard terms (τὸ κύριον) on the one hand, and loan words, metaphors and ornaments etc. (ἡ γλῶττα καὶ ἡ

should not ignore the fact that Aristotle rejects the iambus on the ground that speech 'should be solemn and move the hearer.'[89] In this particular case, Aristotle demarcates the border between the appropriate and the inartistic, but in most passages he focuses on the border with the poetic. Prose style is characterised as the right mean between the flat and the overly dignified, but in general Aristotle seems to be less afraid of risking the former than the latter.[90] Thus, having defined the quality of style as 'neither mean nor overly dignified', he directly concentrates on the dangers of the poetic instead of making it clear how one can avoid the λέξις to be ταπεινή.[91] His focus on the borderline between the appropriate and the poetic rather than on the borderline between the appropriate and everyday language is best explained as a reaction to the style of Gorgias and his contemporaries. Aristotle's warnings against the excessive use of poetic devices in prose seem to be largely based on his observation that the first prose writers, especially Gorgias, were too much influenced by the style of poetry.[92] Thus, although it is not true that Aristotle's single virtue of style is nothing more than clarity (as Grube and Kennedy claim), his discussion of prose style and prose rhythm in particular is indeed determined by his emphasis on σαφήνεια.[93]

μεταφορὰ καὶ ὁ κόσμος καὶ τἆλλα τὰ εἰρημένα εἴδη) on the other. The former will provide clarity (σαφήνεια), the latter will result in an impression that is neither ordinary nor banal (τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν (…) μηδὲ ταπεινόν).

[89] *Rh.* 1408b35–36: δεῖ δὲ σεμνότητα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκστῆσαι.

[90] On the 'Peripatetic mean of style' and its influence on Dionysius' preference for the mixed composition type (*Comp.* 24), see Hendrickson (1904) and Bonner (1938).

[91] *Rh.* 1404b1–4.

[92] See *Rh.* 1404a24–29.

[93] Grube (1965) 95 and Kennedy (1994) 62. This brief sketch of Aristotle's views on prose and poetry is based on his ideas in the *Rhetoric*. It should be noted, however, that this picture is complicated by the fact that the opening of the *Poetics* gives a different picture of the borderlines between prose and poetry than the third book of the *Rhetoric*. In *Poetics* 1447a18–b13, Aristotle argues that what all poetical genres have in common is that they produce μίμησις ('representation'). Metre, however, is irrelevant to poetry. Therefore, the mimes of Sophron and the Socratic dialogues are in fact poetry, because they 'represent'. Aristotle objects to the usual practice of people who employ the verb ποιεῖν with regard to the writing of verses: 'Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common except their metre; so one should call the former a poet, the other a natural scientist.' (Translation Halliwell.) The irrelevance of metre is also made clear in *Poetics* 1451b1–2: the writings of Herodotus could be put into verse, but they would still be history (notice that this passage offers an early instance of 'metathesis', be it a theoretical one; cf. section 7.1). In *On Poets* fr. 1–2 Janko, Aristotle presents similar views: the form of Plato's dialogues is between prose and poetry. For an analysis of Aristotle's

The views that Aristotle expressed in his *Rhetoric* on the difference between prose and poetry were very influential in the rhetorical tradition. Although later rhetoricians were less restrictive on the use of other rhythms than the paean alone, they usually emphasised the differences between the styles of prose and poetry. Theophrastus seems to have allowed more freedom in the use of prose rhythm than Aristotle did: he recommended the paean but may have regarded other rhythms as useful too.[94] 'Demetrius' (the author of the treatise *On Style*) and Cicero followed Theophrastus in this respect. However, they both emphasised the *differences* between the styles of prose and poetry. 'Demetrius' states that one can use rhythmical units in the elegant style, but 'the actual metres must not obtrude in the general flow of the sentence'.[95] Cicero (or rather Crassus, in *De oratore*) warns that the

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views on the differentia of poetry in the *Poetics*, see esp. Else (1957) 39–57, Gantar (1964), Gallavotti (1969), Russell (1981) 13 and Halliwell (1986) 57.

[94] For Theophrastus on prose rhythm, see fr. 698–704 Fortenbaugh (the main sources are 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 41, Cicero, *Orator* 172 and 218 and *De oratore* 3.184–187). Theophrastus discussed prose rhythm 'in greater detail' (*accuratius*) than Aristotle (fr. 700 Fortenbaugh), but it is not clear in what way (cf. Fortenbaugh [2005] 322). Like Aristotle, Theophrastus recommended the use of the paean (fr. 702, 703, 704 Fortenbaugh); in *De oratore* 3.185 (fr. 701 Fortenbaugh), however, Crassus seems to imply that Theophrastus also allowed the use of other rhythms: Theophrastus thought that out of the 'commonly used verse type' (*istis modis, quibus hic usitatus versus efficitur*) the anapaest (⏑ ⏑ –) arose, from which in its turn the 'dithyramb' (see below) originated; 'and it is the members and feet of the dithyramb, as he also writes, that are found everywhere in rich prose.' (Translation May & Wisse.) Besides, 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 41 (fr. 703 Fortenbaugh), reports that Theophrastus praised a colon that was not composed of paeans, but which had a general 'paeonic' quality: οὐ γὰρ ἐκ παιώνων ἀκριβῶς, ἀλλὰ παιωνικόν τί ἐστι. This would mean that Theophrastus favoured the use of a general kind of prose rhythm rather than the use of specific metrical feet. Cf. Grube (1965) 105. Usher (1974) xiii–xiv and Fortenbaugh (2005) 16 consider the possibility that Dionysius' treatment of prose rhythm partly depends on Theophrastus, but Dionysius does not mention him in the context of his discussions of poetic prose.

[95] 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 180–181: Τάχα γὰρ δὴ ἔσται τις ἡδονὴ καὶ χάρις, ἐὰν ἁρμόζωμεν ἐκ μέτρων τὴν σύνθεσιν ἢ ὅλων ἢ ἡμίσεων· οὐ μὴν ὥστε φαίνεσθαι αὐτὰ μέτρα ἐν τῷ συνειρμῷ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλ', εἰ διαχωρίζοι τις καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον καὶ διακρίνοι, τότε δὴ ὑφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν φωρᾶσθαι μέτρα ὄντα. (181) Κἂν μετροειδῆ δὲ ᾖ, τὴν αὐτὴν ποιήσει χάριν. λανθανόντως δέ τοι παραδύεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς χάρις (…). 'There will, perhaps, be a pleasing charm if we integrate metrical units into our composition, whole lines or half-lines; yet the actual metres must not obtrude in the general flow of the sentence, but only if it is divided and analysed in minute detail, then and only then should we detect that they are metres, (181) and even an approximation to metre will produce the same effect. The charm of this pleasing device steals over us before we are aware (…).' (Translation Innes.) Elsewhere (*Eloc.* 41), 'Demetrius' recommends a 'roughly paeonic' composition, and he refers to Aristotle and Theophrastus. As Innes (unpublished commentary) observes, 'Demetrius' largely builds on Aristotle's views on

orator should avoid 'lapsing into verse or into something resembling verse'.[96] In the *Orator*, Cicero remarks that, unlike orators, poets pay more attention to sound (*vocibus*) than to sense (*rebus*).[97] Quintilian too focuses on the differences rather than on the similarities between prose and poetry.[98]

Cicero's views on prose rhythm deserve some closer attention. Nassal compares the discussions of prose rhythm in Dionysius and Cicero and rightly concludes that there are interesting similarities between these accounts, even if Cicero emphasises the differences and Dionysius the similarities between poetry and rhythmical prose.[99] However, I do not believe Nassal's explanation for the resemblances between the accounts of Dionysius and Cicero, namely that they both based their views on the work of Caecilius of Caleacte.[100] As I have mentioned earlier (sections 1.5 and 4.4), Nassal follows Wilamowitz in assigning Caecilius to an earlier period than Dionysius; but even if Caecilius was slightly older than Dionysius (which is uncertain), it is not very probable that he influenced Cicero. More convincing than Nassal's explanation is the suggestion of Janko, who argues that Cicero's views on euphony and

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prose rhythm; but the idea of a generally paeonic rhythm cannot be attributed to Aristotle. The same thing can be said about the composition out of metrical lines or half-lines (ἐκ μέτρων τὴν σύνθεσιν ἢ ὅλων ἢ ἡμίσεων). This idea is not Aristotelian, but it rather corresponds to Dionysius' views in *Comp.* 25.

96 Cicero, *De oratore* 3.182: *in quo impune progredi licet duo dumtaxat pedes aut paulo plus, ne plane in versum aut similitudinem versus incidamus*. 'In this rhythm [i.e. the dactyl] we may safely continue, but only for two feet or a little more, to avoid clearly lapsing into verse or into something resembling verse.' (Translation May & Wisse.)

97 Cicero, *Orator* 68: *Ego autem, etiamsi quorundam grandis et ornata vox est poetarum, tamen in ea cum licentiam statuo maiorem esse quam in nobis faciendorum iungendorumque verborum, tum etiam nonnullorum voluntate vocibus magis quam rebus interveniunt. Nec vero, si quid est unum inter eos simile—id autem est iudicium electioque verborum—propterea ceterarum rerum dissimilitudo intellegi non potest*. 'As for my own opinion, although some poets use grand and figurative language, I recognise that they have a greater freedom in the formation and arrangement of words than we orators have, and also that, with the approval of some critics, they pay more attention to sound than to sense. And indeed if they have one point in common—this is discernment in selection of subject matter and choice of words—we cannot for that reason pass over their dissimilarity in other things.' (Translation Hubbell.)

98 Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 10.1.27–29.

99 Nassal (1910) 42–54, esp. 45: 'Ich möchte in der Behandlung des besprochenen Verhältnisses von Poesie und rhythmischer Prosa durch C. und DH. eine weitere Berechtigung sehen, die Kompositionstheorie beider in engeren Zusammenfassung zu bringen, auch wenn beide in der erwähnten Streitfrage nicht den gleichen Standpunkt einnehmen, indem C. mehr die Unähnlichkeit, DH. die Aehnlichkeit betont.'

100 Cf. esp. Nassal (1910) 48.

prose rhythm are indebted to the so-called *kritikoi*.[101] I will return to the connections between Dionysius, Cicero and the critics of poetry in section 6.6.

When sketching the rhetorical ideas on prose and poetry in broad outlines, we might say that, according to the traditional view of ancient rhetoricians, poetry has two characteristics in particular.[102] First, it makes use of verse. Second, it has a certain 'licence' (ἐξουσία, *licentia*) for the use of metaphors, figures and grammatical constructions. In these respects, poetry differs from oratory: orators are to a certain extent allowed to transgress the borderline between the genres as long as they do not violate the rule of propriety.

Now, how do Dionysius' ideas on the styles of prose and poetry fit into this rhetorical tradition? In most of his rhetorical works, Dionysius carefully preserves the Aristotelian distinction between prose and poetry. Like Aristotle, Dionysius condemns the use of obscure and archaic words in prose. Thus, Lysias and Isocrates are praised for their use of only the commonest and the most familiar words, and Thucydides is criticised for his 'poetic language', which is 'unsuitable for practical oratory'.[103] In particular, Dionysius objects to the use of periphrasis, which he calls at one instance 'poetic substitution' (ποιητικῇ μεταλήψει).[104] Not only in matters of vocabulary, however, but also in the use of figures and grammar Dionysius regards the 'poetic' as something that is wrong: Thucydides' figures (σχηματισμοί) are too obscure even for poetry, and his use of the parts of speech betrays 'poetic license'.[105]

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[101] Janko (2000) 361 n. 3. Pohl (1968) 145–159 also points to the similarities between Heracleodorus and Dionysius, and argues that they are both influenced by the tradition of musical theory.

[102] Cf. Russell (1981) 149.

[103] For praise of the commonest words, see e.g. *Dem.* 4.135,5–8. For Thucydides' poetic language, see *Thuc.* 53.412,26–413,2: τὸ δὲ κατάγλωσσον τῆς λέξεως καὶ ξένον καὶ ποιητικόν.

[104] *Thuc.* 31.376,21–22. The 'poetic substitution' here concerns the words συγγενές ('kindred') and ἑταιρικόν ('partisan'), which Thucydides (3.82.4) has used 'instead of' συγγενεία ('kinship') and ἑταιρία ('party'). See also *Thuc.* 29.375,4–7, where Dionysius comments on Thuc. 3.82.3: "Επιτέχνησις ('ingenuity') and τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπία ('atrocity of their reprisals') and εἰωθυῖα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀξίωσις ('normal meaning of words') and εἰς τὰ ἔργα ἀντηλλαγμένη δικαίωσις ('to suit their actions as they thought fit') are more suited to poetic circumlocution (περιφράσεως ποιητικῆς)'. See also *Thuc.* 46.402,18–24: the text of Thuc. 2.62.3 is more puzzling than the dark sayings of Heraclitus, and Thucydides 'uses circumlocutions of a rather poetical character' (ποιητικώτερον περιπέφρασται).

[105] *Thuc.* 52.412,14–17: (…) οὐδ' ἐν ἁπάσῃ ποιητικῇ χώραν ἔχοντας σχηματισμούς, ἐξ ὧν ἡ πάντα λυμαινομένη τὰ καλὰ καὶ σκότον παρέχουσα ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀσάφεια παρῆλθεν

The view that a poetic style leads to obscurity (ἀσάφεια) agrees with Aristotle's objections to a poetic diction in prose. Dionysius especially objects to the poetic styles of Gorgias and Thucydides, and he thinks that Plato makes the same mistakes as these writers whenever he tries to express himself in a grand and extraordinary manner.[106] The term by which Dionysius often expresses his distaste for 'poetic' prose is διθύραμβος, a word that we find in his descriptions of the styles of Gorgias, Thucydides and Plato.[107] His discussion of the dithyrambic poets (Philoxenus, Timotheus, Telestes) makes it clear that he considered the

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εἰς τοὺς λόγους. '(…) and his figures, which would not even find a place in any kind of poetry, features as a result of which obscurity, which ruins all his beautiful aspects and overshadows his qualities, has come over his discourses.' *Thuc.* 24.362,12: ποιητοῦ τρόπον ἐνεξουσιάζων ('allowing himself poetic licence').

[106] For Gorgias, see esp. *Lys.* 3.10,21–11,8: 'he wrote his speeches in a quite vulgar, inflated style, using language which was sometimes "not far removed from dithyrambic verse".' The latter words (οὐ πόρρω διθυράμβων τινῶν) are borrowed from Plato, *Phdr.* 238d (see below). Dionysius' views on Gorgias' poetic style and its influence on prose style correspond to Aristotle, *Rh.* 1404a20–39. For Plato's poetic style, see esp. *Dem.* 6–7: Dionysius' discussion of Plato's *Phdr.* 237–238 with its inappropriate circumlocution and imagery (ἄκαιρος ἀλληγορία), which makes the Platonic passage similar to a Pindaric poem, seems to build on Socrates' own remarks on his supposedly poetic ecstasy (238d, 241e2, cf. *Dem.* 6.139,6–8). On Dionysius' evaluation of Plato's style, see Walsdorff (1927) 9–24. Walsdorff has pointed out that ancient evaluations of Plato's style are closely related to theories on the styles of prose and poetry.

[107] *Lys.* 3.11,1, *Thuc.* 29.374,18–19, *Dem.* 6.139,7, *Dem.* 7.140,12, *Dem.* 29.192,6. The dithyramb (διθύραμβος) was a choral song performed in honour of Dionysus, which was at a later stage of its development (especially in the fifth century BC) characterised by a lot of freedom in the use of rhythms and harmonies. On the term 'dithyramb' and its association with Dionysus, see Pickard-Cambridge (1962^2) esp. 5–9, Aujac & Lebel (1981) 215 n. 3, Zimmermann (1997) and May & Wisse (2001) 282 n. 255. Plato already used the terms διθύραμβος and διθυραμβῶδες in the field of stylistic analysis of prose and language in general: in the *Cratylus*, Hermogenes calls the invented name σελαενονεοάεια (which would be the most correct name for the moon according to Socrates) 'dithyrambic' (*Cra.* 409b12–c3). In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates remarks, after having interrupted his first speech, that he has started speaking ἔπη and not 'dithyrambs' anymore, i.e. he has gone into poetic ecstasy (*Phdr.* 241e2; see also *Phaedr.* 238d above). For the term *dithyrambos* in connection with a free use of prose rhythm, see Cicero, *De oratore* 3.184–185 (Theophrastus fr. 701 Fortenbaugh): 'For I agree with Theophrastus, who believes that speeches, at least those that are in any way shaped and polished, should be rhythmical, not rigidly, but somewhat loosely. For on the one hand, he was right to suspect that, out of the measures that are the consituents of the commonly used verse type, there arose, later on, the anapaest (⏑⏑–), a longer rhythm; and that from this the dithyramb originated, with its freer and more opulent structure (*inde ille licentior et divitior fluxit dithyrambus*). And it is the members and feet of the dithyramb, as he also writes, that are found everywhere in rich prose.' (Translation May & Wisse.) Theophrastus and other rhetoricians seem to have thought that the dithyramb with its free form influenced the style of prose texts.

dithyramb as a genre that allowed great licence (cf. ἐνεξουσιάζοντες) in the variation of modes, melodies and rhythms.[108]

All these ideas closely correspond to Aristotle's ideas on the difference between the styles of prose and poetry. In some cases, however, Dionysius seems to express a quite different opinion. Aristotle would probably not have approved of Dionysius' ideal of 'a style that is entirely composed of the finest rhythms' (see also section 2.5.4):[109]

> 'Now if it proves possible for us to compose in a style which consists entirely of the finest rhythms (ἐξ ἁπάντων κρατίστων ῥυθμῶν συνθεῖναι τὴν λέξιν), our ideal may be realised; but if it should be necessary to mix the worse with the better, as happens in many cases (for it cannot be helped that things have the names that they have), we must manage our subject-matter artistically and disguise the constraint under which we are working by the elegance of our composition; and we can cultivate this elegance the more effectively because here we have great freedom, since no rhythm is excluded from non-metrical language, as some are from metrical language.'

Where Aristotle recommends the paean as the right mean between the colloquial iambus and the solemn heroic foot, Dionysius argues that 'no rhythm' is excluded from prose. The difference between Aristotle and Dionysius becomes particularly evident in the final chapters of his work *On Composition*. It seems odd that Dionysius, who objects so frequently to the 'poetic' style of Gorgias and Plato, finally undertakes to show how prose can be made to *resemble* a beautiful poem. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will try to solve this problem.

6.5. *Blurring the boundaries: Dionysius' views on poetic prose*

Why does Dionysius, who is so critical of the poetic styles of Gorgias and Thucydides, conclude his work *On Composition* with the relations between prose and poetry? Part of the answer to this question seems to

[108] *Comp.* 19.85,18–86,7: 'The dithyrambic poets actually used to change the modes also, composing in the Dorian, Phrygian and Lydian modes in the same song; and they varied the melodies, making them now enharmonic, now chromatic, now diatonic; and in the rhythms they continually assumed great licence—I mean men like Philoxenus, Timotheus and Telestes—when one considers the strict rules to which the dithyramb had been subject at the hands of the earlier poets.'

[109] *Comp.* 18.73,19–74,6. For the Greek text, see section 2.5.4., p. 77.

lie in Dionysius' formulation of the central question in the 25th chapter of his treatise:[110]

> Τούτων δή μοι τέλος ἐχόντων, ἐκεῖνά σε οἴομαι ποθεῖν ἔτι ἀκοῦσαι, πῶς γίνεται λέξις ἄμετρος ὁμοία καλῷ ποιήματι ἢ μέλει, καὶ πῶς ποίημα ἢ μέλος πεζῇ λέξει καλῇ παραπλήσιον.
>
> 'Now that my discussion of these matters is at an end, I think that you are eager to hear next how language without metre is made to resemble a beautiful poem or lyric, and how a poem or song is made similar to beautiful prose.'

Dionysius' question is how prose is made to resemble *a beautiful poem* (καλῷ ποιήματι ἢ μέλει) and how a poem is made similar to *beautiful* prose (πεζῇ λέξει καλῇ).[111] In other words, the issue is not how prose in general can be like poetry; rather, Dionysius wants to bring *good* prose and *good* poetry together: in the final chapters of his work, he concludes his theory of composition by focusing once more on the aims of composition, which are the central concerns of the treatise as a whole, namely charm and beauty. Thus, the focus is on the aesthetic quality of literature in general; now, of course, Dionysius does not have a word for 'literature'; therefore, he has to start from the two traditional main groups, namely prose and poetry. By emphasising the similarities between the two groups, Dionysius aims to show that the distinction between beautiful and bad literature is more important than the formal difference between prose and poetry. In this way, we can also explain the fact that Dionysius, in the final chapter of his work (26), includes a discussion of poetry that resembles prose. This subject has of course no *direct* relevance to his audience, which consists of students who wish to become orators, not poets. But since Dionysius wants to bring good poetry and good prose together, he must not only deal with poetic prose, but also with poetry that bears a resemblance to prose. Thus, in the final chapter of *On Composition*, Dionysius makes it very clear that he is only interested in prose that imitates *beautiful* prose, just as in the preceding chapter he was only interested in prose that borrows the effects of *beautiful* poetry: he rejects the argument that poets who imitate prose style will automatically write bad, 'prosaic' poems. It is only the

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[110] *Comp.* 25.122,13–16.

[111] On the ancient Greek terminology for 'prose' and 'poetry', see Dover (1997) 182–186.

best prose that poetry should resemble: 'one cannot be wrong to regard as beautiful those poems that resemble beautiful prose'.[112]

I will try to illuminate my interpretation of Dionysius' views on poetic prose by pointing to another passage from Dionysius' work. In the treatise *On Thucydides*, Dionysius remarks that Herodotus 'made his prose style resemble the finest poetry':[113]

> οὗτος δὲ κατά ⟨τε⟩ τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν σχηματισμῶν ποικιλίαν μακρῷ δή τινι τοὺς ἄλλους ὑπερεβάλετο, καὶ παρεσκεύασε τῇ κρατίστῃ ποιήσει τὴν πεζὴν φράσιν ὁμοίαν γενέσθαι πειθοῦς τε καὶ χαρίτων καὶ τῆς εἰς ἄκρον ἡκούσης ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα·
>
> 'This historian [Herodotus] was far superior to the rest in his choice of words, his composition and his varied use of figures of speech; and he made his prose style resemble the finest poetry by its persuasiveness, its charm and its utterly delightful effect.'

Just as in *Comp.* 25, the subject of this passage is prose that resembles 'the *best* poetry' (τῇ κρατίστῃ ποιήσει). Whereas in many other passages Dionysius considers the 'poetic' as something negative, the comment on Herodotus' poetic prose is clearly positive. How should we interpret this passage? To begin with, we should observe that the three qualities of Herodotus that Dionysius praises here are πειθώ (persuasiveness), χάριτες (elegance) and ἡδονή (charm). These qualities are not restricted to poetic writing; what they have in common is that they all seem to refer to the effects that a text has on its *audience*. Further, we should pay attention to the context of Dionysius' remarks on Herodotus. Before he comments on the superiority of Herodotus, Dionysius discusses the predecessors of this historian. He points out that the stylistic writing of the earlier historians contains all the so-called *essential virtues* (ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί) of style, namely purity of language, clarity, and brevity. The *ancillary* or *additional virtues* (ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί), however, such as sublimity, dignity, intensity, charm, persuasiveness, and the ability to arouse emotion (πάθος) are sparsely found in the works of early historians.[114] Herodotus stands out precisely because he adopts not only the essential, but also the additional qualities.

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[112] *Comp.* 26.138,3–5: οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι τις τὰ μὲν ἐοικότα τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ποιήματα καλὰ ἡγούμενος.

[113] *Thuc.* 23.360,12–17.

[114] For the system of essential and additional virtues, see esp. *Pomp.* 3.239,5–240,16 and *Thuc.* 22.358,19–23. For an analysis of Dionysius' system, see Meerwaldt (1920) and Bonner (1939) 16–19. For ancient texts, see also Cicero, *Part.* 31, *Brutus* 261, *De oratore* 3.52.

Dionysius' system of essential and additional virtues was a rather late development in the history of rhetoric. Aristotle had recognised only one real ἀρετὴ λέξεως (virtue of style), which consisted first and foremost in perspicuity (τὸ σαφές), by which the orator can make his meaning clear.[115] It is highly probable that his successor Theophrastus listed four virtues, namely purity of language, lucidity, appropriateness and ornament, while the Stoic philosophers added a fifth virtue, brevity (συντομία).[116] Dionysius' system, which distinguishes between a group of essential and a group of additional virtues, may or may not have been his own invention.[117] In any case, it clearly illustrates the differences between him and Aristotle. Dionysius' essential virtues more or less correspond to Aristotle's demand for lucidity: their aim is to give a clear and intelligible presentation of ideas. The additional virtues, however, aim to produce more artistic effects, which may move or delight the audience: thus, an author like Herodotus does not only write in a clear style, but he also pleases his audience with his elegance and charm. And this is exactly the reason that his prose 'resembles the finest poetry'.[118]

A similar case is found in the *Letter to Pompeius*, where Dionysius remarks that he would not be ashamed to call the works of Herodotus and Thucydides ποιήσεις.[119] Fornaro offers a very complicated explanation of this passage, which I do not accept.[120] She thinks that Dionysius here uses the term ποίησις in the way that the Hellenistic scholar Neoptolemus of Parium used it, namely in the sense of a poem *qua* 'thematic unity' as opposed to ποίημα (the poem *qua* form and style).[121] According to this interpretation, Dionysius would have used the word

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[115] See section 6.4, p. 348: Aristotle claims that virtue of style is 'to be clear (…) and neither mean nor overly dignified, but appropriate.'

[116] For the history of the virtues of style, see Innes (1985) 255–263.

[117] Cf. Bonner (1939) 19.

[118] In his introduction to the Loeb translation of 'Longinus', Russell (1995) 153 compares 'the sublime' (τὸ ὕψος) to Dionysius' 'additional virtues': both add a certain 'tone of writing' to the necessary requirements of style that are already present.

[119] *Pomp.* 3.240,17.

[120] Fornaro (1997a) 228–229.

[121] Fornaro (1997a) 228–229: 'Dionisio ha presente, credo, la distinzione tra ποίημα e ποίησις, che troviamo in Neottolemo di Pario secondo la testimonianza del V libro della *Poetica* filodemea. (…) Nel dire che le opere di Erodoto e Tucidide sono due ποιήσεις Dionisio vuole appunto sottolineare la loro complessità narrativa, per la quale, come l'*Iliade*, varie unità tematiche vengono fuse in un'unica opera.' Neoptolemus distinguished between ποίημα, which includes only the σύνθεσις τῆς λέξεως, and ποίησις, which covers the 'theme' (ὑπόθεσις). On this distinction, which very roughly corre-

ποιήσεις in order to make clear that Herodotus and Thucydides composed works that were organised like the *Iliad*, in which the unifying plot holds a complex structure together. However, I do not see how Dionysius could be speaking of the unity of narrative: in the context of the passage, Dionysius explicitly discusses the expression (ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος), not the subject matter (ὁ πραγματικὸς τόπος) of the two historians.[122] Further, Dionysius nowhere else follows Neoptolemus' distinctions of ποίημα and ποίησις.[123] Instead, I would suggest another interpretation. I think that we can explain Dionysius' qualification of the works of Herodotus and Thucydides as ποιήσεις in the same way as the characterisation of Herodotus' poetic prose style in *Thuc.* 23: in the context of both passages, Dionysius discusses the virtues of style. In the letter to Pompeius, he states that Thucydides is more successful in the qualities whose effects include force (ἰσχύν) and intensity (τόνον), while Herodotus is better in applying the qualities that excite pleasure (ἡδονήν), persuasion (πειθώ) and delight (τέρψιν).[124] The latter list strikingly corresponds to Dionysius' characterisation of Herodotus' poetic prose in *Thuc.* 23: the only difference is that τέρψις has now taken the place of χάριτες. Having listed the stylistic qualities of Herodotus and Thucydides, Dionysius decides that 'the poetic works of both are beautiful'.[125] We may conclude that it is again the aesthetic effects of stylistic writing that make the historical works similar to 'poems'.

It seems that we are now in a better position to understand Dionysius' ambiguous attitude towards poetic prose. On the one hand, there are those passages where Dionysius focuses on the clarity and lucidity of prose texts: in these passages, he agrees with Aristotle and objects to the 'poetic' use of obscure words, figures of speech, obscure con-

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sponds to the difference between 'form' and 'plot', see Greenberg (1961), Asmis (1992b) and Porter (1995b).

[122] *Pomp.* 3.239,1–240,22.

[123] See Porter (1995b) 146: 'Dionysius of Halicarnassus is innocent of Neoptolemus' jargon. He favors *poema* over *poesis*, in the sense of "poem" or "work," most likely for the same reasons that the term *poema* received preferred status in Neoptolemus, namely its proximity to *poema* as "verse of poetry" and as concrete workmanship, the standard meaning of *poema* in criticism. By contrast, *poesis* (singular) in Dionysius usually stands for "poetry" generally. Dionysius, in other words, reverts to the standard meaning of Neoptolemus' terms, even if he shares his biases (at least in his *De compositione verborum*).' See also Greenberg (1961) 267: 'Horace, and the critics after him, Dionysius, Demetrius [sic], Pseudo-Longinus, Plutarch, all knew the work of the three centuries after Aristotle, but did not employ these terms in their technical sense.'

[124] *Pomp.* 3.240,3–8.

[125] *Pomp.* 3.240,16–17.

structions, and excessive prose rhythm. On the other hand, there are passages where Dionysius concentrates on the artistic effects of texts. In these passages, he suggests that prose texts should be *like* good poems: that is, they should aim at producing an aesthetic impact on the reader or listener.[126]

The latter attitude, which emphasises the aesthetic rather than the intellectual aspects of texts, particularly characterises the treatise *On Composition*. I think that the scope of this treatise explains to a large extent why Dionysius focuses on the similarities rather than on the differences between prose and poetry. Clarity and lucidity, which are important virtues for Dionysius in the treatises *On the Ancient Orators*, are pushed into the background, because σύνθεσις is, at least for Dionysius, mainly concerned with the achievement of pleasing and powerful effects.[127] For Dionysius, the two aims of composition are beauty (τὸ καλόν) and attractiveness (ἡ ἡδονή). In discussing the four means of composition, he emphasises that 'the ear (ἀκοή) delights' in melody, rhythm, variety and appropriateness. These sources of successful composition excite pleasure, and we are all enchanted (κηλούμεθα) by them: this can also clearly be seen in the performance of *music*, which, Dionysius tells us, differs from public oratory 'only in degree, not in kind'.[128]

Where Aristotle's orator aims to persuade by presenting his meaning in a clear and lucid style, Dionysius' orator (at least in *On Composition*)

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[126] Cf. Breitenbach (1911).

[127] Besides, it should be pointed out that, according to Dionysius, composition (σύνθεσις) is only one part in the field of expression (λέξις), which, in its turn, is only one aspect of discourse (λόγος). Therefore, in his treatise *On Composition*, Dionysius does not deal with the arrangement of thoughts (νοήματα), nor does he give an independent discussion of the selection of words (ἐκλογὴ ὀνομάτων). This limitation of the subject of *On Composition* partly explains the differences between this work and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

[128] *Comp*. 11.39,17–40,16, esp. *Comp*. 11.40,11–16: 'In oratory, too, the words involve melody, rhythm, variety, and appropriateness; so that, in this case also, the ear delights in the melodies, is fascinated by the rhythms, welcomes the variations, and craves always what is in keeping with the occasion. The distinction between oratory and music is simply one of degree (ἡ δὲ διαλλαγὴ κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον).' See also section 6.2. On Dionysius' aesthetic approach to oratory and his views on the *politikos logos* as a 'kind of music', see Goudriaan (1989) 536–565, who relates these ideas to Plato's aesthetic views on music in the *Republic* and the *Laws*. Goudriaan (1989) 561 points out that Dionysius' four means of composition can also be found in Plato's account of the epic ῥήτωρ in *Rep*. 3.396ff. We should, however, not ignore the differences between this passage and *Comp*. 10–20: Plato is discussing a speaker in verses (not an orator), and, more importantly, he strongly objects to variations (μεταβολαί, 397b, 399c), which are so important to Dionysius. Goudriaan's view that there is a relation between Plato's epic ῥήτωρ and Dionysius' 'musical *politikos logos*' is therefore not in all respects convincing.

is like a musician: he aims to enchant his audience by the beauty and charm of his σύνθεσις. These differences explain the fact that Aristotle focuses on the *dissimilarities* between prose and poetry, while Dionysius (in this work) emphasises the *similarities* between the former and the latter. The focus on aesthetic quality as the central aim of all literature makes the formal differences between prose and poetry less interesting.[129] But it is only at a later stage of the education process that a student may be allowed to experiment with the composition of poetic prose. Like Aristotle, Dionysius warns his students against the dangers of poetic diction and composition: the risks of prose rhythm and poetic periphrasis are highlighted in most of his works, as we have seen. At the end of his work *On Composition*, however, Dionysius has sufficiently prepared his pupils, who have now finally reached the level that is required for the composition of poetic prose. Beginning students should be careful to avoid poetic language, since prose style should—in Aristotelian terms—be clear (σαφῆ) and neither mean (ταπεινήν) nor overly dignified (ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα). Only students who reach the final chapters of *On Composition* are ready to follow the good example of Demosthenes: they can be initiated into the mysteries of poetic prose.

In *Comp.* 25, rhythm is the starting point for the writing of prose that resembles beautiful poems. However, the focus on rhythm should not obscure the fact that there are also other factors that contribute to the poetic effects of a prose text.[130] The final aim of the process is not to write rhythmical (or metrical) prose as such, but to achieve the same enchanting effects that good poems have on the listener.

[129] The difference between Aristotle and Dionysius becomes also clear in the theory of styles. Aristotle (*Rh.* 1404b3–4) emphasises that style should be neither mean (ταπεινή) nor overly dignified (ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα). Thus, he focuses on the bad aspects of the extremes. Dionysius, on the other hand, recognises the positive aspects of the two extremes, and develops a system of three types of style: see section 5.2. The middle style is still the best one, but it makes use of elements from the two extremes. Cf. Bonner (1938) 262–263: 'Aristotle had argued, "Avoid the vice"; Dionysius adds, "And select the virtue" inherent in the two extremes.'

[130] See *Comp.* 25.124,12–21.

6.6. *Prose writers as 'poets': Dionysius and the* kritikoi

In earlier parts of this study, I have already drawn attention to the connections between Dionysius and the Hellenistic critics who are quoted in Philodemus' *On Poems*.[131] It is now possible to add another observation to the results of previous comparisons: the aesthetic approach to the art of composition in *De compositione*, with its appreciation of poetic prose, may well be related to the views of the *kritikoi*. These critics denied the relevance of content and choice of words to the merit of poetry and argued that the only thing that matters in poetry is σύνθεσις (composition) and the *sound* that 'supervenes' upon it.[132] We recall that, like Dionysius (and Cicero), the critics stressed the role of the ear (ἀκοή) in the judgement of texts.[133] One of the most radical *kritikoi* was Heracleodorus, who claimed that 'we need not understand poetry to be enthralled by it'.[134] According to Janko's reconstruction, he expressed the view that not only content and words, but also metre is irrelevant to poetry.[135] In a badly preserved fragment, Philodemus seems to say that his intermediate source Crates of Mallos reports that Heracleodorus and the other critics called those writers 'who achieve perfection' (τοὺς ἀκριβῶντας) 'poets', so that the works of Demosthenes, Xenophon and Herodotus should actually be called poems.[136] Philodemus ridicules this suggestion, and he concludes that Crates either must have misunderstood the *kritikoi* or must have been completely mad. I doubt that Dionysius would find Heracleodorus' statement as ridiculous as Philodemus finds it: the view that *qualitative* prose is in fact 'poetry' seems to anticipate the ideas that we have encountered in some passages of Dionysius' works.

Heracleodorus' statement on the 'poetry' of Herodotus and other prose writers reminds us of Dionysius' evaluation of Herodotus in his *On Thucydides*. But it is especially in his work *On Composition* that Dionysius seems to have been influenced by the ideas of critics like Heracleodorus. Concerning the subject of poetic prose, one could say

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[131] See sections 1.5, 3.2, 4.3.1 and 6.2.

[132] Cf. Janko (2000) 155–156.

[133] The idea of irrational judgement through the ear is found in the fragments of the *kritikoi* and the works of Dionysius and Cicero: see section 4.3.2.

[134] Cf. Janko (2000) 361 n. 3.

[135] Janko (2000) 155–156.

[136] Philodemus, *On Poems* 1, fr. 199 Janko (Heracleodorus fr. 10).

that Heracleodorus and Dionysius somehow seem to draw the same conclusion on the basis of two opposite approaches: while Dionysius extends the use of metres (be it incomplete ones) from the field of poetry to that of prose, Heracleodorus denies the relevance of metre to the merit of poetry, claiming that some prose writers are poets, because they 'achieve perfection'. Both Heracleodorus and Dionysius focus on the pleasing and delightful effects of composition: it is these effects that make prose 'poetic', so that prose authors can be called poets. For both critics, the central concern is the aesthetic quality of literature, and in this perspective, the formal differences between prose and poetry become minor details. Earlier in this chapter (section 6.2), we have seen that Dionysius frequently speaks of the magical effect of rhythmical and musical prose. I have then suggested that, although Dionysius refers to Aristotle's treatment of prose style in the third book of the *Rhetoric*, his ideas on poetic style in *On Composition* are more indebted to the Hellenistic *kritikoi*, who claim that enchantment of the ear is the central aim of poetry. We may now conclude that our analysis of the ideas in *On Composition* 25 has confirmed that Dionysius' appreciation of prose that borrows the aesthetic effects of beautiful poetry is indeed related to the ideas of Heracleodorus and his colleagues.[137]

Now, the interesting consequence of the views of Dionysius and Heracleodorus is that ποίησις and ποίημα ('poetry') become terms that can be used in two different ways.[138] On the one hand, 'poetry' still designates a text in verses, with a certain special vocabulary and licence. On the other hand, 'poetry' gets a new meaning: it becomes the general term that covers all literature which is characterised by aesthetic quality. The latter use of the term 'poetry' explains Dionysius' charac-

[137] Another interesting case is the *kritikos* Pausimachus, who is reported to have held that 'it is the task of neither poets nor prose writers to write in accord with truth (…), one should aim to enthral the many.' (Janko [2000] 168 on Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 49 Janko.)

[138] I cannot extensively deal with the problem of the ancient technical uses of ποίημα and ποίησις. We can roughly distinguish between a traditional and a technical use of the terms. Most critics and rhetoricians use ποίησις as 'the act of composing poetry, the product of such composing, and poetry itself in almost any vague and nebulous sense' (Greenberg [1961] 267), and ποίημα as 'the product of poetic composition, again in a vague and general way' (Greenberg [1961] 267). Neoptolemus of Parium, however, claimed that ποίησις is closely related to the plot (ὑπόθεσις), while ποίημα only includes the verbal arrangement: see esp. Porter (1995b). *Pace* Fornaro (1997a) 228–229, Dionysius was not influenced by the ideas of Neoptolemus: see Porter (1995b) 146 and my section 6.5.

terisation of Herodotus' work, and Heracleodorus' evaluation of some prose writers.

In his book *Criticism in Antiquity*, Donald Russell remarks that most ancient critics 'took a rather naïve view' of the differentia of poetry, since verse remained an essential characteristic of poetry.[139] Although this analysis may be true in a general sense, it does not do justice to the more complicated views on prose and poetry of critics like Dionysius. In my view, the fact that prose writers are called 'poets' is more than a 'hyperbole' (as Russell calls it). Although the 'poetic' is indeed traditionally associated with metre, Dionysius and other critics also use the term in a more subtle way: in the latter case, the 'poetic' refers to the aesthetic character of composition, which has an enchanting effect on the audience.

The fact that Dionysius goes much further in the appreciation of this kind of poetic prose than most rhetoricians seems to be the consequence of his focus on σύνθεσις, which he shares with the critics of poetry. However, traces of the same ideas are not entirely absent from the works of other rhetoricians. 'Demetrius' for example argues that the historian Ctesias may be called a poet, because he is a craftsman of vividness (ἐναργείας δημιουργός).[140] Vividness has, as 'Demetrius' tells us, an emotional impact (πάθος). Thus, Ctesias' prose seems to be poetic because his texts have a compelling effect on his audience. I may add that Dionysius includes vividness among his *additional* virtues of style.[141] As I have pointed out before, it is Cicero, more than any other rhetorician, who shares many of Dionysius' views on euphony, poetic prose and prose rhythm.[142] It has been claimed that Cicero's account of rhythm can be traced back to the views of the *kritikoi*, and this might indeed explain the agreements between the *Orator* and *De oratore* on the one hand and *De compositione verborum* on the other.[143] The idea that prose authors who write effective texts may be called 'poets'

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[139] Russell (1981) 149. Dover (1997) 186 n. 73 agrees with Russell.

[140] 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 215: Καὶ ὅλως δὲ ὁ ποιητὴς οὗτος (ποιητὴν γὰρ ⟨ἂν⟩ αὐτὸν καλοίη τις εἰκότως) ἐναργείας δημιουργός ἐστιν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ συμπάσῃ. 'Altogether, this poet (for Ctesias may reasonably be called a poet) is an artist in vividness throughout his writings.' (Translation Innes.)

[141] See *Pomp.* 3.239,14–16: ἐνάργεια is the first of the ancillary qualities. Cf. Bonner (1939) 19.

[142] See section 6.4 and cf. Nassal (1910) 43–54.

[143] Janko (2000) 361 n. 3. It should be said, however, that the fact that 'one can easily turn his [Cicero's] words back into Greek' (as Janko claims and subsequently demonstrates) is not a proof of Cicero's dependence on Greek sources.

is also found in the *Orator*. There, Cicero states that, according to some people, 'the language of Plato and Democritus, which though not in verse, has a vigorous movement and uses striking stylistic ornaments, has more right to be considered poetry than has comedy, which differs from ordinary conversation only by being in some sort of verse'.[144]

6.7. *Conclusion*

In the final chapters of his work *On Composition*, Dionysius of Halicarnassus is primarily concerned with *beautiful* prose and *beautiful* poetry. Charm (ἡδονή) and beauty (καλόν) are the two aims of composition, both in prose and in poetry. Thus, in the work *On Composition*, the aesthetic quality of literature is more important than the formal distinction between prose and poetry. Of course, Dionysius does not deny that there are differences between prose and poetry: it is not appropriate for prose to be *in metre* or *in rhythm*, but it should only appear metrical or rhythmical. Like Aristotle, Dionysius constantly warns his students that they should avoid the excesses of writers like Gorgias, who make *too much* use of poetic devices such as periphrasis, figures, and rhythm. In some cases, however, especially in *On Composition*, Dionysius focuses on the aesthetic effects of literature in general. This point of view makes it desirable to emphasise the similarities rather than the differences between prose and poetry: the central distinction between aesthetically pleasing literature on the one hand and bad literature on the other obscures the relatively unimportant differences between prose and poetry. It seems that Dionysius thought that only experienced students were ready to learn the secrets of poetic prose.

The final chapters of *On Composition* put, as it were, the crown on Dionysius' lessons in composition theory. His views on prose, poetry, and poetic prose have proven to be an interesting chapter in the history of rhetorical and poetical theory. We have seen that Dionysius combines elements from metrical, musical, poetical and rhetorical theory

[144] Cicero, *Orator* 67: *Itaque video visum esse nonnullis Platonis et Democriti locutionem, etsi absit a versu, tamen, quod incitatius feratur et clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur, potius poema putandum quam comicorum poetarum, apud quos, nisi quod versiculi sunt, nihil est aliud cotidiani dissimile sermonis.* (Translation Hubbell.) Again, the poetic aspect of Plato and Democritus is the artistic effect of a text, caused by prose rhythm, 'which can be measured by the ear' (*quod sub aurium mensuram aliquam cadit*). In the same work (*Orator* 162), Cicero refers to the ear as judge of sounds and rhythms: see section 4.3.2.

in order to introduce his readers to the aesthetic aims of composition and to the methods by which they will achieve these aims. Where the preceding chapters traced the grammatical and philosophical elements in Dionysius' rhetorical theory, the present chapter has clearly brought out the co-operation between the various disciplines that study the aesthetic use of language. With this conclusion, our 'initiation rites of style' have come to an end. We may now safely turn to the last chapter of this study, which will be concerned with Dionysius' most important instrument of assessing the quality and characteristics of texts written in prose and poetry, namely the method of metathesis.

CHAPTER SEVEN

REWRITING THE CLASSICS: DIONYSIUS AND THE METHOD OF METATHESIS

I cannot rewrite what is perfect.

(W.A. Mozart in *Amadeus*,
Peter Shaffer / Milos Forman)

7.1. *Introduction*

In the fourth chapter of his work *On Composition*, Dionysius of Halicarnassus compares the subject of this treatise (σύνθεσις) to the Homeric goddess Athena.[1] Just as Athena makes the same Odysseus appear now in one form, now in another, so composition, taking the same words, makes the ideas (τὰ νοήματα) appear at one time 'unlovely, mean and beggarly', and at another time 'sublime, rich and beautiful'.[2] This elegant comparison, which illustrates the power of composition, also offers an instructive background to one of the most interesting aspects of Dionysius' rhetorical works, namely his method of *metathesis* (μετάθεσις).[3] The re-arrangement of texts, which changes their character just as Athena can change the form of Odysseus, is one of the three methods of literary criticism of which Dionysius makes use, besides the analysis of longer text fragments and the comparison (σύγκρισις) of two

[1] This chapter has been published in a slightly different form as De Jonge (2005b).

[2] *Comp.* 4.19,18–20,10.

[3] On the various applications of the term 'metathesis' in ancient grammar and rhetoric, see Schindel (1993) 113. In this chapter, the word 'metathesis' refers to the technique of rewriting a given text, whether in prose or poetry, in order to make a comparison between the first and second version, thereby pointing to certain virtues, faults or particularities in the style of the original. Dionysius of Halicarnassus usually refers to this technique with the verb μετατίθημι ('to change', 'to transpose', 'to place differently'), but he also uses other verbs, such as ἀλλάττω ('to change', 'to alter') and other compound verbs with μετα-, including μετακινέω ('to change', 'to change places'), μεταπίπτω ('to undergo a change') and μεταρρυθμίζω ('to change the form').

or more authors.[4] The method of metathesis can be considered a language experiment intended to demonstrate the merits and defects, or more generally the particularities of a text.[5]

In the preceding chapters of this study, I have examined Dionysius' ideas on language and the integration of theories from different language disciplines that is characteristic of his rhetorical works. In this chapter, I will not deal with explicit theories on language; but the method of metathesis is a linguistic method, which is closely related to Dionysius' theories on style, syntax and composition. We have already encountered some examples of metathesis in the discussion of Dionysius' views on natural style (see section 5.2, pp. 264–271). We will now more closely examine the rewriting method, which forms an integral part of Dionysius' linguistic knowledge.

Dionysius' use of metathesis seems to belong to a tradition of ancient 'language experiments'. Early examples of the rewriting of texts can be found in Plato and Aristotle. An interesting case is Socrates' criticism of the 'Midas epigram' in Plato's *Phaedrus*.[6] In that passage, Socrates states that a rearrangement of the verses of Midas' poem would not affect its quality, which proves that it is a bad poem. Although Plato does not use the word *metathesis*, it is clear that Socrates is thinking of rearrangement as a test of the quality of a text. The idea is that it would be impossible

[4] The standard work on Dionysius' critical methods is that of Bonner (1939), who has shown that Dionysius' use of these methods became increasingly sophisticated in the course of his career. Although Bonner points to some interesting cases of the rewriting method, he does not give a systematic analysis of Dionysius' use of metathesis. A detailed study is lacking, although many scholars have observed the importance of the metathesis procedure in Dionysius' rhetorical works. See Rhys Roberts (1901) 11–12, Rhys Roberts (1910) 30–31, Grube (1965) 196 and 224, Damon (1991) 50–52, Classen (1994) 338–347, Bottai (1999b) 141–146, Spina (1999), 125–127, and Pernot (2000) 182. On metathesis in the rhetorical tradition, see Spina (2004) and Grimaldi (2004), who quotes a number of examples from 'Demetrius', Dionysius and Hermogenes.

[5] A modern example of the method of metathesis can be found in Denniston (1952) 7, who intends to prove the power of the first sentence of Herodotus' *Histories* by changing the order of the first five words: 'Put the first five words in any other order, and the thing is ruined.' The formulation of this analysis, which clearly echoes the story about the opening words of Plato's *Republic* (see below), resembles the conclusions that Dionysius derives from rewriting Homer or Herodotus in order to prove the quality of their texts: compare, e.g., *Comp.* 4.17,6–14 (section 7.2). Dover (1997) also applies the method of metathesis in his analyses of prose style.

[6] Plato, *Phdr.* 264d.

to change the order of the elements of a good poem or a good speech.[7] Another early example of the rewriting of texts is Socrates' metathesis of the opening of the *Iliad* into prose, which shows how Homer would have spoken himself, if he had not impersonated Chryses.[8] Dionysius himself refers to the famous story about the writing-tablet on which Plato wrote down various arrangements of the opening words of the *Republic*.[9] In Aristotle, we find the first instances of *metathesis* as a didactic method, employed to point out the difference between deliberative and epideictic rhetoric, and the difference between loan words and standard terms.[10] Like Dionysius, 'Demetrius' and, less frequently, 'Longinus' and Cicero employ *metathesis* to illustrate the virtues or faults of a text.[11] There is also an interesting connection between the critical method of metathesis and the preliminary rewriting exercises that were part of the educational system (see section 7.3.2).

Special attention should be paid to the so-called *kritikoi* who appear in Philodemus' *On Poems* (see section 1.5). The possibility or impossibility of *metathesis* played an important role in the exciting debate between Philodemus and his opponents (the *kritikoi*) on the criteria for good poetry.[12] The *kritikoi* used *metathesis* to prove that the quality of poetry does not depend on content or words, but only on word order and the sound that 'supervenes' upon it.[13] The reasoning of these critics seems to have been that if the composition of a verse is changed, τὸ ἴδιον (the distinguishing feature) of poetry, that is the euphony that supervenes on the composition, will be lost, although the meaning and the words have

[7] On this passage and the Platonic notion of 'organic composition', see Sicking (1963) 225–242, Heath (1989) 12–27, Armstrong (1995) 222 n. 32, and Ford (2002) 240–244.

[8] Plato, *Rep.* 392ff. On this passage, see Ferrari (1989), 92–148 and Spina (1994) 173–179.

[9] *Comp.* 25.133,7–13. On this story, see Spina (1999) 111–115.

[10] Aristotle, *Rh.* 1367b–1368a; *Po.* 1458b15–1459a4.

[11] Janko (2000) 227 n. 2 lists all the instances of metathesis in 'Demetrius', *On Style*. See also Damon (1991) 52 n. 100. 'Longinus' employs metathesis e.g. in *Subl.* 39.4 and 40.2–3 (where the procedure is left to the reader). Cicero uses the same method in *Orator* 81, 214–215 and 232–233. Similar to the rhetoricians' method of metathesis is the technique of μετάληψις (paraphrasing) that is employed by the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus: see Sluiter (1990) 111–117.

[12] On the discussion between Philodemus and his opponents about the possibility or impossibility of metathesis, see Armstrong (1995) and Oberhelman & Armstrong (1995).

[13] Cf. Janko (2000) 226–227.

not changed.[14] Philodemus, however, objected that if the composition is altered, the meaning of a verse will change as well.[15]

In this chapter, I will focus on the use of metathesis by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. I will argue that, in the rhetorical works of this author, metathesis is a very useful and versatile method, which he applies in order to point out the virtues, faults or particularities of certain original texts. Metathesis enables Dionysius *and* his readers to compare such an original text with a new formulation of the same thought. Therefore, it is an important didactic instrument for Dionysius, whose aim it is to teach his audience to write in a clear and pleasing style.

7.2. *Metathesis in Philodemus'* On Poems *and in Dionysius'* On Composition

While modern scholars have paid due attention to the views of Philodemus and his opponents on metathesis, they seem to underestimate the usefulness of Dionysius' language experiments. Although Bonner has already shown how important Dionysius' rewritings are with regard to his critical method, these language experiments have been the target of criticism in more recent publications.[16] When discussing Dionysius' method of metathesis, modern scholars usually refer to an article by Greenberg (1958), who treated 'metathesis as an instrument in the criticism of poetry'. Greenberg holds the view that the *kritikoi* who are cited by Philodemus were much more successful in their application of

[14] Cf. Porter (1995a) 88. In an ironical context, Horace, *Sat.* 1.4.53–62 turns things around by employing metathesis to prove the *irrelevance*, instead of the power, of composition: see Freudenburg (1993) 146–147 and Oberhelman & Armstrong (1995) 242–244. For τὸ ἴδιον, see e.g. Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 31 Janko.

[15] See Sbordone (1983) 36 and Janko (2000) 217 n. 7 and 227 n. 2.

[16] Bonner (1939), 92–93: 'It has already been observed that the method of recasting an author's remark in order to bring home a criticism is among the most satisfactory methods of critical exposition, and one which calls for most exertion on the part of the critic.' Apart from Greenberg (1958), who thinks that the *kritikoi* in Philodemus were more successful in their application of metathesis than Dionysius, other scholars have criticized Dionysius' method as well. Gabba (1991) 66 remarks that Dionysius' 'stylistic criticism of Thucydides brings him to the point of *daring* to rewrite the text of Thucydides in a fuller and more normal style'. (My italics.) With regard to Dionysius' recasting of Thucydides 3.81 ff., Usher (1974) 458 remarks that '[s]ome modern students might prefer Dionysius's version, but if they were to do so they would be seen to share his incomplete understanding of Thucydides's view of history.'

metathesis than Dionysius. He draws this conclusion after having discussed only one instance of this method from Dionysius' works, namely the rewriting of some verses from the *Iliad* in *Comp.* 4:[17]

Homer, *Iliad* 12.433–435:
ἀλλ' ἔχεν ὥστε τάλαντα γυνὴ χερνῆτις ἀληθής,
ἥ τε σταθμὸν ἔχουσα καὶ εἴριον ἀμφὶς ἀνέλκει
ἰσάζουσ', ἵνα παισὶν ἀεικέα μισθὸν ἄροιτο.

'Firmly they stayed like the scales in the hands of a labouring woman
Carefully holding the balancing arm and weighing the wool
Poising it level, to earn for her children a beggarly pittance.'

Dionysius' metathesis:
ἀλλ' ἔχεν ὥστε γυνὴ χερνῆτις τάλαντ' ἀληθής,
ἥ τις εἴριον ἀμφὶ καὶ σταθμὸν ἔχουσ' ἀνέλκει
ἰσάζουσ', ἵν' ἀεικέα παισὶν ἄροιτο μισθόν.

'They stayed firmly like the scales in the labouring woman's hands
As she carefully held the balancing arm aloft and weighed the wool,
Level-poised, that her children might a beggarly pittance receive.'

Homer, *Iliad* 13.392–393:
ὣς ὃ πρόσθ' ἵππων καὶ δίφρου κεῖτο τανυσθείς,
βεβρυχώς, κόνιος δεδραγμένος αἱματοέσσης.

'So there outstretched was he lying, his steeds and his chariot before,
Groaning, convulsively clutching the dust that was red with his gore.'

Dionysius' metathesis:
ὣς ὃ πρόσθ' ἵππων καὶ δίφρου κεῖτο τανυσθείς,
αἱματοέσσης κόνιος δεδραγμένος, βεβρυχώς.

'So there outstretched was he lying, his steeds and his chariot before,
At the dust that was red with his gore clutching convulsively, groaning.'

In order to prove the power of composition, Dionysius changes not only the word order, but also the metre of the Homeric verses. He changes the dactylic hexameters from *Iliad* 12 into so-called 'prosodiacs', which Dionysius compares to the 'Priapean' or 'ithyphallic' lines of Euphorion. The hexameters from *Iliad* 13 he rewrites in 'Ionic tetrameters', which he compares to the effeminate lines of the Hellenistic poet Sotades. In linking specific metres with a specific ethos, Dionysius is in line with other ancient critics.[18] He concludes that 'when the choice of words remains unchanged and only the arrangement is altered, the

[17] *Comp.* 4.15,3–16,6; *Comp.* 4.16,7–18,3. On this metathesis, see also Bottai (1999b) 143–145.

[18] Cf. the 'effeminate' rhythm that, according to 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 189 characterises the Sotadean metathesis of a Homeric verse.

rhythm and the metre is changed, and with it the structure, the complexion, the character, the feeling and the general effectiveness of the lines.'[19] Greenberg opposes this technique of rewriting to the metathesis practiced by the critics who appear in Philodemus' *On Poems*. He points to a fragment of this work that Janko (2000) has attributed to the critic Heracleodorus. In this fragment, the importance of word order (and the supervening sound) is proven by a rearrangement (*metathesis*) of *Iliad* 16.112–114, which preserves the dactylic hexameter of the original:[20]

Homer, *Iliad* 16.112–114:
ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι,
ὅππως δὴ πρῶτον πῦρ ἔμπεσε νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν.
Ἕκτωρ Αἴαντος δόρυ μείλινον ἄγχι παραστὰς
πλῆξ' …

Heracleodorus' metathesis:[21]
ἔσπετε Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματα νῦν μοι ἔχουσαι
ὅππως πρῶτον δὴ νηυσὶν πῦρ ἔμπεσ' Ἀχαιῶν
Αἴαντος δόρυ μείλινον Ἕκτωρ ⟨ἄγχι παραστάς⟩

[19] *Comp.* 4.17,6–14: ἐδυνάμην δ' ἂν ἔτι πολλὰς ἰδέας μέτρων καὶ διαφόρους εἰς τὸν ἡρωϊκὸν ἐμπιπτούσας στίχον ἐπιδεικνύναι, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὀλίγου δεῖν πᾶσι συμβεβηκὸς μέτροις τε καὶ ῥυθμοῖς ἀποφαίνειν, ὥστε τῆς μὲν ἐκλογῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων τῆς αὐτῆς μενούσης, τῆς δὲ συνθέσεως μόνης μεταπεσούσης τά τε μέτρα μεταρρυθμίζεσθαι καὶ συμμεταπίπτειν αὐτοῖς τὰ σχήματα, τὰ χρώματα, τὰ ἤθη, τὰ πάθη, τὴν ὅλην τῶν ποιημάτων ἀξίωσιν. 'I could illustrate many further different types of metre, all falling under the category of the heroic line, and showing that the same thing is true of almost all the other metres and rhythms—that when the choice of words remains unchanged and only the arrangement is altered, the rhythm and the metre is changed, and with it the structure, the complexion, the character, the feeling and the general effectiveness of the lines.' Isocrates, *Evagoras* 11 already refers to the possibility of metathesis as an instrument to prove the power of metre: ἦν γάρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοίας καταλίπῃ, τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ, φανήσεται πολὺ καταδεέστερα τῆς δόξης ἧς νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν. '… if you destroy the metre of the most popular poetry, leaving words and ideas as they are, the poems will appear much inferior to their present renown.' (Translation Grube [1965] 43.)

[20] Philodemus, *On Poems* 1 fr. 39 Janko (Heracleodorus fr. 39 Janko). The translations are mine, but inspired by Murray (1957) and Janko (2000). Cf. Greenberg (1958) 264–265 and Janko (2000) 226–227. In his review of Janko's edition of Philodemus' *On Poems* 1, Sider (2002) wrongly attributes the metathesis of *Il.* 16.112–114 (*On Poems* 1 fr. 39 Janko) to Philodemus himself. Philodemus, however, objected that metathesis is impossible, because any change in the composition of a verse will also alter its meaning.

[21] Because Heracleodorus merely changes the word order of Homer's lines, there is no uncertainty about the exact words that are to be read in the papyrus text. For this reason, I leave out the critical signs of the papyrus edition, for which I refer to Janko (2000) 226.

'Tell me now, Muses, who have dwellings on Olympus,
how first fire was flung upon the ships of the Achaeans.
Hector came near to Ajax and smote his ashen spear (…).'

'Tell, Muses, who have dwellings on Olympus, me
how first upon the ships of the Achaeans fire was flung.
Near to Ajax came Hector and smote his ashen spear (…).'

We should observe, though, that Heracleodorus' hexameters contain serious errors. The normal caesura (the *penthemimeral* caesura after the fifth verse-element or the *trochaic caesura* after the first short of the sixth verse-element) is lacking in lines one and three.[22] Of Homer's hexameters without caesura, most have word-end after the fourth marked element, which Heracleodorus' verses do not have either.[23] Besides, the distribution of information is very strange. After he has compared the use of metathesis by Dionysius, who changes the metre of the original, and the *kritikoi*, who preserve dactylic hexameters (deficient as they may be), Greenberg draws the following conclusion:[24] 'Comparison of relevant passages from Philodemus' treatise shows that the device of metathesis has not been employed with full rigor by Dionysius, that metathesis was employed more often by ancient critics than might be supposed from Dionysius' account, and that these critics derived conclusions from the device which were more sweeping than those of Dionysius.'[25]

We could wonder, however, whether such a conclusion, based on one instance of Dionysian metathesis, is justified. First, Greenberg pays no attention to Dionysius' many metatheses of prose, which fall outside the scope of his article.[26] Second, he seems to ignore that Dionysius' lan-

[22] Cf. Van Raalte (1986) 70–83 and Sicking (1993) 75–78.

[23] Cf. Van Raalte (1986) 81–82.

[24] Greenberg (1958) 262.

[25] In fact, Dionysius nowhere says that other critics did *not* employ the method of metathesis. Besides, when Greenberg (1958) 265–266 states that 'Dionysius is demonstrating in effect the efficacy of the meter rather than the primacy of *synthesis*', he seems to forget that for Dionysius σύνθεσις is far more than word order alone, and that rhythm is in fact one of the many aspects that comprise the Dionysian concept of σύνθεσις (see section 1.6). Dionysius does not say that he is discussing the importance of word order, but of composition in general. Therefore, it seems to me that his metathesis of the verses from *Iliad* 12 and 13 is not as unsatisfactory as Greenberg thinks.

[26] Greenberg (1958) 265 n. 11 correctly states that '[u]nlike poetic metathesis, not all prosaic metatheses are bad.' In other words, whereas the metathesis of a line of

guage experiments have a much wider application than those of the *kritikoi* who are discussed by Philodemus. I do not agree with Greenberg that the conclusions that the *kritikoi* derived from the method of metathesis were in general more 'sweeping' than those of Dionysius.[27] For, as I intend to point out, Dionysius' rearrangements have many more purposes than just to establish the general importance of composition. His method of metathesis is a versatile instrument, which he uses to point to specific merits, defects or particularities of classical texts, in order to teach his readers how to write convincingly.

7.3. *The versatility of Dionysius' method of metathesis*

When discussing Dionysius' language experiments, it seems useful to distinguish between three categories of metatheses.[28] First, the rewritings that claim to surpass the quality of the original text, by the correction of certain alleged faults (section 7.3.1). Second, the rewritings that are inferior to the original, thus proving the virtues of that original text (section 7.3.2). Third, the rewritings that are of equal value to the original text, illustrating alternative compositions that are neither better nor worse than the original (section 7.3.3). I will discuss a few examples of each category.

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poetry is always presented as inferior to the original, the rewriting of a prose text can be presented as surpassing the original in quality. See section 7.3.1.

[27] Greenberg (1958) 262.

[28] Damon (1991) 51–52, who focuses on the evaluative aspect of the method, seems to make a distinction between only two groups: 'The majority (33) of the rewritten sentences point out stylistic faults in the original by providing simple, unambiguous and otherwise unobjectionable renderings of the same idea. (…) Ten of the metatheses, however, are intended to show that by changing the word arrangement in a passage of good writing one can either produce a different style of equal acceptability, or destroy its effectiveness altogether.' It seems useful, however, to distinguish between the rewritings that are inferior to the original version on the one hand, and the rewritings that are of equal value on the other hand. Hidber (1996) 66 ignores the metatheses that provide alternatives of equal quality.

7.3.1. *Metatheses correcting alleged faults of the original*

The majority of Dionysius' rearrangements belong to the first group: they bring out stylistic defects in the original. In his early works, Dionysius uses this first type of metathesis exclusively, and it remains the most common technique in his later works, such as the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*, in which Dionysius illustrates his criticism of the style of Thucydides. In most cases, the rewritings of this type prove the artificiality and 'unnaturalness' of a certain passage: the original texts are criticised because they contain hyperbaton, anacolutha, obscure words, complex constructions, long-windedness, redundancy, periphrases, grammatical irregularities, unclear figures, or 'theatrical' parallelisms. Dionysius removes these defects and rewrites the passage in everyday language, or, as we have already seen, in the style of 'those who construct the expression in conformity with common usage' (see sections 4.4.2 and 5.2).[29]

In *On Demosthenes* 18–19, Dionysius intends to show that the style of Isocrates is not perfect, and contains serious deficiencies, in particular long-windedness by the use of repetitions, lack of compactness and the inappropriate use of soft-sounding words.[30] The way in which Dionysius introduces his metathesis of a passage from Isocrates' *On the Peace* is characteristic of his application of the rewriting method, in that he explicitly involves the reader in his analysis:[31]

> εἰ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἐπιλογίζομαι ταῦτ' ἐγὼ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ταύταις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἐνδεέστερος ὁ ἀνήρ, πάρεστι τῷ βουλομένῳ σκοπεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρτίως παρατεθείσης λέξεως ποιουμένῳ τὴν ἐξέτασιν.
>
> 'Whether my argument is sound and Isocrates is inferior in these qualities, any reader can judge for himself by examining the passage which I have just quoted.'

Dionysius then rewrites a sentence of Isocrates' *On the Peace*, 'making one period out of two': he simplifies the original, in order to make it 'more compact' (συντομωτέραν) and 'more elegant' (χαριεστέραν):[32]

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[29] *Amm.* II 11.430,18–20: for the Greek text, see section 4.4.2. p. 235 Cf. Damon (1991) 52.

[30] *Dem.* 18.166,5–8.

[31] *Dem.* 19.167,14–17.

[32] *Dem.* 19.167,14–168,12. On this passage, see also Bonner (1939) 69–70.

Isocrates, *On the Peace* 41:	Dionysius' metathesis:
Τίς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλοθεν ἐπελθὼν καὶ μὴ συνδιεφθαρμένος ἡμῖν ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης ἐπιστὰς τοῖς γιγνομένοις οὐκ ἂν μαίνεσθαι καὶ παραφρονεῖν ἡμᾶς νομίσειεν; οἳ φιλοτιμούμεθα μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν προγόνων ἔργοις καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐκ τῶν τότε πραχθέντων ἐγκωμιάζειν ἀξιοῦμεν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκείνοις πράττομεν ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον.	τίς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλοθεν ἐπελθὼν οὐκ ἂν μαίνεσθαι νομίσειεν ἡμᾶς, οἳ φιλοτιμούμεθα μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν προγόνων ἔργοις, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκείνοις πράττομεν;
'What stranger, coming from abroad and suddenly finding himself embroiled in our affairs before having the time to become corrupted by our depravity, would not think us insane and beside ourselves, when we glory in the deeds of our ancestors, and think it right to sing the city's praises by recounting the achievements of their day, and yet act in no way like them but do exactly the opposite?'	'What stranger from abroad would not think us insane, when we glory in the deeds of our ancestors, but act in no way like them?'

In this case, Dionysius has merely shortened the original passage, leaving out all repetitions and ornaments. He objects to the presence of παραπληρώματα ('filler words') in Isocrates' text, 'which are unnecessary and make the expression more inflated and the period more ornate'.[33] All amplifications in Isocrates' sentence, three of which start with καί (namely καὶ μὴ … γιγνομένοις, καὶ παραφρονεῖν and καὶ τὴν πόλιν … ἀξιοῦμεν), one with ἀλλά (namely ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον), have been removed. He has, however, also changed the word order of ἡμᾶς νομίσειεν into νομίσειεν ἡμᾶς, probably in order to avoid the ugly hiatus of μαίνεσθαι ἡμᾶς. In the subsequent passage, Dionysius goes on rewriting Isocrates, not only shortening the original, but also changing certain words and simplifying periphrastic formulas. Thus, in *On the Peace* 42 (below) he rewrites τὰς πόλεις τὰς Ἑλληνίδας ('the Greek cities') as τὴν Ἑλλάδα ('Greece') and in *On the Peace* 43 he changes τῶν κατ'

[33] *Dem.* 19.168,8–12: παραπληρώματα … οὐκ ἀναγκαίαν ἔχοντα χώραν, ἃ ποιεῖ τὴν ἑρμηνείαν ἀμετροτέραν, τὴν δὲ περίοδον κομψοτέραν. On the concept of παραπληρώματα, see section 4.3.2.

ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον γενομένων ('the men who lived in that time') into τῶν προγόνων ('our ancestors'):[34]

Isocrates, *On the Peace* 42:	Dionysius' metathesis:
κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐλευθεροῦντες *τὰς πόλεις τὰς Ἑλληνίδας* καὶ βοηθοῦντες αὐταῖς τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἠξιώθησαν, ἡμεῖς δὲ [καὶ] καταδουλούμενοι καὶ *τἀναντία τοῖς τότε πράττοντες* ἀγανακτοῦμεν, εἰ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν τιμὴν ἐκείνοις ἕξομεν.	κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐλευθεροῦντες *τὴν Ἑλλάδα* καὶ σῴζοντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν προῆλθον, ἡμεῖς δὲ καταδουλούμενοι καὶ *διολλύντες* ἀγανακτοῦμεν, εἰ μὴ τῶν ἴσων τευξόμεθα.
'They liberated the cities of Greece and came to their aid, and so earned the right to be their leaders, while we try to enslave them, doing the opposite of what they did at that time, and then feel aggrieved when we are not honoured to be as they were.'	'They attained to the leadership of Greece by freeing her and saving her, while we, who are trying to enslave and destroy her, are aggrieved that we are not to be accorded equal honour.'
Isocrates, *On the Peace* 43:	Dionysius' metathesis:
οἳ τοσοῦτον ἀπολελείμμεθα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις τῶν κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον γενομένων, ὅσον οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων σωτηρίας τήν τε πατρίδα τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐκλιπεῖν ἐτόλμησαν καὶ μαχόμενοι καὶ ναυμαχοῦντες τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐνίκησαν, …	οἳ τοσούτῳ χείρους ἐσμὲν τῶν προγόνων, ὅσον οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ σῶσαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας τήν τε πατρίδα τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐξέλιπον καὶ μαχόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐνίκησαν, …
'We who fall so far short of the men of those times in both our deeds and our aspirations that, whereas they had the courage to leave their country in order to save Greece, and fighting on both land and sea conquered the barbarians, (…).'	'We who are so much worse than our ancestors that, whereas they, in order to save the Greeks, abandoned their country, and fighting the barbarians conquered them, (…).'

Dionysius seems to object in particular to rhetorical pleonasms; so he interprets the expression τἀναντία τοῖς τότε πράττοντες ('doing the opposite of what they did at that time') as διολλύντες ('destroying'), thus clarifying the antithesis with βοηθοῦντες (or σῴζοντες, which he uses instead of βοηθοῦντες, possibly in order to avoid assonance of βοηθοῦντες with ἐλευθεροῦντες). He also changes μαχόμενοι καὶ ναυμαχοῦντες

[34] *Dem.* 19.168,12–169,11.

('fighting on both land and sea') into the simple μαχόμενοι ('fighting'). Besides, Dionysius rewrites some of Isocrates' synthetic expressions in an analytical way, which seems to be characteristic of later Greek. So he resolves the verb ἠξιώθησαν into a preposition and a verb, namely ἐπὶ … προῆλθον, and he changes the perfect ἀπολελείμμεθα into χείρους ἐσμέν, leaving out the pleonastic καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις ('in both our deeds and our aspirations').[35] Dionysius also changes the arrangement of clauses: in his version, πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους belongs to μαχόμενοι, whereas Isocrates' τοὺς βαρβάρους is the object of ἐνίκησαν. This change is probably suggested by the disappearance of καὶ ναυμαχοῦντες. In many cases we may disagree with Dionysius, for some of his changes do not preserve the exact meaning of the original. 'The cities of Greece', for example, are not identical with 'Greece', and Isocrates' addition of ναυμαχοῦντες ('even on the sea') is surely not a useless one.

A constant theme in Dionysius' discussions of the passages that he tries to correct is the idea that one should avoid obscurity. Lucidity (σαφήνεια) and the use of standard, ordinary words (κύρια ὀνόματα) are qualities that Dionysius holds in constant regard, from his early essays (especially *On Lysias*) onwards.[36] The view that poetic language and periphrasis should be avoided seems to be central to the metatheses of the first type. Apart from Isocrates, Thucydides is an important target for Dionysius' criticism of obscure language. In his treatise *On Thucydides*, he constantly criticises the style of Thucydides, some of whose passages 'cannot be understood without a linguistic explanation' (see section 4.4.1).[37] Dionysius illustrates his remarks by offering a clearer version of Thuc. 3.82, removing strange words, periphrases and figures of speech, 'which have the appearance of solecisms' (see also section 5.2, p. 272).[38] We have seen that Dionysius puts forwards similar objections to Thucydides' style in the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*, where he focuses on grammatical irregularities in the use of the parts of speech (section

[35] See Sicking & Stork (1996) 121 on the disappearance of the synthetic perfect in later Greek.

[36] See *Lys.* 2–4.

[37] *Thuc.* 51.410,15–17.

[38] *Thuc.* 28–33. See esp. *Thuc.* 29.373,23: τὰς τῶν σχηματισμῶν πλοκὰς σολοικοφανεῖς, 'combinations of constructions that make the impression of solecism'. *Thuc.* 33.381,6–7: σχήματα, ὧν ἔνια σολοικισμῶν παρέχεται δόξαν, 'figures, some of which provide the appearance of solecisms'.

4.4.2).[39] Again, the rewriting of several passages from Thucydides serves to illustrate the ways in which one could avoid obscurity and artificiality.

7.3.2. *Metatheses bringing out virtues of the original*

The second type of metathesis, which is intended to bring out the virtues of an original text, is only found in *On Composition*.[40] We have already observed that the purpose of Dionysius' rewriting of the lines from *Iliad* 12 and 13 in *Comp.* 4 (section 7.2) was to prove that composition in general is more important and powerful than the selection of words. Apart from establishing the primacy of σύνθεσις in general, however, the second type of metathesis can also point to *particular* virtues of certain texts. The virtues that Dionysius analyses in this way are (1) the euphonious effects of certain letters or combinations of letters, (2) the effects of certain rhythms, and (3) the proper arrangement and length of certain clauses. I will give one example of each of these subtypes.

In his discussion of μετασκευή, the third ἔργον of composition (see section 4.3.1), Dionysius shows that the addition of one letter can make a composition more charming (or, rather, that the omission of one letter can make it less euphonious). Here, as in other cases (see below) Dionysius presents his own metathesis as the standard version, from which the original text deviates. At the beginning of his *On the Crown*, Demosthenes has written τουτονὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα instead of τοῦτον τὸν ἀγῶνα, which would be the standard expression.[41]

Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 1:	Dionysius' metathesis:
εἰς τουτονὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα	εἰς τοῦτον τὸν ἀγῶνα
'to the trial here'	'to this trial'

Although Dionysius does not explain why Demosthenes' version is more harmonious than his metathesis, we can easily supply his argument from other chapters of *On Composition*: according to Dionysius, the combination of the semivowel (ἡμίφωνον) ν and the voiceless (ἄφωνον) τ

[39] *Amm.* II 8–15.

[40] Bonner (1939) 76–77 remarks that in *Comp.* 'the method of recasting is used in a novel and most convincing manner.'

[41] *Comp.* 6.29,19–30,1. Dionysius classifies τοῦτον as a pronoun: see sections 3.6.3 and 5.3.6.

produces a dissonant effect.[42] Therefore, the addition of the ι, between the ν and the τ, has made the composition more euphonious.[43] When applying the three activities (ἔργα) of composition to the level of clauses, Dionysius shows that, in a chapter of his speech *Against Leptines*, Demosthenes has made his composition charming, by paying more attention to the rhythmical quality (εὐρυθμία) than to the explicitness (ἀκριβεία) of his clauses:[44]

Demosthenes, *Against Leptines* 2:	Dionysius' metathesis:
ἐγὼ δ' ὅτι μὲν τινῶν κατηγοροῦντα πάντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν ἀτέλειαν τῶν ἀδίκων ἐστίν, ἐάσω.	ἐγὼ δ' ὅτι μὲν τινῶν κατηγοροῦντα ὡς οὐκ ἐπιτηδείων ἔχειν τὴν ἀτέλειαν πάντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι καὶ τοὺς δικαίως αὐτῆς τυχόντας τῶν ἀδίκων ἐστίν, ἐάσω.
'As for me, the fact that it is a case of injustice that, when someone is accusing certain individuals, he tries to deprive all of exemption, I shall pass over.'	'As for me, the fact that it is a case of injustice that, when someone is accusing certain individuals of being unfit for exemption, he tries to deprive all of exemption, even those who receive it by right, I shall pass over.'

Although Dionysius tells us that the rhythm makes the original text preferable to the rewritten version, he is not explicit about the precise character of that rhythm. It is interesting, however, that he describes his own metathesis as the αὐτοτελῆ (complete, self-sufficient) version: here we have his recurring idea of a basic, natural form of language, in which each sentence is complete in itself (see section 5.2).[45] Authors can

[42] Cf. *Comp.* 22.104,14–105,13 where Dionysius discusses the dissonance of the combinations -ν θ- and -ν τ- in Pindar's ὀμφαλὸν θυόεντα and πανδαίδαλόν τ' εὐκλέ' ἀγοράν: with regard to the latter case, Dionysius actually says that the removal of the τ (which would also involve a change of metre) would make the composition more euphonious. See Vaahtera (1997) 593, where all the combinations of a ἡμίφωνον and an ἄφωνον in the texts discussed by Dionysius are counted. According to Vaahtera, the texts of Isocrates that are quoted by Dionysius contain 41 combinations of words ending on -ν and words beginning with τ-, which is far more than the passages by other authors. Isocrates, however, belongs to the smooth composition type, so in fact he should have fewest of these combinations. This fact seems to support Vaahtera's conclusion that Dionysius' theory is not fully consistent with the reality of the texts that he used.

[43] Dionysius may also object to the stamping repetition 'TON TON'.

[44] *Comp.* 9.35,7–16.

[45] On Dionysius' views on natural configuration of language, see also Schenkeveld (1983) 90–92.

deviate from this basic form by shortening or expanding their clauses. The term αὐτοτελής (having its own τέλος, *ending*) points to the idea that a clause embraces a complete thought and is, therefore, independent.[46] Thus, Dionysius assumes that we can isolate a basic, grammatically complete sense-structure, on which supplements can be added or from which items can be removed. The remarkable consequence of this view is that Dionysius describes Demosthenes' original sentence as the *adaptation* of his own version: according to Dionysius, the two first clauses have been 'shortened' (μεμείωται) by Demosthenes. This kind of what we would regard as turning things around appears in many of his discussions of metathesis; Dionysius often presents his own rearrangement as the natural or standard version, from which the original text deviates (see also section 5.2).

Earlier in the discussion of clause composition (*Comp.* 7–9), Dionysius' metathesis of a sentence from Thucydides proves the importance of the proper arrangement of κῶλα (clauses):[47]

Thucydides 3.57.4:	Dionysius' metathesis:
ὑμεῖς τε ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἡ μόνη ἐλπίς, δέδιμεν, μὴ οὐ βέβαιοι ἦτε.	ὑμεῖς τε, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, δέδιμεν μὴ οὐ βέβαιοι ἦτε, ἡ μόνη ἐλπίς.
'And we fear, men of Sparta, lest you, our only hope, may fail in resolution.'	'And we fear, men of Sparta, lest you may fail in resolution, that are our only hope.'

In the metathesis of this paragraph from the speech of the Plataeans, the shift of the words ἡ μόνη ἐλπίς removes the charm (χάρις) and feeling (πάθος) of the original.[48] We could add that Dionysius' change does not make the sentence more understandable.[49]

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[46] On the idea that a colon indicates the conclusion of a thought, see 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 2, with the remarks by Schenkeveld (1964) 23–25 and Innes (1994) 36–53. The word αὐτοτελής was also important for the Stoic philosophers, who introduced the notion of αὐτοτελὴς διάνοια, 'a complete, independent thought', which is the closest definition of a sentence in ancient linguistics: see Schenkeveld (1999) 184.

[47] *Comp.* 7.31,5–17. On this case of metathesis, see also Bonner (1939) 76 and Bottai (1999b) 145.

[48] The original is 'a very felicitously' (χαριέντως) composed sentence, 'full of feeling' (μεστὴ πάθους).

[49] Dionysius may be thinking that 'you who are our only hope' is logically last as providing the cause for the fear: 'Longinus', *Subl.* 22.2 discusses a hyperbaton in Herodotus 6.11, where the historian is said to have inverted the natural order of words by putting the reason (αἰτία) on the first place.

As has been pointed out by Damon, Dionysius is less explicit about the precise nature of the virtues that his metatheses prove than about the defects that he corrects.[50] I think that there are at least two explanations for this habit: on the one hand, we may point to the didactic nature of Dionysius' literary analysis; on the other hand, we should take into account Dionysius' views on the so-called ἄλογος αἴσθησις, the instinctive feeling that enables any person to appreciate and judge a work of art.

First, we should consider the pedagogical character of Dionysius' work *On Composition*, to which the instances of the second type of metathesis are confined (see section 1.3). It is true that in all his treatises, literary criticism is subservient to the actual production of texts: in that sense, all his critical works have an educational purpose. However, the treatise *On Composition* is in particular characterised by a didactic approach. In this work, Dionysius intends to instruct his pupil Rufus Metilius and other young boys who are beginning to take up the study of civil oratory.[51] The person of the addressee and the intended audience in general clearly involve a specific presentation of Dionysius' ideas. This might explain why he uses the second type of metathesis (bringing out virtues of the original text) only in *On Composition*, and not in the works dedicated to his friends and colleagues.[52] It may be significant that the methodological treatise of 'Demetrius' *On Style*, which clearly has a didactic character, applies the technique of illustrating the quality (rather than the faults) of a text very frequently: this type of metathesis is apparently more appropriate to a practical handbook for students than to literary treatises dedicated to competent 'scholars'.[53] The intended audience of *On Composition* might also explain the fact that Dionysius is not always explicit on the virtues that his metatheses bring out: instead of analysing the exact causes of the supreme quality of the original text that he rewrites, Dionysius often invites his readers (or pupils) to draw their own conclusions on the basis of his metathe-

[50] Damon (1991) 52: '(…) all Dionysius does is label the various stylistic characters, never putting his finger on that wherein the character lies. (…) Metathesis, then, though an eminently satisfactory means of locating a passage's faults, is not used by Dionysius to explain its virtues in any but the most general terms.'

[51] *Comp.* 1.4,3–5. See section 1.3.

[52] On the addressees of Dionysius' rhetorical works, see section 1.4. On the intended audience of his works, see section 1.3.

[53] On the didactic nature of 'Demetrius', *On Style*, see Schenkeveld (1964) 22. For the use of metathesis in that work, see Damon (1991) 52 n. 100.

sis. He asks, for example: 'Would the sentence have been composed with the same elegance as in the form in which it was actually written?' (*Comp.* 8.32,21–22). Such repeated didactic questions are absent from the treatises that are addressed to Ammaeus, Pompeius Geminus, and Quintus Aelius Tubero, where Dionysius seems to have in mind an audience of scholars rather than pupils (see section 1.3). The didactic aspect of the rewriting technique in *On Composition* is also indicated by the cases in which Dionysius does not carry out a metathesis, but leaves it to the reader. In *Comp.* 3, for example, Dionysius invites the reader to put the method of metathesis into practice, if he wants to see that the quality of Herodotus' story about 'Gyges and Candaules' is not due to the selection of words, but to the composition:[54]

> ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστι σεμνὸν οὐδὲ περιττόν, ὃ βουλόμενος εἴσεται μεταθεὶς οὐδὲν ὅ τι μὴ τὴν ἁρμονίαν.
>
> 'That there is no grand or striking word in the present passage, anyone who wishes will discover by changing nothing but the arrangement.'

Evidently, Dionysius supposes that his readers are used to the technique of rewriting texts, and he is even confident that they can employ the method of metathesis themselves.[55] We can explain this by pointing to the importance of the *paraphrases* in the 'preliminary training exercises' (*progymnasmata*) that were part of the educational system of Dionysius' time.[56] In his treatise on *progymnasmata*, Theon defines paraphrase as 'changing the form of expression while keeping the thoughts'.[57] He distinguishes four types of *paraphrasis*, namely variation in syntax, by addition, by subtraction and by substitution: these are the four categories of change that we also encountered in Dionysius' discussion of μετασκευή and in Caecilius' theory of figures (section 4.3.1). Dionysius' readers were certainly used to the rewriting of texts because of their

[54] *Comp.* 3.14,16–18.

[55] A similar procedure can be found in 'Longinus', *Subl.* 40.2–3: a metathesis of Euripides, *HF* 1245 (a verse consisting of simple words), would prove that 'Euripides is a poet of word arrangement more than of ideas'.

[56] The *progymnasmata* fell under the teaching of the *rhetor*, but some elementary exercises were already taught by the *grammaticus*. On these preliminary exercises, and the *paraphrasis* in particular, see Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* 1.9.2 and Theon 2.62.10ff. Cf. H.-I. Marrou (1965^{6}) 259–264 and 410–411, Bonner (1977) 250–276, Morgan (1998) 198–226, Kennedy (2000), and Murphy (2000) 484–492.

[57] See Kennedy (2000) 51–52.

daily exercises at school. Therefore, he could assume that his audience was familiar with his technique of metathesis.[58]

However, the didactic character of his works does not offer the complete explanation for the fact that Dionysius is almost never explicit about the virtues of the texts that his metatheses prove. The second aspect that has to be taken into account here is the irrational, instinctive criterion (τὸ ἄλογον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον), which is, besides the rational criterion (τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον), one of the two faculties by which literature is judged.[59] According to Dionysius, everyone has an instinctive feeling (ἄλογος αἴσθησις), on which one can rely to judge literature. It seems that Dionysius therefore supposes that the virtues that his metatheses prove are self-evident and do not need a lengthy explanation. In many cases, the rearrangement is directly followed by a rhetorical question, in which Dionysius makes it clear that he expects everyone to agree with him that the original text is better than his own version: 'When the clauses are arranged in this way, does the same charm still remain, or the same feeling? No one would say so.'[60]

7.3.3. *Metatheses illustrating alternative compositions or particularities*

The third type of metathesis produces a text that is neither preferable nor inferior to the original, but offers an alternative that can exist beside the original. This type is only found in Dionysius' later writings. This may be explained by the fact that in *On Composition* and *On Demosthenes* Dionysius develops a theory of different valid composition types (χαρακτῆρες τῆς συνθέσεως or ἁρμονίαι: see section 4.3.2), whereas in his earlier works he uses the theory of antithetical good and bad qualities (ἀρεταὶ λέξεως), which sharply distinguish good and bad versions of a text (see section 6.5).[61] The metathesis illustrating alternative compositions seems to be a more original approach than the other two types of rewriting, which I have dealt with before. The use of this metathesis also corresponds to the more aesthetic approach and the generally

[58] Similarly, the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus supposes that his audience is familiar with his method of μετάληψις (paraphrasing): see Sluiter (1990) 111–117.

[59] See *Thuc.* 27.371,5–10. Cf. Schenkeveld (1975) 93–107, Goudriaan (1989) 142–154 and Damon (1991) 44–45.

[60] *Comp.* 7.31,16–17: ἆρ' ἔτι μένει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἡρμοσμένων τῶν κώλων ἡ αὐτὴ χάρις ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος; οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι.

[61] On the evolution of Dionysius' doctrine, see Bonner (1939) and Lebel (1973).

more detailed analysis that set Dionysius' later works apart from his earlier writings. Within the third type of metathesis, we can distinguish between three subtypes: (1) conversions of the Ionic dialect, (2) metatheses pointing out differences between various styles of composition and (3) metatheses illustrating the poetical character of clauses in a prose text.

First, we can place in this category those cases where Dionysius changes the Ionic of Herodotus into the Attic dialect. According to Usher, Dionysius was forced to do this, because in the Ionic dialect, Herodotus could never be a satisfactory model.[62] However, there seems to be a second reason why Dionysius converts the dialect of Herodotus. In *Comp.* 3, Dionysius quotes the famous story of 'Gyges and Candaules' in the Attic dialect.[63] As he explains himself, Dionysius changes the Ionic into Attic 'in order that no one may imagine that the passage owes its attractiveness to the dialect'.[64] In other words, Dionysius wants us to believe that the charm of the story is due to the composition, and not to the Ionic dialect. Therefore, he has to show that the passage preserves its pleasing form when rewritten in the Attic dialect. It remains remarkable, however, that it does not seem to bother Dionysius that, together with the dialect, he also changes the sounds of the original text, in spite of the fact that euphony is such an important aspect of σύνθεσις.

In a few cases, Dionysius rewrites a passage in order to show the differences between various composition styles.[65] The most interesting example of this subtype is his dual metathesis of Herodotus 1.6 in

[62] Usher (1974) 398–399 n. 1 (on the rewriting of Herodotus 7.8 in *Dem.* 41.220,23–223,4): 'Herodotus was something of an embarrassment to Dionysius (…).' Dionysius did not have the same problem with Homer, because Homer was considered the model of all dialects, including Attic: see Pseudo-Plutarch, *De Homero* 8–13. Cf. Hillgruber (1994) 114ff. For writing prose, Attic was the model, but for poetry the dialect depended on genre requirements. Therefore, Dionysius quotes not only Homer, but also Sappho and Pindar in their own dialect.

[63] On the many different rewritings of the story of 'Gyges and Candaules' in the rhetorical tradition, see Spina (1999).

[64] *Comp.* 3.12,18–13,2: ἵνα δὲ μή τις ὑπολάβῃ τὴν διάλεκτον εἶναι τῆς ἡδονῆς αἰτίαν τῇ λέξει.

[65] Apart from the metathesis of Herodotus 1.6 in *Comp.* 4 (below), there is the rewriting of a verse by Pindar in *Comp.* 22.105,2–13, which illustrates the difference between the austere and the smooth composition type by removing the dissonant combination -ν τ-. 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 296–298 uses this type of metathesis to illustrate the differences between styles that are specific to individual authors, such as Aristippus, Xenophon, Aeschines and Plato.

Comp. 4. The first rearrangement is in the style of Thucydides, the second is that of Hegesias, the archetype of Asiatic perversity:[66]

Herodotus 1.6:	Dionysius' metathesis, the style of Thucydides:	Dionysius' metathesis, the style of Hegesias:
Κροῖσος ἦν Λυδὸς μὲν γένος, παῖς δ' Ἀλυάττου, τύραννος δ' ἐθνῶν τῶν ἐντὸς Ἅλυος ποταμοῦ· ὃς ῥέων ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας μεταξὺ Σύρων τε καὶ Παφλαγόνων ἐξίησι πρὸς βορέαν ἄνεμον εἰς τὸν Εὔξεινον καλούμενον πόντον.	Κροῖσος ἦν υἱὸς μὲν Ἀλυάττου, γένος δὲ Λυδός, τύραννος δὲ τῶν ἐντὸς Ἅλυος ποταμοῦ ἐθνῶν· ὃς ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας ῥέων μεταξὺ Σύρων καὶ Παφλαγόνων εἰς τὸν Εὔξεινον καλούμενον πόντον ἐκδίδωσι πρὸς βορέαν ἄνεμον.	Ἀλυάττου μὲν υἱὸς ἦν Κροῖσος, γένος δὲ Λυδός, τῶν δ' ἐντὸς Ἅλυος ποταμοῦ τύραννος ἐθνῶν· ὃς ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας ῥέων Σύρων τε καὶ Παφλαγόνων μεταξὺ πρὸς βορέαν ἐξίησιν ἄνεμον ἐς τὸν καλούμενον πόντον Εὔξεινον.
'Croesus was a Lydian by birth and the son of Alyattes. He was king of the nations on this side of the river Halys, which flows from the south between Syria and Paphlagonia and discharges itself into the sea to the north, which is called the Euxine.'	'Croesus was the son of Alyattes, and by birth a Lydian. He was king, on this side of the Halys, over nations; which river from the south flowing between Syria and Paphlagonia runs into the sea which is called the Euxine and issues towards the north.'	'Alyattes' son was Croesus, by birth a Lydian. King over all nations was he, on this side of the river Halys; which river from the south flowing between Syria and Paphlagonia discharges itself to the north, into the Euxine-called sea.'

Dionysius describes the original version as 'leisurely' (ὑπαγωγικόν) and 'history-like' (ἱστορικόν), the second as 'straightforward' or 'systematic' (ὀρθόν) and 'suited for debate' (ἐναγώνιον).[67] The third version, in the style of Hegesias, is 'precious' (μικρόκομψον), 'degenerate' (ἀγεννές) and 'effeminate' (μαλθακόν). There is much to say on these rewritings, but I can here only briefly comment on some aspects. The reason why the Thucydidean version is described as ὀρθόν is probably that it has a more systematic way of distributing its information than the original. In 'outward expansion', 'Thucydides' first deals with Croesus' family, then his Lydian birth and finally his kingship; likewise, the relative clause

[66] *Comp.* 4.18,4–19,18. On this metathesis, see also Bottai (1999b) 145–146.
[67] On the term ἐναγώνιον, see my remarks in section 4.4.2 and cf. De Jonge (2008).

flows together with the river Halys, beginning in the south (ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας) and ending in the north (πρὸς βορέαν ἄνεμον). Dionysius has also altered some words.[68] For example, he has observed that παῖς is more common in Herodotus, whereas Thucydides and Hegesias would rather use υἱός.[69] In the composition of this version, I think that we can observe some characteristics of the austere σύνθεσις, the composition type to which Thucydides belongs, according to Dionysius (see section 4.3.2).[70] The displacement of Λυδός breaks the parallelism between Λυδός, παῖς (υἱός) and τύραννος, and creates *anastrophe*. In the Thucydidean version, there are also more clashes of consonants and semivowels at word boundaries, such as μεσημβρίας ῥέων and ῥέων μεταξὺ. Next, the postponement of ἐθνῶν creates a hiatus between ποταμοῦ and ἐθνῶν. Hiatus and clashes of consonants or semivowels are typical of the austere composition as Dionysius conceives it.[71] Further, instead of eight, there are now twelve words between the relative pronoun ὃς and the verb ἐκδίδωσι (ἐξίησι), a hyperbaton which also appears to suit the σύνθεσις αὐστηρά.[72]

Finally, the removal of the word τε from τε καί might be explained by the fact that the austere composition contains fewer σύνδεσμοι than the smooth composition.[73] As I have pointed out before (section 4.3.2), Dionysius' austere composition, which is characterised as ὀλιγοσύνδεσμος ('containing few connectives'), might be related to Aristotle's λέξις ἀγωνιστική (the style of oral speech), which employs asyndeton. Although the removal of τε from τε καί in the first metathesis of Herodotus 1.6 does of course not produce asyndeton, Dionysius may have been guided by the idea that his austere composition, just like Aris-

[68] In fact, Dionysius had said that he would not change the words, but only the composition: μενόντων μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλαττομένης δὲ τῆς συνθέσεως (*Comp.* 4.18,5–6).

[69] See LSJ s.v. υἱός. The change of παῖς into υἱός may also be explained by the fact that the latter word is more familiar in later Greek: 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 11 (on period theory) makes the same change in his metathesis of Demosthenes, *Lept.* 1.

[70] See *Comp.* 22.98,11 and *Comp.* 22.106,15–111,17. On the three composition types (σύνθεσις αὐστηρά, γλαφυρά and εὔκρατος or κοινή), which should not be confused with the three 'styles', see further Pohl (1968) and Donadi (1986) 42–63.

[71] See *Dem.* 38.210,14ff. and *Comp.* 22.96,13–14: ἀπέχειν τε ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ μόρια διαστάσεις ἀξιολόγους αἰσθητοῖς χρόνοις διειργόμενα. 'The parts shall be at considerable distances from one another, separated by perceptible intervals.'

[72] The austere composition type is in many cases ὑπεροπτικὴ τῆς ἀκολουθίας ('neglecting grammatical sequence'): *Comp.* 22.98,2–3. See section 5.2.

[73] *Comp.* 22.98,1–2; cf. *Dem.* 29.213,6ff. See section 4.3.2. For the term σύνδεσμος, see section 3.6.4.

totle's λέξις ἀγωνιστική, avoids the use of many connectives. And we may notice that Aristotle's views on the use of asyndeton in the 'agonistic' style fit well into Dionysius' description of the Thucydidean version as 'suited for debate' (ἐναγώνιον). An alternative explanation of the removal of τε is that the Thucydidean composition favours a clash between -ν κ- (Σύρων καὶ) to the combination -ν τ- (Σύρων τε). However, both clashes (-ν τ- and -ν κ-) are described as 'rough and dissonant':[74] the interrupted continuity of speech between these letters produces a harsh effect, which is at home in the austere composition type. It may be interesting to add that Usher attributes to Dionysius a 'great partiality' for the particle τε, which might be explained as an aspect of his archaising tendency.[75]

Dionysius' second metathesis of Herodotus 1.6 is a clear example of a defective style, which pays no attention to the systematic distribution of information.[76] The opening with the genitive Ἀλυάττου is strange, the position of μέν after Ἀλυάττου puts the reader on the wrong track, the word τύραννος is concealed at an unnatural place, and the congruent pair βορέαν and ἄνεμον have been separated. This metathesis is associated with the 'Asianic' style, to which the Atticist Dionysius strongly objects.[77]

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[74] Cf. Vaahtera (1997) 589. For the dissonant effect of the clash -ν τ-, see *Comp.* 22.105,2–12 (on Pindar's πανδαίδαλόν τ' εὐκλέ' ἀγοράν) and *Comp.* 22.106,7–10 (on Pindar's στεφάνων τᾶν τ' ἐαριδρόπων). For the clash -ν κ-, see *Comp.* 22.108,18–109,13 (on Thucydides' Πελοποννησίων καί).

[75] Usher (1982) 829–830.

[76] One could argue that this second metathesis, being inferior to the original, should be treated under the second category (metatheses bringing out virtues of the original). The Thucydidean metathesis, however, is not presented as inferior to the original. Dionysius' purpose in this passage is to show the various ways in which one idea can be expressed, rather than to prove the quality of Herodotus' version. I have therefore chosen to deal with both the Thucydidean and the Asiatic metathesis in the third category (metatheses illustrating alternative compositions).

[77] On Hegesias and his alleged corrupt style, see e.g. Swain (1996) 22. See also section 1.2. A third metathesis of Herodotus 1.6 can be found in Hermogenes, *On Types of Style* 1.3 (p. 230 Rabe). According to Hermogenes, Herodotus' original sentence is a model of purity (καθαρότης), which would be lost if the sentence started with a genitive absolute subordinate construction: Κροίσου ὄντος Λυδοῦ μὲν γένος, παιδὸς δὲ Ἀλυάττεω, τυράννου δὲ ἐθνῶν τῶν ἐντὸς Ἅλυος ποταμοῦ …: 'Since Croesus was a Lydian by birth, and since he was the son of Alyattes, and since he ruled those nations on this side of the Halys River (…).' (Translation Wooten [1987]). In Caecilius of Caleacte fr. 76a Ofenloch (Epitome Alexandri III p. 39,12 Spengel), Herodotus 1.6 is rewritten in order to make it clear that the part on the river Halys is a παρεμβολή (parenthesis): ἐδύνατο γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν ὁ λόγος "τύραννος δὲ ἐθνέων τῶν ἐντὸς Ἅλυος ποταμοῦ, οὗτος ὢν ὁ Κροῖσος". 'For the sentence could also be like this: "As king of

There remains one subtype of metathesis to be discussed, namely the rewriting of passages from prose texts in order to illustrate their poetical character. We find these rewritings in *Comp.* 25, which deals with the question how prose can be made to resemble a beautiful poem (see chapter 6). By adding one or two words to a certain clause of Demosthenes, Dionysius shows that this clause almost corresponds to a trimeter, tetrameter or pentameter. In the following instances of metathesis, Dionysius completes two iambic trimeters by adding τινα to the first, and ἐν μέρει to the second clause:[78]

Demosthenes, *Against Aristocrates* 1: προάγειν ἐμαυτὸν εἰς ἀπέχθειαν 'expose myself to his hostility'	Dionysius' metathesis: προάγειν ἐμαυτὸν εἰς ἀπέχθειάν τινα 'expose myself to some hostility of his'
Demosthenes, *Against Aristocrates* 1: ἀποστερηθῆναι πάλιν αὐτῆς 'and once again be taken from you'	Dionysius' metathesis: ἀποστερηθῆναι πάλιν αὐτῆς ἐν μέρει 'and once again be taken from you in return'

We should not assume, of course, that Dionysius really suggests changing the original texts in these cases. Rather, he is proving that, in many cases, Demosthenes' prose texts resemble poetry. His writings are not actually 'in rhythm' (ἔρρυθμον) or 'in metre' (ἔμμετρον), but they *appear* rhythmical (εὔρυθμον) and metrical (εὔμετρον), which is to be preferred:[79] they are poetical though not actually a poem (see section 6.1).[80] By completing the latent metres in Demosthenes' text, Dionysius simply intends to prove that the poetical ways of expression are there.

7.4. *Conclusion*

Having shown the many different ways in which Dionysius applies his method of metathesis, I hope to have made clear that this technique is more useful and successful than is supposed by Greenberg (1958), whose article on this subject is the standard work of reference for modern scholars who discuss metathesis.

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the nations on this side of the Halys river, this Croesus (…)".' 'Demetrius', *Eloc.* 45–46 rewrites a comparable sentence from Thucydides 2.102, in which the course of the river Achelous is described.

[78] *Comp.* 25.128,14–18; *Comp.* 25.129,16–20.

[79] *Comp.* 25.124,10–125,7.

[80] *Comp.* 25.125,6–7.

Although Dionysius' rewritings resemble that of Heracleodorus and the *kritikoi* in some instances, they serve other purposes besides that of establishing the importance of composition. Analysing prose as well as poetry, Dionysius employs metathesis not only to show that composition (σύνθεσις) in general is more important than choice of words (ἐκλογή), but also (1) to correct the artificiality of certain passages, thus showing ways to avoid 'unnatural' composition, (2) to trace specific effects of sound, rhythm and clause arrangement, and (3) to illustrate the differences between various styles of composition, or to point to the poetical character of prose texts. The method of metathesis thus offers a versatile instrument enabling Dionysius to isolate and highlight characteristics of a given text under one aspect, while leaving other aspects unaffected. Dionysius' method of rewriting is closely related to the theories on language, linguistics and literature that we have examined in the previous chapters. In the analysis of style, Dionysius' grammatical theories on syntax and his method of metathesis closely co-operate, as we have seen in sections 4.4.2 and 5.2. By adopting a grammatical framework on the one hand and the method of rewriting on the other, Dionysius is able to trace specific characteristics of stylistic composition. Further, we have seen that Dionysius' use of metathesis departs from the idea that there is a natural form of expression that underlies all utterances, and to which deviating constructions and figures can be reduced. This idea corresponds to the views on natural syntax and word order that I have discussed in chapter 5.

Dionysius' language experiments are in no way theoretical exercises. They have a very practical aim, namely to teach the reader how to write in a correct and convincing style. In accordance with the principles of Atticism and classicism, classical literature is taken as the model for new writing; the method of metathesis shows the merits, defects and particularities of the classical examples.[81] Metathesis offers Dionysius and his audience the opportunity to compare two formulations of the same thought, and, as Dionysius himself has observed, 'the best method of assessment is the comparative.'[82]

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[81] For the relation between μίμησις and μετάθεσις, see the contribution of M. Hurst to the discussion of Flashar (1979) 109.

[82] *Pomp.* 1.224,9–10: κράτιστος ἐλέγχου τρόπος ὁ κατὰ σύγκρισιν γιγνόμενος. See also section 1.4. Dionysius here refers to the method of comparing two or more authors, not to the method of metathesis. The essence of metathesis, however, is also that it enables Dionysius and his readers to *compare* the original text with a new phrasing of the same idea. In that sense, μετάθεσις is also a form of σύγκρισις.

CHAPTER EIGHT

GENERAL CONCLUSION

In this study, I have examined the ideas on language, linguistics, and literature that we find in the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. We have seen that Dionysius is a man of wide interests, who combines theories and methods from various ancient language disciplines, integrating them into a coherent programme of rhetorical instruction. On the one hand, Dionysius is not afraid to use the technical theories that he finds in the works of philosophers, philologists, grammarians, critics of poetry, metrical and musical theorists. He adopts ideas from all these disciplines and makes use of them. On the other hand, Dionysius does not forget the practical purposes of his own works. His rhetorical treatises aim to instruct the audience (mainly consisting of future orators) in the techniques of rhetorical writing, in particular in the art of stylistic composition. Therefore, Dionysius does not want to lose himself in the technical details of grammatical, metrical or philosophical theories. He only discusses those theories from other disciplines that can be helpful for his practical purposes. This balanced approach has consequences for our interpretation of Dionysius' works: Dionysius is not a grammarian or a philosopher, and we should not interpret his treatises as grammatical or philosophical works. On the other hand, Dionysius' practical purposes should not mislead us either: his learning is impressive, and he seems to be well informed: Dionysius studied innumerable works of earlier scholars and he seems to have increased his linguistic knowledge during his period in Rome, where he was in contact with various Greek and Roman intellectuals. For the study of the history of linguistics, Dionysius' works are valuable for two reasons. First, since Dionysius reflects so many theories from various disciplines, he is an important source of information for the ideas that constituted the linguistic knowledge of intellectuals at the end of the first century BC, a period from which, apart from Dionysius' works, only fragments of linguistic works survive. Second, his integration of ideas from different scholarly contexts perfectly illustrates the close connections between rhetoric, grammar, philosophy, and other ancient language disciplines. I will summarise the most important results of this study.

In chapter 2, I examined some of the more general ideas on language that we find in Dionysius' works. Like many other ancient scholars, Dionysius believes that language is characterised by a hierarchical structure. Letters, syllables, words (parts of speech), clauses, periods and discourse (λόγος) are the different levels of language in which Dionysius is interested. He uses the term στοιχεῖα not only for letters, but also for the parts of speech. But unlike the Stoics, who call the parts of speech στοιχεῖα λόγου (elements of speech), Dionysius refers to them as στοιχεῖα λέξεως (elements of diction), thus combining a philosophical idea with a stylistic interest. Although his works focus on formal aspects of expression, Dionysius does not ignore the importance of meaning behind words. Perspicuity is one of his main concerns, which implies that he is also interested in the clear expression of thoughts. There are many different ways in which one can express the same idea, but Dionysius implicitly assumes that there is one natural formulation to which the more figured expressions could be reduced. The distinction between τὸ σημαῖνον (form) and τὸ σημαινόμενον corresponds to Stoic terminology, but Dionysius may also have adopted these terms from grammatical works. His views on Latin as a dialect of Greek should be understood as part of his efforts to present the Romans as descendants from the Greeks. We have seen that this theory, which has political dimensions, is found in the works of various grammarians of the first century BC, notably Philoxenus and Varro. The danger of reading too much into Dionysius' works has been illustrated by an examination of his alleged philosophy of language. I have pointed out that the three passages in which Dionysius seems to make a remark on the relations between words and things should be interpreted within their rhetorical context: his statements do not reveal any explicit view on the natural or conventional relationship between ὀνόματα and πράγματα. Dionysius' reference to Plato's *Cratylus* in a discussion of mimetic words is typical of his approach: he mentions Plato's dialogue as a text in which the mimetic quality of certain words is discussed, but this does not imply that he agrees with the philosophical view of any of the characters in the dialogue.

Chapters 3–5 were mainly concerned with the grammatical parts of speech. Together, these chapters have illuminated the connections between grammar, philosophy and rhetorical theory in Dionysius' works. In chapter 3, I focused on the grammatical theory itself. Dionysius' works contribute to our knowledge of the development of grammatical theory in the period between Aristarchus and Apollonius Dyscolus.

The grammatical theories that we find in Dionysius (which presumably reflect the theories of contemporary grammarians like Tryphon) combine elements from Alexandrian philology on the one hand and Stoic philosophy on the other. The Stoic aspects include the distinction between proper and appellative noun, the terms ὀρθά and ὕπτια (active and passive) and the distinction between ὀρθά and ἐγκλινόμενα (indicatives and other moods). Dionysius is the first extant author who uses the term ἐγκλίσεις for the verbal moods; the term ἐπίρρημα (adverb) is first attested in Dionysius and Tryphon, who were contemporaries in Augustan Rome. I have argued that we should not attribute to Dionysius a 'system' of word classes. He is not interested in the exact number of the μόρια λόγου, but rather in their role as building blocks for composition. Dionysius' references to the curriculum of grammar schools are highly important because they inform us about grammatical teaching in the first century BC. Because he clearly expects that his audience will recognise his description of 'how we learn to read', we should reject the claims of those modern scholars who argue that Dionysius' characterisation is unrealistic.

In chapter 4, we saw that Dionysius effectively applies the grammatical theory of the parts of speech to his theory of stylistic composition. His history of the theory of the parts of speech, which is characterised by an internal approach to the history of linguistics, introduces the μόρια λόγου as the building blocks for composition. Dionysius makes use of these units for his composition theory and for his stylistic analyses. The concept of μόρια λόγου as the elements of style leads to the analogy of text as architecture. His ideas on σύνθεσις that should please 'the ear' show the influence of the Hellenistic critics of poetry (the *kritikoi*). It seems that these critics used the theory of the parts of speech for similar purposes as Dionysius. The theory of the three composition types brings grammatical, musical and rhetorical theory together. The different χαρακτῆρες συνθέσεως are characterised by, among other things, their use of σύνδεσμοι and ἄρθρα. In the *Second Letter to Ammaeus*, Dionysius closely analyses the style of Thucydides by pointing to his deviating use of the parts of speech. Here, we have encountered some interesting ideas on syntactic construction. Dionysius' grammatical notes on Thucydides may be partly based on an Alexandrian commentary. But there are also interesting similarities between Dionysius' observations and the theory of figures that survives in the fragments of Caecilius of Caleacte.

Chapter 5 was concerned with Dionysius' views on natural style, syntax and word order. We saw that in the works of the middle and later periods Dionysius adopts a grammatical framework that enables him to analyse the characteristics of 'natural' and 'unnatural' style in a more efficient way than in his early works. His use of the terms ἀκολουθία and ὁ κατάλληλος λόγος marks an important development in the history of syntax: these terms, which seem to be absent (as far as we can judge) from the works of the grammarian Tryphon (active in the same period as Dionysius) were to become the central concepts in Apollonius Dyscolus' *Syntax*. For Dionysius, natural style is characterised by regular syntax and word order, which is supposed to be typical of everyday language: his rhetorical works are deeply influenced by the contrast between φύσις and τέχνη. In *On Composition* 5, however, he adopts a different concept of φύσις: in his experiment concerning natural word order, he argues that the parts of speech should be arranged according to the logical order of substance, accident, etc. I have argued that the Stoic theory of categories lies behind Dionysius' ideas in the passage on natural word order. Because of the aesthetic interests and the grammatical terms that do not fit with the Stoic theory of the μέρη λόγου, we should not assume that Dionysius borrowed the entire experiment from Chrysippus. I have suggested that Dionysius combined Stoic theories on the logical order of the parts of speech with his own interest in σύνθεσις. The passage on natural word order functions as a foil in the treatise *On Composition*, which is primarily concerned with aesthetic effects on the basis of musical means such as rhythm and euphony.

In chapter 6, we turned from grammar and philosophy to poetical, metrical and musical theory. I argued that Dionysius' discussion of poetic prose in *On Composition* 25 aims to bring all literature together under the heading of aesthetic composition. His ideas on the magical character of poetic prose correspond to the views of the *kritikoi* in Philodemus, which are also reflected in 'Longinus', *On the Sublime*. In most of his works, Dionysius closely follows Aristotle's precepts on the difference between the styles of prose and poetry. In *On Composition*, however, he focuses on the aesthetic aims of beautiful literary writing: this approach leads him to blur the boundaries between prose and poetry. It is significant that the discussion of the relations between prose and poetry concludes the work *On Composition*: the writing of poetic prose is a subject that is for the 'initiated': it completes Dionysius' detailed instructions on stylistic composition. Because oratory is

ultimately 'a kind of music' for Dionysius, it is understandable that his views in the work *On Composition* largely correspond to those of musical and poetical critics.

The method of metathesis is closely related to Dionysius' views on language. In chapter 7, I discussed the various different ways in which Dionysius applies this useful method. By rewriting classical texts, he is able to analyse the exact qualities, defects and particularities of a given text. It forms an important tool in the pedagogical process: metathesis enables Dionysius to show which stylistic aspects of the writing of different models should be imitated or avoided. Thus, metathesis and μίμησις, a central concept in Dionysius' works, are closely connected.

This study has clearly shown that Dionysius does not merely refer to ideas from earlier and contemporary scholars, but also brings them together in a coherent system of rhetorical teaching. In each of the chapters Dionysius' practical purposes have become manifest. Throughout his rhetorical works, his main concern is to instruct his audience on the writing of effective texts, which should be based on the eclectic imitation of classical examples. The many different ideas on language and linguistics that he brings together all contribute to the success of both his analysis of classical models and his instructions for future writing. Dionysius of Halicarnassus was after all not a 'kleine Seele', but an intelligent scholar who studied a large number of literary and scholarly works from earlier times; he acquired an impressive knowledge of linguistic theories, not only from his reading but also from his contacts with the intellectuals in Augustan Rome, and he effectively integrated these theories into a practical programme of rhetoric.

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